# Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Economic Sector

for the year ended March 2013

**Government of Karnataka Report No. 2 of the year 2014** 

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
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#### **PREFACE**

- 1. This Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has been prepared for submission to the Governor under Article 151 of the Constitution for being laid before the State Legislature.
- 2. The Report contains significant results of the Performance Audit and Compliance Audit of the Departments of the Government of Karnataka under the Economic Services, including Departments of Commerce & Industries, Horticulture, Information Technology, Bio-Technology and Science & Technology, Public Works, Water Resources. However, Department of Agriculture and allied activities, Food Security Public Distribution System/Civil Supplies, Cooperation and Rural Development Panchayat Raj are excluded and covered in the Report on the General and Social Services.
- 3. The cases mentioned in this Report are among those which came to notice in the course of test audit of accounts for the period 2012-13 as well as those which had come to notice in earlier years but could not be reported in previous Audit Reports; matters relating to the period subsequent to 2012-13 have also been included wherever necessary.
- 4. Audit has been conducted in conformity with the Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, based on the auditing standards of the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions.
- 5. Chapter 1 of this Report covers auditee profile, authority for audit, planning and conducting of audit and responses of the department to the paragraphs. Highlights of audit observations included in this Report have also been brought out in this Chapter.



#### Chapter 1

#### Introduction

#### 1.1 About this Report

This Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C&AG) relates to matters arising from the Performance Audit of selected programmes and activities and Compliance Audit of Government departments and autonomous bodies under Economic Sector.

Compliance Audit refers to examination of the transactions relating to expenditure of the audited entities to ascertain whether the provisions of the Constitution of India, applicable laws, rules, regulations and various orders and instructions issued by competent authorities are being complied with.

The primary purpose of the Report is to bring to the notice of the State Legislature, important results of audit. Auditing Standards require that the materiality level for reporting should commensurate with the nature, volume and magnitude of transactions. The findings of audit are expected to enable the Executive to take corrective actions as also to frame policies and directives that will lead to improved financial management of the organisations, thus, contributing to better governance.

This chapter, in addition to explaining the planning and extent of audit, provides a synopsis of the significant deficiencies and achievements in implementation of selected schemes, significant audit observations made during the Compliance Audit and follow-up on previous Audit Reports. Chapter-2 of this Report contains findings arising out of Performance Audit of selected programmes/activities/departments. Chapter-3 contains observations on Compliance Audit in Government departments and autonomous bodies.

#### 1.2 Auditee Profile

There are 17 departments in the State at the Secretariat level, headed by Additional Chief Secretaries/Principal Secretaries/Secretaries, who are assisted by Directors/Commissioners and subordinate officers under them, and 23 autonomous bodies which are audited by the Principal Accountant General (Economic & Revenue Sector Audit), Bangalore.

The summary of fiscal transactions during the year 2011-12 and 2012-13 is given in Table 1 below:

**Table 1: Summary of fiscal transactions** 

(₹ in crore)

Re	eceipts		Disbursements						
	2011-12	2012-13		2011-12		2012-13			
Section A: Revenue				Total	Non-Plan	Plan	Total		
Revenue receipts	69,806.27	78,176.22	Revenue expenditure	65,115.07	55,081.58	21,211.68	76,293.26		
Tax revenue	46,475.96	53,753.56	General services	16,445.48	20,028.35	152.50	20,180.85		
Non-tax revenue	4,086.86	3,966.10	Social services	25,171.73	17,110.39	13,309.41	30,419.80		
Share of union taxes/duties	11,075.04	12,647.14	Economic services	19,153.90	15,112.05	6,562.14	21,674.19		
Grants-in-aid & contributions from GOI	8,168.41	7,809.42	Grants-in-aid & contributions	4,343.96	2,830.79	1,187.63	4,018.42		
Section B: Capital and o	Section B: Capital and others								
			Capital outlay	15,505.65	321.65	15,156.82	15,478.47		
Miscellaneous	90.10	22.04	General services	625.49	27.09	562.38	589.47		
Capital receipts	89.19	33.04	Social services	2,695.19	6.64	2,909.35	2,915.99		
			Economic services	12,184.97	287.92	11,685.09	11,973.01		
Recoveries of loans & advances	240.40	157.61	Loans & advances disbursed	1,815.55	17.77	1,084.60	1,102.37		
Public debt receipts	9,357.95	13,464.66	Repayment of public debt	3,319.88	3,727.06	-	3,727.06		
Contingency Fund	12.53	0.51	Contingency Fund	0.51	-	-	-		
Public Account receipts	94,408.53	1,07,548.81	Public Account disbursements	86,216.03			1,01,877.94		
Opening cash balance	7,667.31	9,609.49	Closing cash balance	9,609.49			10,511.24		
Total	1,81,582.18	2,08,990.34	Total	1,81,582.18			2,08,990.34		

(Source: Finance Accounts)

#### 1.3 Authority for Audit

The authority for audit by the C&AG is derived from Articles 149 and 151 of the Constitution of India and the Comptroller and Auditor General's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971. C&AG conducts audit of expenditure of the Departments of Government of Karnataka under Section 13<sup>1</sup> of the C&AG's (DPC) Act. C&AG is the sole auditor in respect of 23 autonomous bodies which are audited under sections  $19(2)^2$ ,  $19(3)^3$  and  $20(1)^4$  of the C&AG's (DPC) Act. In addition, C&AG also conducts audit of 310 other autonomous bodies, under Section 14<sup>5</sup> of C&AG's (DPC) Act, which are substantially funded by the Government. Principles and methodologies for various audits are prescribed in the Auditing Standards and the Regulations on Audit and Accounts, 2007 issued by the C&AG.

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Audit of (i) all transactions from the Consolidated Fund of the State, (ii) all transactions relating to the Contingency Fund and Public Accounts and (iii) all trading, manufacturing, profit & loss accounts, balance sheets & other subsidiary accounts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Audit of the accounts of Corporations (not being Companies) established by or under law made by the Parliament in accordance with the provisions of the respective legislations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Audit of accounts of Corporations established by law made by the State Legislature on the request of the Governor

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Audit of accounts of any body or authority on the request of the Governor, on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the C&AG and the Government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Audit of all receipts and expenditure of a body/authority substantially financed by grants or loans from the Consolidated Fund of the State and with the previous approval of the Governor of the State and audit of all receipts and expenditure of any body or authority where the grants or loans to such body or authority from the Consolidated fund of the State in a financial year is not less than ₹ one crore.

# 1.4 Organisational structure of the Office of the Principal Accountant General (Economic & Revenue Sector Audit), Karnataka

Under the directions of the C&AG, the Office of the Principal Accountant General (E&RSA) conducts audit of Government Departments/Offices/Autonomous Bodies/Institutions under them which are spread all over the State. The Principal Accountant General (E&RSA) is assisted by three Group Officers.

#### 1.5 Planning and conduct of Audit

Audit process starts with the assessment of risks faced by various departments of Government based on expenditure incurred, criticality/complexity of activities, level of delegated financial powers, assessment of overall internal controls and concerns of stakeholders. Previous audit findings are also considered in this exercise. Based on this risk assessment, the frequency and extent of audit are decided.

After completion of audit of units, Inspection Reports containing audit findings are issued to the heads of the departments. The departments are requested to furnish replies to the audit findings within one month of receipt of the Inspection Reports. Whenever replies are received, audit findings are either settled or further action for compliance is advised. The important audit observations arising out of these Inspection Reports are processed for inclusion in the Audit Reports, which are submitted to the Governor of State under Article 151 of the Constitution of India.

During 2012-13, in the Economic Sector Audit Wing, 1,272 party-days were utilised to carry out audit of 137 units and conduct one Performance Audit.

#### 1.6 Significant audit observations

In the last few years, Audit has reported on several significant deficiencies in implementation of various programmes/activities through performance audits, as well as on the quality of internal controls in selected departments which impact the success of programmes and functioning of the departments. Similarly, the deficiencies noticed during compliance audit of the Government departments/organisations were also reported upon.

The present report contains one Performance Audit and 14 paragraphs. The significant audit observations are discussed below:

#### 1.6.1 Performance Audit of Working of Sericulture Department

Sericulture is an agro based cottage industry involving cultivation of host plants, rearing of silkworms and finally producing silk yarn. Karnataka is the leading State where sericulture is practiced with a tradition of more than 200 years and is the home land of popular Mysore silk. The State produces mulberry variety of raw silk and accounts for 44 *per cent* of the country's total mulberry raw silk production. Various schemes are being implemented by the Sericulture Department to increase the production of silk and an expenditure of ₹ 381.30 crore was incurred between 2008 and 2013. A Performance Audit of the working of the Department during 2008-13 showed the following:

- Mulberry cultivation area in the State decreased from 91,434 to 74,128 hectare.
- Savings persisted under Plan expenditure constituting 39.10 *per cent* of total grants and huge balance of ₹ 127.46 crore available under Price Stabilisation Fund was not utilised for market intervention.
- Non-plan expenditure exceeded Plan expenditure and many of the departmentally owned units were incurring huge losses.
- Identification of schemes for gender budgeting was incorrect. While the raw silk production stagnated, the expenditure towards subsidies and incentives had increased manifold.
- Production of Bivoltine silk (a high yielding variety) had not been accorded priority though objective of major schemes was linked to Bivoltine culture.
- Many instances where the subsidies and incentives under different schemes were disbursed in violation of guidelines.
- The sericulture activity in non-traditional area registered negative growth.

(Paragraph 2.1)

#### 1.6.2 Compliance Audit

Audit has also reported on several significant deficiencies in critical areas which impact the effective functioning of the Government departments. These are as under:

## Contract management in Public Works, Ports & Inland Water Transport Department

We observed that despite the recommendations of Dr. Nanjundappa Committee, the Department did not prepare a sustainable road development plan setting forth targets particularly to address the deficiencies in more backward and less backward taluks. Authorities consistently failed to follow the provisions of KTPP Act, rules and directions of Government in the procurement process. Renewals of roads were not based on sustained action plan or as per prescribed norms which contributed to avoidable expenditure.

Sanctions accorded by authorities were not consistent with financial rules governing it. Effective quality assurance envisaged by Government was not implemented due to staff constraints. Estimated extra cost/financial implication of these violations were to the extent of ₹ 137.48 crore.

(*Paragraph 3.1.1*)

#### Irregularities in release of funds and execution of works in Magadi

We observed that grants (₹ 250 crore) were allotted to Magadi Sub-Division of Public Works, Ports & Inland Water Transport Department without ascertaining necessity. Absence of Appendix 'E,' which is a list of capital works to be included in budget, facilitated release of bulk grants for original and capital nature of works without approval from competent authority contrary to codal provisions. The works proposed for village roads, link roads as well as other roads not under the jurisdiction of the sub division and road length exceeding the actual road length was approved by controlling officer without proper scrutiny. The estimates were split below ₹ 20 lakh in order to invite manual tenders and tendering process was violated at every stage to favour few contractors. There were irregularities in taking measurements and the Executive Engineer did not check measure the works to the extent prescribed before payment of bills. There were instances of payment by creating fake bills and duplication of estimates. The bills of road improvement works were paid without quality control reports.

(*Paragraph 3.1.2*)

Adoption of unrealistic vehicle damage factor by consultants in road improvement estimates resulted in overdesigning of pavement thickness which resulted in avoidable extra cost of ₹ 42.83 crore. Further, irregular/excess payment of ₹1.59 crore was made to project management consultants appointed for supervision of these works.

(*Paragraph 3.1.3*)

➤ Uncontrolled illegal sand mining in Mulbagal taluk of Kolar district resulted in loss of revenue of ₹ 2.54 crore to Government in respect of three sand blocks.

(*Paragraph 3.1.4*)

➤ Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board allotted developed plots to three industrial units at Narasapura Industrial Area at subsidised rates, in violation of Government approval resulting in loss of ₹104.40 crore.

(*Paragraph 3.1.8*)

➤ The Government sanctioned excess interest free loan to the extent of ₹385.27 crore in violation of provisions of the Industrial Policy 2009-14 to a Company. The Government also prematurely released ₹20.94 crore which was recoverable.

(Paragraph 3.1.9)

Improper and deficient scrutiny prior to release of grants for establishing biotechnology finishing schools resulted in excess release of grant towards ineligible investments aggregating to ₹ 7.93 crore. Out of this, ₹ 4.39 crore remain unutilised.

(*Paragraph 3.1.11*)

➤ Channapatna lake in Hassan town which had been de-notified a decade earlier was taken up for rejuvenation and then abandoned mid-way leading to wasteful expenditure of ₹3.57 crore.

(Paragraph 3.2.1)

➤ Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board mismanaged investment of funds leading to deposit amount of ₹ 12 crore remaining unencashed much after maturity.

(Paragraph 3.3.1)

#### 1.7 Lack of responsiveness of Government to Audit

#### 1.7.1 Response of departments to the audit observations

The audit observations/Performance Appraisal were forwarded demi-officially to the Principal Secretaries/Secretaries of the concerned departments between April and September 2013 with the request to send their responses within six weeks. The Government replies for five out of 14 observations featured in this Report have been received. The replies, wherever received, have been suitably incorporated in the Report.

#### 1.7.2 Follow-up on Audit Reports

The Rules of Procedure (Internal Working), 1999 of the Public Accounts Committee provides that all the departments of Government should furnish detailed explanations in the form of Action Taken Notes (ATNs) to the observations in Audit Reports, within four months of their being laid on the Table of Legislature to the Karnataka Legislature Secretariat with copies thereof to Audit Office.

The administrative departments did not comply with these instructions and six departments as detailed in **Appendix 1.1** had not submitted ATNs for 24 paragraphs for the period from 2001-02 to 2011-12.

#### 1.7.3 Paragraphs to be discussed by the Public Accounts Committee

Details of paragraphs (excluding General and Statistical) pending discussion by the Public Accounts Committee as of 31 December 2013 are given in **Appendix 1.2**.

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# **Chapter 2**

### **Performance Audit**

**2.1 Working of Sericulture Department** 

#### **CHAPTER 2**

#### PERFORMANCE AUDIT

#### HORTICULTURE DEPARTMENT

#### 2.1 Working of Sericulture Department

#### **Executive summary**

Sericulture is an agro based cottage industry involving cultivation of host plants, rearing of silkworms and finally silk yarn. Karnataka is the leading State where sericulture is practiced with a tradition of more than 200 years and is the home land of the popular Mysore silk. The State produces the mulberry variety of raw silk and accounts for 44 *per cent* of the country's total mulberry raw silk production. Various schemes are being implemented by the department to increase the production of silk and an expenditure of ₹381.30 crore was incurred between 2008 and 2013.

A Performance Audit of the working of the Sericulture Department was conducted during March to June 2013 covering the period 2008-13. The major findings were as follows:

- The mulberry cultivation area in the State decreased from 91,434 hectare (ha) to 74,128 ha.
- ➤ Savings of ₹ 244.73 crore persisted under Plan expenditure constituting 39.10 *per cent* of total grants and huge balance of ₹ 127.46 crore available under Price Stabilisation Fund was not utilised.
- ➤ Non-plan expenditure exceeded Plan expenditure and many of the departmentally owned units were incurring huge losses.
- ➤ Identification of schemes for gender budgeting was incorrect.
- ➤ While the raw silk production stagnated; the expenditure towards subsidies and incentives had increased manifold.
- ➤ Production of Bivoltine silk had not been accorded priority though objective of major schemes was linked to Bivoltine.
- ➤ Many instances were noticed where the subsidies and incentives under different schemes were disbursed in violation of guidelines.
- > Sericulture activity in non-traditional area registered negative growth.

#### 2.1.1 Introduction

The production of silk, is divided into five phases *viz.*, cultivation of host plants, silkworm seed production, rearing of silkworms, reeling of raw silk and weaving of silk. The cultivation of host plants such as mulberry on which the worm feeds and rearing of silkworms are farm based activities. Karnataka is the leading sericulture state for only mulberry raw silk production. The climatic condition of Karnataka favour sericulture throughout the year. Sericulture has traditionally been a very important non-agricultural farm based activity in the State contributing as much as 0.30 *per cent* to the GSDP.

Realising the benefits of sericulture in employment generation in rural areas at low investment, both Central and State Governments provide financial, technical and marketing assistance under various schemes to boost productivity as well as to attract fresh cultivators.

Sericulture as a subject was earlier dealt with by the Commerce & Industries Department and was then shifted to Horticulture Secretariat by Government of Karnataka (Government) during May 2011.

The objectives of the Sericulture Department (Department) are to:


- > increase of mulberry silk production through horizontal and vertical expansion besides increasing productivity by reducing production cost;
- encourage contract/corporate farming and undertake market reforms;
- strengthen sericultural research and development;
- > promote sericulture in northern part of the State.

The Performance Audit of the Department was selected as Karnataka is the leader in silk production in the country and sericulture has the potential of providing gainful employment to rural masses.

#### 2.1.2 Organisational structure

At the Government level, the Principal Secretary, Department of Horticulture is responsible for all matters relating to sericulture in the State. A detailed organisation structure is shown in an organogram in **Chart 2.1:** 

**Chart 2.1: Organisational Chart of Sericulture Department** 



#### 2.1.3 Audit objectives

The Performance Audit was conducted to assess whether:

- > funds provided were adequate and releases were timely;
- ➤ the State has a well defined policy for development of sericulture and long/medium/short term plans were in accordance with the policy;
- ➤ the schemes/programmes were implemented as per prescribed norms/guidelines and were beneficial to stakeholders;
- ➤ the farms, grainages, filatures and silk exchanges were managed efficiently;
- > manpower was adequate; and
- internal control system was adequate and functioning effectively.

#### 2.1.4 Audit Criteria

The audit findings were benchmarked against the following:

- ➤ The Central Silk Board Act, 1948 and Central Silk Board Rules, 1955 as amended till November 2008;
- ➤ The Karnataka Silkworm Seed, Cocoon and Silk yarn (Regulation, Production, Supply, Distribution and Sale) Act, 1959 and Rules made there under;
- > Scheme guidelines issued by Government of India and State Government;
- The Karnataka Financial Code and Budget Manual; and
- ➤ Instructions, Circulars/ Orders issued by Government.

#### 2.1.5 Audit scope and methodology

The activities of the department from seed production up to reeling of silk yarn were covered during Performance Audit. The Performance Audit covers examination of records for the period 2008-09 to 2012-13 in the offices at the Government level, Commissionerate level, three<sup>6</sup> Joint Directors and eight<sup>7</sup> Deputy Directors. Stratified sampling/simple random sampling methods were adopted for selection of offices/units. Six<sup>8</sup> schemes out of 16 schemes, which include two centrally sponsored schemes, were selected for Performance Audit based on judgmental sampling method. The functioning of silk farms, grainages, filatures and silk exchanges were also generally reviewed. The scope included obtaining data from Central Silk Board (CSB) to present

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Bangalore, Belgaum and Mysore seed area

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Bagalkot, Bangalore Rural, Chikkaballapur, Dharwad, Gadag, Haveri, Ramanagara and Tumkur

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Catalytic Development Programme (CDP), Reshme Varadana Yojane (RVY), Development of silk rearing activity, Rashtriya Krishi Vikasa Yojane (RKVY), New initiative for Sericulture Development and Building (works)

holistic picture of sericulture activities/development in the State. Beneficiary survey was also conducted to assess the impact of the schemes. In addition, the activities of the Karnataka Silk Marketing Board Limited (KSMBL), a public sector undertaking, involved in purchase/sale of silk yarn to ensure silk price stabilisation was also generally reviewed.

An entry conference was held on 25 April 2013 outlining the scope, objective criteria and methodology of performance audit. The audit findings were discussed in exit conference held on 28 October 2013 and the replies of the Department have been incorporated suitably in the review.

The Indian Audit and Accounts Department acknowledges the co-operation extended by Department of Sericulture in the conduct of Performance Audit.

The audit findings are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:

#### 2.1.6 Financial Management

#### 2.1.6.1 Preparation of budget estimates

The Finance Department in their annual instructions regarding preparation of budget estimates emphasised that "object heads" should be operated for simplified classification of expenditure and the concerned departments should provide for the schemes only under these object heads. The operation of "object heads" vests with the concerned budget preparation officers. The object head "059" refers to "other expenditure" while object head "106" refers to "subsidies"

Review of budget estimates of the Department for the years 2008-13 showed that provision for subsidy payments were being made under the object head "059-Other expenditure" instead of "106-subsidies" and thus, ₹ 263 crore under six<sup>9</sup> schemes paid towards subsidies were incorrectly depicted in accounts.

The Commissioner agreed (October 2013) to take up the matter with the Government.

#### 2.1.6.2 Failure to utilise grants

The Government of India and State Government provide funds under plan head for implementation of various schemes/programmes comprising two Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) and 14 State Plan Schemes (SPS), out of which one CSS and five SPS were being implemented from 2011-12. The details of budget estimates, expenditure, savings and surrenders during 2008-13 were as shown in **Table 2.1**:

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ODP, RKVY, Development of silk rearing activities, New initiative for sericulture development, Sericulture cluster development and RVY

Table 2.1: Details of budget provisions and expenditure

(₹ in crore)

	Plan/	Budget Provisions Actual Savings /		Savings /	Amount	Un-		
Year	Non-plan	Original	Supple- mentary	Total	expenditure		surrendered, if any	surrendered savings, if any
2008-09	Plan	48.14	0	48.14	45.82	2.32 (4.82)	0	2.32
2008-09	Non plan	86.08	6.42	92.50	78.67	13.83(14.95)	13.83	0
2009-10	Plan	55.64	0	55.64	34.53	21.11(37.94)	0	21.11
2009-10	Non plan	86.02	2.00	88.02	77.42	10.60(12.04)	11.12	-0.52
2010-11	Plan	54.00	40.39	94.39	74.51	19.88(21.06)	9.20	10.68
2010-11	Non plan	91.59	12.13	103.72	87.05	16.67(16.07)	14.52	2.15
2011-12	Plan	179.75	41	220.75	102.43	118.32(53.60)	60.43	57.89
2011-12	Non plan	99.39	10.49	109.88	94.64	15.24(13.87)	13.53	1.71
2012-13	Plan	191.00	16.11	207.11	124.01	83.10(40.12)	0	83.10
2012-13	Non plan	126.94	1.95	120.55*	106.59	13.96(11.58)	0	13.96
Total	Plan	528.53	97.50	626.03	381.30	244.73(39.09)	69.63	175.10
1 otai	Non plan	490.02	32.99	514.67*	444.37	70.30(13.66)	53.00	17.30

<sup>\*</sup> Includes re-appropriation of ₹ 8.34 crore

{Source: Grant Register maintained by Pr AG (A&E)}

As may be seen from Table 2.1, the budgetary allocation under plan heads made from 2010-11 and onwards increased substantially as compared to 2008-10 and the increase was due to introduction of six new schemes and allotment of more funds for the existing schemes. The savings persisted in all the years and the total savings was ₹ 315.03 crore constituting 28 *per cent* of the total grant. Out of ₹ 315.03 crore savings, only ₹ 122.63 crore was surrendered and ₹ 192.40 crore was allowed to lapse. The major savings were observed under Catalytic Development Programme (CDP) and "New Initiative for Sericulture Development", a State Sector Scheme aggregating ₹ 141.03 crore and ₹ 84.05 crore respectively out of total Plan savings of ₹ 244.73 crore during the period 2008-13.

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) the savings to late release of funds by CSB, sudden fall in cocoon and silk prices due to reduction of customs duty and prevalence of severe drought. The reply was not acceptable as savings persisted in all the years under plan and non-plan head of accounts.

#### 2.1.6.3 Plan expenditure inflated

The Karnataka Sericulture Project II, a world bank assisted scheme was implemented between 1990 and 1996 with 770 sanctioned posts and their pay and allowances were charged to the project. Though project came to an end during 1996, the pay and allowances of 138 posts continued to be charged to Plan expenditure and total expenditure of ₹ 14 crore was charged during 2008-13. The irregular charging of expenditure had resulted in inflating the plan expenses.

#### 2.1.6.4 Non-Plan expenditure

The non-plan expenses comprising salaries, allowances, other establishment charges *etc.*, exceeded the plan expenses *i.e.*, grant of subsidies, incentives during 2008-13 as shown in **Table 2.2**:

Table 2.2: Details of expenditure

(₹ in crore)

Year		Non-plan		
1 cai	CSS	SPS	Total	expenditure
2008-09	24.43	21.39	45.82	78.67
2009-10	20.46	14.07	34.53	77.42
2010-11	50.89	23.62	74.51	87.05
2011-12	57.75	44.68	102.43	94.64
2012-13	64.85	59.16	124.01	106.59
Total	218.38	162.92	381.30	444.37

{Source: Grant registers maintained by Principal Accountant General (A&E)}

We observed that the overall non-plan expenditure exceeded the plan expenditure except in the years 2011-12 and 2012-13. Owing to removal of restrictions on the various activities of silk production by Government of India during November 2008, the Department should have reassessed its manpower so as to reduce the non-plan expenditure. The excess staff and unviable departmental undertakings/wings contributed to higher non-plan expenditure. The Revenue Reforms Commission also recommended closure of unviable units. This resulted in reduced availability of funds for planned development of sericulture activities in the State.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that action will be initiated to take up a study to identify the excess staff and unviable departmental undertakings/wings in order to control the non-plan expenditure.

#### 2.1.6.5 Gender budgeting in respect of Sericulture Department

Karnataka is a pilot state to initiate gender budgeting in 2006-07 with a commitment from the State Government. Gender based budgeting helps to prioritize and orient public expenditure to reflect the concerns of women. To give focus to this, a Gender Budget Cell was set up in January 2007 in the Finance Department to identify the quantum of resource allocation and expenditure for women and proper translation of policy commitments. The fine-tuning of the process to classify schemes is continuous.

We observed that though eight heads of accounts with overall provision of ₹ 241.65 crore implemented by the Department under Central/State Sector were included under category B<sup>10</sup> in gender budget for the year 2008-11, only one scheme was included for the year 2011-12 and no schemes were included for the year 2012-13.

The provision of ₹ 72.50 crore made during 2008-12 in budget for implementation of schemes benefitting women includes provision of ₹ 27.45 crore made for (a) booking establishment expenditure of Karnataka Sericulture Project II (KSP-II) and (b) for transfer of market fee and license fee to Price Stabilisation Fund. Since the grants relates to establishment and provision of adjustment, identification of above schemes for gender budget was incorrect and amount shown as spent towards gender budget was misleading.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Comprises of schemes with more than 30 per cent women beneficiaries

We also observed that the physical and financial targets and achievements indicating actual number of women beneficiaries due to be benefitted and actually benefitted under the schemes were not assessed and documented by the Department. Since involvement of women in different activities of sericulture is about 60 *per cent*, adequate prioritising and orienting public expenditure to reflect the concerns of women is not done.

The Commissioner stated (June 2013) that measures were taken to capture the achievement under the women component separately and details of benefits extended to women would be procured from all the districts and consolidated from the next year.

#### 2.1.6.6 Diversion of fund

Article 7 of the Karnataka Financial Code stipulates that money shall not be kept outside the Government account without specific authorisation.

Two cheques amounting to ₹ 5.20 crore were received (September 2010 and December 2010) from CSB towards implementation of two CDP components viz., Beneficiary Empowerment Programme and Bivoltine incentive to reelers. These cheques were deposited in a Savings Bank Account by the Commissioner. The Secretary (Commerce & Industries Department) directed (December 2010) to remit the amount to Government account for spending after due observance of procedure. However, the Commissioner remitted ₹ 4.43 crore (February 2011) after incurring an expenditure of ₹ 76.97 lakh. Out of this, ₹ 13.72 lakh was spent towards purchase of wireless equipments and furniture, which were not covered in the above two components of CDP.

The Commissioner replied (October 2013) that while implementing the Beneficiary Empowerment Programme, the Department thought of providing wider and effective communication system through wireless network especially to strengthen seed area. The reply was not acceptable as the Beneficiary Empowerment Programme was implemented to impart training to the farmers/reelers and meeting expenditure towards wireless networking was not in order.

#### 2.1.6.7 Price Stabilisation Fund

The Price Stabilisation Fund (Fund) was established (November 1979) to control the cocoon and silk yarn prices from fluctuations and also for development of other sericulture activities like rearing, reeling, *etc*. The proceeds from license fee from traders and reelers, market fee for silk cocoon markets/exchanges, other fee/charges and all grants and contributions made by Government are to be credited to the Fund. The Director of Sericulture administers the Fund and rules provide for keeping the amount in treasury/saving bank account of any scheduled bank. The fund account should be got annually audited by such person as the State Government may direct and submit a report to Government. Accumulation in the fund was observed from 1980-81.

As per Audit Report on State Finances for the year ended 31 March 2012, an amount of ₹ 127.46 crore was outstanding in the fund. We further observed that:

- ➤ The Government barred the utilisation from fund account by Director of Sericulture through savings bank/Personal Deposit account from March 2008 and instructed to surrender cheque book, pass book and other documents after reconciliation. However, an amount of ₹ 11.52 lakh was still held in treasury account and ₹ 51.22 lakh in Savings Bank Account as of March 2013 in violation of Government instruction. Further, the cheque books and connected documents were also not surrendered.
- The expenditure towards the implementation of two new schemes<sup>11</sup>, are to be met out of the fund. The expenditure is initially met out of the budgetary grants provided under plan head of account and finally charged to fund account through book adjustment at the year end. A deduction provision has to be made in the budget for carrying out the adjustment. We observed that during 2012-13, an expenditure of ₹ 7.40 crore was incurred towards implementation of these two schemes out of budget grant (plan) of ₹ nine crore, however the same has not been charged to the fund account as the Government did not make provision for carrying out the adjustment.
- The transactions of the fund account could not be ensured as the accounts remained unaudited from 1993-94 onwards.
- ➤ To the end of March 2012, the balance amount as per Appropriation Accounts was ₹ 127.46 crore against ₹ 152.92 crore as per departmental records and reconciliation was not carried out despite instruction by the Government.
- ➤ Though huge balance of ₹ 127.46 crore was available in the Fund, the Department had not formulated scheme/plan to utilise the same and as a result the balance remain idle.

The Commissioner replied (October 2013) that efforts are being made to get the accounts audited by the Chartered Accountants and that the cheque books/documents would be surrendered after getting the audit report. With regards to non-utilisation of money from the fund towards two schemes for 2012-13, the Commissioner stated that the matter had been brought to the notice of the Government.

#### 2.1.6.8 Revenue estimates inflated

The revenue/receipts of the Department comprises of market fees, farm receipts, grainage receipts, license fees and other items. However, we noticed that the total receipt of ₹ 309.71 crore for the years 2008-13 included CSB releases of ₹ 175.76 crore and resulted in inflating of revenue receipts as grants released cannot be treated as receipts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Development of Silk rearing activity (from 2005-06) and Interest subsidy to reeling units (from 2010-11)

The Commissioner agreed (October 2013) to follow the correct procedure in future.

#### 2.1.6.9 Arrears of rent

The Department had let out (July 2010) three buildings to Karnataka State Law University as per rental rates to be fixed by PWD for a period of three years and the University was allowed to occupy the buildings before the rental agreements were concluded. The Department approached (August 2012) PWD for fixation of rent which intimated (March 2013) rental rate based on rates of 2012-13. This was not accepted by university as it had occupied the buildings during 2010-11. The issue had been referred back to PWD to furnish the rentals at 2010-11 rates and their response was still awaited. The rental value for three buildings as per rates fixed by PWD works out to ₹ 13.99 lakh¹². The handing over of buildings before concluding agreements and delay in getting proper rent fixed by PWD resulted in monthly rent not been recovered for nearly three years.

The Commissioner replied (October 2013) that action had been taken to revise the rent and to recover the dues.

#### 2.1.7 Non-formulation of Silk Policy

The National Fibre Policy of Ministry of Textiles, Government of India announced (June 2010) measures and incentives for promotion and development of silk industry in the country. The policy identified single window mechanism as an essential measure to provide effective linkages to create value addition for silk products as issues relating to silk industry from farm to fabric are handled by different departments. We noticed that the State Government is yet to formulate its own policy for promotion and development of silk industry and prepare an action plan, though it aimed to increase area under sericulture from 77,239 ha to 1.70 lakh ha by 2020. The Commissioner stated (June 2013) that action will be taken to formulate a policy and that a proposal had been forwarded (March 2013) to Government to merge Karnataka Silk Marketing Board Limited (KSMBL), Karnataka Silk Industries Corporation (KSIC) and all the five Silk filatures<sup>13</sup> under one administrative head to minimise the expenditure, monitor the productivity and quality besides providing single window facility to the stake holders.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that action has been initiated to prepare Sericulture policy for the State.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Total rent recoverable for 33 months

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Located at Kollegal, Santhemarahally, Chamarajanagar, Mambally and Tholahunase

#### 2.1.8 Physical targets and achievements

#### 2.1.8.1 Shortfall in achievement of targets

The targets fixed for production of cocoons and raw silk for cross breed (CB) variety and bivoltine (BV) variety during 2008-13 and achievement thereon were as shown in **Table 2.3**:

Table 2.3: Production of cocoons and raw silk

(in metric ton)

	Target					Achievement (percentage)						
Year		Cocoon			Raw Silk			Cocoon			Raw Sill	Κ.
	BV	CB	Total	BV	CB	Total	BV	CB	Total	BV	CB	Total
2008-09	6,080	61,200	67,280	950	8,270	9,220	2,409	50,968	53,377	374	6,864	7,238
							(40)	(83)		(39)	(83)	
2009-10	7,620	65,120	72,740	1,200	8,800	10,000	2,126	52,156	54,282	335	7,025	7,360
							(28)	(80)		(28)	(80)	
2010-11	5,670	73,000	78,670	900	10,000	10,900	1,929	50,780	52,709	311	7,027	7,338
							(34)	(70)		(35)	(70)	
2011-12	3,765	58,410	62,175	600	7,994	8,594	2,249	53,708	55,957	364	7,432	7,796
							(60)	(92)		(61)	(93)	
2012-13	6,204	60,935	67,139	1,001	8,333	9,334	3,549	45,892	49,441	572	6,491	7,063
							(57)	(75)		(57)	(78)	

(Source: Details furnished by CSB and the department)

As may be seen from the above Table, while achievement under CB variety was above 70 *per cent*, the shortfall was noticed in BV variety. The BV silk is superior and used by power loom industry and stress is laid to increase its production and grant of subsidy/incentive for different components of CDP and RKVY are linked to raising BV silk production. Despite this, the target for BV was reduced in subsequent years as compared to 2009-10 and achievement ranged between 28 and 60 *per cent*. Thus, enhancing the production of BV variety had not received adequate priority.

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) the short fall to drought condition, shortage of labours, reduction in quality and quantity of mulberry leaf, migration of labours from rural area to urban area, import of China silk and fluctuation in cocoon and silk rates. However, the reply failed to explain the reason for shortfall in achievement of BV production while achievement in CB variety was high.

#### 2.1.8.2 Reduction in mulberry area

Mulberry is a fast growing perennial plant and thereby provides regular supply of mulberry leaves. The silkworms feed solely on mulberry leaves. The area under mulberry cultivation is widely used as the indicator for assessing the growth of sericulture. The details of overall target, new area to be added and achievements thereon for area under mulberry cultivation in the State during 2008-13 were as shown in **Table 2.4**:

Table 2.4: Cultivation of mulberry

(Area in ha)

<b>X</b> 7	Area		New area adde	d	Area	Net area
Year	under mulberry	Target	Achievement	Percentage	uprooted	under mulberry
			d of 2007-08	91,434		
2008-09	91,434	15,140	5,992	40	20,097	77,329
2009-10	77,329	31,000	7,755	25	2,986	82,098
2010-11	82,098	16,000	8,883	56	28,284	62,697
2011-12	62,697	40,000	9,819	25	1,558	70,958
2012-13	70,958	20,000	5,939	30	2,769	74,128
	Total	1,22,140	38,388	31	55,694	

(Source: Details furnished by CSB and the Department)

As of March 2013, the net area under mulberry cultivation was 74,128 ha against 91,434 ha at the beginning of 2008-09 registering a reduction of 17,306 ha. Reduction in area was due to uprooting of 55,694 ha which was more than the area added during the period. Further, the new area added was only 38,388 ha as against the target of 1.22 lakh ha for the period 2008-13. District-wise analysis revealed that the area under mulberry was increased only in three (Bidar, Raichur and Ramanagara) out of 29 districts whereas in the remaining 26 districts, it decreased from 80,689 ha to 59,417 ha as detailed *vide* **Appendix 2.1**. As the area under mulberry cultivation was decreasing, the aim to achieve the target of 1.70 lakh ha by 2020 appears to be unachievable.

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) the decline in mulberry area to lack of rainfall/erratic rainfall, urbanisation, reduction in customs duty, fluctuations in temperature/humidity, *etc*. The reply was not acceptable as the key to achieve the objective is not to lose the existing cultivators by taking appropriate promotional, counseling and remedial measures. Besides, no study was undertaken by the Department to ascertain the reasons behind large scale uprooting for taking appropriate measures.

#### 2.1.8.3 Decline in the position of the State in overall mulberry area

In India, the states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Tamil Nadu are the major producers of mulberry silk with more than 80 *per cent* share. The share of these states during 2007-08 and 2012-13 were as shown in **Chart 2.2**:

**Chart 2.2: Trend in mulberry cultivation** 250000 1,92,126 (3.89% In the Country (Ha) increase) 200000 1,84,928 □In Karnataka (Ha) Area in Ha 150000 91,434(49%) ■ In Andhra Pradesh (Ha) 74,128 (39%) 100000 ■In Tamilnadu (Ha) 35,180 (19%) 41,592 (22%) 50000 14,047 (7.6%) 10,545(5.5%) As at the end of 2007-08 As at the end of 2012-13

(Source: CSB figures)

We observed that the overall mulberry area in the country increased by 3.89 per cent over the period from 2008-09 to 2012-13 but Karnataka's contribution which stood at 49 per cent at the beginning of 2008-09 has come down to 39 per cent as at the end of 2012-13. However, the contribution of neighbouring AP increased from 19 per cent to 22 per cent. The increase in mulberry area in AP was attributed (July 2013) by CSB to scrupulous implementation of improved packages for mulberry cultivation.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that new mulberry plantations were being encouraged by motivating the farmers by the extension staff and by providing several incentives/subsidies. However, the fact remains that there had been a decline in mulberry cultivation when compared to AP requiring better implementation of promotional measures.

During the exit conference, Government was of the opinion that linking of employment generation schemes to Sericulture could lead to increase in cultivable area.

#### 2.1.8.4 Promotion of sericulture in non-traditional areas

The Government constituted (July 2009) a Mission Group under 'Vision-2020' for providing inputs to enable the State to finalise and implement Vision 2020. The Group suggested for promotion of sericulture activities in non-traditional areas such as Bijapur and Bagalkot, as the climate and soil characteristics in these areas were found to be conducive for mulberry cultivation. Review of the progress during the past five years in Bijapur and Bagalkot districts however revealed no substantial improvement in sericulture activities as shown in **Table 2.5**:

Raw silk Mulberry area New area Uprooted area Cocoon production production (in MTs) (in ha) (in ha) (in ha) Year (in MTs) Bijapur Bijapur Bagalkot Bijapur Bijapur **Bagalkot** Bagalkot Bijapur Bagalkot Bagalkot 2008-09 216 452 37 65 86 143 62 156 8 21 2009-10 235 298 64 133 45 287 65 128 9 18 2010-11 107 124 7 268 370 76 43 35 55 17 2011-12 286 372 80 72 62 70 72 145 11 21 2012-13 204 344 40 54 122 82 127 19 358 617 Total 297 431

Table 2.5: Sericulture activities in non-traditional areas

(Source: Annual Administration Report of the Department)

As may be seen, the area uprooted was more than the new area added with net loss in area by 61 ha (Bijapur) and 186 ha (Bagalkot) and thus these non-traditional areas were registering negative growth in raw silk production. The overall plan expenditure for these two districts during 2008-09 to 2012-13 was ₹ 4.47 crore.

The Commissioner agreed (October 2013) to improve the situation in these areas. During the exit conference, however, Government agreed that there was

a need to re-think the strategy of bringing non-traditional areas into the sericulture fold, in view of poor response.

#### 2.1.8.5 Trends in productivity level

The activities of the department begin with mulberry farm and ends with production of raw silk. The productivity is measured in terms of production of raw silk in kilogram per ha per year. The national average of raw silk production ranged between 87.73 and 105.75 kg per ha per year during 2008-13. The productivity in the State during 2008-13 is as shown in **Table 2.6**:

**Productivity** Area under Cocoon Raw silk Year mulberry production production (Kg per ha per year) Raw silk (ha) (MT) (MT) Cocoon 2008-09 77,329 53,377 7,238 690.25 93.60 2009-10 82,098 54,282 7,360 661.19 89.65 2010-11 62,697 52,709 7,338 840.69 117.04 2011-12 70,958 55,957 7,796 788.59 109.87 2012-13 74.128 49 441 7 063 666 97 95.28

**Table 2.6: Trends in productivity** 

(Source: Information furnished by CSB and Department)

As may be seen, the productivity of raw silk ranged between 89.65 and 117.04 kg per ha per year. The least productivity was reported during 2009-10 despite the area under mulberry cultivation being the highest and productivity had decreased during 2011-13 when compared to productivity level of 2010-11.

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) drought conditions for low productivity during 2009-10 and shortage of technical staff for lesser productivity for the years 2011-12 and 2012-13. The Commissioner, also, stated that Karnataka is pioneer in silk production and technologies adopted in the State were followed by other States.

The reply was not acceptable as there was above the normal rainfall during 2008-09 to 2010-11 and staff requirement was assessed surplus with reference to the target of one lakh ha for 2012.

Further, the highest productivity of 117.04 kg per ha per year achieved in the State was less than the lowest productivity (134.79 kg per ha per year) recorded in Andhra Pradesh and hence pioneer status of Karnataka is losing ground since productivity of raw silk in Karnataka was less than that of AP.

#### 2.1.8.6 Delay in establishing Automatic Reeling Machines

Automatic Reeling Machines (ARMs) are capable of producing international quality raw silk out of the Indian silk cocoons and cater to the demand of the domestic power loom and export sector. To promote BV cocoon production in the country and demand for gradable raw silk yarn in the domestic as well as overseas markets, support for establishment of ARMs in selected clusters

was provided under CDP. The total project cost for each ARM was estimated to cost ₹ 2.50 crore. The cost of equipment was ₹ one crore which was shared by CSB, State Government and beneficiary in the ratio of 50:25:25.

It was envisaged to establish seven ARMs by March 2013 but only two ARMs were established during 2009-10. An amount of ₹ 3.75 crore being the share from CSB/State Government had been released (September 2012) towards cost of equipment and kept in ESCROW account as per scheme guidelines.

The Commissioner replied (August 2013) that establishment of remaining units were underway and attributed delay in establishment of ARMs to delay in disbursement of loans by banks and process involved in import of machineries from China. Reply was not acceptable as import of the machineries should have been synchronised with release of funds to avoid such delays.

#### 2.1.8.7 Productivity level and subsidy cost

The Department is extending benefits and concessions to the silk rearers and silk reelers under various Central and State schemes to increase the silk production. The year-wise expenditure incurred under the schemes and total silk produced in the State during 2008-13 were as shown in **Table 2.7**:

**Expenditure** on Subsidy per Raw silk production Year subsidy schemes metric tonne (in metric tonne) (₹ in crore) (in ₹) 2008-09 7,238 36.41 50,304 2009-10 27.94 7,360  $37,96\overline{2}$ 86,958 2010-11 63.81 7.338 2011-12 84.97 7,796 108,992 2012-13 106.28 7,063 150,474

Table 2.7: Details of year-wise expenditure and silk production

(Source: Grant Register maintained by PAG (A&E) and details furnished by CSB)

As may be seen from above Table, while the annual silk production was stagnant at an average of 7,359 MT, the expenditure towards subsidy had risen disproportionately *i.e.*, almost three times. The higher spending by Government had not really translated into increased production.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that sericulture which is an agro based labour intensive cottage industry, depends on active participation of farmers, other stake holders and also affected by seasonal conditions. The Commissioner, also, stated that production and productivity linked cocoon incentive under new initiative programme are being given to farmer to encourage sericulture. The reply was not specific to the audit point of the increasing cost of incentives/subsidies *vis-a-vis* raw silk produced.

#### 2.1.9 Programme implementation

The Department has been implementing 16 schemes, both Central and State sector schemes during 2008-13 for development of sericulture industry. The two major Central schemes, CDP and Rashtriya Krishi Vikasa Yojane

(RKVY), and four state sector schemes were reviewed and observations are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

#### 2.1.9.1 Catalytic Development Programme

The CDP launched in IX Plan period is continued by Government of India through CSB and assistance is being provided for the various components under the scheme. During 2008-13, ₹ 207.74 crore was spent on various components of this scheme. According to guidelines, the beneficiary should be from a cluster area and raise BV crops/rear BV silkworm eggs to get subsidy/incentive under the four components of the scheme *i.e.*, (i) raising mulberry plantation in new area, (ii) assistance for drip irrigation for mulberry plantation, (iii) assistance for rearing house, and (iv) assistance for purchase of equipments.

We noticed that the subsidies/incentives were paid to beneficiaries in contravention of scheme guidelines as detailed below:

- Incentives/subsidies amounting to ₹ 141.61 crore for four components under CDP were extended during 2008-13. Out of this, incentive/subsidy amounting to ₹ 70.64 crore were extended to farmers in districts<sup>14</sup> where no clusters were formed.
- ➤ According to notification issued by Government (February 1979), three areas<sup>15</sup> notified under Mysore seed areas should rear only pure Mysore race silkworm and *Hosa* Mysore race silkworm. However, subsidy amounting to ₹ 27.94 lakh under CDP was extended to beneficiaries of these areas who raised mulberry plantation in new area and those who purchased equipments, which was irregular.
- ➤ In eight<sup>16</sup> checked offices, instances of inadmissible subsidies aggregating to ₹ 12.75 crore for other components under CDP were made to sericultarists, the details of which were shown in **Appendix 2.2.**

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that all the programmes are being implemented in the interest of sericulture sector. Regarding extending the benefits to sericulturists under Mysore seed area, Commissioner stated that the benefit was extended (February 2010) by CSB. The reply was not acceptable as subsidies/incentives have been granted in contravention of the prescribed guidelines which led to non-achievement of the objective of the scheme. Further, as per CSB letter the benefit to sericulturist under Mysore seed area was extendable for drip irrigation and rearing house only.

#### 2.1.9.2 Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana

The RKVY<sup>17</sup>, a centrally sponsored scheme, was introduced from 2011-12. As against ₹ 19.50 crore approved by the State Level Sanctioning Committee,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Bangalore (Urban), Chamarajanagar, Chikkballapur, Chikkamagalur, Dakshina Kannada, Dharwad, Kodagu, Mysore, Ramanagara, Udupi and Uttara Kannada

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Hebbur hobli of Tumkur taluk, Kunigal taluk and Magadi taluk

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Bangalore Rural, Bagalkot, Chikkaballapur, Dharwad, Gadag, Haveri, Ramanagara & Tumkur

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Sericulture component – incorporated under RKVY

₹ 19.08 crore was released to the department during 2011-13 for implementation of various components like "trenching/ mulching<sup>18</sup>", supply of bio-fertilizers, mechanisation, *etc.*, under the scheme. Out of this, ₹ 10.64 crore had been spent as of March 2013 leaving an unspent balance of ₹ 8.44 crore. Reasons for savings were attributed by the department to release of funds at the fag end of the year.

Subsidy of ₹ 15,000 per acre were admissible under the trenching mulching component for only BV farmers. In three  $^{19}$  out of eight test-checked offices, an amount of ₹ 33.06 lakh was paid to 171 sericultarists towards trenching and mulching though they were not BV farmers.

The Commissioner replied (October 2013) that the farmers who reared 2-3 BV crops in favourable season in a year were called BV rearers. Commissioner also stated that all the sericulturists are eligible for trenching mulching. The reply was not acceptable as all the 171 farmers pointed out in audit were not BV farmers.

#### 2.1.9.3 Reshme Varadan Yojane

The Reshme Varadan Yojane, a State Plan scheme, being implemented from 2006-07, provides assistance for drip irrigation and rearing house (RH) for the second hectare for beneficiaries who had availed similar benefits under CDP in tenth plan period (2002-2007) for first hectare only.

- ➤ The scheme was not consistent with CDP objectives as promotion of BV was not provided in this Scheme.
- ➤ In four offices<sup>20</sup>, the benefits for second drip irrigation aggregating to ₹ 8.52 lakh was granted to 30 beneficiaries and in five offices<sup>21</sup>, the benefits for second RH aggregating to ₹ 17.75 lakh was granted to 30 beneficiaries who had received incentives on first occasion under CDP during the period other than 10<sup>th</sup> plan.
- ➤ No mechanism was put in place to ascertain the existence of first drip irrigation and first RH constructed under CDP before release of benefits under this scheme.
- ➤ In five<sup>22</sup> test-checked offices, subsidy of ₹ 19.22 lakh for second RH was extended to 32 beneficiaries though the beneficiaries did not adhere to the condition of raising of minimum number of BV crops as stipulated under CDP while giving subsidy for first RH.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that scheme guidelines were observed and did not furnish specific reply to the audit observation.

<sup>20</sup> Bagalkot, Bangalore Rural, Gadag and Tumkur

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Excavation of trench and filling with organic waste

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Bangalore Rural, Gadag and Ramanagara

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Bangalore Rural, Gadag, Haveri, Ramanagara and Tumkur

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Bangalore Rural, Gadag, Haveri, Ramanagara and Tumkur

#### 2.1.9.4 Suvarna Bhoomi Scheme

The State Government launched Suvarna Bhoomi Scheme during 2011-12 for cultivation of mulberry plantation in dry land areas. Under the scheme, small and marginal farmers were eligible for grant of ₹ 10,000 as incentive and payable in two equal instalments. First instalment was to be released before June to meet the cost of preliminary activities such as purchase of seed/seedlings, equipments, *etc.*, and balance was to be released after ensuring that mulberry plantation had been raised by the beneficiary. The guidelines prescribe that farmers, who had received first instalment and failed to take up mulberry plantation, were ineligible for receiving any benefits under any other schemes (except calamity relief) for the next three years.

An amount of  $\[ \]$  10.27<sup>23</sup> crore was paid to 31,322 farmers as first instalment whereas second instalment of  $\[ \]$  1.37 crore was availed by 4,900 farmers only. Thus, 26,422 farmers did not take up mulberry plantation in 35,640 *acres* after receiving  $\[ \]$  8.90 crore as first instalment. Thus, the expenditure of  $\[ \]$  8.90 crore paid to 26,422 beneficiaries was infructuous.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that not all the famers who have received first instalment have taken up mulberry cultivation due to drought condition, depletion of water, and labour problem. Commissioner also stated that farmers who failed to take up mulberry plantation after receipt of first instalment were made ineligible to receive any benefit under any other schemes for next three years.

#### 2.1.10 Non-closure of loss making Departmental units

#### 2.1.10.1 Continuation of loss making grainages and filatures

The 45 grainages and five filatures located in the State are managed departmentally and were incurring losses for many years. The Revenue Reforms Commission (RRC) had recommended (February 2004) closure of loss making units. Although all these units were under loss with combined loss of ₹ 85.71 crore during 2008-13 as shown in **Table 2.8**, the Department did not act on the recommendation of RRC.

Table 2.8: Loss incurred by grainages and filatures

(₹ in crore)

Voor	Loss incurred				
Year	Grainages (45)	Filatures (5)			
2008-09	7.53	6.45			
2009-10	8.87	6.61			
2010-11	10.10	7.36			
2011-12	10.68	7.19			
2012-13	12.53	8.39			
Total	49.71	36.00			

(Source: Details furnished by the Department)

<sup>23</sup> First instalment proportionately reduced for farmers having less than two acres of land

Further, we noticed that no production had taken place in  $two^{24}$  out of 45 grainages in the past three years though ₹ 24.84 lakh was incurred towards administrative expenses. The Silk Twisting and Weaving Factory at Mudigundam, also a loss making unit, incurred loss of ₹ 3.30 crore during 2008-13 was also not wound up despite recommendation of RRC for its closure and redeployment of staff.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that Government would take up the matter of redeployment of staff during reorganisation of the Department and unviable grainage buildings/land would be handed over to needy Government departments.

#### 2.1.10.2 Continuation of unviable silk farms

The 88 Government sericulture farms spread over 2,333.34 *acres* were established for production of pure Mysore basic seed and also for production of BV and CB seed cocoons. Of these, nine sericulture farms in Mysore seed area are producing the basic female parent required for production of commercial eggs and the remaining 79 farms are involved in the production of CB and BV seed cocoons.

The sericulture farms are classified into four categories for the production of seed at different levels *viz.*, P4–Breeder stock, P3–Parental stock, P2–Basic seeds and P1–Commercial parent. The RRC had recommended (February 2004) the Department to lease out the sericulture farms to private companies which intend to set up large integrated silk factories and also recommended that production of P1 grade seed- commercial parent should be privatised. The production, income and expenditure of the Government sericulture farms during 2008-13 were as shown in **Appendix 2.3.** 

We observed that the revenue generated from silk farms ranged between 2.95 and 3.66 *per cent* of the expenditure incurred during 2008-13. We also noticed that sericultural activities *viz.*, raising mulberry plantation, harvesting of leaves and harvesting of cocoons were not carried out in 33 farms having an area of 888.33 *acres* in seven districts during the above period. Further, production of commercial seeds (P1) was being continued in 63 farms. The total loss incurred in managing farms during 2008-13 was ₹ 35.64 crore.

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) decline in farm activities to scarcity of water, shortage of labour and electricity, *etc*. Further, it was stated that as per recommendations made by RRC some unviable farms were closed and handed over to other needy departments. However, most of the unviable farms were continued to be functional contributing further loss.

#### 2.1.10.3 Declining transactions in Silk Exchanges

The Silk Exchanges were established by Government to facilitate transaction of raw silk produced by reelers. The main silk exchange is situated at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Hanur, Belakavadi

Bangalore with nine sub-exchanges<sup>25</sup> at different places of silk weaving centers. A market fee of 0.5 *per cent* of the transacted value is levied and collected from buyers.

Though, Karnataka is the largest producer of raw silk in the country, the raw silk transacted in these silk exchanges was barely between 14 and 18 *per cent* of raw silk production in the State as detailed in **Table 2.9:** 

Table 2.9: Transaction of raw silk

(in metric tonnes)

Year	Raw silk produced in the State	Raw silk sold in Silk exchanges	Percentage
2008-09	7,238	1,310	18
2009-10	7,360	1,084	15
2010-11	7,338	1,037	14
2011-12	7,796	1,310	17
2012-13	8,219	1,238	15
Total	37,951	5,979	16

(Source: Details furnished by the Department)

We observed that the bulk of the transactions take place in Bangalore Silk Exchange with 49 *per cent* share during 2008-09 which reduced to 25 *per cent* during 2012-13 and the market fee collected was ₹ 1.75 crore against establishment expenditure of ₹ 11.91 crore incurred towards 56 officers/officials working in various cadres. The large working strength was injudicious in view of introduction of free movement of raw silk by Government of India in November 2008. In four  $^{26}$  exchanges, the transactions was ranged between one *per cent* and three *per cent* and market fee collected was only ₹ 40.57 lakh against the establishment expenditure of ₹ 1.75 crore.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that a Hi-Tech Silk Exchange with the co-ordination of CSB is proposed to be established in Bangalore for which staff is required. Commissioner also stated that proposal has been sent to Government regarding reduction of staff strength.

#### 2.1.10.4 Karnataka Silk Marketing Board Ltd

The Karnataka Silk Marketing Board Ltd (KSMBL) was established (1979) to act as a catalyst for stabilisation of silk yarn prices to ensure that reelers get satisfactory returns for their produce by purchasing raw silk during slump in the market and sells twisted yarn to weavers by outsourcing the twisting activity. The KSMBL purchases raw silk transacted at silk exchanges only. The KSMBL was a loss making unit and its feasibility of continuation was entrusted (March 2006) to a consultant by Department of Public Enterprises as part of restructuring of Public Sector Enterprises reforms. The consultants in their report (February 2008) stated that closure being a crucial decision for the State Government, it must be taken after careful view of the sector and the sector policy and objectives of the State. If the policy and objectives do not need the support of KSMBL then closure should be seriously considered.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Kollegal, Ramanagara, Sidlaghatta, Chikkaballapur, Kolar, Kanakapur, Chamarajanagar, Guledgudda and Gadag

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Chamarajanagar, Chikkaballapur, Guledgudda and Kollegal

We observed the following:

- ➤ Consequent on removal of restrictions by Government of India in November 2008, the share of KSMBL was 887 MT *i.e.* only 2.34 *per cent* of overall raw silk produced during 2008-13. With a miniscule share in market operations the objective of achieving price stabilisation obviously could not be achieved.
- ➤ The accumulated losses of ₹ 18.20 crore of KSMBL at the beginning of the financial year 2008-09 increased to ₹ 33.63 crore at the end of 31 March 2013.
- The Government had provided loans to KSMBL aggregating to ₹ 12 crore during 2010-11 and permitted (March 2011) KSMBL to borrow loan up to a maximum of ₹ 25 crore from Canara Bank to meet working capital for market stabilisation operations exclusively. The liability towards interest and guarantee commission of one *per cent* of loan amount per year payable by KSMBL was borne by Government and total liability borne by Government was ₹ 2.44 crore<sup>27</sup> during period from January 2012 to May 2013.

Since an amount of ₹ 127.46 crore was available under Price Stabilisation Fund, the Government's decision to borrow from financial institutions for price stabilisation operations instead of utilising the fund available was not justified.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that the interest relates to over draft facility which had been reimbursed by the Government. Specific reply on non-utilisation of the amount available in the fund was not furnished.

#### 2.1.11 Manpower management

#### 2.1.11.1 Surplus staff

Against the overall sanctioned strength of 4,475 posts in the Department as of March 2013, the working strength was 3,582 as detailed in Appendix 2.4. Based on the target of 1.70 lakh ha to be achieved by 2020, the Commissioner submitted a report to the Government in September 2009 proposing to restructure the Department by suitably transferring the posts in respect of surplus staff of 703 to other departments with corresponding annual expenditure of ₹ 14.42 crore. The staff requirement proposed by Department was discussed (December 2009) in a meeting held under the Chairmanship of Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department. The Department had assessed the staff requirement with reference to mulberry hecterage targeted for year 2020 and decided in a meeting (December 2009) that staff requirement should be restricted to immediate requirement (for the revised target of one lakh hecterage as of 2012) and additional recruitments could be made in pace with the increase in mulberry area as and when it happens. It was also decided in the meeting to find out ways to redeploy more than 1,000 employees rendered surplus due to revised target. However, no action was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Interest ₹ 1.69 crore and guarantee commission ₹ 75 lakh

taken by Department to redeploy the surplus staff to other departments (July 2013). The additional burden due to non-redeployment of 703 surplus staff works out to ₹ 43.26 crore<sup>28</sup>.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that proposal was submitted to Government to close 262 institutions and 19 posts have been identified as excess.

#### 2.1.11.2 Irregular retention of Sericulture Inspectors

The Finance Department (FD) approved (June 2010) the upgradation of 322 posts in the cadre of Demonstrators to the Inspectors cadre and also permitted the Sericulture Department to utilise the 144 vacancies which existed in the cadre of Inspectors for giving promotion with the condition that 466 beneficiaries should submit undertaking to serve in other departments on deputation. The upgradation was valid for one year within which the process of deputation should be completed. Accordingly, the orders (August 2010) were issued benefitting 466 personnel.

We observed that process of deputation was not completed fully within one year as stipulated and only 100 personnel were deputed to other departments. The retention of promoted personnel was injudicious and a financial burden as the posts of Inspectors were found to be surplus, thereby warranting deputations to other departments. Further, as the upgradation was valid for one year, the 344 posts in the cadre of Inspectors ceases to exist and hence their retention was irregular. The additional financial burden for the retained 344<sup>29</sup> Inspectors works out to ₹1.10 crore<sup>30</sup>.

The Commissioner replied (October 2013) that process of deployment is under progress and action for deployment will be taken whenever demands come from other departments. The reply was not acceptable as the Government had ordered to complete the upgradation/deputation within one year.

#### 2.1.12 Internal Controls

#### 2.1.12.1 Internal Audit Wing

The Internal Audit Wing (IAW) is functioning since 1984. The annual target for conduct of internal audit ranged between 132 and 248 out of 397 offices. During 2010-11 and 2011-12, the shortfall in coverage was 37 and 137 offices representing 28 *per cent* and 55 *per cent* respectively. As of March 2013, 12,283 paragraphs with money value of  $\mathbf{\xi}$  96.38 crore were outstanding for settlement, of which,  $\mathbf{\xi}$  69.51 crore were pending for more than five years. The recoverable amount pointed out in internal audit reports aggregated to  $\mathbf{\xi}$  7.83 crore.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> As the cadre- wise details of surplus staff of more than 1,000 was not made during December 2009, the comment has been restricted to surplus staff of 703 for three years

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> 22 retired/expired

Worked out as difference between the minimum pay scales of Demonstrators and Inspectors for the period from September 2011 to March 2013

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) the shortfall in coverage of Internal Audit to inadequate staff strength and also stated that action would be taken to settle the pending paragraphs and to clear the money value by way of recovery/ratification. Commissioner also stated that sufficient staff would be provided to audit wing. Reply is not acceptable as the Finance Department had assessed excess staff in the Department and hence the Department could have redeployed the excess staff to clear the backlog.

#### 2.1.12.2 Response to Audit

The Principal Accountant General (E&RSA), Karnataka conducts test check of records of head of administrative department and subordinate offices under their control and observations were communicated through Inspection Reports (IR). First replies to IR were to be furnished within four weeks and a six monthly report on pending paragraphs of IRs was also sent to the Department to facilitate monitoring of the action taken on the observations.

There were 52 IRs and 206 paragraphs with money value of ₹ 66.06 crore were outstanding as on 31 December 2012. Year-wise break up of outstanding IRs were as shown in **Table 2.10**:

Sl No.	Year of Accounts	No. of IRs	No. of paragraphs	Money value (₹ in lakh)
1	Up to 2007-08	07	12	11.22
2	2008-09	03	10	0.03
3	2009-10	11	29	2.24
4	2010-11	04	23	1,659.14
5	2011-12	27	132	4,933.44
	TOTAL	52	206	6,606.07

Table 2.10: Year-wise break up of outstanding IRs

As seen from the above table, there is an increase in trend in pending money value observations.

#### 2.1.12.3 Departmental manual not revised

The departmental manual being an important internal document that guides officers/officials in discharging their functions is required to be updated/revised. The manual in respect of the Sericulture Department was prepared in 1954. However, significant and major changes that have taken place were not incorporated by revising the manual.

The Commissioner replied (October 2013) that the committee was reconstituted during June 2013 and action will be taken to revise the departmental manual at the earliest.

#### 2.1.13 Other issues

#### 2.1.13.1 Delay in allotment of reeling units

The "Construction of Living Room cum Reeling Complex (eight units) and allied works" at Shirhatti was administratively approved in February 2010 and

technically sanctioned in December 2010 for ₹ 1.54 crore. The work taken up during 2010-11 were completed (January 2012) excluding living rooms. The construction of living room was withdrawn from the scope of tenders as per instruction (March 2011) of Commissioner since living rooms near reeling complex would affect the health of reelers. The balance work of construction of living rooms was entrusted, after lapse of two years, to eight piece work contractors with total tendered price of ₹ 21 lakh during March 2013 with a stipulation to complete by May 2013 and the work was not completed as at the end of September 2013. As allotment of reeling unit can be made only after completion of living room, the reeling complex and allied works though completed more than a year ago by incurring an expenditure of ₹ 1.36 crore were not put to use due to non completion of living rooms.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that the work will be completed and action will be taken to handover the buildings to the concerned.

#### 2.1.13.2 Avoidable expenditure on wireless communication

The Commissioner approved in July 2010 installation of "Wireless network" at a cost of ₹ 28.11 lakh and the work was entrusted (August 2010) to M/s Mourya Infotek (P) Limited, Bangalore for supply/installation of the wireless equipments without obtaining approval from Government. The expenditure of ₹ 13.34 lakh was charged to CDP and ₹ 14.77 lakh charged to capital head of account resulting in diversion of funds. Also, the control room for wireless network was not functioning since July 2012. In addition, as the staff in the department were not working in remote areas, installation of wireless network was not justifiable.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that action will be taken to obtain ratification from the Government. However, the fact remains that the staff do not work in remote areas requiring wireless communication.

#### 2.1.13.3 Training

The Department is having six training institutes located at Channapatna, Rayapura, Tholahunase, Hassan, KR Pet and Kuderu to impart training to sericulturists. The number of persons trained under regular trainings in the six institutes reduced from 3,427 in 2008-09 to 353 persons during 2012-13 as detailed in **Table 2.11**:

Others- Handicrafts, In service Total Year Sericulturists Reelers RSPs, etc 3,427 2008-09 2.345 139 494 449 2009-10 2,040 41 563 245 2,889 2010-11 2,091 299 2,713 60 263 2011-12 1,849 62 308 279 2,498 2012-13 347 0 0 353 6

Table 2.11: Year-wise details of training conducted

(Source: Details furnished by Department)

Further, we noticed that training was imparted to 18,311 farmers and reelers under Beneficiary Empowerment Programme of CDP at a cost of  $\mathbf{\xi}$  5,000 per beneficiary and total expenditure incurred was  $\mathbf{\xi}$  7.18 crore during 2010-13. Against the target of imparting training to 20,674 farmers, 17,543 farmers were trained with a shortfall of 15 *per cent*. Further, against the target of training 4,000 reelers, only 768 reelers were trained with a shortfall of 81 *per cent*.

The Commissioner attributed (October 2013) the shortfall in achievement due to late release of funds and inadequate infrastructure facilities for imparting training to the reelers and stated that it has been planned to provide training at district level with the assistance of other departments wherever infrastructure facilities are available. The reply was not acceptable as targets were to be fixed with reference to availability of infrastructure facilities.

#### 2.1.13.4 Health insurance

A Health Insurance Scheme was introduced<sup>31</sup> under CDP to enable the women workers in private reeling units and Grainages to access the health care facilities in the country with annual coverage of ₹ 15,000 for OPD and hospital treatment. The annual premium of ₹ 781.60 were to be shared<sup>32</sup> between CSB, State Government and beneficiary. The scheme covers not only the women but her husband and two children. In 14<sup>33</sup> districts, 46,671 beneficiaries were covered under this scheme during 2009-13. This may be extended to other districts also.

#### 2.1.13.5 Crop insurance

Crop Insurance component to protect sericultarists from loss of disease free layings<sup>34</sup> (DFLs) was introduced during XI plan period under CDP. For a sum assurance of ₹ 4,700 per 100 DFLs for CB and ₹ 5,787 per 100 DFLs for BV the premium payable was ₹ 329 and ₹ 463 for CB and BV respectively. The 50 *per cent* of the premium amount was to be borne by Government of India and 25 *per cent* by State Government and the rest by the beneficiary. However, this component was not implemented in Karnataka.

There were 145 Private Registered Seed Producers (RSPs) in the State for production and distribution of DFLs to the sericulturists as of March 2013. Out of overall quantity of 39.63 crore DFLs produced during 2008-13, 25.18 crore DFLs constituting 64 *per cent* were produced by these RSPs. However, during 2008-13, it was observed that:

➤ the RSPs solely concentrated on production of CB DFLs though objective of several schemes were to increase BV silk production. Only 60,000 BV DFLs were produced as against the CB DFL production of 1,225.20 lakh

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> XI plan period

<sup>32</sup> CSB-₹ 642.47,State Government-₹ 83.47 and beneficiary-₹ 55.66

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Ramanagara, Mandya, Bangalore Rural, Bangalore Urban, Chamarajanagar, Mysore, Kolar, Chikkaballapur, Bagalkot, Belgaum, Tumkur, Davangere, Dharwad and Hassan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Silkworm egg from which silkworms are hatched

during 2008-09 and 2009-10 and no BV DFLs were produced thereafter (2010-13) and;

➤ production of overall DFLs by the RSPs declined by 46 *per cent i.e.* from 6.46 crore DFLs during 2008-09 to 3.50 crore DFLs during 2012-13.

The trend in production of BV DFLs by RSPs is an indicative of risk aversion. A crop insurance scheme mitigates these kind of risks, which is absent in Karnataka. The BV production in Tamil Nadu, where crop insurance component is being made available by the Government, is more than that of Karnataka.

The Commissioner stated (October 2013) that crop insurance was implemented as early as 1982 but as these claims were more than the total sum assured, the insurance companies have withdrawn from this scheme. The reintroduction of the insurance scheme as being implemented in Tamil Nadu could be considered.

# 2.1.14 Beneficiary survey

Beneficiary survey was conducted as part of Performance Audit to assess the impact of scheme interventions, extension services provided by the Department was timely and adequate, timely release of various subsidies/incentives *etc.*, by making field visits aided with structured questionnaires to farmers. Survey of 104 farmers, selected randomly, in five districts<sup>35</sup> was conducted and results thereof are as below:

- ➤ All the farmers surveyed expressed their happiness and intended to continue sericulture;
- ➤ Ninety Seven *per cent* of the farmers surveyed stated that technical support/guidance received was timely;
- ➤ Eighty Seven *per cent* of the farmers surveyed wanted an increase in subsidies;
- ➤ Eighty Six *per cent* of the farmers surveyed wanted minimum support price to protect them against price fluctuations;
- ➤ All the farmers surveyed expressed improvement in the economic status.

#### 2.1.15 Conclusion

The objectives of the Department for expansion of mulberry area and increase the production and productivity and reduce the production cost remained largely unachieved as reflected in the reduction of area under mulberry cultivation. The Department had not formulated a sericulture policy. The budgetary control was deficient as the Department could not absorb the available funds provided by the Government of India and the State Government, non-plan expenditure exceeded the plan expenditure, balance available under Price Stabilisation Fund remained unutilised and the funds accounts remained unaudited since 1993-94. The raw silk production had

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<sup>35</sup> Bagalkot, Dharwad, Gadag, Haveri and Tumkur

stagnated while expenditure on subsidies had increased manifold. Subsidies under different schemes were disbursed in violation of guidelines. No action was taken for winding up of the loss making departmental units and also for redeployment of excess staff as assessed by the Department which resulted in avoidable expenditure on salaries to staff engaged in these units. Internal control was ineffective as there were shortfall in Internal Audit coverage during 2010-11 and 2012-13 and Departmental manuals were not revised since 1954.

# 2.1.16 Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for streamlining the functioning of the Department:

- Ensure optimal utilisation of funds to avoid persistent savings;
- Formulate a state sericulture policy to augment silk production;
- Fix realistic target to increase the mulberry area, cocoon/raw silk production;
- ➤ Scheme guidelines be scrupulously adhered to while granting various incentives/subsidies;
- ➤ Reassess staff requirement and consider closure of loss making units to control non-plan expenditure;

The matter was referred to Government in August 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

# Chapter 3

# **Compliance Audit**

- 3.1 Non-compliance with the rules
- 3.2 Audit against propriety/Expenditure without justification
- 3.3 Failure of oversight/governance

# **CHAPTER 3**

#### **COMPLIANCE AUDIT**

Compliance Audit of the Economic Sector departments, their field formations as well as that of the autonomous bodies brought out several instances of lapses in management of resources and failures in the observance of the norms of regularity, propriety and economy. These have been presented in the succeeding paragraphs under broad objective heads.

# 3.1 Non-compliance with the rules

For sound financial administration and financial control, it is essential that expenditure conforms to financial rules, regulations and orders issued by the competent authority. This not only prevents irregularities, misappropriation and frauds, but helps in maintaining good financial discipline. Some of the audit findings on non-compliance with rules and regulations are as under:

# PUBLIC WORKS, PORTS AND INLAND WATER TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT

# 3.1.1 Contract Management in Public Works, Ports and Inland Water Transport Department

# 3.1.1.1 Introduction

The Public Works Ports and Inland Water Transport Department (PWP&IWTD) is responsible for planning, construction and maintenance of state highways and major district roads, bridges, buildings and maintenance of national highways. The department also undertakes construction of buildings on behalf of other departments under deposit contribution works. The Government provides funds in annual budget for creation and maintenance of assets. The department follows Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 1999 (KTPP Act) and rules made there under for undertaking works. The Department functions under the administrative control of the Principal Secretary assisted by a Secretary, with two Chief Engineers (CE) and one Principal Chief Architect.

#### 3.1.1.2 Audit objectives

The audit objectives were to assess adherence to the provisions of Transparency Act, performance of contracts and adequacy of system to ensure quality assurance of works.

# 3.1.1.3 Audit scope and methodology

The audit covering the period 2008-13 was conducted between February 2013 and July 2013. The records at the Secretariat, two Zonal Offices, 10<sup>36</sup> out of 39 divisions and one out of four Quality Control divisions were test checked based on units selected through simple random sampling method. The total outlay of the department during 2008-13 was ₹ 15,445 crore. The total number of contracts concluded in 10 test checked divisions were 18,375 out of which 486 contracts valued at ₹ 951.58 crore were scrutinised. The audit was confined to Communications and Buildings (C&B) wing of PWP&IWTD in view of large number of contracts involved.

# **Audit findings**

# **3.1.1.4 Planning**

# Tardy implementation of the scheme

Effective implementation of scheme depends on a practical action plan conforming to laid out objectives, setting out annual physical and financial targets.

The average road length in the State was 68.73 Km per 100 sq.kms. The Dr. Nanjundappa Committee was appointed (October 2000) by Government to study regional imbalances among all the districts in the State and to advise the Government on remedial measures to redress the regional imbalances, including road development in the State. The Committee in its report (June 2002), while fixing the responsibility on Public Works Department for the development of roads in Karnataka, also identified 50<sup>37</sup> taluks as more backward and 40<sup>38</sup> taluks as less backward in the State which required improvement of roads as these taluks had road length which were below the state average road length. The expenditure incurred during the last five years ending 31 March 2013 on road development as per the Dr Nanjundappa Committee Report (Report) is shown in **Chart 3.1:** 

<sup>38</sup> North Karnataka-24; South Karnataka-16

38

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> PWP&IWTD Division- Chitradurga, Kolar, Chickmagalur, Special Division Shimoga, No. 2 Buildings Division-Bangalore, Road and Buildings Special Division, Bangalore, Haveri, Belgaum, Huvina Hadagali and Karwar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> North Karnataka-37; South Karnataka-13




Chart 3.1: Expenditure incurred on road development

(Source: Grant and Outlay statement furnished by the Department)

Despite the fact that the Report aimed at systematising the road development plan in the state with particular emphasis on addressing the deficiencies in the more backward taluks, Government failed to bring out a 'Road Development Plan' and fix a realistic target to overcome the deficiencies pointed out in the Report. Mere provisions of budgetary grants under a separate head called "Dr Nanjundappa Committee Report" failed to meet the objectives of the Report in the absence of a definite action plan and targets to meet the demand.

During 2008-13, against the budget provision of ₹ 479.50 crore for North Zone, only ₹ 254.18 crore was released and expenditure incurred was ₹ 247.70 crore. In respect of South Zone, ₹ 185.07 crore only was released against the budget grant of ₹ 315.88 crore. The short release of grants besides impacting the recommended road development also highlights lack of sustained interest by the department in addressing the achievement of budgeted objectives. During 2011-12, South Zone released a grant of ₹ 66.16 crore though the budget provision was only ₹ 52.34 crore. In 2010-11, South Zone spent ₹ 61.82 crore against grant of ₹ 41.20 crore released. The absence of action plan enabled selection of works at the discretion of the implementing officers and fiscal indiscipline. During 2012-13, no grants were sanctioned and released.

The Chief Engineer, (South) Zone, Bangalore stated (August 2013) that works were selected based on the recommendations of the field officer and that the decision made by the Executive Engineers (EE) were as per policy decisions contained in suggesting such works. It was also replied that efforts are being made to have information of all repairs and improvement of roads carried out in the software developed under Road Information System.

#### 3.1.1.5 Estimation for works

A key aspect of an effective contract management is that all preliminary steps are taken before a contract is awarded *i.e.*, a detailed project report (DPR) is prepared and scrutinised thoroughly and the procurement process conforms to

the statutes and accepted norms of financial propriety. The DPR should contain the justification for taking up the work, details of survey and investigations conducted, cost and time estimation, availability of materials and provision for budget and the competent authority ought to have the estimate vetted for financial economy and effectiveness in attaining objectives.

#### Incomplete and inadequate details in the sanctioned estimates

For improvement of existing roads the guidelines issued by Indian Road Congress in IRC 81-1997 should be followed, which stipulate that the overlay thickness (thickness of bituminous layer laid over the existing road surface) of an existing road should be computed based on the design traffic and the extent of structural deficiency noticed in the reaches under construction.

In three Divisions<sup>39</sup>, in respect of 83 road improvements works not involving widening, carried out at a cost of ₹ 64.64 crore, the report accompanying estimates did not mention the structural deficiency of roads, the details of improvement works carried out earlier, traffic census, etc. Despite the absence of these details, provisions towards structural improvements were made in the estimate towards embankment construction, sub grade and sub base layers, base layers throughout the carriageway in addition to bituminous layers of bituminous macadam (BM), dense bituminous macadam (DBM) as applicable to new constructions, in addition to bituminous surfacing. Even the details of the existing thickness of the pavement under construction were not mentioned in the estimates. The competent authority sanctioned these estimates without assessing the actual requirements. The only justification mentioned in these estimates was a general note mentioning about damages and pot holes caused due to monsoon rains which did not justify reconstruction of the road from sub-base upwards. If the problem related only to pot holes etc, it would have been more appropriate to have surface correction with bituminous layer after filling up of pot holes. The unjustified provision towards sub-base and base layers worked out to ₹ 19.19 crore<sup>40</sup> constituting 29.69 *per cent* of the estimated cost of these works.

#### Unwarranted items in the estimates

(i) In Chickmagalur Division, improvements to State Highway 64 from km 4.375 to km 10, costing ₹ 4.83 crore were sanctioned by Executive Engineer (EE) to augment the existing concrete road which had been damaged extensively. The scope of estimates included laying of 60 mm DBM and 40 mm BC besides edge, camber correction and crack filling for entire concrete surface. The work costing ₹ 4.83 crore was split up into 50 estimates and put to tender. All these works were awarded to a single agency in 50 separate agreements which were completed in three months as per agreement.

Since the existing pavement was already made of concrete, this ought to have been considered while computing total thickness of the existing road as shown in **Table 3.1:** 

40

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Roads and Buildings Special Division, Chitradurga Division, Special Division Shimoga <sup>40</sup> Excavation and embankment- ₹ 5.05 crore; GSB-₹ 6.44 crore; WMM/WBM-₹ 7.70 crore

Table 3.1: Statement showing the existing pavement and proposed thickness

Traffic	Required thickness	Existing pavement				Proposed thickness		
in MSA		Sub base	Base	Concrete pavement	Total	DBM	BC	Total
136	720	285	300	Not considered	585	60	40	100

(Source: Details furnished by the divisions)

Despite the existence of the concrete pavement, providing 60 mm DBM (which was a binding layer) was not justified. The unwarranted provision resulted in avoidable extra expenditure of ₹ 1.41 crore towards 1,856.25 cum of DBM executed. The EE stated (July 2013) that the work was executed (March 2012) as per the instructions of local representatives in view of an ensuing local festival. Reply was not acceptable as surfacing with BC was sufficient to meet the objective of improving the riding quality. Further, the reply failed to justify the necessity of DBM layer since crack filling and camber correction were also provided.

(ii) As per MORTH<sup>41</sup> specifications 601 and 602, cement concrete pavement consists of dry lean cement concrete of the required thickness as sub-base and unreinforced plain cement concrete over such prepared sub-base for wearing course. The Schedule of rates also contains a separate chapter for concrete pavement.

In 20 road works costing ₹ 3.92 crore pertaining to Roads and Buildings Division, Bangalore, instead of dry lean concrete as sub-base and unreinforced plain cement concrete as wearing course, the Department provided 150 mm thick cement concrete of 1:3:6 as sub-base and 150 mm thick reinforced cement concrete of M- 20 grade layer as wearing course respectively in the estimates and by adopting rates applicable to building specification. The estimates also provided laying wet mixed macadam (sub-base) of 250 mm in addition to two concrete layers. In terms of paragraph 6.5.1 of IRC -15 2002, the unreinforced cement concrete can be laid on sub-base of existing pavement having 150 mm thickness. Hence, providing 150 mm cement concrete of 1:3:6 at an additional expenditure of ₹ 69.12 lakh was avoidable. Also providing RCC as per building specification instead of unreinforced cement concrete as per IRC resulted in avoidable expenditure of ₹ 1.04 crore<sup>42</sup>.

The EE stated (August 2013) that in many villages the roads were very narrow having heavy traffic and therefore concrete pavement with steel reinforcement was found necessary. The reply was not acceptable as there was no mention in the estimate regarding density of traffic *etc.*, which could justify such extra costs.

#### Diversion of legislative approval on works

Public Accounts Committee in its sixth report (2009-10) observed that works included in Appendix-E should be regarded as list of works approved by the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Ministry of Road Transport and Highways

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> ₹ 27.57 lakh towards RCC and ₹ 76.42 lakh towards cost of steel

State Legislature and therefore expenditure on works not included in Appendix-E should be treated as unauthorised expenditure. We noticed that both the Controlling Officers and Implementing Officers failed to respect the Legislative sanction for works.

In three Divisions<sup>43</sup>, 17 executed works costing ₹ 7.61 crore did not conform to the legislative sanction as provided in Appendix-E for the year 2011-12. In two cases of Chitradurga Division, the scope of work was changed during technical sanction as suggested by the Superintending Engineer/Executive Engineer. In another case in Chickmagalur Division, out of the sanction of ₹ 1.75 crore, only ₹ 50 lakh was utilised for the work and the balance amount of ₹ 1.25 crore was utilised for another work not included in Appendix-E. In Kolar Division, 14 works costing ₹ 5.28 crore provided in Appendix-E were substituted with new works not included in the Appendix. The deviations were not even subsequently approved by the Assembly through Supplementary or Revised proposals.

While, EE, Chitradurga replied (June 2013) that change in scope was found necessary as the changed reaches of the road were badly damaged, the EE, Chickmagalur stated (July 2013) that diversion was as per oral instructions of the Minister for Public Works and EE, Kolar Division stated (June 2013) that the changes were made based on local needs as suggested by the local MLA of which 13 works costing ₹ 4.48 crore were subsequently approved by the PWD Minister. Reply cannot be accepted as the diversion was not authorised by the Legislature and scope of works and changes were made on verbal orders.

#### 3.1.1.6 Tendering for works

The KTPP Act, provides for transparency in the tendering process and to regulate the procedure in inviting, processing and accepting of tenders. The following deficiencies in adherence to the provision of the Act were noticed in the tendering process:

#### Entrustment of works by circumventing open tender system

The invitation of tender through E-procurement is mandatory in all cases where the value of procurement exceeds ₹ 20 lakh (which was revised to ₹ five lakh from 03 December 2012) as per KTPP Act and rules thereunder. Paragraph 167 of Karnataka Public Departmental Code strictly prohibits splitting of major works into smaller estimates so as to bring it within the delegated powers of the sanctioning authority and to evade the necessity of higher sanction.

During 2010-12, in Roads and Buildings Special Division, Bangalore, 40 road improvement works were split into 175 estimates of less than ₹ 20 lakh each to avoid E-procurement process. These contracts were accepted by EE with average tender premium of plus 4.75 *per cent* while the rates for similar works accepted through E-tendering during the corresponding period was *minus* 12.37 *per cent*. Deviations from norms and acceptance of significantly higher

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Chitradurga, Chickmagalur and Kolar

rates than prevailing rates for similar contracted works resulted in extra financial burden of ₹ 5.08 crore<sup>44</sup> to Government.

Also, in two divisions<sup>45</sup>, 12 road works costing ₹ 15.90 crore were split into 136 estimates for which contracts were accepted by the Divisional Officers. In all these cases the road lengths of the original works measured from one to nine km and since the entire stretch was to be repaired, technical approval and administrative approval from higher authorities were necessary including that of Government. Of this, one State Highway improvement work costing ₹ 4.83 crore was split into 50 estimates and was contracted through manual process. Finally, all these works were awarded to a single agency on single bid with a premium of 4.7 *per cent* above the estimated cost. Bidding time allowed in these cases was one day as tender forms were issued only one day prior to the last date stipulated for submission of tenders.

The EE, Chickmagalur stated (July 2013) that the tenders were accepted as the offers received were found to be beneficial. Since splitting of works violated statutory provisions, did not allow transparency and accountability and did not prove to be economically beneficial to Government, this justification was not acceptable.

#### Irrelevant publicity

As per KTPP Rules and orders issued by the Government (March 2004), notice inviting tenders for all procurement for works costing between ₹ 10 lakh and ₹ 50 lakh shall be published in two local papers and two State Level newspapers in addition to publishing the same in District Bulletin. In No. 2, Building Division, Bangalore, for 38 works in and around Bangalore each costing between ₹ 10 lakh and ₹ 20 lakh, notification inviting tenders through manual procedure was published in newspaper editions from Gulbarga and Shimoga. The irrelevant publication defeated the objective of publicity and competition in the procurement process, as in all these cases only two bids were received.

#### Failure to allow prescribed bidding period

Rule 17 of KTPP Rules stipulate that the tender inviting authority shall ensure the minimum bidding time of 30 days for works costing up to ₹ two crore and 60 days for works costing above ₹ two crore. The rules further stipulate that any reduction in bidding time should be specially authorised for reasons to be recorded in writing. Government stipulated (September 2003) that tender documents should be made available for the entire period provided for submission of tenders in conformity with KTPP rules.

In ten test checked divisions, out of 486 works reviewed in audit, prescribed minimum bidding time was not allowed for 466 works costing ₹ 827.11 crore. For 280 out of 364 works costing up to ₹ two crore, the shortfall in bidding

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Procurement value ₹ 29.67 crore × 17.12 per cent (12.37 per cent + 4.75 per cent) = ₹ 5.08 crore

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Chickmagalur and Kolar

time ranged between 16 to 29 days and for 83 out of 102 works costing ₹ two crore and above, the shortfall ranged from 31 to 59 days. Shortfall in bidding time was compounded with the departmental decision in restricting time allowed for issue of tender forms/ downloading of tender forms. Absence of sufficient bidding time inhibits transparency and competition in bidding which led to bid adjustment and tenders with high premium due to lack of participation of bidders as discussed in the following paragraphs.

# 3.1.1.7 Evaluation of tenders

For works costing  $\ref{totaleq}$  50 lakh and above, the Act stipulates invitation of bids in two cover system *i.e.* technical and financial bids. The technical bid detailing the technical qualifications would be opened first and financial bid of those technically qualified bidders only would be opened for further processing and acceptance. Instances were noticed (Three divisions–32 works costing  $\ref{totaleq}$  78.32 crore) where authorities either overlooked the laid down criteria or failed to attach significance to technical qualification of bidders as illustrated below;

- In two divisions, 16 contracts for works (₹ 43.77 crore) were awarded to contractors whose Certificates of experience had not been furnished. In Chickmagalur Division, the Experience Certificate furnished by a bidder actually related to another bidder, but the same was accepted.
- In Chickmagalur Division, the technical criteria on work experience for concrete item was not provided and the work costing ₹ 1.53 crore was awarded though the contractor had not furnished the requisite details.
- ➤ Contract for a work costing ₹ 2.37 crore was awarded to a contractor in Chickmagalur Division though his technical bid was initially rejected by the Superintending Engineer (SE).
- In Roads and Buildings, Special Division, Bangalore, contract for "Construction of Dr Babu Jagajivan Ram Bhavan" at Bangalore was awarded for ₹ 9.97 crore to an agency in March 2013. We observed that the two bidders participated in the tender had failed to meet the technical criteria but the financial bids of both the bidders were opened and work awarded to lowest tenderer in violation of the KTPP Act.

# 3.1.1.8 Negotiation and acceptance of tenders

#### Irregular acceptance of tenders

Where tenders are received with premium pegged over 10 *per cent* of Current Schedule of Rates (CSR), circular instructions of 3 December 2002, prescribe that the negotiations with the lowest tenderer for reduction of rates should not be resorted to. The preferred course of action should be the rejection of tenders and invitation of fresh tenders. This was further reiterated in Government circulars (August 2006 and June 2007) which stipulated that negotiation should be held only after inviting tenders for a minimum of three

times. While revising the delegation of powers in June 2009, the Government empowered Tender Scrutiny Committee (TSC) to conduct negotiations in respect of tenders of value between ₹ 50 lakh and ₹ five crore to bring it within a premium not exceeding ten per cent of CSR for submission to Tender Acceptance Committee (TAC), which was formed in September 2011. Thereafter, Government would issue tender acceptance order based on TAC recommendations.

During 2008-12, 1,057 tenders valued between ₹ 50 lakh and ₹ five crore, estimated to cost ₹ 1,473.78 crore were recommended by TSC for acceptance at the total cost of ₹ 1,721.49 crore after reduction of rates by contractors. The tender premium recommended varied between 11 per cent and 24.6 per cent of CSR, which should have been rejected as the prescribed limit of 10 per cent was exceeded. As seen from the TSC proceedings there were no indications of negotiations having been conducted (except for contractor's letters reducing their rates by some percentage). Further, 442 tenders costing ₹ 756.47 crore under the jurisdiction of CE (S) were accepted on single bids in the first call itself. Also, test check of 118 cases in five offices<sup>46</sup> revealed that specific orders accepting the tenders were not issued by the Government. As per the Government order of June 2009, it was necessary to have specific orders issued by Government justifying the acceptance of bids. Instead of rejecting the tenders by TSC, they were recommended for acceptance which were marked as "approved" by the Secretary. Even after formation of TAC, these tenders were not subjected to review by it. Thus, the procedure adopted by TSC was not in compliance with various instructions of Government and resulted in extra financial implication of ₹ 100.34 crore as calculated in **Table 3.2:** 

Table 3.2: Tenders with tender premium above 10 per cent recommended by TSC (₹ in crore)

Office	Type of work	No of contracts	Amount put to tender	Contract price	Calculated loss due to excess premium accepted over 10 per cent	Average tender percentage above CSR
CE, C&B	Roads	442	648.23	756.47	43.42	16.70
(South)	Buildings	344	413.27	488.00	33.40	18.08
Zone	Bridges	27	43.20	52.06	4.54	20.51
CE, C&B	Roads	169	273.42	312.51	11.75	13.91
(North)	Buildings	72	86.35	101.49	6.51	17.53
Zone	Bridges	3	9.31	10.96	0.72	17.72
			TOTAL	1,721.49	100.34	

(Source: Register of Tenders of respective Zonal Offices)

The action of the TSC in accepting tenders with substantially high premium undermines the basic essence of KTPP Act and instructions there under.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> EEs, No. 2 building Division, Bangalore, Chickmagalur, Chitradurga and Special Division, Shimoga and Chief Engineer, Communication and Buildings (North), Dharwad

#### 3.1.1.9 Award of contracts

# Award of contracts without obtaining performance security

The contract conditions stipulate that Performance Security Deposit (PSD) at five *per cent* of the contract value should be furnished by the successful bidder within 20 days from the date of communication of acceptance of tender. Failure to furnish the same would lead to cancellation of tenders and forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit (EMD).

In three divisions, during 2008-13, the EEs entrusted 94 works valued at ₹ 221.34 crore to contractors without obtaining PSD aggregating to ₹ 11.07 crore based on the request of contractors to recover the same from running account bills. This not only violated the tender conditions but also resulted in extending undue financial benefits to contractors.

#### Award of contracts without additional performance security

The Clause 25.5 of prescribed contract document (KW-4) stipulate that wherever the rates quoted by a contractor are seriously unbalanced in relation to the estimated cost of the work to be performed, the employer may recover Additional Performance Security (APS) to protect against financial loss in case of default by the contractor.

The APS was being recovered when quoted rates were less than the employer's rates but this was not followed by all EEs. Since the term "seriously unbalanced" had not been defined in the contract documents, no uniform practice was followed by EEs. In six cases, APS of ₹ 2.49 crore was not collected even in respect of tenders with rates lesser than the cost of work.

#### Bid adjustment

We noticed that insufficient competition resulting in bid adjustment by tenderers.

- In Road and Buildings Special division, Bangalore, 25 works costing ₹ 4.59 crore for which tenders were invited (2011-12) in a single notification were shared by three bidders. While the bids were rotated in serial order, even the item rates in accepted tender quoted by different bidders remained the same. In another instance of tender notification (2011-12) for 25 works costing ₹ 4.97 crore, only two bidders participated for 22 works and one particular bidder was found to be lowest for all the 22 works.
- In No 2 Buildings division, 26 works tendered during 2012-13 at a procurement cost of ₹ 4.36 crore were rotated between two bidders each securing 12 works and 14 works by quoting tender premium within five *per cent* for the successful bids.

The tendency of bid adjustment inhibited transparency and competition in the procurement process which also affected fair pricing of contracts.

#### 3.1.1.10 Execution of works

#### Change in scope of work after receipt of tenders

➤ The comprehensive improvement of Aurad-Sadashivagad road from km 551.46 to 583.06 (31.60 km) by KRDCL was approved by Government in September 2009.

However, tenders for improvement of the road in the same chainage estimated to cost ₹ 13.83 crore were invited (October 2009) by EE, PWD Belgaum in six packages and tenders received from two agencies for a total of ₹ 17.19 crore was recommended to Government by the TSC for acceptance. As the work was already entrusted to KRDCL for comprehensive improvement, the Secretary to Government in PWD restricted the scope of work to ₹ 4.20 crore with provision of 150 mm WBM, surface dressing and 20 mm premix carpet as wearing course while accepting (November 2009) the tenders. The change in scope of work after receipt of tenders and entrustment thereof with reference to rates quoted for the work as a whole was arbitrary besides violating the KTPP Act. An expenditure of ₹ 5.22 crore was incurred on the work before it was handed over to KRDCL in December 2010.

Besides, the quality of construction was found to be substandard as reported by the Regional Commissioner, Belgaum.

The notice inviting tenders for improvement to Avalahalli – Bhyratti road from km 0 to 11.30 estimated to cost ₹ 18 crore was issued on 11 February 2009 stipulating 11 March 2009 as the last date for submission of bids. The scope of the work was restricted to km 0 to 2.9 with an estimated cost of ₹ 4.50 crore and last date of submission of bids extended to 21 May 2009. While the evaluation of the bids for km 0 to 2.9 was in progress, the work in km 9 to 11.31 was entrusted (August 2009) to the lowest bidder *in lieu* of his tender for 0 to 2.9 km at the quoted rates for km 0 to 2.9 as per suggestion of Minister for Higher Education on the condition that the bill of quantities as well as the cost of work would remain unchanged as notified. Though the entrustment was ratified (October 2009) by Government, the action taken violated the provisions of KTPP Act.

#### Unauthorised widening

The improvement to Kommaghatta–Tavargere road from km 5.25 to 14 in Bangalore South taluk estimated to cost ₹ 12 crore was taken up in three contracts (January 2011 and March 2011) and were completed during January 2012 at an expenditure of ₹ 12.10 crore. Against the approved width of seven meters, the execution of the road surface was carried out to a width varying up to 17 meters in several reaches at an additional expenditure of ₹ 80.35 lakh.

The EE stated (April 2013) that in village limits the road width was more than seven meters and hence construction was taken up uniformly. The reply was

not acceptable as improvement was to be taken up for the existing road which had a carriage width of seven meters and execution of work beyond the approved width by the EE was not in accordance with the sanctioned estimate. The additional expenditure of ₹ 80.35 lakh was thus unauthorised.

# Entrustment of additional reaches without approval

In Kolar Division, improvement of road<sup>47</sup> from Venkatagiri Kote border to Kolar *via* Bethmanagala in Bangarpete taluk was taken up under Central Road Fund with the approval of Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (Ministry) and was entrusted (December 2009) to an agency for ₹ 3.28 crore against the estimated cost of ₹ 3.27 crore. The work was completed in March 2013. Since savings of ₹ 72 lakh were available, the contractor was entrusted with the work of further reaches *i.e.* km 23.35 to 24.10 and 25.75 to 26.40 as variation items costing ₹ 71.60 lakh with the approval (March 2013) of CE. The utilisation of savings towards entrustment of works in reaches not provided in the sanctioned estimate as variation items was unauthorised and improper as variations items always refers to any variation incidental to the sanctioned work provided in the Bill of quantities. Further, approval from Government of India for additional reaches was not obtained before execution.

The EE stated (June 2013) that as it was not possible to execute the work on the same road by two agencies, therefore the balance portion of the work was entrusted to the same agency. The reply was not acceptable as chainages were different and not overlapping. Besides, the variation items should necessarily be incidental to the sanctioned work. Therefore entrustment of additional work out of savings was unauthorised.

#### Execution of variations without approval

The sanction of Government should be obtained for variation exceeding five *per cent* of the contract value as per circular instructions of October 2008. In six divisions, 26 works with procurement value of ₹ 97.53 crore, the variation comprising extra items and excess quantity amounting to ₹ 27.41 crore were approved (2008-13) by the CE/SE though these powers to do so did not exist with them.

Further, in respect of seven works with procurement value of  $\stackrel{?}{\underset{?}{?}}$  26.19 crore, the variation items amounting to  $\stackrel{?}{\underset{?}{?}}$  14.79 crore were executed by EEs without obtaining approval from the competent authority, which amounted to unauthorised execution of works.

The EE, Shimoga and Chitradurga agreed (June 2013) to obtain approval of Government.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Reaches in kms 13.50 to 18.55, 21.80 to 23.55, 24.10 to 25.75 and 29.10 to 32.50

#### Irregular substitution of work

Tenders were invited (July 2011) for resurfacing of SH-57 in km 207 to 216.40. While technical evaluation was in progress, SE suggested (25.07.2011) not to take up the work as the road length had been handed over to KSHDP for improvement. Instead, it was suggested to take up improvement works in SH 26 from chainage zero to seven km. Disregarding these instructions, the EE entrusted (September 2011) the work in SH 57 to an agency for ₹ 76.66 lakh allowing three months for completion. Simultaneously, the EE without even entering into separate agreement allowed the same agency to carry out the work on SH 26 from zero to seven km at the rates and items contracted as per agreement for SH 57. While no work was carried out on SH 57, an amount of ₹ 73 lakh was spent on SH 26 (March 2013).

Allowing the contractor to carry out the work in SH 26 without even a formal agreement and rate list not only violated the KTPP Act and codal provisions, but also the action taken was unauthorised in the absence of competent financial and technical approval for work in SH 26. It was also not clear if the work on SH 26 (km zero to seven) was necessary as no detailed estimate was prepared and got approved.

#### 3.1.1.11 Enforcement of risk clause

#### Non-enforcement of contractual provisions

The terms of the contract stipulate levy of liquidated damages (LD), for delays in completion of the project or failure to achieve the stipulated progress as per milestone.

In 10 test checked divisions, 66 works with contract value of ₹ 116.33 crore were finalised without recovering LD from the contractors despite inordinate delay in completion of these works which ranged between one to 36 months. The LD leviable works out to ₹ 11.38 crore. We also noticed that in 24 works costing ₹ 46.45 crore, the EEs (Hadagali, Haveri and Special Division, Shimoga) levied LD less than the prescribed amount in the agreement resulting in short recovery of ₹ 4.46 crore. The EE, Kolar and Chickmagalur agreed to recover the amounts.

Failure to levy LD not only violated the contract conditions but also amounted to extending unintended financial benefit of ₹ 11.38 crore to the contractors.

#### Non recovery of extra cost

The contract conditions provides for recovery of extra cost in case of rescinding of contract.

The construction of Mini Vidhanasoudha at Bangarpet (Kolar Division) estimated to cost ₹ 1.50 crore was entrusted (May 2007) to an agency for ₹ 1.56 crore for completion by May 2008. The contractor had stopped the work after showing a progress of ₹ 21,350. The contract was rescinded

(August 2008) by the CE at the risk and cost of the contractor and the balance work was entrusted (May 2011) to a second agency for ₹ 2.38 crore with stipulation to complete the work by 30 November 2012. However, the extra cost ₹ 82.65 lakh<sup>48</sup> was not recovered from the first agency.

The EE stated (June 2013) that proposals will be submitted to competent authority and further action will be taken to recover the extra cost. However, in view of the delay of 32 months in re-entrusting the work, the possibility of recovery of extra cost appears to be doubtful.

# 3.1.1.12 Deposit works

# Commencement of work before receipt of money

The "Work of construction of Rail Over Bridge" at Bhadravathy estimated to cost ₹ 12.60 crore was taken up (March 2010) on equal sharing basis with Railways. The estimate was revised (December 2011) with railways share of contribution at ₹ 8.94 crore as accepted by Railways. Though an expenditure of ₹ 11.01 crore had been incurred up to March 2013, only ₹ two crore had been received (February 2012) from the Railways. The non receipt of the balance amount of ₹ 6.94 crore from the Railways has affected the timely completion of work.

#### 3.1.1.13 Quality control

Government issued (February 2010) detailed guidelines making both the implementing divisions and quality control divisions fully responsible for quality of works executed, renaming the existing quality control system into 'Quality Assurance System'. The QC is headed by an officer of the rank of SE functioning under the administrative control of respective CEs'.

Review of records in four test checked divisions<sup>49</sup> under South Zone and records in Quality Assurance division, Dharwad (North Zone) revealed that the guidelines stipulated (February 2010) by Government for quality assurance of works executed were not followed as mentioned below:

- ➤ Reports on scrutiny of designs and surprise inspection carried out by the Quality Assurance Sub divisional officer were not being forwarded to the work monitoring cell.
- Compliance to 595 reports of inspection (April 2008 to March 2013) of Quality Assurance Divisions, Dharwad was not furnished by nine working divisions as of May 2013;
- ➤ No objection Certificates were not being obtained by implementing divisions nor issued by Quality Assurance divisions;

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Cost of balance work retendered (₹238.28 lakh) – cost of balance work as per original tender (₹155.63 lakh)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Special Division Shimoga, Chitradurga, Chickmagalur and No. 2 Buildings Division, Bangalore

➤ Other than testing construction materials and random scrutiny of works, no other quality control checks, scrutiny of approved designs and submission of reports to Works Monitoring Cell, inspection of works on completion, *etc.*, were carried out.

A review of quality control inspection reports on 26 works estimated to cost ₹ 111.95 crore, received by the CE, C&B (North) Zone, Dharwad, revealed that the observations relating to defective works, use of sub standard material *etc.*, had not been followed up by the zonal office as compliance to the deficiencies pointed out was not on record.

Review of reports in the Works Monitoring Cell at Government also revealed that reports on scrutiny of approved designs on works as also surprise inspection of laboratories conducted by Quality Assurance sub divisions were not being received by them.

The EE, Quality Assurance Division, Dharwad, while, accepting the audit observations attributed (March 2013) the shortfall in Quality Assurance performance to inadequate staff. EE also stated that indents for field tests and list of completed works for issue of NOC's were not being received from implementing divisions.

Though proposals had been submitted (March 2010) by SE, Quality Assurance Circle, Dharwad, seeking additional manpower for effective quality assurance functions, CE, C&B (North), Dharwad, had sought Government permission to continue with the quality control mechanism as existed earlier. Noncompliance with prescribed guidelines by executing divisions coupled with inadequate staff in quality control divisions largely defeated the objectives of total quality assurance on works.

#### **3.1.1.14 Conclusion**

We observe that despite the recommendations of Dr. Nanjundappa Committee, the Department did not prepare a sustainable road development plan setting forth targets particularly to address the deficiencies in more backward and less backward taluks. Authorities consistently failed to follow the Codal provisions, provisions of KTPP Act and Rules, and directions of Government in the procurement process. Failure to observe fair contract management practices affected economy in tendering. Renewals of roads were not based on sustained action plan or as per prescribed norms which contributed to avoidable expenditure. Sanctions accorded by authorities were devoid of propriety and were not consistent with financial rules governing it. Effective quality assurance envisaged by Government was not implemented due to staff constraints.

#### 3.1.1.15 Recommendations

We recommend that;

- Government may formulate a sustainable road development plan for effective implementation of road works;
- Compliance to the KTPP Act and rules made there under should be ensured;
- Work should be selected with objectivity and scope of work regulated as per approved norms;
- Sanctions accorded should be consistent with the financial rules governing it;
- Quality Assurance Wing to be made an independent wing directly reporting to Government and adequate manpower deployed for effective working of the divisions.

The matter was referred to Government in September 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

# 3.1.2 Irregularities in release of funds and execution of works in Magadi

#### 3.1.2.1 Introduction

The Government provides annual grants under different heads of account to public works divisions for construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and buildings. Detailed provisions are enumerated in Karnataka Budget Manual (KBM) as well as Departmental Code, Accounts Code and Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurements (KTPP) Act for preparation of budget estimates, for obtaining legislative sanction for works, preparation of estimate for works, invitation and award of contracts for procurement of goods and services and measurement and payment for works.

The Public Works, Ports & Inland Water Transport Department (PWD) Sub Division Magadi, in Ramanagara district was allocated grants of ₹ 250.62 crore during 2011-12 under several major heads of account<sup>50</sup> for improvement and maintenance of roads. The sub division prepared 1,946 estimates, out of which 1,549 estimates were sanctioned by SE splitting up works costing less than ₹ 20 lakh and awarded on manual tender basis with a stipulation to complete within two months. Out of 1,311 works entrusted to the contractors, 737 works were reported to have been completed and the total expenditure incurred to the end of 31 December 2012 was ₹ 137.86 crore. The status of the remaining 574 works was not verifiable from the records made available to audit.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> 3054, 5054, 2059 and 2216

# 3.1.2.2 Report of Joint Inspection Team and Legislature House Committee

Following allegations from elected representatives on large scale financial irregularities in the execution of road works in Magadi Sub-Division, the Government ordered ((June 2012) a joint inspection of works by the SE, Quality Assurance Circle, Bangalore and the EE, Work Monitoring Cell. The Government also directed not to make payment of bills and instructed that all tender process relating to these works be kept in abeyance until completion of the probe. Accordingly, the Chief Engineer (South) constituted (August 2012) an Inspection Team headed by SE to probe all aspects right from utilisation of grants to execution of works. The Inspection Team, besides scrutiny of records, also conducted physical verification of several works randomly selected and submitted (March 2013) their report to the Chief Engineer. The Inspection Team recommended cancellation of work orders, deletion of entries in the measurement books, recovery of amount etc., Further, a Legislature House Committee (Committee) took up (February 2013) the matter suo motu and recommended (April 2013) to the Government for rectification of the works, recovery of amount from contractors and taking action against the departmental officials responsible for the irregularities. The Report was placed (June 2013) in the House.

The Department replied (November 2013) that Executive Engineer, Assistant Executive Engineer and concerned Engineers in charge of works had been suspended and ₹ 5.33 crore had been recovered from contractors besides cancellation of 288 works as per the report of Inspection Team.

#### **Audit Findings**

Audit scrutiny of records of the PWD Secretariat in Government, Chief Engineer, Communication and Buildings (South Zone), Bangalore (CE), SE and the EE (March-August 2013) showed various lapses and irregularities. The audit findings are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. From our assessment, the authorities at different levels in the system failed to exercise necessary controls leading to large scale financial irregularities as detailed below:

#### 3.1.2.3 Disproportionate allotment of grants

In accordance with provisions (Paragraphs 132 to 134) of KBM, budgetary grants for 'Plan' heads are provided through Appendix-'E' which contains the list of ongoing works as well as fresh works proposed after administrative approval and technical sanction had been accorded by the competent authority and after prioritising the works in the order of urgency. For maintenance and repairs of roads, bulk grants are allotted by Government for further distribution to executing divisions based on length and category of road under its jurisdiction. The works are taken up after obtaining approval from SE, who is the competent authority for approval of programme of works of a division under his control.

The Appendix-E' of 2011-12 for road works prepared for only one major head of account (5054-Other Road Formation) included 85 works pertaining to Magadi subdivision with a budgetary allocation of ₹ 4.94 crore. The non-preparation of Appendix-'E' for other capital heads enabled allotment as bulk grants without having list of works, in violation of KBM provisions.

In addition, during 2011-12, total grant of ₹ 245.68<sup>51</sup> crore were allotted under different heads of account to Magadi Sub-division for road works. The grants so allotted represented an increase of nearly 27 times over the average grants allotted to Magadi Sub-Division during preceding three years. The details of grants allotted during 2008-12 were as shown in **Chart 3.2**:




Chart 3.2: Grants allotted during 2008-12

(Source: Committee report for 2008-09 to 2010-11 and Appendix 'E' and grant letters for 2011-12)

Out of the total grants of ₹ 250.62 crore allotted to Magadi sub division, ₹ 110.58 crore were under 'Plan' head ("5054-Renewals of State Highways (SH)" - ₹ 58 crore, "5054-SH maintenance" - ₹ 28.14 crore, "5054-Suvarna Vikasa" - ₹ 19 crore, 5054 -ORF - ₹ 0.50 crore and through Appendix-'E' - ₹ 4.94 crore) and ₹ 140.04 crore were allotted under 'Revenue' Head of Account - 3054 for maintenance and repairs of roads under Chief Minister's Grameena Raste Abhivrudhi Yojane (CMGRAY), 13<sup>th</sup> Finance Commission grants and Roads and Bridges. The grants excluding Appendix-'E' allocations were allotted by different authorities are shown in **Chart 3.3**:




Chart 3.3: Allocation of grants by different authorities

(Source: Grant release letters)

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Capital head -5054- ₹ 105.64 crore and Revenue head 3054- ₹ 140.04 crore

Our scrutiny revealed that;

- ➤ The Secretary/Internal Financial Adviser (IFA) did not ensure that the grants were allotted to works under capital heads of accounts only after approval by State Legislature resulting in unauthorised expenditure. There was no indication in release orders of IFA to the effect that approval of Secretary was obtained and hence issue of release orders by IFA was irregular.
- ➤ The CE allotted grants of ₹ 24.13 crore meant for 'original' and 'repair' works to Magadi Sub-division alone.
- ➤ Similarly, the SE irregularly allotted grants of ₹ 188 crore to Magadi Subdivision which were released for allocation among all the PWD divisions in his jurisdiction. The SE did not ensure prioritisation of works as per the prescribed rules and procedure nor did he submit the budget estimates to the Government.

The Department replied (November 2013) that grants were released based on the request by MLAs and works proposed by the elected representatives. Accordingly, the programme of works were submitted and approved by the competent authority.

The reply was not acceptable as the procedure laid down in the Budget Manual was not followed in allotment of grants as the works were to be identified and included in the Appendix-'E' for obtaining legislature approval before allotment of grants. Thus, the procedure adopted in release of grants by various authorities under capital head of accounts was irregular and improper.

# 3.1.2.4 Deficiencies in preparation and sanction of estimates

#### Splitting of estimates and programme of works

Paragraphs 167 and 192 (b) of Public Works Departmental Code prohibit splitting up of work just to bring it within the sanctioning limit of an officer and should be resorted to only in exceptional cases with the prior approval of the authority who is competent to accept the tender for the work as a whole. The circular instructions of Government (March 2011), while reiterating these provisions also stipulated that all the works relating to a single road should be clubbed and awarded for execution on "package tender basis".

We, however, noticed that contrary to the codal provisions and circular instructions of Government, EE prepared 1,311 estimates of works each costing below ₹ 20 lakh. This splitting up facilitated invitation of manual tenders to avoid e-procurement and also obviated the necessity of securing the approval of Government which would have been required had they been tendered on a package basis.

Further, we noticed that in as many as 24 instances covering 1,005 works costing ₹ 155.70 crore, the programme of works was approved by SE on the same day of their submission by EE, which indicated lack of proper scrutiny, especially in view of a large number of road works been proposed outside the jurisdiction of Magadi Sub-Division.

The Department replied (November 2013) that works taken up under different heads during 2011-12 were based on the proposals of people's representatives. The reply was not acceptable as the estimates were split up below ₹ 20 lakh in all these cases and thus sanction accorded by competent authority was improper.

# Preparation of estimates in excess of the road length

The Magadi Sub-division under its jurisdiction was having three State Highways (SH) for a length of 114.53 km and 15 Major District Roads (MDR) for a length of 161.35 km. During 2010-11, 26.83 km of SH 3 was transferred to KSHIP<sup>52</sup> for improvement under a World Bank aided project and thus the effective length of SH reduced to 87.70 km either for improvement or their maintenance.

We noticed that 553 improvement works for a length of 179.72 km costing ₹ 109.40 crore in respect of four MDRs and two SH were sanctioned as against the actual total length of 130.30 km of these roads under its jurisdiction. The excess length of road thus sanctioned was 49.42 km and financial implications of executing these excess length of road works was ₹ 30.09 crore, out of which ₹ 9.19 crore had already been paid (Appendix 3.1).

The Department replied (November 2013) that based on request of elected representatives, approach road improvement were carried out and ₹ 5.33 crore had been recovered so far as recommended by the Inspection Team.

The reply was not acceptable as the works proposed by the elected representatives do not fall under the jurisdiction of PWD. The departmental officers were required to appraise the correct position to the elected representatives as the connecting/link roads are under the jurisdiction of another authority *i.e.* PRI divisions instead of sanctioning the work. Thus, the execution of works outside the jurisdiction was highly irregular.

# Inadequate details in estimates and fictitious estimates

The sanctioned estimates did not indicate chainages and instead mentioned areas falling in village limit, temple premises, panchayat office, in front of a house, *etc.*, thereby making it difficult to identify the reaches where work was proposed to be tackled. We noticed that in as many as 189 cases, more than one estimate was prepared for the same works leading to fictitious estimates. The SE, however, while sanctioning these estimates did not notice the repetition of works. The total estimated cost of these 189 works was ₹ 35.96 crore, out of which ₹ 22.50 crore had already been paid. The amount already paid included ₹ 10.36 crore relating to 53 fictitious estimates. The Inspection Team constituted by CE concluded that in many cases, the section officers in charge of work failed to identify the works and therefore recommended recovery of ₹ 42.43 crore towards extra length not tackled though payments were made.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Karnataka State Highways Improvement Project

The Department stated (November 2013) that as the kilometer stones in some of the roads in Magadi Sub Division are not existed and hence the estimates indicated only the land marks *i.e.*, near village limit, temple premises, panchayat office, *etc*. The reply was not acceptable as the estimates could always have included chainage details which are fixed entities which do not vary with presence or absence of milestones. The execution of several works could not be identified by Inspection Team during physical inspection due to absence of chainage details. Hence, sanction accorded by competent authority for the estimates which did not disclose relevant chainage details were incorrect and resulted in irregularities.

# Road inventory not maintained

We observed that road inventory was not maintained in the Sub-Division or Division in respect of repairs and improvement works carried out in the past as required under IRC-SP-19-2001. Evidently, the improvement works were taken up without having adequate data.

The Department replied (November 2013) that road inventory data would be updated periodically.

#### Lack of transparency in tendering process

The KTPP Act provides that the works costing ₹ 20 lakh and above shall be done only through e-procurement.

Out of 1,946 works sanctioned, 368 were tackled on piece work system and 11 works were entrusted through e-procurement platform. Since works were split and kept below ₹ 20 lakh, manual tenders were invited for the remaining 1,549 works through 48 notifications. Out of these, 256 works covered under seven notifications were not executed and only 1,311 works under 41 notifications were awarded to contractors for execution.

We observed following irregularities in tender process which not only lacked transparency but also favoured selected few contractors for award of work.

- ➤ The EE invited (August 2011 March 2012) short term tenders for all the 1,311 works under 41 notifications. The time allowed for submission of tenders was less than a week which was contrary to the provisions of KTPP Act, which prescribe minimum bidding time of 30 days.
- ➤ The bidders were required to deposit Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) of 2.5 per cent of value of amount put to tender along with bidding documents. Though, EMD amounting to ₹ 6.35 crore was not submitted by any of the bidders, the bids received were evaluated, accepted and works were awarded in gross violation of conditions governing acceptance of tenders.
- The circular instructions of the Government (June 2007 and January 2010), provided that single bids received with high tender premium and in response to first tender call itself should not be either recommended or accepted and the single bids received in the first tender

call where premium would not fall below five per cent even after negotiations, should be rejected. However, single bids received for 351 works under 18 tender notifications, in response to the first tender call were accepted.

- ➤ The bids including Schedule 'B' were required to be signed by the contractor and documents produced to audit did not contain signature of the participated bidders in respect of 321 works.
- As per Clause 24.1 of Section 2-Instructions to tenderers, the contractor should furnish performance security of five *per cent* of the contract value within 20 days from the date of acceptance of tenders. The non-furnishing of such performance security entails cancellation of award of contract and forfeiture of EMD. We noticed that in all these cases, work orders were issued without complying with the tender conditions, which was in violation of Transparency Act.
- ➤ The tender proceedings were not openly conducted and the tender proceedings were not kept on record.

The Inspection Team recommended 453 work orders involving ₹ 22.71 crore for cancellation as they were issued before acceptance of tenders.

The Department while accepting (November 2013) the tender irregularities stated that lapses occurred due to heavy work load, minimum bidding time was not allowed as the estimates were sanctioned at the tail end of the financial year, bidders deposited the EMD, *etc*. The Department also stated that 453 work orders involving ₹ 22.71 crore were cancelled as recommended by the Inspection Team.

The reply reinforces the dangers of rush of expenditure at the tail end of the financial year. However, we observed that not all expenditures were sanctioned at end of financial year; some were sanctioned as early as August 2011. The manual tendering process was abused to favour few contractors and vindicated by the fact that as many as 453 work orders involving ₹22.71 crore were cancelled due to irregular tender process.

#### Undue Favour to contractors

Three contractors were awarded 891 contracts valuing ₹ 175.48 crore as detailed in **Table 3.3:** 

Table 3.3: Details of award of contracts

Sl. No.	Contractor's name	Number of contracts awarded	Value of contracts (₹ in crore)	
1	Sri Nanjaiah	396	78.20	
2	Sri Kemparaju	270	53.28	
3	Sri Shankar	225	44.00	

(Source: Information furnished by Division)

Clause 3.1 of the standard bid document stipulate formula for evaluation of available tender capacity of bidder for award of contracts. The formula takes into consideration the turnover during the last five years, tender period and works on hand. However, we observed that contracts aggregating to ₹ 44 crore to ₹ 78.20 crore were awarded to three contractors without considering the works already awarded. Had the bid capacity been properly evaluated by EE with reference to the total number of works entrusted to each contractor, above contractors would not have qualified.

The Controlling Officers failed to notice these violations and take appropriate action when copies of acceptance of tenders were received by them.

The Department replied (November 2013) that based on the tender process the works were entrusted to the successful bidder. The reply was not acceptable as the evaluation of tender was not carried out properly and single contractor was awarded large number of works.

#### 3.1.2.5 Execution of works outside the jurisdiction

During 2011-12, 451 estimates costing ₹ 86.24 crore were sanctioned for improvement of roads under village limits, approach roads to MDR/SH, etc., which did not primarily come under the jurisdiction of PWD but with Panchayat Raj Engineering Divisions. These works were taken up without obtaining prior consent of authority under whose jurisdiction these roads came. Since the details viz., total length of the road, its condition, works carried out previously and traffic data were not available with the PWD, taking up these road works was irregular. The sanction for these ineligible works was conveyed under head of account "5054- SHs Renewals" despite these roads not being SHs. Payment of ₹ 54.68 crore for 289 out of these 451 ineligible works had already been made to the contractors.

The Department replied (November 2013) that as recommended by the Inspection Team action would be taken to recover the excess paid to the contractors and  $\mathfrak{T}$  5.33 crore had been recovered so far.

The reply was silent about irregularities in other works not verified by the Inspection Team in view of gross violation of procedures at all stages for all works pointed out elsewhere in the report.

# 3.1.2.6 Measurements of unduly large number of works on a single day

The provisions under Appendix VII of KPWD Code stipulate that EEs should check measure final claims of all works costing ₹ 25,000 and above, at least to the extent of 25 *per cent* of such measurements, before admitting the claims for payment and a Register of Check Measurements should be maintained for the purpose.

Scrutiny of sub-divisional records revealed that:

Check measurements was not done by EE for any of the works.

As seen from the running account bills paid, measurement and check measurement of works ranging from 25 to 85 works were done on a single day by section officer in charge of work and the Sub-divisional Officer, which was impracticable as works were situated at different places and involved taking measurement of several items. Thus, measurements for large number of works recorded as done on a single day cast serious doubts about the accuracy of measurements.

The Inspection Team pointed out that extra works aggregating 372 works valued at ₹ 71.23 crore were recorded in measurements books and recommended for their cancellation.

The Department accepted (November 2013) that so many works could not be accurately measured on a single day and as directed by the Inspection Team, 288 numbers of works estimates as well as agreements were cancelled. However, status of remaining 84 works as recommended for cancellation by Inspection Team was not furnished.

# 3.1.2.7 Fraudulent payment of bills

We noticed that the Sub Division prepared fake bills in respect of nine works which were already passed for payment by misrepresenting facts such as referring to the Measurement Book (MB) which was issued to some other Sub division and referring to the MB which recorded measurements of different works. The total fraudulent payment so made was ₹ 1.70 crore (**Appendix 3.2**).

The Department did not furnish any specific reply to the observation and recovery made in this regard

# 3.1.2.8 Undue benefit to contractors by premature refund of performance security

As per provisions of the contract, refund of performance security (PS) should be made based on the requisition of the contractor and after expiry of the period prescribed in the contract after completion of work. The refund bill duly signed by the departmental officer and acknowledged by the contractor should indicate reference to recoveries of PS effected and credited to Deposit head originally.

We noticed that PS aggregating to ₹ 6.78 crore was recovered in running account bills in respect of 178 works and released to the contractors, without requisition of such refund, before expiry of the prescribed period of 24 months from the date of completion of work. The refund bills did not contain the signatures of the contractors, the sub divisional Officer and the EE. There was no reference to voucher number and the date in which the PS was originally recovered and credited to Deposits head.

The Department while accepting the lapses stated (November 2013) that the same would be avoided in future.

# 3.1.2.9 Quality control of works

Quality control reports from the Quality Control Division of PWD were not made available by the Division in respect of these road improvement works. Hence, the quality of works could not be verified in audit.

The Department replied (November 2013) that due to rush of works QC reports of some of the works have not been observed and agreed to follow in future.

# 3.1.2.10 Lack of Monitoring of works and Internal control failures

There was total lack of monitoring and supervision by any of the higher authorities (EE/SE/CE) during the course of execution of works although the SE/CE were required to regularly monitor and supervise these works as per Paragraph 9 to 29 of KPWD Code. Quality control reports were not available with the Department in respect of any of the works claimed to have been executed.

The Secretary/IFA failed to obtain a complete list of works proposed to be under taken by the CE/SE/EE in respect of allocated grants, even though a huge amount of the allocated grants under capital heads were passed on without enlistment under Appendix E. The IFA and Secretary were also failed to correlate monthly expenditure statement received from subordinate officer with details of works in progress. IFA is required to conduct meeting of their controlling officer every month and to monitor the expenditure as per circular instructions of July 2003.

The CE allocated grants to the extent of ₹212.13 crore without prioritising the works as per the prescribed procedure and did not submit any budget estimates to the Government. The CE failed to monitor the progress of works and did not conduct departmental inspection of the division/sub division thereby resulting in total absence of budgetary and expenditure controls.

The SE did not exercise proper checks after irregularly allocating/diverting grants to extent of ₹ 188 crore to the sub division. As per the provision of PWD code, technical scrutiny of estimates has to be carried out by the SE/EE. However the SE failed to detect the following irregularities:

- Estimates without chainage-wise details,
- Duplicate estimates,
- Splitting up of estimates,
- Execution of works without his approval.

The SE did not monitor the progress of works during the monthly meetings as they did not figure in the monthly progress reports of the division.

The EE split up the estimates to bring all the 1,311 works within his powers to invite manual tenders. The EE did not ensure maintenance of Register of Tenders and Tender Opening Register to record all the details of tender proceedings. The EE did not check measure or inspect any of the works executed by the sub-division. The EE failed to appraise the higher authorities about the progress of works executed in the division/sub division.

The Divisional Accountant (DA) has to assist and advise the EE on financial matters, up keeping of accounts and due compliance with the rules and procedures prescribed by the Government. The DA, as an Internal Auditor and Financial Advisor, failed to highlight the ongoing irregularities and their implications. The DA failed to score out all items of work recorded in the MB after the bill is passed for payment and a reference to the voucher number, date and the amount of payment recorded in the MB could have prevented more than one payment in respect of the same work. The DA did not advise the EE against premature refund of PS and failed to detect irregular remittance of royalty to Deposits head.

Government in their Circular (August 1993) instructions have fixed target for conducting surprise checks of works apart from regular checks by CE/SE/EE<sup>53</sup> to improve the quality and progress of works and submit a report on such inspections/checks in the prescribed form to the Government. The Divisional Officer is also expected to inspect the accounts records of sub-division office and to check a percentage of initial accounts as per Paragraph 444 of Departmental Code.

We observed that no such inspections were carried out by CE/SE/EE in respect of the works executed in the Magadi sub division during 2011-12.

The Department did not furnish any specific reply to the observation and reasons for not conducting surprise inspection in respect of works executed in Magadi Sub-Division.

#### **3.1.2.11 Conclusion**

Grants of ₹ 250.62 crore were allotted to subdivision without ascertaining necessity and absence of Appendix 'E' facilitated allotment of bulk grants for original and capital nature of works contrary to codal provisions. The works proposed for village roads, link roads though not under the jurisdiction and road length exceeding the actual road length was approved by controlling officer without proper scrutiny. The estimates were split below ₹ 20 lakh in order to invite manual tenders and tendering process was violated at every stage to favour few contractors. There were irregularities in taking measurements and EE did not check measure the works to the extent prescribed before payment of bills. There were instances of payment by creating fake bills and duplication of estimates. The bills of road improvement works were paid without quality control reports. Thus, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> CE – Minimum five works per month; SE – Minimum eight works per month; EE – Minimum 12 works per month

expenditure of ₹ 75.93 crore incurred on excess road length, ineligible works, duplicate works and on account of double payments was indicative of fraudulent payments. The quality control reports in respect of road improvement works were not produced. The monitoring was lacking and Controlling Officers did not conduct surprise checks in respect of works executed by Magadi Sub division during 2011-12.

#### 3.1.2.12 Recommendations

- ➤ The Government in Finance Department should ensure timely preparation of Appendix-'E' before release of funds;
- ➤ The Controlling Officers should not sanction the estimates which do not include all relevant details;
- ➤ The funds should not be allotted for works falling under other jurisdictional authorities;
- ➤ All excess payments should be recovered at the earliest and works orders and extra measurements recorded should be cancelled as recommended by Inspection Team;
- ➤ The Government may consider giving wide publicity in the departmental websites about the Notification Inviting Tenders, works in progress with details up to chainage level and also invite the views of the stake holders as to the quality of works executed;
- ➤ Signage boards at work spots should be exhibited displaying details of works as done in NABARD assisted projects for Public awareness;
- ➤ Register of Road should be scrupulously maintained in all divisions to indicate the complete history of works undertaken on the road in lines of the Codal provisions;
- ➤ The treasury which performs financial check on vouchers presented for payment should check whether details of works have been noted on the voucher including specific area chainage, etc.

The matter was referred to Government in September 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

# 3.1.3 Irregularities in execution of road improvement works

Adoption of unrealistic vehicle damage factor by consultants in road improvement estimates resulted in overdesigning of pavement thickness and avoidable extra cost of  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{\checkmark}{}}$  42.83 crore. Irregular appointment of project management consultant, led to irregular/excess payment of  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{\checkmark}{}}$  1.59 crore.

The IRC guidelines (IRC 37-2001) specify the Vehicle Damage Factor (VDF) should be carefully arrived at by conducting Axle Load Surveys (ALS) and realistic values should be considered for designing the pavement thickness. If the project size does not warrant ALS, the guidelines recommend adoption of

indicative values of VDF based on traffic density of commercial vehicles during design life and minimum factor being 1.5 and maximum of 4.5.

Government sanctioned (February/June 2009) ₹ 212 crore for improvement, strengthening and upgradation of 105 km of road in Mandya and Mysore districts to provide good roads for pilgrims visiting Panchalinga Darshana<sup>54</sup> (PD) event at Talakad to be held in November 2009. The Chief Engineer accorded technical sanction to six estimates submitted by the Consultant in February 2009/June 2009.

The contracts of four works were awarded between May 2009 and September 2009 to M/s RMN Infrastructure Limited<sup>55</sup> and M/s VDB Projects Limited and the remaining two works were awarded in May 2010 and June 2010 to M/s G Balaraj and M/s RMN Infrastructure Limited. Out of four works awarded before the PD, only two works were scheduled for completion (November 2009) before the PD but none of the works could be completed as scheduled. Five works were completed between March 2011 and November 2012 while one work was still under progress (May 2013). The total expenditure incurred on works was ₹ 196.75 crore.

Our scrutiny of records in EE, PW&IWTD, Mysore (February 2013) showed improper planning, unwarranted expenditure on account of excess pavement thickness as well as extra payment to project management consultants in execution of work as brought in succeeding paragraphs.

#### Uneconomical design due to excessive pavement thickness

The preparation of Detailed Project Report (DPR) with cost estimates for road improvement works under PD was entrusted to a consultant at a cost of ₹ 92.56 lakh. The consultant had adopted VDF value of 20.28 obtained from ALS for calculating design traffic and finalised pavement thickness. The ALS conducted was found deficient as detailed below:

- ➤ The terms of reference only mentioned that traffic analysis to be made in terms of numbers from the data supplied by the Department and did not specify conducting ALS by the consultant.
- The ALS was conducted on a sample size of just 84 two axle vehicles against the traffic density of 1,098 commercial vehicles which includes tandem/multi axle vehicles.
- ALS was done at only one place *i.e.*, Sargur Hand Post and the VDF value so derived was adopted for other roads also contrary to guidelines.
- ➤ The IRC guidelines also stipulate that origin and destination survey should also be conducted along with ALS. However, no origin and destination survey was conducted by the consultant.
- ➤ The maximum prescribed VDF value being 4.5 as per IRC guidelines, the VDF value of 20.28 adopted exceeded the prescribed maximum value.

55 Three works

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> The Panchalinga Darshana is held at Talakad in Karnataka and involves the darshana of five shivaling during an auspicious period as per Hindu Panchanga

Adoption of higher VDF value resulted in overdesigning of pavement thickness leading to avoidable extra cost of ₹ 42.83 crore as detailed in **Appendix 3.3**.

The Superintending Engineer (SE) stated (April 2013) that the ALS was conducted at Sargur Hand Post to get a realistic value of VDF and designed for worst scenario. SE also stated that the roads were running in wet lands and subjected to heavy loading. The reply was not acceptable as department had not specified ALS and neither approved sample size nor class of vehicles, date, duration, location, *etc.*, in order to obtain realistic VDF values. The consultant had worked out minimum (3.45) and maximum (20.28) VDF but had adopted maximum VDF as realistic value without citing any reasons.

#### Irregular appointment of project management consultants

Government approved (August 2009) appointment of project management consultants (PMC) for completion of road works before PD and the consultant who had prepared DPR was appointed as PMC on short term tender basis for one year period at a contract price of ₹ 4.13 crore. The selection of PMC was flawed as eligibility criterion was changed after invitation of tenders. The bidding conditions stipulated that the consultants or joint venture partner should have rendered similar services for a value of ₹ 30 crore in Karnataka with minimum annual turnover of ₹ 1.50 crore in any of the preceding three years and possess valid accreditation certificate issued by National Accreditation Board for Testing & Calibration Laboratories (NABL). The CE modified this criterion to include "associates" after issue of request for proposals for PMC:

- ➤ The modification was done only to suit particular firm as the consultant who was appointed as PMC was incorporated only during previous year (September 2008) and did not possess NABL certificate. The consultant had entered into "memorandum of understanding" with another firm having NABL certificate and therefore eligibility criterion was modified to include "associates". The consultant did not satisfy the financial criteria as it had not rendered similar services in Karnataka for the value of ₹ 30 crore.
- ➤ The PMC contract was awarded in December 2009 for a period of one year. The change in eligible criteria subsequently was made only to suit the particular consulting firm as it was already supervising the road works from September 2009 *i.e.* before award of PMC contract. Thus, the tender process was vitiated and award of contract was irregular.
- The agreement was also defective leading to irregular and excess payment. The PMC was appointed in December 2009 for supervision of six works at a contract price of ₹ 4.13 crore (1.95 per cent of estimated value of six works) and payable at monthly rate of ₹ 34.45 lakh. The consultant was paid for the period from 15 September 2009 to 15 September 2010. The payment of ₹ 1.03 crore for the period from September 2009 to December 2009 was irregular and hence recoverable as the period was before PMC contract was awarded.

- The payment to PMC as per agreement was to be made at ₹ 34.45 lakh per month for supervising all the six road works for one year, but only four road works were awarded at the time of agreement in December 2009 and two works were awarded only during May/June 2010. Thus, PMC actually supervised only four works from December 2009 to May 2010. Hence, the payment for this period was to be limited for these four works but paid for all the works which resulted in excess payment of ₹ 56 lakh towards the service not rendered.
- Further, the objective of Government to appoint PMC was to complete the works before PD that was scheduled in November 2009. However, the PMC was appointed (December 2009) only after the PD. The delay defeated the very purpose of appointment of PMC and expenditure of ₹4.13 crore was unjustified.

The SE replied (April 2013) that the payment of ₹ 1.03 crore made to PMC prior to agreement would be reviewed for taking necessary action.

The matter was referred to Government in March 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

#### 3.1.4 Loss of revenue due to illegal sand mining

Uncontrolled illegal sand mining in Mulbagal taluk of Kolar district resulted in loss of revenue of ₹ 2.54 crore to Government in respect of three sand blocks

The sand mining was under the control of the Department of Mines and Geology (DMG) till 2010-11. The sand deposited along the river banks was disposed through public auction by the DMG. However, many sand deposits could not be disposed/auctioned due to various reasons. In order to overcome this problem, the Government of Karnataka formulated the Karnataka Sand Policy 2011 effective from 01 April 2011. The Public Works, Ports and Inland Water Transport Department (PWD) was entrusted with the responsibility of quarrying and sale of sand deposits in all identified blocks under the monitoring and guidance of the concerned Deputy Commissioner (DC) of the District in co-operation with other Government Departments through co-ordination committees formed for this purpose.

Accordingly, a District Sand Monitoring Committee (DSMC) was formed (February 2011) in Kolar district under the Chairmanship of the DC. The PWD and DMG jointly inspected (February 2011) all sand deposits of the district and identified 20 blocks estimated to possess 9.42 lakh cum of sand in five taluks of the district. The committee approved (August 2011) quarrying in only 20 blocks and to establish nine check posts.

The Executive Engineer, PWD, Kolar (EE) invited tenders (November 2011) for quarrying operations for 11 approved blocks with the estimated quantity of 5.26 lakh cum and bids for three blocks (estimated quantity 2.10 lakh cum) (Block No. 5, 7 and 8) of Mulbagal taluk were received. The agreements were executed with three contractors on 30 and 31 January 2012 for 1.25 lakh cum. The contractors commenced sand mining from 06 February 2012 and had

extracted 29,434 cum in three blocks as of 27 August 2012. The Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD, Mulbagal in letter of 31 August 2012 informed EE about the non-availability of further quantities of sand in these three blocks and requested that matter be referred to Director, Mines & Geology for further action. Thereafter the quarrying was stopped. Tenders were not invited for the remaining 17 blocks including eight blocks for which no bids were received in the first call.

From the scrutiny (November 2012 and June 2013) of the records of EE, PWD, Kolar, we observed that there was large scale illegal sand mining in Mulbagal taluk during 2011 and 2012 as reported by the different offices<sup>56</sup>. Further, we observed that in Mulbagal taluk, only two check posts were operated from January 2012 by the DSMC though 82 *per cent* of sand deposits of the district were identified as available, whereas other taluks where very small percentage of (7.90 and 4)<sup>57</sup> sand deposits were provided with two check posts. Thus, the number of check posts operated in Mulbagal taluk was found insufficient.

Thus, illegal sand mining lead to shortage of 0.96 lakh cum of sand in the three blocks and loss of revenue amounting to  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{?}{?}}$  2.54 crore at the rate of  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{?}{?}}$  265<sup>58</sup> per cum being recovered from public towards cost of sand *minus* extraction cost.

The extent of illegal mining in other blocks of Mulbagal taluk and resultant loss of revenue could not be assessed as no survey/assessment was conducted after February 2011.

The EE stated (November 2012/June 2013) that there was not much sand available as assessed and the remaining sand is not of good quality and stopping of illegal mining/transportation is the duty of all the departments who are members of DSMC and that the sand quarries were identified on visual survey and points fixed by using GPRS. The EE stated that number of check posts were operated as per the decision of the DSMC, additional manpower required for extraction of sand was not provided by Government and that other departments could not effectively control the illegal mining of sand leading to loss to Government.

Reply regarding the quality of sand was not acceptable as there was no proof with the Department having conducted any tests regarding the quality of sand remaining in the quarries. Further there were no measurements of the sand pits excavated for extraction of sand and thus there were no control mechanisms to assess the quantity removed from the quarries.

The matter was referred to Government in May 2013, their reply is awaited (December 2013).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Tahsildar, AEE, PWD Sub Division, Mulbagal, EE, PWD Division, Kolar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Bangarpet, Kolar taluks

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> ₹ 600 – ₹ 335 = ₹ 265

# 3.1.5 Unintended benefit

Failure to levy liquidated damages as per the contractual provisions for road works executed after completion of the defect liability period resulted in unintended benefit of  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{?}{\sim}} 2.16$  crore to a contractor

The contract of "Upgradation of Road from Krishna Bridge to Lokapur" for a length of 55.63 km forming part of Karnataka State Highways Improvement Project (KSHIP) was awarded (May 2004) to a contractor for ₹ 67.62 crore and a consultant designated as "the Engineer" (Project Management Consultant− PMC) was appointed for administration and management of contract. The work was to be executed against prescribed milestones (MS) with overall completion in 30 months. The agreement clauses provides for issue of Taking Over Certificate (TOC) for any milestone on its substantial completion as per certificate of the Engineer and for levy of liquidated damages (LD)<sup>59</sup> for each day of delay in completion subject to a maximum of 10 per cent of the contract value.

The completion of work under all MS was delayed on account of delay in acquisition and handing over of land/removal of encumbrances, heavy/unseasonal rains, execution of additional utility ducts, etc., and extension of time was approved by Project Director (PD) on recommendations of the Engineer. The Engineer issued (September 2007) TOC for all the MS on the ground that the works were substantially completed on 30 June 2006, 13 June 2007 and 19 June 2007 after obtaining an undertaking from the contractor that the outstanding works<sup>60</sup> would be completed within the Defect Liability Period (DLP) of one year. The total payments including price adiustments made to contractor was ₹ 77.71 crore. The MS-wise details of work are as given in **Table 3.4**:

Extension Date of Date of Mile Stone/ Date of commencement/due of time completion length take over date for completion of DLP approved MS-I/15km 30.06.2006 30.06.2007 14.05.2004/13.05.2005 23.05.2006 MS-II/24 km 14.05.2004/13.05.2006 13.06.2007 13.06.2007 13.06.2008

20.06.2007

19.06.2007

19.06.2008

Table 3.4: Milestone-wise details of work

We noticed (October 2011) from the records in the Office of the PD that the works under all the MS were completed at the end of January 2008. The Engineer certified that contractor had completed all incomplete items within DLP but actually balance works (₹ 1.48 crore) under MS-I were completed after DLP and delay works out to 215 days (01 July 2007 to 31 January 2008). The Certificate issued by the Engineer was accepted (July 2009) by KSHIP for final settlement of the bill though it was factually not correct. The delay in completion of work attracts levy of LD. However, LD for 37 days for the period from 24 May 2006 to 30 June 2006 was only proposed. The LD

14.05.2004/13.11.2006

MS-III/16.63km

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> At ₹ 1.00.254 for MS-I. ₹ 1.63.507 for MS-II and ₹ 3.71.607 for MS-III

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> MS I - ₹ 3.86 crore, MS II - ₹ 3.97 crore and MS III - ₹ 4.51 crore

recoverable for 215 days in respect of MS-I works out to ₹ 2.16 crore (₹ 1,00,254 per day) which was not recovered resulting in unintended benefit to the contractor

Government stated (September 2013) that the Steering Committee, which is the competent authority, had approved the extension of time on the recommendations of the Engineer and that the Engineer issued completion certificate on substantial completion of work as per the condition of contract. Government also stated that liquidated damages of ₹ 74.18 lakh has been levied for MS-I for 37 days, the time elapsed between extension of time and issue of TOC. Government further stated that LD clause ceases after the TOC was issued. The reply was not acceptable as Clause 48 stipulates two dates for completion of permanent works (to be executed as per contract), one relating to substantial completion for which TOC is issued by the Engineer and the other for completion of balance works during DLP as indicated in the TOC for each section. Thus, failure of the contractor to complete the balance work within DLP attracts LD for the number of days elapsed between time of completion and date indicated in the TOC, as per provisions of LD clause.

#### 3.1.6 Avoidable extra cost

Use of higher grade cement concrete for leveling course resulted in avoidable extra cost of  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{\checkmark}}$  97.43 lakh and unintended benefit of  $\stackrel{?}{\stackrel{\checkmark}}$  41.43 lakh to contractors due to consumption of lesser quantity of cement than specified in the tender documents.

The cement concrete pavement is designed based on IRC 15:2002 and IRC 58:2002. The IRC guidelines stipulate a course of dry lean concrete (DLC) of 100 mm thickness over prepared subgrade base and M-40 cement concrete of 300 mm thickness.

The Government gave (February 2011) administrative approval to the work of improvement of 8.5 km in selected reaches of State Highways (48 and 69) divided into nine reaches at an estimated cost of ₹ 25 crore which involved construction of cement concrete over the existing bituminous road which had worn out at several places. As per the request of the Department, the Professor & Head of Department of Civil Engineering, National Institute of Technology, (Consultant) Karnataka, Suratkal after inspection (December 2010) initially suggested (11 January 2011) providing DLC as leveling course in places where Semi Dense Bituminous Concrete (SDBC) had worn out and later revised (20 January 2011) to richer mix i.e., M-15 cement grade concrete. The Chief Engineer, Communications & Buildings (North), Dharwad (CE) technically sanctioned (February/March 2011) the works which falls under the jurisdiction of two divisions<sup>61</sup>. The works were awarded (between July 2011 and November 2011) for ₹ 25.10 crore on tender to different contractors and were under progress. An expenditure of ₹ 16.80 crore was incurred (March 2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Executive Engineers, Karwar and Sirsi Divisions

Our scrutiny (February and May 2013) of records showed avoidable extra cost and unintended benefit to the contractors aggregating to ₹ 1.39 crore as brought in the succeeding paragraphs:

#### Unwarranted use of higher grade CC for leveling course

The consultant had suggested use of CC M-15 in place of 100 mm DLC, as DLC would not withstand the load as traffic could not be diverted to alternate route during construction period. Accordingly, the sanctioned estimates provided CC M-15 as leveling course below the CC M-40 pavement. In the absence of alternate roads, the work has to be carried out in half portion of the road allowing other half portion for traffic movement as per Clause 112 of Specification for Road and Bridge Works (Fourth revision). The pavement thickness arrived by Consultant based on traffic loads was 300 mm of CC M-40 and hence CC M-15 grade provided with lesser thickness (100 mm) and also lower grade mix<sup>62</sup> would not withstand the traffic load. The DLC as leveling course as recommended initially was justified and use of CC M-15 grade was avoidable in view of the actual execution. The injudicious decision in providing CC M-15 grade resulted in extra cost of ₹ 97.43 lakh.

The Executive Engineer, PWD, Karwar stated (February 2013) that the DLC has to be laid only on sub grade and for laying DLC the entire Black Top surface was to be scarified and rebuilt with Granular Sub Base and Wet Mix Macadam which would be costlier. The CC M-15 was considered since leveling course has to be laid on bituminous surface.

The reply was not acceptable since IRC recommends laying of DLC as a sub base above the sub grade. In the instant case, the DLC was suggested by Consultant for leveling course on the existing damaged surface and change was done on non-technical grounds.

#### Unintended benefit to contractors

The sanctioned estimates provided with 480 kg per cum for CC M-40 item and rate was revised accordingly for inviting tenders. During execution, the Quality Control authorities approved (November/December 2011) design mix of 425 kg per cum for CC M-40 grade item and hence usage of cement was less than that specified in tender. However, the differential cost of 55 kg per cum in cement usage was not recovered from contractors bills which had resulted in unintended benefit of ₹ 41.43 lakh to the contractors.

The Executive Engineer, PWD, Sirsi agreed (May 2013) to recover the amount from the contractors.

The matter was referred to Government in July 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Compared to M40 grade mix

#### 3.1.7 Avoidable extra cost

Improper procedure followed in taking up construction of building works belonging to other departments resulted in avoidable extra cost of ₹ 92.82 lakh to Government

As per Paragraph 105 of Karnataka Public Works Departmental Code, the PWD accords administrative approval and technical sanction to works falling under its jurisdiction. For works belonging to other departments, the PWD technically sanctions the work for taking up execution after obtaining administrative approval from department concerned. The communication of administrative approval by other departments meant authorisation to PWD to take up the work and it is the duty of the concerned department to provide funds for execution.

The Secretary, Social Welfare Department (SWD) accorded administrative approval (March 2005) for construction of two boys hostel buildings<sup>63</sup> for backward class students at an estimated cost of ₹ 1.08 crore based on the proposals (2004-05) sent by Chief Engineer, Communication & Buildings (North), Dharwad (CE), who had assured availability of funds under major head of account (MHA) 4225 - Capital Outlay on Welfare of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and other Backward Classes. The contracts were awarded (March 2007) to two contractors at the tender cost of ₹ 1.14 crore<sup>64</sup> for completion in nine months and twelve months excluding monsoon period. The contractors achieved a financial progress of ₹ 18.33 lakh<sup>65</sup> and execution of works were stopped (March 2008) due to non-payment of bills by PWD. The bills could not be paid as funds under MHA 4225 were not made available by SWD. The Director, SWD informed (May 2008) PWD that it had taken up 150 new works and also stated that the administrative approval was accorded as availability of fund was assured by PWD. The pending bills were cleared (March 2010) by PWD by charging to MHA 4059-Capital Outlay on Public Works. As both the contractors gave willingness (November 2011) to execute the balance works as per Schedule of Rates of 2011-12 (SR), the revised estimates for two works aggregating to ₹ 2.12 crore were approved (June 2012) with cost escalation of ₹ 1.04 crore. The supplementary agreements for balance work of ₹ 1.33 crore and ₹ 55.25 lakh were executed (November 2012) with contractors for completion in May 2013. The works were not yet completed though expenditure of ₹ 1.31 crore had been incurred on the two works (May 2013).

Scrutiny of records (October 2012) of the Executive Engineer, PWP&IWTD Division, Bagalkote (EE) showed that grants of ₹ 42.90 lakh was provided in Appendix 'E' by the PWD for these works in the year 2004-05 but lapsed as works were not taken up during the year, as administrative approval was not received. The grants were not provided in the subsequent two years. Though,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> At Jamakhandi (estimated cost ₹ 75 lakh ) and at Savalagi (estimated cost ₹ 33 lakh)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> ₹ 78.26 lakh + ₹ 35.75 lakh

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Physical progress of works: Jamakhandi – up to lintel level, Savalagi – up to plinth level

a provision of ₹ 43.50 lakh was made in budget for the year 2007-08, the bills amounting to ₹ 18.33 lakh submitted (up to January 2008) by the contractors were not paid as funds were not released by SWD. The SWD insisted that the initial sanction itself was given with the condition that PWD had proposed the works by assuring funds itself. The PWD had to provide funds under MHA 4059 for completion of works. The proposal forwarded by PWD to take up the works was irregular and in contravention of provisions as the user department proposed the works by according administrative approval and hence was also responsible to provide funds for execution by PWD. Following improper procedures and failure to take remedial action resulted in delay of five years in construction of hostels leading to non-provision of intended benefits to the backward class students and avoidable extra cost of ₹ 92.82 lakh 66 to Government.

The EE stated (October 2012) that the work was sanctioned by the SWD and the delay was due to non-allotment of grants by the user department (SWD). The reply did not clarify as to why the initial proposal by PWD was accepted though it was in contravention of rule and why the rule was invoked later only to seek administrative approval from SWD, since PWD was already providing funds for the purpose. Because of the lack of coordination between PWD and SWD, there was cost escalation in the project.

The matter was referred to Government in July 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

#### COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT

#### 3.1.8 Loss due to under recovery of cost

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board allotted developed plots to three industrial units at Narasapura Industrial Area at subsidised rates against the approval accorded by Government for allotment of undeveloped land resulting in loss of ₹ 104.40 crore.

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (Board) approved (August 2010) formation of Narasapura Industrial Area layout (NIA) and fixed tentative price (FTP) at ₹ 85 lakh per *acre* (LPA) to allottees. In addition to the FTP, ₹ 6.70 LPA was payable by allottee towards Tertiary Treated Water (TTW).

The Government accorded (November 2010) in principle approval for establishing aerospace components, structures and assembly unit proposed by M/s Mahindra Aerospace Private Limited (MAPL) and allotted (January 2011) 12 *acres* of undeveloped land at subsidised rate of ₹ 42.65<sup>67</sup> LPA plus TTW cost of ₹ 6.70 LPA. The Board allotted (February 2011) 12 *acres* to MAPL. The MAPL had also requested for allotment of additional land of eight *acres* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Value of work as per supplementary agreement (₹188.50 lakh) *minus* value of balance work as per original agreement (₹95.68 lakh)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Includes five *per cent* premium for corner site

which was approved (May 2011) by Government and alternate developed land of 20 *acres in lieu* of original allotment was allotted.

The Government concurred (September 2011 and November 2011) to the allotment of 96 *acres* of land to M/s Honda Motorcycles and Scooter India Private Limited (HSMI) for establishing their third factory and 12 *acres* of land to M/s Cerebra Integrated Technologies Limited for establishing "E-Waste Re-cycling Plant" as proposed (August 2011) by the Board at the subsidised rate of ₹ 40.62 LPA similar to allotment made in respect of MAPL. The Board while approving the allotment of 96 *acres* to HMSI resolved (November 2011) that any additional land to HMSI would be allotted at regular rate of ₹ 85 LPA. However, the additional land of 23.05 *acres* to HMSI was allotted (September 2012) at the same subsidised rate by Board in contradiction to its earlier resolution. Thus, HMSI was allotted totally 119.05 *acres* of developed land at subsidised rate.

We observed (February/July 2013) that the total development cost for establishing NIA was ₹ 462.09 crore with allotable area of 418.29 *acres*. Thus, the cost per *acre* of allotable area works out to ₹ 1.10 crore. Though, Government in their letters (November 2010, May 2011, September 2011, November 2011 and September 2012) approved the Board's proposal of allotment of undeveloped land at subsidised rate, the Board allotted developed plots at subsidised rate to these three firms which resulted in loss of ₹ 104.40 crore<sup>68</sup>.

The Government stated (December 2013) that Board has resolved (July 2013) for revision of the tentative allotment rate to ₹ 138.50 LPA for allotments made at NIA excluding bulk allotment made at subsidised rates to three companies since they are anchor industries in the field of automobiles which attracts vendor industries. There would be no loss to the Board in view of revision of tentative allotment rates to other allottees.

The reply was not acceptable as:

- As per prevailing rules, there is no provision to fix or approve any cross subsidised rate in allotment of land and to adjust under recovery of cost from one set of industries against cost on vendor industries.
- ➤ The July 2013 Board resolution was an afterthought and resolved after issue of audit observation. Recovery of differential cost from other allottees is highly doubtful as their consent had not been obtained for *post facto* escalation.
- ➤ The Government had ordered for allotment of undeveloped lands to these two companies but Board allotted developed lands.
- ➤ The anchor industry is defined as an "industry with capital investment of ₹ 500 crore or more in the first phase and having minimum of 15 vendor units in the same industrial area". As per this definition, the MAPL cannot be categorised as anchor industry as their capital investment was ₹ 284 crore only.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> MAPL { 20 acres × (₹ 110 lakh - ₹ 42.651 lakh)} = ₹ 13.47 crore + HMSI {119.05 acres × (₹ 110 lakh - ₹ 40.62 lakh)} = ₹ 82.60 crore + M/s Cerebra Integrated Technologies Ltd (12 acres x (₹ 110 lakh -40.62 lakh)) = ₹ 8.33 crore

#### 3.1.9 Undue benefit due to excess sanction of incentive

The Government sanctioned excess interest free loan in violation of provisions of Industrial Policy 2009-14. The Government also irregularly released ₹ 20.94 crore even before commencement of commercial production from the expanded capacity.

The Government introduced (February 2009) Industrial Policy 2009-14 (new IP) effective from April 2009 in place of IP 2006-11(Original IP)<sup>69</sup> to attract more investments and spur industrial growth in the State. The new IP offered various incentives and concessions for investments made on or after 01 April 2009 to the extent of at least 50 *per cent* of the original investment. The State Level Co-ordination Committee (SLCC) approved (May 2009) operational guidelines for granting various incentives and concessions offered in the new IP. As per operational guidelines, a unit which had obtained benefits during implementation stage of original IP was also entitled for other benefits under new IP, provided,

- ➤ Sanction and first release of loan by financial institutions/banks should be after 01 April 2009.
- ➤ Orders for supply of machinery should be placed only after 01 April 2009.
- ➤ Date of commercial production should be in operational period of new IP.

M/s Jaykay Cements Limited<sup>70</sup> (Company) proposed to establish (1997) one<sup>71</sup> million tons per annum (MTPA) capacity cement manufacture plant at Muddapur village in Bagalkot district at an investment of ₹ 300 crore. The Company's proposal to increase the capacity of plant to 2.5 MTPA including two power plants at total investment of ₹ 750 crore was approved by Government in February 2007. The Company was granted (February 2007) incentives (entry tax/special entry tax exemption of ₹ 8.97 crore – up to July 2009) and concessions in terms of original IP subject to commissioning of plant within two years. The Company's subsequent proposal (April 2008) to enhance the capacity of the plant to three MTPA and 50 MW captive power plant at a total investment of ₹ 850 crore was approved by Government in February 2010. The Company had commenced commercial production in October 2009. The Company sought (February 2010) for grant of "interest free loan on VAT", a new incentive introduced in new IP.

The Commissioner, Commerce & Industries Department, (DIC) recommended (May 2010) for approval of the proposal. The Government rejected (May 2010) the recommendation for the reasons that company had (i) already exercised its option (13 February 2007) to avail benefit under original IP and availed entry tax/special entry tax exemption up to March 2009, (ii) already availed loan of ₹ 525 crore from financial institutions, (iii) invested more than 50 *per cent* of the project cost of ₹ 750 crore prior to 01 April 2009.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> In force from 01 April 2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Renamed as M/s JK Cement Works

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Expandable to 2 MTPA

Following Company's representation, the issue was referred to SLCC which recommended (October 2010) for extending benefits as per new IP subject to repayment of entry tax exemption availed by company under original IP for the reasons that company had (i) not placed supply order for all the machinery prior to 01 April 2009, (ii) availed benefits under original IP before the introduction of new IP, (iii) not exercised option to remain under original IP in terms of Annexe-5 of new IP, etc.

Accordingly, Government issued order in October 2010 and DIC issued (July 2011) VAT Loan Eligibility Certificate (New Enterprises) for ₹ 521.39 crore being 50 *per cent* of the value of the investment on fixed assets (₹ 1,042 crore) as "interest free VAT loan", which could be availed in 10 years. The loan was repayable in four annual instalments on completion of 10 years from the date of release of loan.

We observed (February 2013) that grant of "interest free VAT loan" was incorrect as company did not fulfill the conditions laid down in operational conditions referred to in the introductory paragraph, since;

- ➤ loan to company was sanctioned<sup>72</sup> by financial institutions prior to April 2009 and it had invested ₹ 771.42 crore before 01 April 2009; out of which ₹ 425.42 crore was towards supply of machinery.
- ➤ the output from plant had not exceeded 2.5 MTPA as total production was 1.82 MTPA during 2011-12 and commercial production of the expanded capacity had not commenced.

The Company has fulfilled only the condition of additional investment towards expansion *i.e.* ₹ 271.58 crore (₹ 1,042 crore *minus* ₹ 771.42 crore). Therefore, the Company was eligible for "interest free VAT loan" of ₹ 135.79 crore (50 *per cent* of ₹ 271.58 crore) as against ₹ 521 crore sanctioned and excess incentive granted was ₹ 385.21 crore. Further, the Company had been granted the incentive of ₹ 20.92 crore (as of August 2012) even before it had commenced commercial production from expanded capacity and the release of incentive was irregular and recoverable along with interest.

The Commissioner stated (May 2013) that:

- the incentive to the Company has been allowed as per clause 'K' of conditions of the Industrial policy 2009-14 and also stated that the earlier decision of the Government refusing the benefit was not in order.
- the Company availed incentive under 2006-11 policy as 2006-11 policy only was in force at the time of project clearance and entry tax exemption on the capital goods brought was claimed under the said policy. To continue in 2006-11 policy exercising option again was mandatory, which was not done by the Company.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Investment made by the Company before 1 April 2009: Plant & Machinery- ₹ 425.42 crore, Foundations & other expenses - ₹ 280.00 crore, and Land & *etc*-₹ 66 crore

 the investment made prior to 01 April 2009 and after 01 April 2009 cannot be treated as under two different policies but should be treated as under one policy.

The reply was not acceptable for the following reasons:

- ➤ Government initially rejected the proposal for reason that more than 50 per cent of the project cost was invested prior to 1 April 2009 and that the Company had already availed entry/special entry tax exemption up to 31 March 2009. The option under Clause 'K' of the new IP is applicable for availing incentives and concessions under previous IP. Hence, the option was not applicable for those who had already availed incentives and concessions under previous IP.
- The exercising of option as per Annexe-5 of new IP was mandatory only for availing capital investment subsidy which was introduced in new IP for large and mega projects, which was also extended to units covered by previous IP in order to remove disparity between the two IPs. Such option was to be exercised before 30 June 2009. Therefore, by not exercising option, the Company does not qualify to come over to new IP.
- As per operational guidelines, the quantum of incentives has to be regulated based on additional investments made after 1 April 2009. Therefore, incentive granted on ₹ 771.42 crore invested prior to 1 April 2009 resulted in extending undue benefit to the Company.

Allowing the Company to refund the benefit already availed under previous IP was a new condition stated by Government in the sanction order to benefit the Company which was not contemplated under new IP.

The matter was referred to Government in March 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

#### 3.1.10 Avoidable liability due to misinterpretation of rules

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board had to bear tax liability due to non-deduction of income tax at source from land compensation payments. This resulted in excess payment of  $\ref{taylor}$  12.08 crore to land owners besides loss of  $\ref{taylor}$  1.58 crore towards payment of interest.

The Karnataka Financial Code<sup>73</sup> stipulates that the Drawing and Disbursing Officer should deduct all statutory deductions from the bills before making payment and any violation in this regard would be considered as negligence. Further, as per Section 194-LA<sup>74</sup> of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act), any person responsible for making payment should deduct 10 *per cent* as income tax out of compensation payment, exceeding ₹ one lakh in a financial year, towards compulsory acquisition of immovable property, under any law, other

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Article 3 read with Article 341

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Effective from 01 October 2004

than agricultural land. The tax deducted at source should be credited to Government account within prescribed date. Any default in observing the statutory provisions entails payment of tax with simple interest<sup>75</sup> by the person responsible to deduct tax.

We observed (January 2013) from records of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) that statutory provisions were not followed by Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) in following cases causing unwarranted liability to the Board:

The Income Tax Officer, Hubli (ITO) conducted (August 2011) survey of records of SLAO, KIADB, Dharwad covering the period from May 2010 to April 2011 and found that income tax was not deducted from compensation amount of ₹ 144.48 crore paid to 28 land owners for acquisition of their immovable property other than agricultural lands. During the enquiry proceedings, the SLAO cited circular issued (December 2001) by State Government for non-deduction of tax at source and deduction was resumed after instructions (April 2011) from higher SLAO further stated that the KIADB would take the authorities. responsibility for collecting the tax due from land owners and remit to the income tax department. The explanation was rejected by the income tax authorities who held (September 2011) SLAO as "assessee in default" and issued notice (September 2011) under section 156 of IT Act for financial year 2010-11 (assessment year 2011-12) demanding a sum of ₹ 16.02 crore (Principal - ₹ 14.44 crore, interest - ₹ 1.58 crore) with directions to pay the same within 30 days. The demand was reduced as some land owners had filed income tax returns for TDS amount aggregating to ₹ 2.36 crore. As the payment was not made by SLAO, the tax authorities attached (December 2011) the bank accounts of SLAO and deducted a sum of ₹ 13.66 crore (Principal - ₹ 12.08 crore, interest -₹ 1.58 crore). Thus, failure to deduct tax at source by SLAO resulted in excess payment to land owners in addition to causing avoidable liability of ₹ 13.66 crore to the Board. The Controller of Finance, KIADB had instructed (February 2012) recovery of the amount from the land owners.

The Government stated (December 2013) that an amount of ₹ 4.15 crore has been recovered by SLAO, Dharwad up to March 2013. However, it was observed that only the principal amount was recovered and the amount paid towards interest was not being recovered.

For delay in remittance of tax – at 1.5 *per cent* from the date on which tax was deducted to date of remittance {Section 201 (1A) of IT Act, 1961}

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> For non-deduction of tax – at one *per cent* interest from date on which tax was deductible on tax amount not deducted (Section 201 (1) of IT Act 1961

### INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT

#### 3.1.11 Excess release of grants

The improper and deficient scrutiny in release of grants for establishing biotechnology finishing schools resulted in excess release of grants towards ineligible investments aggregating to ₹ 7.93 crore, out of this ₹ 4.39 crore remain unutilised.

As a part of Biotech Policy II (Policy), the Government of Karnataka announced (July 2009) establishment of Biotechnology Finishing Schools (BTFS) and constituted (May 2010) a Selection Committee (SC) for framing guidelines regarding course content, duration, selection procedure, university affiliation, *etc*. Based on the guidelines submitted (May 2010) by SC, the Government approved (June 2010/December 2010) establishment of 12 finishing schools and extended financial assistance to a maximum of 25 *per cent* of the cost of necessary laboratory equipment, gadgets and instruments procured. The reimbursement was subject to a maximum of ₹ one crore per school and the following conditions were to be satisfied:

- The schools shall procure the required equipment and other related gadgets relevant to the courses offered as per the list approved by SC, and
- ➤ the procurements so made would be scrutinised and inspected by the committee for recommending for release of Government share.

As per the recommendation of SC in December 2010, the reimbursement procedure was changed (February/May 2011) to advance release of grants. Government released (February 2011/May 2011) ₹ six crore to 12 schools (₹ 50 lakh per school) through Managing Director, Karnataka Biotechnology and Information Technology Services (KBITS) established on 07 December 2000, as a Society under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act. It was also specified that further release would be considered after the institutions invest their share of 75 per cent in the setting up of the BTFS and any investment made prior to Government Order shall not be counted for determining their share. The KBITS was required to furnish Utilisation Certificate (UC) through Director, Information Technology and Bio-Technology, Bangalore.

The balance grant of ₹ six crore was released to all the BTFS by KBITS during June 2012 based on the UCs submitted by the institutions and report (April 2012) of Inspection Committee set up by the SC.

From the records of Director, Department of Information Technology & Biotechnology, we observed that the grants were released despite the finishing schools not complying with the stipulated conditions. The scrutiny by SC/KBITS was deficient and improper monitoring resulted in excess release of grants for the reasons stated below:

- > SC had not approved the list of required equipment and other related gadgets before release of first tranche of grants, as per sanction orders.
- > SC members inspected the institutions between January and March 2012 *i.e.* before release of second installment of grant of ₹ six crore. As per the report of inspection, the cost of procurement of equipment/gadgets from Government grant ranged from ₹ 28 lakh to ₹ 48 lakh in respect of seven BTFS and details regarding remaining five were not on record.
- As seen from the expenditure statements and UCs furnished by the 12 institutions, we noticed that investments made prior to cut-off period which were not to be counted towards 75 per cent share were included besides expenses towards ineligible items viz., construction of buildings, site development, leased area cost, electrical installations, furniture, mini bus, salaries and administrative expenditure and hence these items were not reimbursable. The total expenses incurred by each of the 12 institutions towards procurement of equipment/instruments/gadgets ranged between ₹ 0.42 crore and ₹ 2.97 crore and hence several institutions were not even eligible to receive second instalment of grant as they had not invested their 75 per cent share.
- ➤ As of May 2013, the unspent balances from Government contribution held by 11 institutions was ₹ 4.39 crore *i.e.* more than one-third of total grant released by Government. These details were obtained at the instance of audit which evidently indicates that monitoring was poor.

The actual expenditure incurred by the institutions towards procurement of equipment/gadgets during the eligible period (June 2010 to May 2013) aggregates to  $\stackrel{?}{\underset{?}{|}}$  16.36 crore and against the 25 per cent grant of  $\stackrel{?}{\underset{?}{|}}$  4.07 crore eligible for release to them,  $\stackrel{?}{\underset{?}{|}}$  12 crore was released. The improper scrutiny and lack of monitoring resulted in excess release of  $\stackrel{?}{\underset{?}{|}}$  7.93 crore.

Government replied (August 2013) that, an inspection committee constituted to inspect and report about the infrastructure setup and utilisation of grants by the institutions for BTFS has reported that the total investment by each institution in setting up of BTFS was more than ₹ three crore. Government also stated that instruments/equipment are not available off the shelf and hence not all the institutions could procure them before the start of the academic course.

The reply was not acceptable as financial assistance to a maximum of 25 per cent was only towards cost of necessary laboratory instruments, gadgets and equipment and does not include cost of infrastructure.

#### 3.2 Audit against propriety/Expenditure without justification

Authorisation of expenditure from public funds is to be guided by the principles of propriety and efficiency. Authorities empowered to incur expenditure are expected to enforce the same vigilance as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in respect of his own money and should enforce

financial order and strict economy at every step. Audit has noticed instances of impropriety and extra expenditure, some of which are hereunder.

#### FOREST, ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT

#### 3.2.1 Wasteful expenditure

The work of rejuvenation of Channapatna lake in Hassan town, which was de-notified a decade earlier, was stopped mid-way leading to wasteful expenditure of ₹ 3.57 crore.

The rejuvenation of Channapatna lake in Hassan town, covering an area of 159.39 acres, was taken up under National Lake Conservation Plan for which Government of India (GOI) provides 70 per cent grant and balance to be borne by State Government. The lake had turned dry with extensive weed growth and sewerage was also let into the lake. The project was mooted by Lake Development Authority (LDA), Karnataka in response to a request of then Hon'ble Member of Parliament, Hassan. The cost was estimated at ₹ 6.35 crore by Government of Karnataka (GoK). However, GOI accorded (January 2005) sanction for ₹ 4.97 crore by deleting items of works like construction of boat jetty, providing electrical works and the fountains etc., and reducing quantity in some other items. The LDA technically sanctioned (July 2005) the work and entrusted (July 2005) the work to Deputy Commissioner, Hassan (DC) who in turn appointed Hassan Urban Development Authority (HUDA) as the implementing agency. The work portion costing ₹ 4.42 crore was entrusted (October 2005) to a contractor for completion in 12 months excluding rainy season. The contractor had stopped execution of the work in April 2006 after achieving financial progress to the extent of ₹ 3.28 crore. The unspent balance available with LDA/HUDA was ₹ 68 lakh out of the ₹ 4.24 crore received from GOI.

The non-completion of work was discussed in several meetings and the DC after inspection (December 2009) reported that the project would not serve the intended purposes by completing balance work as several deviations had taken place in execution of work. A proposal was sent to LDA by DC to re-design the project with an additional cost of ₹ 27.21 crore. The contract was terminated in January 2010 and it was decided to assign the project to more technically competent department. The Empowered Committee of LDA directed (April 2010) DC to fix responsibility on the concerned for deviation/delay in execution of work and rejected the modified proposal. The LDA asked (October 2010) the DC to return the fund released under the project; while DC informed (February 2011) the State Government that the work was executed as per the estimate approved by LDA. The LDA while furnishing (November 2012) the status report to GOI stated that the whole work was carried out in an unplanned manner and more importance was given to urbanisation in the form of setting up of bus stand and office buildings etc. The LDA further stated that intended purpose cannot be achieved by completing balance work and sought advice for refunding the unspent balance. No progress was made in this regard and rejuvenation of the lake was not achieved after incurring an expenditure of ₹ 3.57 crore.

We observed (February 2012/June 2013) from the records of DC, LDA that the lake was not in existence when rejuvenation work was taken up by LDA in 2003. In November 1996 itself, the Government had taken decision to de-notify the command area of the lake which had turned highly polluted causing health hazard due to discharge of sewerage and decision to de-notify was taken as per the recommendation of Karnataka State Pollution Control Board in consultation with Department of Health/Agriculture and Hassan City Municipal Council. The notification was issued and the lake was breached in December 1996 by the DC in pursuance of Government direction for allotment of lake bed at market price to Urban Development Department for development to overcome health hazard.

There were railway tracks built on the lake bed and 55 *acres* of lake bed was allotted to different agencies by the DC for urban development and water source had dried up. Hence, the decision to rejuvenate a non-existing lake by LDA was irregular and DC/HUDA failed to appraise the factual position to LDA in 2003. The circumstances under which a non-existing lake was sought to be rejuvenated by the LDA without formal hand over by Government were not forthcoming from the records. The rejuvenation proposal had resulted in wasteful expenditure of ₹ 3.57 crore and despite this, the DC had further proposed for additional expenditure of ₹ 27.21 crore.

The LDA initially stated (June 2013) that the work was taken up as per request of people's representative and also stated that notices have been issued to DC to enquire into diversion of lake land for non-lake activities and to refund the amount. However, the CEO, LDA admitted (September 2013) that the lake was not handed over to LDA either through notification or Government Order. Thus, rejuvenating the lake by LDA was devoid of authority as likelihood of fructification was remote and consequently there was a wasteful expenditure of ₹ 3.57 crore.

The matter was referred to Government in July 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

#### WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT – MINOR IRRIGATION

#### 3.2.2 Avoidable outlay on ill-conceived project

The work of improvements to a percolation tank were taken up without conducting adequate survey and assessing benefits. The work remained incomplete due to land acquisition problems whereas cost of land acquisition had increased by four times.

The Government approved (March 2010) 'Improvements to Mysorammanadoddi tank' in Anekal taluk, Bangalore Urban district at an estimated cost of ₹ 2.20 crore with the objective of increasing storage capacity of the tank from 0.0234 million cubic meter (mcum) to 0.1012 mcum. It was anticipated that these improvements would increase the yield from the bore-

wells in surrounding areas and consequently increase the area under irrigation. The sanctioned estimate amongst other items included raising the height of the bund and waste-weir by two meters, removal of silt and also included cost of acquisition of 5.90 hectare (ha) of additional land amounting to ₹ 78.31 lakh.

The contract of civil works was awarded (December 2010) to a contractor at his quoted rates of ₹ 1.32 crore (minus 24.62 per cent of current schedule of rates) for completion in 11 months (August 2011). The contractor could achieve a financial progress of ₹ 78.37 lakh during the contract period before stopping the work (August 2011). The contractor had completed raising the height of the bund and partly completed the work relating to removal of silt, waste-weir, etc. The waste-weir was tackled up to ground level as raising the height further would result in submergence of land which was yet to be acquired. The land acquisition process was still in preliminary stage due to non-receipt of requisite details from revenue authorities. The Sub-Divisional Officer proposed (May 2013) pre-closure of work anticipating considerable delay in land acquisition as preliminary notification under Land Acquisition Act, itself had not commenced. The improvement work which commenced in December 2010 had remained incomplete and the delay would result in further cost overrun.

Scrutiny of records (January 2013) of the Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Bangalore (EE) showed that the survey conducted was deficient and the objective of increasing storage capacity of the tank was not achievable without acquisition of further land as brought out in the succeeding paragraphs:

- Though the objective was to increase the storage capacity of the tank, no survey was conducted to assess the rate of percolation. The cost benefit ratio was not worked out and project report did not contain data on extent of suffering *atchkat*<sup>77</sup>, number of bore-wells, additional area that would be benefitted due to increase in storage capacity, *etc*.
- ➤ The land acquisition process for additional land of 5.90 ha had not commenced as EE had not deposited the amount with revenue authorities. As per information furnished (July 2013) by EE, the cost of land per acre was ₹ 30 lakh and cost of land acquisition works out to ₹ 4.38 crore against provision of ₹ 78.31 lakh, which is grossly inadequate to meet the land acquisition cost.
- ➤ The existing storage capacity of the percolation tank was 0.0234 mcum (23,400 cum) which was proposed to be increased to 0.1012 mcum at an estimated cost of ₹ 2.20 crore involving submergence of additional land. Further, provision for silt removal for 36,334.34 cum was also provided and out of which 29,112.36 cum (0.0291 mcum) had been removed. The silt accumulation in the tank exceeded the existing storage capacity of the tank.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Physical progress: Waste weir up to RL 100m (old level), removal of silt 29,112 cum

<sup>77</sup> Command area

Thus, the project was ill-conceived and taken up without conducting adequate survey to assess the benefit accrue, which resulted in abandonment of the project after incurring an expenditure of ₹ 78.37 lakh.

The EE stated (July 2013) that land acquisition proceedings were held up as revenue authorities had not made available *podi*<sup>78</sup> maps and hence recommendations were made to close the work. EE also stated that silt deposited was 36,334.34 cum and accordingly provision was made in the estimate for its removal.

The reply regarding silt removal was not acceptable as the quantity of silt removed was far in excess of the existing storage capacity of the percolation tank, besides the project report also stated that the water level in the tank was full throughout the year.

The matter was referred to Government in July 2013; their reply is awaited (December 2013).

#### 3.3 Failure of oversight/governance

The Government has an obligation to improve the quality of life of the people for which it works towards fulfilment of certain goals in the area of health, education, development and up gradation of infrastructure and public service *etc*. However, Audit noticed instances where the funds released by Government for creating public assets for the benefit of the community remained unutilised/blocked and/or proved unfruitful/unproductive due to indecisiveness, lack of administrative oversight and concerted action at various levels. One such case is discussed below:

#### COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT

#### 3.3.1 Mismanagement of investments

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board officials had irregularly deposited ₹ 12 crore and mismanaged the entire transaction leading to the entire amount remaining unencashed much after maturity

The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (Board) invests surplus funds with scheduled banks in short term and long term securities. The Board on 14 September 2011 deposited a cheque of ₹ 25 crore drawn on Corporation Bank with Punjab National Bank (PNB), Rajajinagar Branch, Bangalore for a term deposit of one year at 9.75 *per cent* interest rate. The amount was debited to the Board account on 16 September 2011. However, Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) was issued by Sankari West Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu and the same was accepted by the Board.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Bifurcation made on survey number into sub-survey numbers

The Controller of Finance of the Board forwarded (7 September 2012) the FDR to PNB, Rajajinagar Branch, Bangalore for crediting the proceeds into its accounts on maturity.

As the proceeds of FDR of ₹ 12 crore were not received, the Board took up (21 September 2012) the matter with the Manager, PNB, Rajajinagar branch (Manager). The Manager stated (29 September 2012) that the proceeds in respect of said FDR have not been received from PNB, Sankari West Branch, Salem and advised (20 October 2012) the Board to take up the issue directly with the PNB branch where the deposit was actually parked. This advice was not accepted by the Board. The Board's contention that the cheque was deposited with the Rajajinagar Branch and therefore they alone should discharge was not accepted by PNB, Rajajinagar branch by stating (September 2012) that the deposit was transferred to Sankari West Branch, Salem as per the instruction of the Board as Sankari West Branch, Salem had offered interest rate of 9.75 per cent. The stalemate continued and proceeds of FDR of ₹ 12 crore with interest due on the same have not been received till date (December 2013).

We observed (January 2013) the following financial impropriety and negligence on the part of the Board:

- ➤ The Board issued a cheque towards fixed deposit in favour of PNB, Rajajinagar Branch expecting an interest rate of 9.75 *per cent* though the Bank had offered only 9.60 *per cent*. The expectation about obtaining a higher rate was not backed by any commitment from the Bank.
- ➤ When the cheque was handed over to PNB, Rajajinagar, an undertaking from the Manager was obtained which stated that maturity proceeds would be paid either through banker's cheque or pay order and failing which, "we undertake to pay interest at 18 per cent per annum for days default". Ordinarily, neither such undertaking is given by any scheduled bank on receipt of a fixed deposit nor it is insisted upon by a depositor. Obtaining of such an undertaking suggested that the depositor was doubtful of the fructification of this deposit.
- ➤ It is not clear how and why the Board accepted the FDRs issued by another branch of the PNB when it had submitted the application form to a different branch.
- ➤ It was necessary to vigorously pursue and primarily correspond with the branch which had issued the FDRs for its discharge. Instead, the Board chose to correspond with Rajajinagar Branch for the discharge of FDR.


The matter was not taken up at Government level and was not being pursued legally either.

The Government stated (December 2013) that the matter was investigated by CBI at the instance of PNB. The Executive Officer also stated that the Board had resolved (July 2013) to file recovery suit against PNB and departmental enquiry against two officials as recommended by CBI, would be conducted.

BANGALORE THE (ANITA PATTANAYAK)
Principal Accountant General
Economic & Revenue Sector Audit

**COUNTERSIGNED** 

NEW DELHI THE (SHASHI KANT SHARMA) Comptroller and Auditor General of India



Appendix 1.1 (Reference: Paragraph 1.7.2, Page 6) Details of Departmental Notes pending as of 31 December 2013

	Total	01	01	80	02	01	11	24	
	2011- 12#	1	:	01	1	-	03	04	
			1		'		0		
	2010-	-	1	02	01	01	01	05	
	2009- 10	1	-	ŀ	1		02	02	
Year of Audit Report (Civil)	2008- 09	01	1	02	ŀ		03	90	
	2007- 08	1		01	;		:	01	
f Audit R	2006- 07	1	-	1	:		-		
Year o	2005- 06	1	01	1	1	1	1	01	
	2004- 05	1		1	1	+	02	02	
	2003- 04	1	1	01	01	1	1	02	
	2002- 03	1		!	-		+		
	2001- 02	1	+	01	-	1	ł	01	0.00
	Department	Commerce & Industries	Co-operation	Forest, Environment & Ecology	Public Works, Ports & Inland Water Transport	Tourism	Water Resources (Minor Irrigation)	Total	
5	No.	I	2	8	4	5	9		۵ :

# Report No. 5 (Economic Sector) of the year 2013

Report No.2 of the year 2014

Appendix 1.2
(Reference: Paragraph 1.7.3, Page 6)
Number of paragraphs/reviews yet to be discussed by PAC as of 31 December 2013

	lotal	7	2	16	2	2	12	1	1	89	33	14
	11-12#			-		1	,			,	3	4
	10-11	1		7		1	1		1		1	9
	09-10					1				-	2	3
	60-80	1		2		1	1			1	3	œ
	80-20			1		ı	-	-		•	-	1
	20-90	1		ı		ı	ı	ı		,	ı	1
	90-50		-	ı		ı	ı	ı		ı	1	2
	04-05	ı		,		ı	ı	1		-1	2	3
Civil)	03-04			1		7	1	ı		7	1	7
Year of Audit Report (Civil)	02-03					,	ı	ı		7	ı	2
ır of Audi	01-02			3		ı	ı	•		9	,	6
Yea	00-01			7		1	ı	ı		7	,	4
	00-66	1		,		ı	ı	•		2	,	3
	66-86	1		,	_	,	,	-		2	,	4
	86-26	2		,	_	,	,			7	2	12
	26-96			1		,	1	ı		∞	4	13
	96-56			2		,	4			9	5	13 17
	94-95			-1		1	2			7	3	13
	93-94			,		,	2	1		7	s	15
	92-93		-	-		1				14	1	17
	Department	Commerce & Industries	Co-operation	Forest, Environment & Ecology	Horticulture	Information Technology, Bio-technology & Science and Technology	Public works, Ports & Inland Water Transport	Rural Development & Panchayat Raj	Tourism	Water Resources (Major & Medium)	Water Resources (Minor Irrigation)	
S.	No.	1	2	3	4	8	9	7	8	6	10	

# Report No. 5 (Economic Sector) of the year 2013

## APPENDIX 2.1 (Reference: Paragraph 2.1.8.2, Page 19)

# Statement showing district-wise comparison of mulberry area as at the beginning of 2008-09 and end of 2012-13

#### A. Districts where decrease in mulberry area was noticed

(in hectares)

District	As on 31.03.2008	As on 31.03.2013	Decrease in area	Percentage decrease
Bangalore Urban	1,556	991	565	36
Bangalore Rural	5,454	5,353	101	2
Bagalkote	530	344	186	35
Belgaum	620	329	291	47
Bellary	1,100	805	295	27
Bijapur	265	204	61	23
Chamarajanagar	7,960	1,846	6,114	77
Chikkaballapur	16,769	12,928	3,841	23
Chickmagalur	144	132	12	8
Chitradurga	1,658	1,264	394	24
Dakshina Kannada	110	32	78	71
Davangere	413	213	200	48
Dharwad	92	59	33	36
Gadag	197	148	49	25
Gulbarga	397	235	162	41
Hassan	1,431	857	574	40
Haveri	861	804	57	7
Kodagu	115	23	92	80
Kolar	20,130	14,269	5,861	29
Koppal	207	163	44	21
Mandya	15,008			6
Mysore	2,522			37
Shimoga	341	301	40	12
Tumkur	2,511	2,201	310	12
Udupi	55	29	26	47
Uttara Kannada	243	234	9	4
Total	80,689	59,417	21,272	

#### B. Districts where increase in mulberry area was noticed

District	As on 31.03.2008	As on 31.03.2013	Increase in area	Percentage increase
Bidar	314	345	31	10
Ramanagara	8,808	12,722	3,914	44
Raichur	263	315	52	20

# APPENDIX 2.2 (Reference: Paragraph 2.1.9.1, Page 23)

# Statement showing subsidies granted in violation of scheme guidelines under Catalytic Development Programme

Name of the				of irregular/extra payments made
component	Office	Number of cases	Amount (₹ in lakh)	Nature of observation    O.14
	Haveri	5		
	Gadag	2		
	Tumkur	289		
Mulberry in	Ramanagar	487		
new area	Bangalore R	154		to this, subsidy was granted to farmers having
	Chikkaballapur	267		mulberry plantation in less than one acre of land
	Total	1,204	37.15	
	Haveri	98	61.15	
	Gadag	79	57.25	
Rearing house Rearing house Rearing house Rearing house Bangalore R Bagalkot Dharwad Chikkaballa	Tumkur	183	107.65	
	Ramanagar	7	As per guidelines, subsidy of ₹ 4,125 per acre shall be granted for a minimum area of one acre up to a maximum area of one hectare. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers having mulberry plantation in less than one acre of land  37.15  61.15 57.25     As per guidelines, subsidy ranging from ₹ 25,000 to ₹ 75,000 shall be granted to the farmer subjected to the condition that those who availed ₹ 25,000 subsidy should raise one BV crop per year, those availed ₹ 50,000 should raise two BV crops per year and those availed ₹ 75,000 should raise BV crop throughout the year. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers who were not raising prescribed minimum number of BV crops.  567.50  Certificate of non-availment of similar benefit from other departments was not furnished and minimum two BV crops not raised.  9.09  3.43  31.74     As per guidelines, subsidy was applicable to farmers raising BV crops only. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers who were not raising BV crops  4.72  347.09  594.32  As per guidelines, subsidy was applicable to farmers having minimum one acre of irrigated land. However, subsidy was granted to farmers who were having less than one acre of land.	
Rearing house	Bangalore R	192	110.25	As per guidelines, subsidy of ₹ 4,125 per acre shall be granted for a minimum area of one acre up to a maximum area of one hectare. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers having mulberry plantation in less than one acre of land  As per guidelines, subsidy ranging from ₹ 25,000 to ₹ 75,000 shall be granted to the farmer subjected to the condition that those who availed ₹ 25,000 subsidy should raise one BV crop per year, those availed ₹ 50,000 should raise two BV crops per year and those availed ₹ 75,000 should raise BV crop throughout the year. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers who were not raising prescribed minimum number of BV crops.  Certificate of non-availment of similar benefit from other departments was not furnished and minimum two BV crops only. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers who were not raising BV crops only. Contrary to this, subsidy was granted to farmers who were not raising BV crops
	Ramanagar 7 1.75  Bangalore R 192 110.25  Bagalkot 103 67.75  Dharwad 28 18.45  Chikkaballapur 246 143.25  Total 936 567.50  Ramanagar 7 1.75  Z 25,000 subsidy should raise one year, those availed ₹ 50,000 should crops per year and those availed ₹ raise BV crop throughout the year. this, subsidy was granted to farme not raising prescribed minimum in crops.  Certificate of non-availment of signs of the properties of the pr			
Rearing house Bangalore R Bagalkot Dharwad Chikkaballapur Total	Dharwad	28	18.45	
	246	143.25		
	Total	936	246 143.25 crops.  936 567.50 Certificate of non-availment of simil from other departments was not furn	
Drip irrigation	Ramanagar	75	16.81	from other departments was not furnished and
Drip irrigation	Haveri	31	9.09	
	Gadag	12	3.43	
Haveri   31   9.09	As per guidelines, subsidy was applicable to			
	Bangalore R	1,209	197.5	57.25  107.65  107.65  1.75  110.25  67.75  110.25  67.75  110.25  67.75  120.25  130.25  130.25  130.25  130.25  130.25  130.25  143.25  1567.50  159.25  16.81
	Bagalkot	4	0.75	
	Dharwad	21	4.72	
Equipment	Bagalkot 4 0.75 Dharwad 21 4.72 Chikkaballapur 1,876 347.09			
Equipment				
	Haveri	2		
	Ramanagar	82		
	Bangalore R	174		
	Tumkur	8	1.3	
	Chikkaballapur	123		
	Total	389	59.68	
	Grand total	6,003	1,275.46	

APPENDIX 2.3 (Reference: Paragraph 2.1.10.2, Page 26)

Statement showing works turned out at various types of farms and corresponding revenue earned and expenditure incurred during the period from 2008-09 to 2012-13

Year	Type of farm	No. of farms	Area of the farm (acres)	Plantation area (acres)	Leaves harvested (in kg)	Cocoons harvested (in lakh)	Expenditure (₹ in lakh)	Revenue (₹in lakh)
	P1	63	1,570.87	65.34	70,936.60	7.23	429.47	7.97
	P2	12	372.97	26.84	1,44,739.70	14.07	125.15	7.52
2008-09	P3	12	327.38	11.81	65,039.96	18.86	122.27	7.62
	P4	1	11.24	1.00	1,714.00	0.57	32.11	1.27
	Total	88	2,282.46	104.99	2,82,430.26	40.74	709.00	24.38
	P1	63	1,570.87	65.34	67,661.50	2.53	327.16	6.14
	P2	12	372.97	26.84	60,457.21	13.17	136.56	7.70
2009-10	P3	12	327.38	11.81	55,866.19	16.18	132.66	6.59
	P4	1	11.24	1.00	2,310.00	0.56	35.16	1.43
	Total	88	2,282.46	104.99	1,86,294.90	32.44	631.54	21.86
	P1	63	1,621.75	78.50	72,096.70	3.08	423.73	5.58
	P2	12	372.97	26.84	64,543.55	13.94	139.18	6.64
2010-11	P3	12	327.38	11.81	50,375.64	16.07	142.18	8.48
	P4	1	11.24	1.00	2,480.00	0.55	41.36	1.69
	Total	88	2,333.34	118.15	1,89,495.89	33.64	746.45	22.39
	P1	63	1,621.75	65.34	55,924.25	2.34	397.51	5.05
	P2	12	372.97	29.84	66,871.95	14.64	161.62	9.57
2011-12	P3	12	327.38	11.81	44,867.35	13.25	164.39	6.29
	P4	63 1,570.87 12 372.97 12 327.38 1 11.24 88 2,282.46 63 1,621.75 12 327.38 1 11.24 88 2,333.34 63 1,621.75 12 327.38 1 11.24 88 2,333.34 63 1,621.75 12 327.38 1 11.24 88 2,333.34 63 1,621.75 12 372.97 12 327.38 1 11.24 88 2,333.34 63 1,621.75 12 372.97 12 327.38 1 11.24 88 2,333.34	1.00	2,715.00	0.57	53.01	1.98	
	Total	88	2,333.34	107.99	1,70,378.55	30.80	776.53	7 7.97 7 7.52 7 7.62 1 1.27 0 24.38 6 6.14 6 7.70 6 6.59 6 1.43 4 21.86 3 5.58 8 6.64 8 8.48 6 1.69 5 22.39 1 5.05 2 9.57 9 6.29 1 1.98 3 22.89 1 9.61 7 11.71 8 6.53 7 2.21 3 30.06 8 34.35 8 43.14 8 35.51 1 8.58
	P1	63	1,621.75	65.14	1,57,653.10	4.03	418.31	9.61
İ	P4         1         11.24         1.00         2,715.00           Total         88         2,333.34         107.99         1,70,378.55           P1         63         1,621.75         65.14         1,57,653.10           P2         12         372.97         26.84         62,850.24           2012-13         P3         12         327.38         11.81         41,636.38	15.21	170.37	11.71				
2012-13	P3	12	327.38	11.81	41,636.38	12.76	172.98	6.53
	P4	1	11.24	1.00	2,668.00	0.58	60.17	2.21
	Total	88	2,333.34	104.79	2,64,807.72	32.58	821,83	30.06
				P1	4,24,272.15	19.22	1,996.18	34.35
1			70-4-1	P2	3,99,462.65	71.03	732.88	43.14
1			Total	Р3	2,57,785.52	77.11	734.48	35.51
				P4	11,887.00	2.83	221.81	8.58
			GRA	ND TOTAL	10,93,407.32	170.19	3,685.35	121.58

# APPENDIX 2.4 (Reference: Paragraph 2.1.11.1, Page 28)

# Statement showing cadre-wise sanctioned strength and working strength in Sericulture Department

SI No	Cadre	Sanctioned strength	Working strength as of 31.03.2013
1	Commissioner for Sericulture Development and Director of Sericulture	1	1
2	Additional Directors	2	1
3	Chief Accounts Officer	1	1
4	Joint Directors	7	7
5	Joint Brectors  Joint Registrar	7	1
$\frac{3}{6}$	Chief Economist	1	1
7		1	1
8	Executive Engineers  Deputy Directors of Sericulture	61	59
9	Administrative Officers	01	1
		3	2
10	Accounts Officers Asst Executive Engineers	5	5
12		7	<u> </u>
13	Asst Engineers Asst Directors of Sericulture	214	202
14	Sericulture Extension Officers	238	144
15		36	31
16	Gazetted Managers 1 & 2 Accounts Assistants	1	0
17	Accounts Superintendants	1	0
18	Superintendants	76	69
19	Senior Sericulture Inspectors	1	1
20	Junior Engineers	6	5
21	Inspectors of Co operative Societies	2	2
22	Sericulture Inspectors	965	867
23	Draftsman	903	0
24	First Division Assistants	234	180
25	Stenographers	234	12
26	Sericulture Demonstrators	1,078	879
27	Second Division Assistants	97	87
28	Sericulture Operatives	540	300
29	Typists	71	47
30	Melvicharaka	1	1
31	Drivers	216	145
32	Mechanics 1 & 2	5	4
33	Helpers	47	40
34	Cleaner	1	1
35	Weighers	9	7
36	'D' Group employees	520	477
	Total	4,475	3,582

APPENDIX 3.1 (Reference: Paragraph 3.1.2.4, Page 56)

# Statement of extra road length

SI No	MDR/ SH	Actual length (in km)	No. of works proposed	Estimated cost (\$\forall \text{in} \text{in} \text{crore})	Road length as per estimate (in km)	Extra road length (in km) (col 6 –	No. of works admissible (col 3 ÷ average length of 0.325 km)	Extra works executed	Addl financial implications (₹ in crore)	No. of works paid	Amount paid on excess length (\(\begin{align*} \pi \) in crore)
	-2-	ę	4	÷.	-9-	-7-	*	-6-	-10-	-11-	-12-
	MDR5	5.20	57	1,096.24	18.525	13.325	16	41	8.11	99	8.17
	MDR10	20.60	80	1,572.30	26.000	5.400	63	17	3.29	62	ı
	MDR12	19.00	62	1,217.10	20.150	1.150	58	4	0.70	36	
	MDR13	8.80	33	658.75	10.725	1.925	27	9	1.17	32	1.02
	SH85	32.00	135	2,691.86	43.875	11.875	86	37	7.23	48	ı
	SH94	44.70	186	3,703.35	60.450	15.750	138	48	9.58	62	
TOTAL		130.30	553	10,939.60	179.725	49.425	400	153	30.08	296	9.19

(Reference: Paragraph 3.1.2.7, Page 60)

# Statement of fake bills paid to contractors during 2011-12

<u>v</u> S	Name of the work	Vr No. & date	SER No.	MB No. & page No.	Amount paid (in ₹)	Remarks
-	Improvements & asphalting to Bangalore Jalasur road near Bhyranahalli gate	DBR 1127/ 21.11.2011	600/11-12	653/17-22	19,95,198	This work had already been paid vide DBR No. 860/28.10.2011, MB No. 500 page 62-74, amount ₹ 19,95,198. Hence, bogus bill.
2	Improvements to Bangalore to Jalasur Road near Jamalsaheb house	196/18.1.12	598/11-12	653/1-10	19,95,198	Already paid vide Vr No. 545 dated 29.10.11 MB No. 646/1-2, 96
8	Improvements and asphalting to Bangalore-Jalasur road near Kondahally gate.	195/18.1.12	599/11-12	653/7-12	19,95,198	Already paid vide Vr No. 544 dated 29.10.11 MB 500/48-61
4	Improvements to Kagimadu – Adarangi – Veerapura road in Thigalara Palya	480A/22.3.12	1490/11-12	473/32-34	20,54,405	The work was already paid vide Vr No. 480/22.3.12.
S	Improvements to road from NH 48 to Lakkenahalli via Akkinalu at km 4.00	929/31.3.12	462/11-12	645/32-36	9,29,932	This is not the work approved vide SER No.462/11-12. The approved work (viz Improvements to Bagepalli – Halgur at ch 0.00 to 0.150 mtrs) was already paid vide Vr No. 181/8-10-11 for ₹19,19,687. Hence the claim is bogus.
9	Improvements to road curve near Tippagondanahalli village in Magadi taluk.	315/24.2.12	1651/11-12	725/44-46	19,50,000	Work already paid vide Vr No. 492/22.3.12 MB No.725/47-49 ₹20,15,500
7	Improvements & Asphalting to Byaladakere - Gollahalli to join Gudemarana halli road	102/13.1.12	1073/11-12	701/1-7	19,98,000	This work is already paid vide Vr No.9 dated 3.12.11 amount ₹ 19,99,000 MB No. 397/98-103 (MB not produced)
∞	Construction of Masonry Drain to the right of pump house on Rangaiah playa approach road on Kudur – Shivagange road	490A/22.3.12	1634/11-12	723/6-7	20,50,000	This work was already paid vide Vr No. 490/22.3.12 for ₹ 20,39,800 Vr No.490A was a fake bill prepared on Xerox copy of Vr No. 490/22.3.12 and not signed by anybody.
6	Improvement to Kagimadu – Adarangi – Veerapura road at km 1.90	479/22.3.12	1491/11-12	473/35-38	20,54,000	As per MB the work is post monsoon maintenance of Amammanahalli road to join shanabhoganahalli in Ramanagara sub-division. Moreover, the MB No.473 pertained to No.1 Ramanagara Sub-division.
				TOTAL	1,70,21,931	

APPENDIX 3.3 (Reference: Paragraph 3.1.3, Page 65)

Statement showing the calculation of MSA as per IRC 37-2001 and avoidable extra expenditure on excess thickness of pavement

in ₹)	net		3,440	,502	,925	209;	,470	7,972	000,	899	,584
(Amount in ₹)	Extra cost		2,07,68,440	9,53,17,502	2,78,05,925	6,37,38,607	1,86,56,470	7,30,17,972	4,16,19,000	8,74,01,668	42,83,25,584
	te	BC	9,000	8,207.1	8,961.95	8,962	8,515	9,479.41	9,000	8,201	TOTAL
	Tender rate	DBM	7,640	7,242	7,515	7,507	7,600	7,514.9	7,500	6,500	
		GSB	882	961.96	917.92	910.05	882	936	750	596	
	ity A3	BC	0	0	0	790	350	1,049	\$08	1,193	
	Excess quantity executed in M3	DBM	1,400	9,576	1,820	5,927	1,400	6,292	3,221	8,946	
	Exc	GSB	11,420	26,995	15,392	13,367	5,710	16,870	13,622	20,175	
	Excess	provided	120	160	120	185	150	170	150	185	
	Thickness	provided	510	460	510	510	510	510	510	510	
	Thickness	in mm	390	300	390	325	360	340	360	325	
	MSA worked	out as per IRC	77	8	79	11	31	26	32	16	
	CBR	Value	8	8	8	∞	8	8	8	8	
	VDF as	37	4.5	3.5	4.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	
	Name of the Road/work	Maine of the Model Holk	Srirangapatana MM Hills Road Ch 24.3 to 48.30 (SH 79)	Srirangapatana MM Hills Road Ch 0 to 37.2 and 48.31 to 65 (SH79) - 0 to 23 km	Srirangapatana MM Hills Road Ch 0 to 37.2 and 48.31 to 65 (SH79) - 23 km to 37.2 km	Srirangapatana MM Hills Road Ch 0 to 37.2 and 48.31 to 65 (SH79) - 48.30 to 59.6 km	Madapura- Talakad Road (MDR)	Sira Nanjangud Road (SH 84)	Madapura- Talakad- Saragur Hand Post Road (MDR)	Talakad- Vijayapura- Holesalu Road (MDR)	
	SI.	Š	1		2		Э	4	5	9	