

**CHAPTER III**  
**PERFORMANCE REVIEWS (CIVIL)**

**HOME DEPARTMENT**

**3.1 Modernisation of State Police Force**

The scheme of Modernisation of Police Force is an important initiative of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and is under implementation in Manipur since 1969. The scheme, revived in 2000-01 for a period of 10 years, aimed at capacity building of the State Police Force, especially for meeting the emerging challenges to internal security. Manipur has been classified as 'A' category State under the scheme and accordingly receives 100 per cent Central assistance for modernisation of its Police Force. A performance review on modernisation of the Force in the State revealed the following lapses:

Although the Manipur Police Housing Corporation had spent only Rs.7.02 crore up to March 2007 out of Rs.18.97 crore placed (2002-07) at its disposal for construction of police stations, buildings and barracks, the Department had shown the entire amount (Rs.18.97 crore) as expenditure.

(Paragraph 3.1.9)

There was 30 to 51 per cent shortage of vehicles impacting the mobility of the force adversely.

(Paragraph 3.1.11)

Despite acute shortage of residential buildings, the satisfaction level achieved as of March 2007 was only 11 per cent which is very poor in insurgency prone State of Manipur.

(Paragraph 3.1.12)

The objective of sharing/disseminating information with other police organisation/CPMF through POLNET system could not be achieved despite spending Rs.2.63 crore.

(Paragraph 3.1.14)

Forensic laboratory was not functioning properly due to 82 per cent vacancies in respect of technical posts resulting in 73 to 82 per cent cases pending during 2002-07 for want of analysis.

(Paragraphs 3.1.19 and 3.1.20)

Shortfall of arms and ammunitions ranged from 17 to 100 per cent and from 37 to 95 per cent respectively, which hindered the capacity of the force to combat insurgency.

(Paragraph 3.1.22)

### 3.1.1 Introduction

The GOI's scheme of Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) was introduced in Manipur in 1969. The scheme was revived<sup>1</sup> from 2000-01 for a period of ten years up to March 2010. It is an important initiative of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) that aimed at capacity building of the State Police Force, especially for meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism *etc.*

The objectives of the scheme included, *inter alia*, the following:

- Meeting the identified deficiencies in basic police infrastructure;
- Improving operational efficiency of the police force by providing them with better arms and ammunition, and other equipment;
- Improving mobility of the forces by providing better and more secure transportation;
- Improving communication between different field formations with adequate number of new and sophisticated communication gadgets;
- Improving investigative skills through better training and modern equipment; and
- Reducing the dependence of the State Government on the Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) and Army to control internal security and law and order situation.

### 3.1.2 Organisational set-up

The State Police Department is headed by the Director General of Police (DGP) who is assisted by two<sup>2</sup> Additional Directors General of Police (ADsGP), five<sup>3</sup> Inspectors General of Police (IsGP), two<sup>4</sup> Directors, seven Deputy Inspectors General of Police (DIG) and other officers. The implementation of the scheme is overseen by a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) headed by the Chief Secretary. In Police Headquarters (PHQ), the ADGP (AP&LO) is overall in charge of implementation of the MPF programme. The organisational set up is given below:

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
<sup>1</sup> The scheme was not in operation during 1999-2000 in Manipur as the Reserve Bank of India had imposed ban on all transactions involving payments to the State Government.

<sup>2</sup> 1. ADGP (AP& LO); 2. ADGP (TRG/HR/WELFARE/ADMIN)

<sup>3</sup> 1. IGP (AP); 2. IGP (L&O-1); 3. IGP (L&O-II); 4. IGP (INT & CRIME); 5. IGP (ADMN)

<sup>4</sup> 1. Director (MPTS); 2. Director (MPR)

**Chart No.1**



**3.1.3 Scope of audit**

Performance review of the programme was carried out during April to June 2007 and covered the functioning of the Department during the period 2002-07. Four out of nine districts (Imphal East, Thoubal, Chandel and Churachandpur) were selected for test check.

**3.1.4 Audit objectives**

The objectives of the performance review were to assess whether:

- The objectives of modernisation of police force were achieved.
- Planning for implementation of the programme was sound and adequate.
- The financial management of the implementation of the programme was efficient.
- The striking capability of the State Police improved with induction of better arms and other equipment.
- There was effective monitoring and evaluation system in place.

**3.1.5 Audit criteria**

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Perspective Plan of the State Government (2000-05)
- Annual Action Plans of the Department (2000-07)
- Guidelines issued by the MHA

- Guidelines of Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D) and Directorate of Co-ordination & Police Wireless (DCPW).

### **3.1.6. Audit methodology**

Audit methodology included holding an entry conference (April 2007) with the Department, selection of field units for test check based on simple random sampling without replacement method, checking relevant records, documents, holding discussions with the Departmental officers, analysis of data and documentary evidence on the basis of set audit criteria to arrive at audit findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Audit findings were discussed with the Department in the exit conference (October 2007) and the replies of the Department have been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

### **Audit findings**

The important points noticed in the course of review are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:

### **3.1.7 Planning**

The MHA approved (February 2001) continuation of the MPF scheme in the State for a period of 10 years from 2000-01. Accordingly, the State Government prepared and submitted a five year Perspective Plan for 2001-05 for approval of GOI (July 2001). The formal approval of the Perspective Plan had not yet (May 2007) been received. The Department did not make any efforts for obtaining the approval of GOI. It was also observed that the Department was yet to prepare and forward the Perspective Plan for next five years (2005-10) even though the first five year plan had ended in March 2005.

- Funds for modernisation were released by the MHA on the basis of requirement projected by the State Police in their Annual Plans. However, the flow of funds lagged behind schedule as is evident from the fact that although the Annual Plans for the years 2000-01 to 2002-03 were approved by the SLEC in the respective years, the Central assistance pertaining to these years was released only between December 2003 and April 2005, i.e. after a lapse of one to three years.
- It was observed that the Annual Plans did not flow out of the Perspective Plan for the first five years. Requirements, which were not projected in the five year plan, were sent separately to MHA by the State Police. The Perspective Plan contained a proposal to provide Thief and Snatch proof Rifle Racks and Central Armoury Store Rooms (Secure – 8 Type) for the Quarter Guards of three MR battalions in a phased manner to be purchased at a total cost of Rs.3.47 crore. However, subsequently the Department changed (2004-05) the item of expenditure because of a change in priority and the equipment was not procured.
- The Perspective Plan also included a provision for raising a Dog Squad at a cost of Rs.4.99 lakh. Due to non-availability of willing Dog Trainers and non-procurement of puppies, the fund could not be utilised. Besides, Rs.51.94 lakh were projected in the Perspective Plan

for procurement of vehicles and communication equipment, of which the State Government utilised (2003-06) Rs.46.38 lakh on the projected items resulting in savings of Rs.5.56 lakh. The savings were because of projection of higher cost of items in the Perspective Plan. With the approval of MHA, Rs.4.05 lakh out of Rs.5.56 lakh were utilised on procurement of weaponry and balance Rs.1.51 lakh (Rs.5.56 lakh – Rs.4.05 lakh) could not be utilised. The un-utilised balance of Rs.6.50 lakh (Rs.4.99 lakh + Rs.1.51 lakh) was deposited into Government Account in February 2006.

Thus, the *ad hoc* planning and casual and unfocused approach as well as non-prioritisation negated the need for modernisation of the State Police Force which also adversely affected the security preparedness of the State Police in trying times.

The Department stated (June 2007) that the flow of expenditure differed from the Perspective Plan to some extent depending upon immediate necessity.

### ***Financial management***

#### ***3.1.8 Poor financial management***

The financing of the programme was shared by the GOI and the State Government on 50:50 basis up to 2002-03. In 2003-04, Manipur was classified as an 'A' category State and it started receiving 100 *per cent* funding from the Centre for modernisation of police force. The expenditure for maintenance of the capital equipment provided by the Centre is to be met by the State Government through its budget. Miscellaneous security items (other than major security items like arms and weapons), which are not readily available on DGS&D rate contract, can be procured by the State Government after adopting the prescribed financial procedure and with prior approval of the MHA. All such proposals for procurement along with the anticipated expenditure are to be sent to MHA, which examines the proposals and accords approval. The State Government then procures the items as per the prescribed financial norms.

The year-wise approved outlay, funds released by GOI and the State Government and expenditure incurred during 2002-07 are depicted in the following table:

**Table No.1**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Approved outlay	Releasable share		Actual release			Expenditure incurred	Savings (-) (w.r.t funds released)
		Centre	State	Centre	State	Total		
2002-03	21.00	10.50	10.50	0.59	0.02	0.61	0.58	(-) 0.03
2003-04	21.00	21.00	Nil	5.69 0.95*	Nil	6.64	6.64	Nil
2004-05	21.00	21.00	Nil	2.00 1.00*	Nil	3.00	3.00	Nil
2005-06	21.15	21.15	Nil	4.67 10.18*	Nil	14.85	14.85	Nil
2006-07	20.00	20.00	Nil	8.65	Nil	8.65	8.65	Nil
<b>Total:</b>	<b>104.15</b>	<b>93.65</b>	<b>10.50</b>	<b>33.73</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>33.75</b>	<b>33.72</b>	<b>(-) 0.03</b>

\* Paid directly by MHA to Manipur Police Housing Corporation for construction works.  
(Source: Departmental records)

During 2002-07, GOI had released Rs.33.73 crore against the total releasable amount of Rs.93.65 crore resulting in short release of Rs.59.92 crore (64 per cent). The State Government released only Rs.2 lakh against its releasable share of Rs.10.50 crore during the year 2002-03. Thus, total release of only Rs.33.75 crore against the approved outlay of Rs.104.15 crore during 2002-07 had adversely affected the modernisation programme.

### 3.1.9 Inflated expenditure on housing

During 2002-07, an amount of Rs.18.97 crore (Rs.12.13 crore from MHA, Rs.6.84 crore from the Department) were placed at the disposal of the Manipur Police Housing Corporation (MPHC) for construction of Police Stations, barracks for police personnel and Home Guards, office buildings, boundary fencing etc. Out of the above, only Rs.7.02 crore (37 per cent) were actually utilized as of March 2007 as per records of MPHC. However, the State Government showed the entire amount of Rs.18.97 crore as expenditure, resulting in inflated expenditure of Rs.11.95 crore, which was irregular.

### 3.1.10 Mobility

One of the major thrust areas of the MPF Scheme was to increase the mobility of the State Police Force to enable them to face the challenges to internal security duties effectively. Holding of adequate number of vehicles is essential for improving the mobility of police personnel and enhance their effectiveness. The State Police bought (2006-07) 25 motor cycles at a total cost of Rs.12.57 lakh and in addition, received 166 vehicles during 2002-07 from MHA in kind.

### 3.1.11 Short holding of vehicles by the districts and MR Battalions

Test-check of records of four selected districts<sup>5</sup> and two MR BNs (1<sup>st</sup> MR and 8<sup>th</sup> MR) revealed that holding of vehicles as of March 2007 was as follows:

<sup>5</sup> Imphal East, Thoubal, Churachandpur and Chandel.

**Table No.2****Position of short holding of vehicles by district formations as of March 2007**

Type of Vehicles	Imphal East			Thoubal			Churachandpur			Chandel		
	Require-ment	Holding	Off road	Require-ment	Holding	Off road	Require-ment	Holding	Off road	Require-ment	Holding	Off road
Non BP Jeep/Gypsy	42	26	11	39	34	11	12	12	5	14	17	8
BP Gypsy	14	18	1	13	10	1	9	4	1	11	2	1
Non BP Tata 407	11	6	-	10	8	5	7	3	-	9	8	3
BP Tata 407	12	2	-	11	4	1	7	2	1	9	2	1
Ambulance	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1
Bus	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Recovery Van	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Prisoners' Van	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-
Water Cannon	1	1	-	1	-	-	NIL	-	-	NIL	-	-
Water Tanker	2	1	-	2	2	-	1	1	-	1	-	-
Tata Truck	3	3	-	3	2	1	3	3	1	3	2	-
Motorcycles	11	3	-	10	4	1	7	2	-	7	2	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Shortfall percentage</b>		<b>40</b>			<b>30</b>			<b>45</b>			<b>42</b>	
<b>Off road percentage</b>			<b>20</b>			<b>30</b>			<b>30</b>			<b>44</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

**Table No.3****Position of short holding of vehicles by the MR Battalions as of March 2007**

Type of Vehicle	1 <sup>st</sup> MR			8 <sup>th</sup> M.R		
	Requirement (as per scale)	Holding	Off road	Requirement (as per scale)	Holding	Off road
Non BP Jeep/Gypsy	16	15	2	16	8	2
BP Gypsy	9	1	-	9	-	--
Non BP Tata 407	10	7	-	10	7	2
BP Tata 407	6	-	-	6	2	1
Tata Truck	5	2	1	5	5	2
Water Tanker	2	1	-	2	1	-
Bus	2	1	1	2	1	-
Mini Bus	1	-	-	1	-	-
Ambulance	1	1	-	1	1	-
Motor Cycles	3	3	-	3	2	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Shortage percentage</b>		<b>44</b>			<b>51</b>	
<b>Off road percentage</b>			<b>13</b>			<b>26</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

**Table No. 4**

**Position of short holding of vehicles by the State as a whole**

Type of vehicle	Scale as per requirement	Present holding	Shortage	Percentage of shortage
Tata truck	100	93	7	7
Water Tanker	41	24	17	41
Bus	42	38	4	10
Water Cannon	4	2	2	50
Prisoners' Van	22	2	20	91
Recovery Van	13	3	10	77
Ambulance	20	18	2	10
Non-BP Tata 407 Medium	239	118	121	51
BP Tata 407	182	50	132	73
Non-BP Gypsy/Jeep	617	593	24	4
BP Gypsy	255	85	170	67
NBP Ambassadors Car	25	24	1	4
BP Ambassador Car	12	10	2	17
Motor Cycle	174	128	46	26
Vajra Anti Riot Vehicle	4	2	2	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>1750</b>	<b>1190</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>32</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

It can be seen that there was severe shortage of vehicles ranging from 30 to 51 *per cent* impacting adversely the mobility of the force. It was also observed that 66 (27 *per cent*) out of total existing holding of 246 vehicles by six units<sup>6</sup> test-checked were off-road due to aging and were awaiting condemnation. Thus, 13 to 44 *per cent* of the total holding vehicles of these units were off-road and the effective availability of vehicles with police formations in relation to their actual requirement ranged from 32 to 49 *per cent*. Although 191 vehicles were procured during 2002-07 and issued to various units/district offices in the State, the gap between the requirement and holding of vehicles did not improve. Thus, the mobility of the units did not improve under the scheme which had a direct relation to their response time.

It will also be seen from the above table that overall shortage of different categories of vehicles by the State as a whole ranged from 4 to 91 *per cent* and the average shortage was 32 *per cent*. This had an adverse impact on the mobility of the State Police force. The Department admitted (June 2007) that vehicles received from MHA during 2002-07 are yet to fulfil the requirement of the State Police. It was further, stated (July 2007) that the shortfall would be augmented by funds provided under the modernisation scheme. The reply is indicative of the fact that the Department had failed to project its actual requirement of vehicles to the MHA during the years.

**3.1.12 Lack of secure residential buildings**

Secure housing is essential in a State like Manipur where law and order is adverse and effective policing requires provision of adequate secure housing

<sup>6</sup> SP, Imphal East; SP, Chandel; SP, Churachandpur; SP, Thoubal; Commanding Officer (CO), 1<sup>st</sup> MR and CO, 8<sup>th</sup> MR.



infrastructure. Though there was a huge shortage of residential buildings ranging between 9 to 30 *per cent* for police personnel in the State, the State Government had not projected the requirements for new residential buildings in the Perspective Plan (2000-05). The satisfaction level in respect of residential buildings in the State as of March 2007 is depicted below:

**Table No.5**

Group	Strength	No. of persons provided with quarters	Housing satisfaction level ( <i>per cent</i> )
Lower Subordinates	13,605	1,258	9
Upper Subordinates	1,659	325	20
Officers	230	69	30
<b>Total:</b>	<b>15,494</b>	<b>1,652</b>	<b>11</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

Thus, overall satisfaction level was only 11 *per cent* which is very poor given the adverse law and order situation in the State due to presence of numerous underground groups in the State.

The Department also admitted (June 2007) that the housing satisfaction level is one the lowest in the country and that was due to low allocation of funds.

### 3.1.13 Non-completion of administrative buildings

During 2002-07 the Manipur Police Housing Corporation (MPHC) had taken up 85 works of construction of Police Stations (52 works), barracks (12 works), compound fencing (1 work), office buildings (10 works), toilet/sentry post *etc.* (10 works), under the modernisation programme at a cost of Rs.18.97 crore. Of these, 57 taken up during 2002-06 were to be completed between October 2004 and August 2007 and the remaining 28 works were to be taken up during 2006-07 with stipulated date of completion between March 2007 and July 2008. Details of works taken up and their present status are as below:

**Table No.6**

Year	No. of works taken up	Stipulated date of completion	Present status			
			No. of works completed and handed over	No. of works completed but not handed over	No. of works in progress	No. of works not started
2002-03	3	October 2004	3	Nil	Nil	Nil
2003-04	10	June 2005 to August 2007	2	6	2	Nil
2004-05	8	August 2006 to October 2006	Nil	4	4	Nil
2005-06	36	July 2005 to October 2006	11	6	15	4
2006-07	28	March 2007 to July 2008	Nil	Nil	5	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>85</b>		<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

Out of 57 works taken up during 2002-06, only 16 works (28 *per cent*) were completed and handed over to the Department. Another 16 works, although completed between July 2005 and April 2006, were not handed over to the Department even after lapse of 12 to 21 months from the date of their completion. Besides, 22 works were in progress (June 2007) and site selection in respect of 4 works was yet to be finalised (June 2007) although works orders were issued (November 2005 to March 2007) to the contractors. It was observed that site was selected and work order issued without testing the soil

in case of the work of construction of 'Water Storage Tank and Supplies System to the Laboratories' in the Forensic Science Laboratory, taken up in June 2005 at an estimated cost of Rs.19.95 lakh. The work had to be stopped due to poor soil condition after incurring an expenditure of Rs.5.10 lakh. This had an adverse impact upon the functioning of Forensic Laboratory.

**3.1.14 Procurement of POLNET, communication gadgets and other equipment**

One of the mainstays of operational strategy of the force is improved, effective and efficient communication system. It consists of providing the force with modern and sophisticated gadgets including Police Communication Network (POLNET). POLNET is a satellite based integrated network, which envisages installation of Very Small Aperture Terminals (V-SAT) and Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART) to link the national capital with all the State capitals. As per MHA's instructions, the project is to be implemented by 2005-06 by all the States. The main objective of implementation of POLNET is to obtain criminal data translation through sharing/disseminating information with other Police organisations/Central Para Military Forces (CPMF) inside and outside the State.

Audit scrutiny revealed that 13 Base Station Units (BSUs) including four BSU towers to be used as repeaters of POLNET System and 38 Remote Station Units (RSUs) were to be installed by 30 June 2005 by Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) in Manipur under the Programme at a cost of Rs.2.66 crore. The BEL however installed only nine BSUs and all 38 RSUs. The repeater towers were not installed due to non-receipt of equipments. Out of 38 RSUs installed, 26 RSUs were found to be defective/non-functional (May 2007) due to non-availability of Line of Sights (LOS) and lack of support from the BEL. Although a sum of Rs.33.11 lakh had been paid (February 2005 to March 2006) to the BEL by the MHA for maintenance of POLNET, the firm did not send any engineer to rectify the defective/non-functional RSUs. The equipment costing Rs.2.30 crore was lying idle.

The Department stated (June 2007) that commissioning of POLNET was delayed as technical experts from BEL had not reported despite reminders. Further, it was stated (September 2007) that there was no adverse effect of not commissioning the POLNET as the existing communication system was functioning effectively. The reply is not tenable as the desired objective of sharing/disseminating information with other police organisations/CPMF could not be achieved despite spending Rs.2.63 crore (Rs.2.30 crore on equipment and Rs.0.33 crore on maintenance charges).

**3.1.15 Procurement of wrong gadgets**

As per the Action Plan, the Intelligence Branch of the Manipur Police required 100 VHF hand held Transreceiver MS – F3 sets in order to revamp the branch and for effective intelligence gathering. The Department procured 100 ICOM F-3 wireless hand sets with other supporting accessories at a cost of Rs.16.28 lakh in March 2002 from M/s Magnostar, New Delhi and issued the gadgets to the Intelligence Branch in October 2004. However, the Intelligence Branch

returned the equipment back to the Director, Manipur Police Wireless (MPR) as the supplied items were different from what was proposed and were found un-suitable for use by Special Branch (SB) Personnel. Thus, the State Government had procured communication equipment of different specifications resulting in infructuous expenditure of Rs.16.28 lakh. The equipment procured (March 2002) remained unutilised (September 2007). As a result, the much needed revamping of the Intelligence Branch and effective intelligence gathering could not be accomplished.

The Department stated (June 2007) that the equipment were handed over to the Director, MPR for safe custody as Criminal Investigation Department does not have facilities for proper maintenance. The reply is not tenable as the items were of different make from what was proposed as the IGP (Intelligence) had also indicated (April 2007) to this effect.

### 3.1.16 Non-procurement of secrecy devices

Audit scrutiny also revealed that 540 units of communication equipment like SIMCO PRM 8020 (lower version), SIMCO PRM 8020 (higher version), GP 338 Hand Held set, ICOM MS F – 310/F 3 required for communication system purchased during the period 2003-07 from Magnostar, New Delhi at a total cost of Rs.44.37 lakh, could not be commissioned due to non-procurement of secrecy devices and were lying idle (September 2007).

The Department stated (June 2007) that the procurement of secrecy devices was under consideration.

### 3.1.17 Non-availability of general policing equipment

The Department projected (2006-07) its requirements for equipment/aids required for investigations, intelligence gathering and traffic control, *etc.* in its Annual Action Plan for 2006-07 and the proposal was approved by the MHA for procurement of 17 to 50 *per cent* of projected requirement of equipment at a cost of Rs.19.15 lakh. However, as funds were not released by the MHA, the required equipment could not be procured (March 2007). The requirement projected and approved is depicted in the following table:

**Table No.7**

Sl. No.	Type of equipment	Requirement as per scale	Holding	Shortfall	Qty approved by MHA as per projected requirements	Percentage approved by MHA
<b>A</b>	<b>Equipment for General Policing</b>					
	Breath Analyser (ALCOMETER)	53	NIL	53	9	17
<b>B</b>	<b>Equipment for Traffic Police</b>					
	Vehicle Immobiliser	4	NIL	4	1	25
	Night Reflective Jackets	151	NIL	151	30	20
	Nose Masks	151	NIL	151	30	20
	Hand Gloves and Night Red Gloves	151	NIL	151	30	20
	Cats' Eye Reflective Road Stand	100	NIL	100	50	50
	LED Baton	40	NIL	40	20	50

(Source: Departmental records)

The non-availability of general policing equipment had adversely affected the performance of the general policing and traffic control system. Thus, modernisation of the police forces in the State with these equipment/aids required for investigation/intelligence gathering and traffic control had remained unfulfilled.

### 3.1.18 Forensic Science Laboratory

The modernisation programme aimed at equipping Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) in Manipur with state of the art equipment and trained staff. Provision of sophisticated equipment for chemical examination of various exhibits sent to the FSL and their investigation and early detection were the area of focus under the programme.

### 3.1.19 Inadequate manpower

Due to lack of equipment and non-filling up of one vacant post of viscera cutter, the Toxicology Division of the FSL remained non-functional (September 2007). Further, 36 (82 per cent) technical posts against minimum requirement of 44 posts, remained vacant in various Divisions of the FSL. Division-wise minimum requirement of staff and staff available therein are depicted in the following table:

**Table No.8**

Name of Division	Number of posts in a full fledged Division	Available manpower	Number of vacant posts (percentage)
Toxicology Division	8	2	6 (75)
Photography Division	7	1	6 (86)
Ballistics Division	8	1	7 (88)
Documents Division	7	1	6 (86)
Chemistry Division	7	2	5 (71)
Biology Division.	7	1	6 (86)
<b>Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>36 (82)</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

The MHA stressed (July 2006) upon filling up of the vacant posts i.e. 82 per cent on priority basis over procurement of further equipment for FSL. However, the vacant posts were not filled up (May 2007) because of imposition of ban on direct recruitment by the State Government. As a result, the Toxicology Division remained in-operational. Consequently, equipment procured (2004-05) at a cost of Rs.39.85 lakh for use in this Division could not be put to use. Other Divisions of the FSL were also not functioning properly. The posts of Assistant Directors and Scientific Officers were vacant in all the six Divisions. While admitting the fact, the Additional Director, FSL stated (June 2007) that no Division of the laboratory was functioning at the desired level because of lack of adequate manpower.

### 3.1.20 Poor functioning of Forensic Laboratory

Analysis report in a forensic case is required to be prepared immediately after the exhibit of the case is received. It was however observed in Audit that the

pendency of cases ranged between 73 to 82 *per cent* during 2002-07 as depicted in the following table:

**Table No.9**

Year	No. of cases received	Back log of previous years	Total cases received	No. of cases examined	No. of pending cases	Percentage of pendency
2002-03	295	820	1115	296	819	73
2003-04	307	819	1126	229	897	80
2004-05	214	897	1111	202	909	82
2005-06	254	909	1163	274	889	76
2006-07	169	889	1058	194	864	82

(Source: Departmental records)

The huge pendency of cases was attributed to shortage of technical manpower in the Divisions of the FSL. Year-wise pending cases is shown in the following table:

**Table No.10**

Year	No. of cases
1999-2002	245
2002-03	115
2003-04	132
2004-05	75
2005-06	154
2006-07	143
<b>Total:</b>	<b>864</b>

(Source: information furnished by FSL)

It would be seen that cases were pending for as long as eight years. In fact, it would be difficult to properly and accurately analyse the old cases due to the decomposition of ageing exhibits. Thus, the utility of the FSL in the State was largely frustrated.

### **3.1.21 Weaponry and ammunition**

The State Government projected its requirement of various weapons in the Perspective Plan, the approval of which is awaited from MHA. Audit scrutiny revealed that the units at field level did not possess adequate number of weapons and ammunition prescribed to be held by them as per the scale. Further, some units like Chandel had not lifted new weapons from the PHQ as they were less in number and the units did not have adequate place for storing these weapons or firepower to prevent them from being snatched by militants.

### **3.1.22 Short holding of weapons by units**

It was seen from the revised Annual Action Plan for 2006-07 that there was short-holding of weapons, both arms and ammunition, by the Department as of March 2007 as detailed below:

**Table No.11**

Type of arms and ammunition	Requirement (as per scale)	Present holding	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
<b>Arms</b>				
7.62 mm SLR	5,315	4,411	904	17
7.62 mm SLR magazine	31,890	16,456	15,434	48
AK-47 Rifle	6,794	2,114	4,680	69
AK-47 Rifle magazine	27,176	2,456	24,720	91
5.56 mm LMG	524	50	474	90
5.56 mm LMG magazine with accessories	13,100	1,250	11,850	90
MP 5 Carbine with magazine	18	Nil	18	100
Cartridge for MP 5 Carbine	5,000	Nil	5,000	100
51 mm Mortar	136	20	116	85
Glock Pistol for CID Personnel	150	Nil	150	100
<b>Ammunition</b>				
5.56 mm CTN	4,98,748	23,478	4,75,270	95
7.62 x 39 mm cartridge	12,22,920	5,50,904	6,72,016	55
7.62 mm CTN	5,60,272	2,11,570	3,48,702	62
7.62 mm BDR	10,55,175	6,60,316	3,94,859	37
.38 special cartridge	3,000	1,911	1,089	36
51 mm Mortar HE Bomb	9,928	1,600	8,328	84

(Source: Departmental records)

The shortfall with regard to arms was between 17 and 100 *per cent* while the shortfall in ammunition was between 36 and 95 *per cent*. Thus, one of the major objectives of the modernisation programme was only partially met, depriving the State Police of necessary means of combating insurgency.

### 3.1.23 Holding of unserviceable weapons

Test-check of records of offices of SPs of four<sup>7</sup> selected districts and two MR Battalions, revealed that the units were holding 703 unserviceable weapons of various kinds (details at **Appendix 3.1**). However, no action was taken for the disposal/replacement of these weapons by issuing serviceable weapons to the units and most of the weapons held by the units were of vintage. Modern sophisticated weapons have not been provided in adequate numbers to meet the operational needs of the State Police. It is particularly serious as Manipur is an insurgency prone State and was graded 'A' category by the GOI.

### 3.1.24 Human resource management

Acquisition of superior weapons, communication and other equipment would become meaningful only if the vacancies in various ranks/technical posts are filled up and adequate training on use of modern gadgets is imparted. But non-filling up of vacancies and inadequate training on weapons acquired by the State Police under MPF contributed to a great extent towards non-achievement of its objectives.

<sup>7</sup> Imphal East, Chandel, Churachandpur and Thoubal

### 3.1.25 Vacancies in State Police

The High Powered Committee of the MHA stressed (July 2006) the need for filling up vacancies in the ranks on priority basis so that the assistance made available under the MPF scheme could be optimally utilized. It was also suggested that 10 *per cent* representation of women in the Police should be achieved in a time bound manner. But the position in the State (March 2007) is as follows:

**Table No.12**  
**Sanctioned strength and men-in-position**

Ranks	Sanctioned Strength			Men-in-position			Shortfall			Percentage of shortfall	
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Subedar Major	6	Nil	6	6	Nil	6	Nil	Nil	Nil	-	-
Subedar	93	Nil	93	92	Nil	92	1	Nil	1	1	-
Inspector	96	2	98	90	Nil	90	6	2	8	2	100
Sub-Inspector	353	5	358	281	3	284	72	2	74	20	40
Jamandar	291	Nil	291	198	Nil	198	93	Nil	93	32	-
Havildar	2189	Nil	2189	1380	Nil	1380	809	Nil	809	37	-
Head Constable	465	43	508	421	40	461	44	3	47	9	7
Constable	3302	430	3732	3280	191	3471	22	239	261	1	56
Constable Driver	49	Nil	49	26	Nil	26	23	Nil	23	47	-
Rifleman	7837	Nil	7837	6411	Nil	6411	1426	Nil	1426	18	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>14,681</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>15,161</b>	<b>12,185</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>12,419</b>	<b>2,496</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>2,742</b>	<b>18</b>	

(Source: Departmental records)

It may be seen from the above table that as of March 2007, there were 2,742 vacancies in various ranks which constituted 18 *per cent* of the sanctioned strength. Further, representation of women in the force was only three *per cent*. Against sanctioned posts of 480, it was noticed that 246 posts (51 *per cent*) were lying vacant. Thus, the State Government had failed to take steps to fill up the vacancies and to reduce the gender gap as suggested by the MHA.

The PHQ stated (September 2007) that 206 posts of women constables had since been filled up and the process of filling up another 19 posts was underway.

### 3.1.26 Poor training facilities

2,250 police personnel attended 124 training courses during 2002 to 2006 in and outside the State. Of these, 23 training courses were organised by the Manipur Police Training School (MPTS) which were attended by 2,042 trainees. However, the courses were essentially basic training and refresher courses and no training was imparted on modern weapon systems in MPTS. The IGP stated (April 2007) that practice on certain weapons could not be imparted by the MPTS as the said weapons were not in the custody of the training institute. Besides, the training institute also required more SLRs to give extensive practice to the trainees as this category of weapon is most commonly used by most of the MR Battalions/District Police. It was further stated that the training institute also needed 'passive night vision' and 'telescopic sight' of INSAS Rifles. Thus, although it possessed the expertise to impart training in the use of these sophisticated weapons, the training institute lacked the basic training aids. This impeded capacity building and dissemination of technical know-how to the police personnel.

**3.1.27 Impact of modernisation programme on striking power of the State Police**

Manipur is an insurgency prone state with several militant organisations active in different parts of the State. One of the major objectives of the Modernisation of State Police was to improve its strike rate to combat the activities of the militant organisations in the State. Audit scrutiny, however, revealed that during 2002-07, there was no reduction in crime rate and the law and order had not improved despite implementation of the modernisation programme in the State.

**3.1.28 No reduction in crime rate**

The position regarding number of crimes committed and number of cases registered during 2002-07 is depicted in the table below:

**Table No.13**

Year	Number of crimes committed	Number of cases registered	Percentage of cases registered
2002-03	2458	699	28
2003-04	2484	614	25
2004-05	2531	450	18
2005-06	2911	539	19
2006-07	2886	483	17

(Source: Annual Administrative Reports)

It would be evident from the above table that though number of crimes committed during the period increased by 17 per cent, the number of cases registered had declined gradually from 28 per cent in 2002-03 to 17 per cent in 2006-07. This seems to suggest that people seek justice elsewhere rather than from police because of disturbed law and order situation prevailing in the State. It is also possible that people do not have confidence in the ability of the police to solve their cases, considering the meagre number of cases settled by the police over the years, as brought out in paragraph 3.1.20 (Table No.9).

**3.1.29 Number of persons killed, injured and arrested**

The position of civilians, police personnel and extremists killed/injured during 2002-07 is as below:

**Table No. 14**

Year	No. of persons killed			No. of persons injured		
	Civilians	Policemen	Extremists	Civilians	Policemen	Extremists
2002-03	9	12	140	14	30	NIL
2003-04	69	20	9	20	42	NIL
2004-05	89	35	132	124	112	NIL
2005-06	55	21	55	50	28	NIL
2006-07	128	29	120	8	49	NIL
<b>Total</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>NIL</b>

(Source: Annual Administrative Reports)

It can be seen that the number of civilian casualties have gone up steeply from nine in 2002-03 to 128 in 2006-07 but the casualties in respect of



extremists declined from 140 in 2002-03 to 55 in 2005-06 and to 120 in 2006-07. The casualties in respect of police have shot up from 12 in 2002-03 to 29 in 2006-07. It will also be seen that 477 persons (Civilian: 216, Policemen: 261) were injured during the years 2002-07 as a result of counter insurgency operations. However, there was no instance of any extremist being injured during this period.

Thus, there was no desirable improvement in the striking capability of Manipur Police due to the modernisation programme.

### 3.1.30 Arms and ammunition recovered

Audit scrutiny also revealed that the number of extremists arrested/surrendered and arms and ammunition recovered did not show any encouraging sign during the past five years. Details are depicted below:

**Table No. 15**

Year	Number of extremists arrested	Number of extremists surrendered	Number of arms recovered	No. of ammunition recovered	Type of weapons recovered
2002-03	529	16	90	967	Rocket launcher, Hand
2003-04	1149	03	290	2022	Grenade, Lethod
2004-05	687	07	141	2013	Bombs, Bombs,
2005-06	894	23	305	2728	Detonator, Explosives,
2006-07	780	21	165	1841	W.T Set, IED etc.

(Source: Annual Administrative Reports)

It was observed in Audit that despite considerable investment in weaponry under the programme, there was no significant improvement in arrest and surrender of the extremists. The arms and ammunition recovered from militants also included rocket launchers, which shows that rather than getting dissipated, extremists were acquiring more sophisticated weapons. The Department admitted (June 2007) that underground elements operating in the State were well-equipped with sophisticated weapons including rocket launchers. This indicates that the capability of the State Police Force is a mismatch with that of the underground insurgent groups.

### 3.1.31 Snatching of arms and ammunition by the terrorists

Test-check of records of four selected districts and two M.R. Battalions revealed that a large number of arms and ammunition were snatched by the extremists on various occasions (2002-07) from the personnel of 1<sup>st</sup> MR, 8<sup>th</sup> MR, SP, Churachandpur and SP, Thoubal. The snatched weapons include 127 arms and 7,939 rounds of various ammunition/magazine (Details are given in the *Appendix 3.2*).

The above fact highlights the intensity of terrorism in the State and ineffectiveness of State Police force, which does not seem to suggest any improvement in the striking capacity of the Police force.

### **3.1.32 Monitoring and evaluation**

The SLEC has been entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the physical and financial progress of the programme. Although, it was stated that SLEC met every year before finalisation of the Annual Action Plan, the Department could produce records relating to only two meetings of the committee held during May 2001 and March 2002. No other monitoring mechanism was adopted by the State Government to watch proper implementation of the programme and no evaluation of the scheme was undertaken to assess its impact.

### **3.1.33 Conclusion**

The modernisation programme of State Police in Manipur suffered on account of poor planning and inadequate funds. Both the GOI and the State Government failed to release the approved outlay for various components of the programme, which affected the implementation of the programme adversely. There was shortfall in the number of vehicles required by the force. The programme also suffered on account of inadequacy in modern weapons as well as lack of training of police personnel. Secure residential housing for the police personnel was meagre, being only 11 *per cent*. Forensic Science Laboratory is almost non-functional due to lack of trained staff and equipment procured were not put to use. Communication system suffered on account of mismatch between equipment required and equipment procured. POLNET is non-functional due to lack of maintenance support by the BEL. The programme was being implemented on an *ad hoc* basis and did not have the desired impact on the prevailing adverse law and order situation in the State.

### **3.1.34 Recommendations**

- Five year Perspective Plan should be formulated in a timely manner and Annual Action Plans should flow out of the Perspective Plan.
- Modern vehicles and sophisticated weapons should be procured as per need and norms, to equip the Police force with state of art vehicles and equipment to deal with the challenges of terrorism.
- POLNET and other communication systems should be commissioned at the earliest.
- Residential housing infrastructure should be created to provide secure housing to police personnel.
- FSL should be fully staffed and provided with all the essential equipment for quick analysis of cases to meet the ends of justice
- Training infrastructure available in the State should be strengthened in order to accelerate capacity building by quicker assimilation of new technologies and policing methods.

## **PUBLIC HEALTH ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT**

### **3.2 Imphal Water Supply Scheme**

*The State Government failed to formulate its State Water Policy as envisaged in the National Water Policy 2002 leading to absence of policy initiatives and directives. Baseline survey for assessing actual requirement of potable water and preservation of water resources had never been conducted. Contamination of water was prevalent due to inadequate and ineffective water treatment, leakages and unauthorised diversions. Improvement and augmentation works could not be executed in a timely manner. Non- revision of water tariff and laxity in revenue collection led to wide gap between the revenue realized and O&M costs. Supply of quality drinking water could not be ensured due to lack of effective quality control mechanism.*

#### **Highlights**

**The State Government has neither evolved any State Water Policy nor conducted a base line survey to assess the present and future requirements of water despite the population growth and expansion of urban conglomerates.**

**(Paragraph 3.2.7)**

**Of the Central assistance of Rs.33.97 crore, the State Government was yet to release Rs.1.16 crore to the implementing agency.**

**(Paragraph 3.2.8.1)**

**Revenue amounting to Rs.7.41 crore was yet to be collected as of March 2007. The cost of operation and maintenance far exceeded the revenue billed.**

**(Paragraphs 3.2.8.2 & 3.2.8.3)**

**Wastage in the system was as high as 30 per cent as against the Central norm of 10 per cent. Unless the abnormal wastage is checked, there is no possibility of meeting even the present requirement of 97 MLD.**

**(Paragraph 3.2.11)**

**Quality control was found to be inadequate. En-route contaminations were not checked and there were numerous instances of water-borne diseases.**

**(Paragraph 3.2.12.2)**


#### **3.2.1 Introduction**

The Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) is responsible for ensuring sufficient supply of clean and safe drinking water to all consumers of

the Imphal city and nine other districts of the State. This primarily involves developing strategies for meeting the demand of the ever-increasing population, planning and implementation of new water supply schemes by adopting scientific techniques, proper maintenance of the existing water supply system, besides timely revision of water tariff and generation of revenue with effective mechanism of collection. The Imphal Water Supply Scheme (IWSS) consists of mainly two components – augmentation of water supply to the city and improvement of the existing system.

### 3.2.2 Organizational set up

The Commissioner (PHED) is the administrative head of the Department and the Chief Engineer (CE), PHED, is the executive and technical head. The responsibility for all the activities relating to IWSS vests with the CE who is assisted by an Additional Chief Engineer, two Superintending Engineers (SEs) and five Executive Engineers (EEs) as shown in the chart below:



### 3.2.3 Scope of audit

Performance review of the IWSS was carried out during April to June 2007 and covered the offices of the CE and four EEs<sup>1</sup> for the period 2002-07.

### 3.2.4 Audit objectives

The objectives of the performance review were to assess whether:

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<sup>1</sup> Project Construction Division, Water Supply Maintenance Division No. I, Water Supply Maintenance Division No. II and Monitoring and Evaluation Division.

- the scheme achieved the objective of providing sufficient quantity of safe drinking water to the targeted population;
- the financial management of the implementation of the scheme was efficient;
- planning and implementation of the scheme including policy formulation were done as required under the scheme;
- operation and maintenance of water supply was effective;
- quality of water supplied was of acceptable standard; and
- there was effective monitoring and evaluation system in place.

### **3.2.5 Audit criteria**

The criteria benchmarked for achieving the audit objectives were:

- Targets and milestones set in the policy pronouncements;
- Scale of water requirement per consumer;
- Treatment norms for ensuring quality; and
- Codal provisions for execution of works.

### **3.2.6 Audit methodology**

Audit methodology included holding of an entry conference (April 2007) with the Officers of the Department, checking of records, documents of the selected Divisions and analysis of data and documentary evidence on the basis of audit criteria to arrive at audit findings, conclusions and recommendations. Audit also carried out a consumer survey to gauge the extent of provision of potable drinking water to the people.

Audit findings were discussed with the Departmental authorities in an exit conference (September 2007). The replies of the Department have been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

### **Audit findings**

The important points noticed during the course of review are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:

### **3.2.7 Policy and planning**

The National Water Policy *inter alia* envisaged (September 1987) formulation of a State Water Policy (SWP) backed by an operational action plan to achieve the desired objective of providing safe drinking water to the entire population of the State. However, the State Government had neither formulated a SWP nor worked out any long term perspective plan for capacity building to meet the ever increasing demand. Besides, no base line survey was ever conducted to assess the present and future requirements of water despite population growth and expansion of urban conglomerates.

The Department did not evolve any perspective plan and annual plan. Accordingly, there was no operational plan to achieve various milestones. In the absence of long term perspective plan and operational action plan, the Department did not fix annual targets for completing various works (new construction, upgradation, improvement and maintenance).

Even the broad based targets including institutional reforms, preparation of master plan, outstanding revenue collection, improvement of water testing laboratory, strengthening of monitoring and evaluation as mentioned in the Manipur Annual Plan documents were not achieved as of June 2007.

As per Administrative reports of the Department, the projected population, water requirement and installed capacity of treatment plants in respect of Imphal city and adjoining area were as shown below:

**Table No.1**

Parameters/Year	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07
Population (in lakh)	5.65	Data not available	7.13	7.16	7.16
Water requirement (MLD) <sup>2</sup>	109	-do-	107	97	97
Installed capacity (MLD)	83.03	-do-	83.03	80.82	80.82
Short fall (MLD)	25.97	-do-	23.97	16.18	16.18

Source: Departmental records

It may be observed from the above table that the Department had no scientific annual plan as population and water requirement data are not in consonance with each other. It is also observed that according to administrative report of the Department, the estimated population increased from 5.65 lakh (2002-03) to 7.16 lakh (2006-07) in the last five years but water requirement decreased from 109 MLD to 97 MLD. The projected population data according to the Department's administrative report is also not credible as there is zero *per cent* growth in the population from 2005-07. Since there was no effort to enhance the installed capacity, instead of increasing, the installed capacity decreased by 2.21 MLD during these years. Thus, due to faulty planning, the Department failed to synchronise the water requirement against the population growth in advance.

### **3.2.8 Financial management**

Funds for the scheme were sanctioned and released under two components *viz.* 'Augmentation of Water Supply for Imphal city (AWSI) – Phase-I' and 'Improvement of Imphal Water Supply Scheme (IIWSS) Phase –I' during 2002-07. Total amount sanctioned, released and expended on the schemes during these years are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### **3.2.8.1 Erratic release of funds**

The AWSI, Phase-I (29.50 MLD) was fully funded by the GOI (90 *per cent* grant and 10 *per cent* loan), while the funding pattern for IIWSS– Phase-I was

<sup>2</sup> Million litres per day.

in the ratio of 90:10 by the Centre and the State. During 2002-07, the GOI sanctioned Rs.35 crore for the augmentation and improvement schemes and released Rs.34 crore. The position of funds sanctioned and released by GOI to the State Government and subsequent release of funds by State Government to the implementing agency and expenditure incurred thereagainst are as follows:

**Table No. 2****(Rupees in crore)**

Year	Funds released by the GOI	Funds released by the State Government out of (2)	Cumulative amount retained by the State Government	Expenditure	Excess(+)/ Savings(-)/
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) (5-3)
2002-03	21.88	17.56	4.32	9.90	(-) 7.66
2003-04	5.31	2.13	7.50	8.78	(+) 6.65
2004-05	-	5.94	1.56	5.36	(-) 0.58
2005-06	6.78	6.87	1.47	5.75	(-) 1.12
2006-07	-	0.56*	1.16	3.83	(+) 3.27
<b>Total:</b>	<b>33.97</b>	<b>33.06</b>		<b>33.62</b>	

(Source: Departmental records)

\*includes State's share of Rs.0.25 crore

It will be seen from the above table that of Rs.27 crore released by the Central Government during 2002-04, the State Government retained Rs.7.50 crore affecting the implementation of the projects of augmentation and improvement of IWSS during these years. Out of the total amount released by the GOI, the State Government had not released Rs.1.16 crore as of March 2007.

For IIWSS Phase –I, the GOI sanctioned (August 2002) Rs.2.51 crore and released (August 2002) the first instalment (Rs.112.92 lakh) being fifty *per cent* of its share of Rs.225.84 lakh. The terms and conditions of the sanction stated that the balance amount was to be released on submission of Utilisation Certificate (UC) of the first instalment by the Department. However, the Department submitted UC for Rs.31.40 lakh only. Because of the failure to utilize the full amount of the first instalment, the Central Government curtailed (January 2004) the second instalment to Rs.31.40 lakh against its releasable share of Rs.112.92 lakh. Thus, due to slow utilization of funds and tardy implementation of the projects, the Department could not receive the full amount of the sanctioned assistance.

Moreover, the State Government released its share of Rs.25.10 lakh only in 2006-07. Obviously it has violated provisions envisaged in the NWP that “inadequate funding should be obviated by an optimal allocation of resources on the basis of prioritization having regard to the early completion of on-going projects as well as the need to reduce regional imbalance”. The scheme of improvement and augmentation of water supply thus suffered due to slow and erratic release of funds.

### 3.2.8.2 Financial sustainability

Union Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation (MOUD&PA), while according sanctions to water supply projects, issued instructions that realistic tariff structure must be formulated and implemented so as to ensure recovery of at least the annual operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditure to start with and 100 per cent cost recovery in stages for making the scheme self sustainable.

The expenditure on O&M and revenue billed during 2002-2007 were as follows:

**Table No.3**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Expenditure on O&M				Revenue billed
	Wages	Chemical	Energy charges	Total	
2002-03	1.50	0.98	1.15	3.63	1.17
2003-04	1.67	1.13	1.24	4.04	1.57
2004-05	1.74	1.37	1.24	4.35	2.29
2005-06	1.80	1.09	1.24	4.13	2.15
2006-07	2.05	0.97	1.24	4.26	2.14
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.76</b>	<b>5.54</b>	<b>6.11</b>	<b>20.41</b>	<b>9.32</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

The above table shows that the Department had altogether spent Rs.20.41 crore during 2002-07 on O&M charges. However, during the same period, it raised bills on the consumers for an amount of only Rs.9.32 crore which clearly shows that the tariff structure was not realistic even to realize the O & M cost. Thus, due to non-structuring of tariff based on its costs, the Department had suffered a loss of Rs.11.09 crore with regard to O&M cost during 2002-07 which could have been avoided by initiating appropriate steps. It was observed that the Department had not made any efforts to revise the tariff fixed as far back as 1999. Thus, the guidelines of MOUD&PA to make the scheme self sustainable were not adhered to.

### 3.2.8.3 Accumulation of outstanding revenue

As per the provisions of Manipur Water Supply Act 1992, the consumers are required to pay water charges at the rates fixed by the Government from time to time within 15 days from the date of receipt of the bill, failing which, the Department is empowered to disconnect the water connection. In addition, the consumers are also punishable with imprisonment of one to six months or with fine of Rs.500 or Rs.3000 or both [Paragraph 23 (v)].

The Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 2005-06 brought out that revenue amounting to Rs.5.76 crore was yet to be collected, as of March 2006 (Paragraph 5.1.15). However, the Department did not improve its collection system and the outstanding arrears increased further as discussed below.

Records of rent sub-division (Maintenance Divn. No.1), which was the only rent collecting unit in Imphal, revealed that the percentage of collection during the last five years was very low and the revenue realization, in fact, declined



from 24 *per cent* in 2002-03 to a meagre 6 *per cent* in 2006-07 and huge revenue arrears had accumulated as shown in the table below:

**Table No. 4***(Rupees in lakh)*

Year	No. of consumers	Demand		Total demand	Collection during the year	Outstanding dues	Percentage of collection
		Arrear	Current				
2002-2003	11502	145.99	116.96	262.95	61.88	201.07	24
2003-2004	12,909	201.07	156.90	357.97	69.35	288.62	19
2004-2005	21,164	288.62	228.56	517.18	76.12	441.06	15
2005-2006	21,790	441.06	215.49	656.55	80.28	576.27	12
2006-2007	22,074	576.27	213.80	790.07	48.65	741.42	6

(Source: Departmental records)

Scrutiny of records revealed that while the percentage of collection had declined from 24 *per cent* in 2002-03 to 6 *per cent* in 2006-07, the percentage of defaulters on payment of water charges showed an increasing trend from 63 *per cent* in 2003-04 to 90 *per cent* in 2006-07 as shown in the table below:

**Table No. 5**

Year	Number of		Percentage of defaulters	Number of disconnections made during the year	Percentage of disconnections
	consumers	defaulters			
2002-2003	11502	7630	66	25	0.33
2003-2004	12,909	8070	63	22	0.27
2004-2005	21,164	17221	81	26	0.15
2005-2006	21,790	18477	85	59	0.32
2006-2007	22,074	19761	90	117	0.59

(Source : Departmental records)

It will be seen from the above that the Department did not initiate any action against the defaulters. Enforcement of the provisions of the Act was negligible. During 2002-07 the number of disconnections was less than one *per cent* of the total defaulters. Failure to prosecute defaulters encouraged the practice of non-payment of water charges amongst the consumers. The Department did not take effective measures for realization of the outstanding arrears. Only once during 2002-03 target for collection was fixed at Rs.65 lakh. Thereafter, even the targets were not fixed by the Department for realisation of dues/arrear.

Thus, accumulation of huge arrears of revenue amounting to Rs.7.41 crore (March 2007) is indicative of lackadaisical approach of the Departmental authorities to ensure timely collection of Government revenue.

### 3.2.9 Implementation of Improvement works

Improvement of existing water distribution system and augmentation of old treatment plants are the two most essential areas of focus for the Department for ensuring safe drinking water facility for the increasing population of the city. In the course of scrutiny of these works the following points were noticed:

The improvement of Imphal water supply consisted of the following three components:

- Improvement of existing distribution system in selected areas of Imphal city (EC: Rs.71.11 lakh)
- Upgradation of old treatment plant at Chinga (EC : Rs.86.56 lakh), and
- Improvement of Ningthempukhri water supply scheme (WSS) (EC: Rs.93.28 lakh).

The first component had been completed in March 2004. But the remaining two components were lingering behind schedule as discussed below:

#### **3.2.9.1 Upgradation of old treatment plant at Chinga**

The GOI sanctioned (August 2002) Rs.86.56 lakh for upgradation of the old treatment plant at Chinga and released Rs.38.95 lakh (50 *per cent*) against its share of Rs.77.91 lakh. The project was stipulated to be implemented within a period of two years and the balance share was to be released during 2003-04 on receipt of utilization certificate. However, the Department awarded nine works for upgradation only between September 2004 to March 2007 (**Appendix 3.3**). The delay in award of works ranged from more than one year to five years from the date of sanction. Of the nine works, four had been completed (October 2006) and two are in progress (September 2007). The remaining three works had not been started (July 2007). The GOI had not released its balance share (July 2007) as the progress of works was not satisfactory.

As per DPR (May 2002), the Project was to be constructed at Chinga hillock and its vicinity. But due to non-availability of suitable site, this had later been shifted to Moirangkhom Bazar (August 2003). The Department attributed the delay in completion to non-finalisation of proper site and non-release of adequate funds. The reply of the Department is not tenable considering that there were huge unspent balances at the end of each year and considerable quantum of the funds released by the GOI had been retained by the State Government each year during this period. The delay in finalization of suitable site indicates inadequate planning for upgradation of the Chinga treatment plant.

The scheme was implemented with a view to provide potable water to 3,000 people. Due to non-completion of the work, the intended benefit could not be provided to the targeted people.

#### **3.2.9.2 Improvement of Ningthempukhri WSS**

The GOI sanctioned (August 2002) Rs.93.28 lakh for “Improvement of Ningthempukhri water supply scheme” to provide drinking water to 33,000 people and released (August 2002) Rs.41.97 lakh (50 *per cent*) of its share of Rs.83.95 lakh with the stipulation to complete the work within two years, the balance share was to be released during 2002-03 on receipt of utilization certificate. Scrutiny of records revealed that the Department awarded seven

components of the work only in January to May 2004 (**Appendix 3.4**). The delay in award of these items ranged from 16 to 20 months from the date of sanction. Out of seven works, five had been completed (March 2005). The remaining two works relating to the improvement of the schemes had been completed up to 30 to 90 per cent.

It was seen that the Department had paid (February 2004) Rs.17.59 lakh, being the cost of 1,500 RM of 200 mm pipe to its Stores Division for use in this WSS but the pipes were yet to be received (July 2007). No action was taken for expediting delivery of the pipes from the Stores Division as of July 2007.

Despite an expenditure of Rs.89.17 lakh incurred as of July 2007 on various items of work of the scheme, drinking water could not be provided to the targeted people.

### **3.2.10 Implementation of augmentation works**

The augmentation of Imphal Water Supply consisted of the following works:

- Augmentation from Singda dam by 9.08 MLD (EC : Rs.9.75 crore)
- Replacement of old hume pipes by new ductile iron pipes from Leimakhong to Iroisemba (EC: Rs.11 crore).
- Augmentation from Iril river by constructing a treatment plant of 6.81 MLD at Irilbung (EC: Rs.8.17 crore)
- Tapping ground water from Potsangbam and Sekmai areas–Phase-II (6.81 MLD) (EC: Rs.6.73 crore), and
- Utilization of Leisangkhang moat at Canchipur as a pre-settling tank for storing the water to be pumped from the confluence point of Imphal and Iril rivers at Lilong (6.81 MLD) (EC: Rs.7.64 crore)

The first three works had been commissioned in September 2001, November 2003 and July 2007 respectively. Progress on the remaining projects is as under:

#### **3.2.10.1 Scheme for tapping ground water from Potshangbam and Sekmai area, Phase II**

The GOI sanctioned the scheme for tapping of ground water from Potshangbam and Sekmai area, Phase – II to provide drinking water to 50,000 inhabitants and released (June 2005) an amount of Rs.3.78 crore. The work was targeted to be completed by December 2006 which was subsequently revised to March 2007. It was observed that out of 19 items of work, only six items had been completed (February 2007), six partially completed (60 to 95 per cent) and works on seven items were yet to be started (details shown in **Appendix 3.5**). Against a projected cost of Rs.6.73 crore, a sum of Rs.7.24 crore had so far been spent (July 2007) leading to a cost over-run of Rs.51 lakh. The Department could not furnish any reasons for the delay and cost over-run. Due to non-completion of the Scheme, the problem of drinking water in Imphal city could not be alleviated.

### **3.2.10.2 Scheme for utilization of Leishangkhong moat**

The GOI sanctioned (March 1999) the scheme for utilization of Leishangkhong moat and released (January 2003) an amount of Rs.5 crore being the first instalment. Ten items of works were awarded (October 2003 to March 2006) after a delay ranging from nine months to more than three years from the date of sanction (details shown in **Appendix 3.6**). The entire work was projected to be completed by December 2005 which was subsequently revised to March 2006 and then to March 2007. However, only seven items of work were completed within the stipulated period. Two items were completed (November 2006) with a delay ranging from 4 months to 30 months. The work of design and construction of treatment plant consisting of clarifloculator, rapid sand filter, chemical dosing chambers *etc.*, which was awarded (August 2004) at a tendered cost of Rs.1.93 crore for completion by June 2005 was still incomplete as on July 2007.

Scrutiny of records revealed that the Department had initially (July 1998) contemplated utilizing a part of the Leishangkhong moat (which was extending from Lilong to Canchipur) as a pre-settling tank where the water pumped from the confluence point of Iril and Imphal rivers was to be stored. From there the water was to be sent to the treatment plant to be constructed at Canchipur and then to be sent to a ground sump of six lakh gallons capacity for pumping into the distribution pipelines.

Subsequently (October 2003), the Department abandoned the idea of using the moat due to encroachment problems at the site and changed it to laying of 350 mm pipes for 3,643 metres from the confluence point of Iril and Imphal rivers to the treatment plant. Also, the plan of constructing a ground sump of six lakh gallon capacities had been replaced by construction of two sumps each of three lakh gallon capacity – one of them on a hillock. However, the changed design was not technically cleared subsequently and the Department proceeded without technical sanction.

The DPR, which was finalized in July 1998 did not even provide for soil testing for the treatment plant. This item was added (December 2004) by the Department after a gap of six years. The investigation was completed in January 2005. Thus, the DPR prepared by the Department was deficient and it did not take into account all the possible eventualities.

The planning and project formulation process was thus deficient and suffered from adhocism. Thus, even after spending Rs.6.90 crore (90 *per cent*) against the projected cost of Rs.7.63 crore, the project was yet to be completed (July 2007). The Department stated that the project could not be completed by the target date due to prevailing law and order situation and inadequate release of funds by the State Government. Had the scheme been completed in time, 50,000 people could have been provided potable water.

IWSS Phase-I thus envisaged a capacity creation of 25.38 MLD for catering to water requirement of 1.88 lakh people. It was observed that only one treatment plant with a capacity of 6.81 MLD could be completed as of July 2007 and four treatment plants under Phase-I with a capacity of 18.57 MLD could not

be completed as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, depriving 1.38<sup>3</sup> lakh people of their drinking water requirement.

Thus, a majority of the people targeted to be covered by the scheme were deprived of clean drinking water and the problem is unlikely to be alleviated in near future.

### 3.2.11 Low performance of the existing schemes

The total installed capacity of IWSS was 80.82 MLD as of 2006-07. Audit scrutiny, however, revealed that the production was only 63.16 MLD which was 78 per cent of the installed capacity. The details of installed capacity of the existing treatment plants and their daily production as of March 2007 were as under:

**Table No. 6**

Name of scheme	Installed capacity (in MLD)	Daily production (in MLD)	Efficiency (in per cent)
Kangchup	23.61	22.93	97
Chinga	1.14	1.00	88
Khuman Lampak	0.45	0.45	100
Canchipur	6.81	5.45	80
Koirengei	2.27	1.50	66
Singda	18.16	14.52	80
Ningthempukhri	4.54	3.90	86
Porompat	9.08	7.49	82
Porompat Phase-II	6.81	5.10	75
Potsangbam, Ph-I	6.81	0.60	9
Minuthong	1.14	0.22	19
<b>Total:</b>	<b>80.82</b>	<b>63.16</b>	<b>78</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

It was further observed that scrutiny revealed that of the eleven treatment plants, the two water supply schemes, Potsangbam Phase-I and Minuthong with installed capacities of 6.81 MLD and 1.14 MLD respectively, produced only 0.60 MLD and 0.22 MLD respectively, showing a very low productivity which ranged from 9 per cent to 19 per cent only. Reasons for such low performance were not intimated.

The requirement of water was 97 MLD at the rate of 135 litres per head per day which was based on the population of Imphal city estimated by the Department at 7.16 lakh including the floating population by the end of 2006-07. Scrutiny of Departmental records revealed that the wastage including leakage and un-authorised diversions in its systems was 30 per cent which was much in excess of the norm of 10 per cent fixed by the Central Public Health and Environmental Engineering Organization. Considering the Departmental rate of leakage, water available for public distribution would be 44.21 MLD only. Thus, there was a shortfall of 52.79 MLD which was 54 per cent of daily

<sup>3</sup> Water requirement=135 litre per head per day  
Number of population left out=185.7/135=1.38 lakh

requirement (97 MLD) of potable water. Thus, not even half of daily water requirement was being met in the capital city of Imphal.

It was observed that even after completion of the five new treatment plants (25.38 MLD)<sup>4</sup> there was no possibility of meeting the demand unless the leakages in the system are plugged. There was no record to show that the Department was even contemplating to undertake some action to plug leakages and check unauthorized tapping of water distribution system.

Unless wastage in distribution system due to leakages is checked, the demand for water of the city is unlikely to be met.

### **3.2.12 Quality control**

The Department is to ensure distribution of safe drinking water to the consumers of the city. The quality of the drinking water should be free from contamination, ensured through treatment plants. Periodical monitoring should be done by the authorities to ensure that drinking water supplied to the consumers is of acceptable quality and that no health hazards are caused by the water supplied to the people.

Several deficiencies in assurance of water quality were highlighted in the Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year 2005-06 (Paragraph 5.1.18). However, the Department did not take proper steps to improve the water quality and the situation worsened further as discussed below.

#### **3.2.12.1 Analysis of water treatment**

The raw water should be analysed for physical, chemical and bacteriological parameters and suitable treatment and disinfection should be ensured before supply. Leak detection survey and repairs to control underground leakages in the system are regular exercises that should be undertaken as part of maintenance.

The Department recorded that it was maintaining its water quality as per WHO standards by regularly collecting water samples and testing them for physical, chemical and bacteriological analysis. But this contention is not evidenced by the records, which revealed that the Department did not carry out analysis of raw water regularly by collecting adequate water samples from different water sources. During 2002-07, only 528 water samples were collected from the four test-checked treatment plants serving a population of 1,70,000 against 2,040 samples required to be collected as per Manual of water supply and treatment. The shortfall varied from 70 to 76 per cent as shown in the table below:

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<sup>4</sup> 1. Construction of treatment plant at Irilbung – 6.81 MLD.  
2. By utilizing Leisangkhong Moat at Canchipur – 6.81 MLD.  
3. By tapping ground water from Potsangbam – 6.81 MLD and Sekmai areas Phase – II.  
4. Up-gradation of Old Treatment Plant at Chinga – 0.45 MLD.  
5. Improvement of Ningthempukhri water supply scheme – 4.50 MLD

Table No. 7

Location of treatment plants	Population covered	Minimum sample to be collected (Five Years)	Number of samples collected (Five years)	Shortfall in sample collection	Percentage of shortfall
Ningthem Pukhri	40,000	480	144	336	70
Canchipur	50,000	600	144	456	76
Koirengei	30,000	360	96	264	73
Potshangbam Phase-I	50,000	600	144	456	76

(Source: Departmental records)

Tests of water were conducted at the only existing State Laboratory, Imphal which was not provided with adequate and trained technical staff and up to-date calibrated equipment. There was also no evidence on record to show the Departmental efforts in strengthening the existing laboratory and to establish another laboratory, if the existing laboratory was not enough to handle the required number of samples.

It was further observed that the annual requirements of chemicals for the years 2002-2003 to 2006-07 were assessed at the same rate (Lime: 521.62 MT; Ferric alum: 1107.01 MT; Chlorine: 237.33 MT). This reveals that the requirements were computed based on the installed capacity of the treatment plants and not on actual requirement to be arrived at after testing the turbidity and quality of water from time to time.

Examination of eighty water analysis reports pertaining to various water supply schemes revealed that the turbidity of treated water was beyond the acceptable limit in 43 cases which is 54 *per cent* of total reports scrutinised. Total dissolved solids in treated water increased in comparison to raw water indicating that excess quantities of alum and chlorine had been used in the treatment. In fact the presence of total dissolved solids was within limits in raw water. Hardness of water increased after treatment in respect of 67 samples due to use of disproportionate quantity of chemicals in some samples. Lime (Calcium carbonate) was also added more than the requirement as was indicated by high level of total alkalinity in five reports. Chloride content had also increased in treated water in 60 samples which indicates use of more chlorine than required. This was substantiated by the results of a test check conducted on Chinga Water Supply Scheme. During the last four years (2003-07) against the annual requirements of 8.5 MT of Chlorine, the Department used 11 to 15 MT.

It was also observed that these reports did not contain any reference to any biological tests being performed to ascertain total Coliforms and E. coli. These tests should be conducted on a routine basis, especially for the surface water samples.

Thus, as the quality of the drinking water supplied to the city had not been checked, the possibility of health hazard to consumers through consumption of such water cannot be ruled out.

### 3.2.12.2 Water contamination and prevalence of water borne diseases

Scrutiny of records revealed that the Department had not made any effort to conduct any survey of underground leakage, un-authorised tapping and en-route contamination of water as of July 2007. However, there were indications that the water at the consumer's end was contaminated as most of the consumers surveyed stated that they had to boil water before use. Also, the incidence of water borne disease was very high as disclosed by the information furnished by the Medical Department. It stated that during the last five years (2002-2006) there were 8,633 cases of water borne diseases such as acute gastro enteritis, enteric fever, ineffective hepatitis and dysentery. Details are shown in the following Table:

**Table No. 8**

Type of disease	Name of medical institute	Year					Total
		Number of cases					
		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	
Enteric fever	RIMS	71	64	35	60	45	275
	JNH			206	267	135	608
Acute Gastroenteritis	RIMS	430	327	188	255	328	1528
	JNH			3,186	285	1784	5255
Ineffective Hepatitis (A.E)	RIMS	24	18	18	30	44	134
	JNH			104	160	234	498
Viral Hepatitis	RIMS	5	15	3	4	2	29
	JNH			124	85	97	306
<b>Total</b>		<b>530</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>3,864</b>	<b>1,146</b>	<b>2,669</b>	<b>8,633</b>

Source: Departmental records.

RIMS: Regional Institute of Medical Sciences.

JNH: Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital.

The table discloses that as many as 8,633 persons suffered from water borne diseases during the period 2002-06. Of these, the number of persons suffering from acute gastroenteritis was the highest with 6,783 persons suffering from it. The number of persons suffering from water borne diseases has increased from 530 cases in 2002 to 2,669 cases in the year 2006 which is an increase of more than 400 *per cent*. This clearly indicates that the drinking water supplied by the Department was not free from harmful bacteria. Thus, the Department failed to ensure supply of quality potable water free from microbes which has serious implications for public health.

### 3.2.13 Asset Management

Asset management is very critical in a Department like PHED for better upkeep and maintenance of its assets. However, it was observed that the Department had not evolved any system of accounting for the assets acquired by it in the form of Asset Registers. As a result, details of construction of treatment plant, date and cost of construction, land acquisitions/allotments *etc.*, present status of the assets, position of damaged / non-functional assets *etc.* could not be ascertained in audit. As such, it was not clear as to how the Department was monitoring regular maintenance of its assets which might have been sustaining wear and tear due to usage and passage of time.



### **3.2.14 Results of consumer survey**

The Department furnished a list of 22,074 consumers to whom it was supplying water as of March 2007 (the list was not updated). The supply was to be made at the rate of 135 litres per capita daily (lpcd) and frequency of supply being once or twice a day either in the morning or in the evening or both.

**3.2.14.1 Objective of survey:** Audit conducted a postal survey of consumers of Imphal area to elicit their opinion regarding effectiveness of water supply schemes and thereby to ascertain whether the supply was regular, adequate in quantity and the water was safe for drinking and whether water bills were being raised and issued regularly. The scope and sample size, survey methodology and model of the questionnaire of the survey are given in **Appendix 3.7**. The postal survey consisted of issuing a simple questionnaire to 818 consumers during June – August 2007.

**3.2.14.2 Survey response:** 802 consumers (98 per cent) returned the questionnaires with their responses. Two per cent of the questionnaires were returned by the Postal Department with the comments “incorrect address/addressee not found”. This is indicative of the fact that some of the addresses of the consumers with the Department were not correct or were incomplete.

**3.2.14.3 Survey findings:** Analysis of the responses disclosed the following facts:

Forty seven per cent of the respondents stated that they did not receive the supply regularly whereas 57 per cent of respondents stated that the delivery was less than the norm of 135 lpcd. Thirteen per cent of surveyed consumers received less than 50 litres, 15 per cent less than 100 litres and only 24 per cent of them received more than 100 litres of water.

Forty nine per cent of the respondents stated that water was not clean and was smelly and 88 per cent of the respondents stated that water was required to be boiled before drinking as the quality of water supplied by the Department was not safe.

Thirty three per cent of them stated that water bills were not served regularly which goes to prove that the Department is not very keen to collect the water charges from its consumers.

Some of the general comments offered by the consumers were (i) non-supply of water for a long time (ii) unauthorised drawing of water from distribution pipe line by electrical pumps (iii) non-repair of leakages (iv) large number of illegal connections (v) non-fitting of water taps and (vi) delay in supply and dependence on private hawkers.

Results of the survey indicate that though the Department had incurred an enormous expenditure in the implementation of the water supply schemes, it

could not alleviate the problem of drinking water by providing safe and sufficient drinking water.

### **3.2.15 Monitoring and evaluation**

The Department had not undertaken any evaluation of its water supply system during the last five years (2002-07) to identify weak areas and to take remedial action. Inspections were not carried out at periodical intervals to detect cases of unauthorized connections, leakages and loss of water for taking up effective remedial measures.

The control required to be exercised at the higher level (Chief Engineer and Additional Chief Engineer) was also found inadequate. Monthly progress reports furnished to the Planning and Development Department and Chief Minister's office were mostly incomplete as vital information like scheduled dates/actual dates of commencement and completion of projects, revised cost of work, reasons for delay and cost revision *etc.* were not mentioned in most of the cases.

### **3.2.16 Conclusion**

Implementation of the water supply schemes was tardy and the objective of providing potable drinking water to the citizens could not be achieved. Planning and project formulation process was deficient. Financial management was poor. Funds released by the GOI were not utilised fully. Project sites were not settled in advance. Most of the projects were behind schedule and as such the Department failed to achieve scheme objectives. Collection of water tax was poor resulting in non-realisation of substantial portion of the Government revenue. Due to non-revision of water tariff, revenue realised could not compensate the cost of operation and maintenance. Water was contaminated due to inadequate and inefficient treatment and underground leakage in the pipelines. Due to the absence of an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism, unauthorized connections, leakages/wastage of water remained unchecked. As a result, the Public Health Engineering Department failed to provide safe and sufficient drinking water to the consumers.

### **3.2.17 Recommendations**

- The Department should formulate a State Water Policy as envisaged in the National Water Policy and formulate a Perspective Plan for capacity building to meet the water requirement of Imphal city.
- The performance of existing schemes should be enhanced by adopting effective measures to plug the leakages and by preventing unauthorised diversions.
- Adequate funds should be released to complete the water supply schemes in a timely manner and execution of various water supply projects should be closely monitored.

- The Department should ensure proper treatment of water and conduct periodical inspections to prevent *enroute* contamination so as to ensure supply of safe drinking water.
- Effective mechanism for realization of revenue should be evolved and water tariff structure should be revised to compensate the cost of operation and maintenance.

## EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

### 3.3 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan

The programme was launched in Manipur in 2001; however, actual implementation of the programme in the State could begin only in 2004 due to legal wrangles. The delay has had a cascading effect on capacity building (both physical and human), adversely affecting the overall objectives. The implementation of the programme was plagued by delays, lack of full time administrator, absence of financial control over expenditure and lack of participatory approach in planning. Thus, there was little impact of various initiatives and interventions at the ground level.

#### *Highlights*

Proper planning for implementation of the programme could not be done as there was no Perspective Plan and the implementation was based on inaccurate data in the absence of a proper household survey report.

(Paragraph 3.3.7)

1,349 out of 4,850 habitations were still without access to primary school/EGS up to the end of 2006-07.

(Paragraph 3.3.10)

The objective of having all children in school by the year 2005 could not be achieved. Even as of March 2007, 12 per cent of the children in the age group 6–14 years remained out-of-school.

(Paragraph 3.3.11)

Teacher pupil ratio was 1:20 as against the norm of 1:40 in Government schools. 396 out of the 2,029 primary schools in the State had only a single teacher.

(Paragraph 3.3.14)

SMA incurred excess expenditure of Rs.1.29 crore on management cost in contravention of SSA guidelines.

(Paragraph 3.3.24)

#### 3.3.1 Introduction

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is a flagship programme of the GOI to universalise elementary education (UEE) in the country in a mission mode. The programme was launched in Manipur in 2000-01 but could not be implemented before March 2004 as the State Council for Education Research and Training (SCERT), an autonomous body, filed a civil case with the District & Sessions Court in October 2002 praying for giving liberty to the SCERT to implement the programme. The Court disposed off the case in September 2003 giving liberty to the Education Department to go ahead with

implementation of the programme. Thus, the implementation of the programme in the State got delayed and actually started only in March 2004.

The main objectives of the programme were:

- to ensure that all children in the age group of six to 14 years are in the schools, Education Guarantee Centres (EGCs), Alternative Schools, or 'Back to School' camps by 2005;
- all children complete five years of primary schooling by 2007;
- all children complete eight years of elementary schooling by 2010;
- elementary education is of satisfactory quality with emphasis on education for life; and
- all gender and social category gaps are bridged at the primary stage by 2007 and universal retention is achieved by 2010.


The Children belonging to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), disabled children and girls in this age group were treated as special focus groups.

### 3.3.2 Organisational set up and management structure

SSA was implemented in the State through the State Mission Authority (SMA) which was created in December 2000.

The organisational set up for implementation of the programme is given below:

**Chart No.1**



### **3.3.3 Scope of Audit**

A review of implementation of SSA in the State for the period 2002-07 was conducted during July-August 2006 and April-May 2007. Out of nine districts and 35 blocks in the State, one hill districts and two valley districts were selected for examination and nine blocks and 54 schools were also selected for detailed checking.

### **3.3.4 Audit objectives**

The audit objectives were to see whether:

- Planning for implementation was as per prescribed SSA framework and guidelines
- Necessary infrastructure for increasing the reach of universal elementary education was created and its reach expanded to cover all beneficiaries
- Financial management of the programme was efficient and in accordance with generally accepted financial norms
- Major interventions of SSA were carried out as per norms
- An effective monitoring and evaluation system was put in place

### **3.3.5 Audit criteria**

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Annual Work Plan and Budget
- Scheme Guidelines
- Norms prescribed for appointment and training of teachers
- Prescribed outputs and benchmarks of performance fixed for each intervention

### **3.3.6 Audit methodology**

Audit methodology included holding an entry conference (April 2005) with the Departmental authorities, checking records of SMA, Education Directorate, and schools and other bodies in the selected districts, issuing questionnaires, holding discussions with the auditee management to seek clarifications, analysis of data, documentary evidence vis-à-vis audit criteria to arrive at audit findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Audit findings were discussed with the Departmental officials in an exit conference (October 2007). The replies of the SMA and Education Directorate have been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

### **Audit findings**

The important points noticed in the course of review are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

### 3.3.7 Planning

Primary sources of data required for plan formulation should be based on comprehensive household surveys and their updating from time to time. Proper planning and identification were critical for successful implementation of the SSA.

#### 3.3.7.1 Household survey

The SSA framework envisaged a comprehensive household survey for ascertaining the exact number of children in the 6 – 14 years age group and those out-of-school, as well as their regular updating. Audit observed that no comprehensive household survey was carried out. However, partial household survey was conducted during 2002 in respect of only two hill districts – Chandel and Tamenglong. Being only partial, the results thereof could not be used for implementation of the programme. Thus, there was no assessment of base line information at the time of commencing the programme. Subsequently, household survey was conducted in 2005 but compilation of data could not be completed (May 2007) which had adversely affected the implementation of the programme.

#### 3.3.7.2 Non-preparation of Perspective Plan

Information furnished by the SMA revealed that no perspective plan was prepared either for the individual districts or for the State as a whole. Outlays for the years 2002-03 to 2006-07 were determined on the basis of the Annual Work Plans and Budget of the nine districts. Audit compiled the details of children in the target age group (6-14 years) for the years 2004-07 as given below:

**Table No. 1**  
Statement showing targeted number of students enrolled in recognised schools and out-of-school children (6-14 age group)

(in numbers)

District name	Year					
	2004-05		2005-06		2006-07	
	Enrolment	Out-of-school	Enrolment	Out-of-school	Enrolment	Out-of-school
Bishenpur	33892	9,076	41761	3,706	40630	3,986
Chandel	23242	5,177	28845	6,361	28506	6,361
Churachandpur	38537	11,493	38570	15,427	38537	9,332
Imphal West	61952	12,267	83806	6,984	81531	6,984
Imphal East	79928	10,751	73557	4,466	67952	9,152
Senapati	75614	24,786	60110	15,182	94552	15,182
Tamenglong	26492	7,876	30696	4,484	32699	4,437
Thoubal	82908	20,230	80596	7,165	57152	7,165
Ukhrul	21884	9,391	39428	6,406	38515	6,406
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,44,449</b>	<b>1,11,047</b>	<b>4,77,369</b>	<b>70,181</b>	<b>4,80,074</b>	<b>69,005</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

### 3.3.8 Financial Management

Regular and timely release of funds is an essential requirement for effective implementation of any programme. Delays, irregular or short release of funds have a cascading impact on the execution of time-bound interlinked activities. Regular funding assumes importance as implementation of SSA had been started in the State only three years ago and fund requirement at this stage of implementation should have necessarily been oriented towards infrastructure and capacity building.

#### 3.3.8.1 Short release and delay in release of funds

The Manual of Financial Management and Procurement (FMP) stipulated that the Ministry would release funds directly to the State Implementing Society (SIS) in two instalments (April and September) every year. Norms of the programme further envisaged that the State would contribute its share within 30 days of the receipt of the Central share. Audit however, noticed that the Ministry did not release its share as per the prescribed norms as shown in the table below:

**Table No. 2**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Opening Balance	Approved Plan Outlay	Releasable Share			Actually Released		Total funds available	Expenditure	Balance
			Centre	State	Total	Centre	State			
2002-03	Nil	9.38	7.03	2.35	9.38	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
2003-04	Nil	31.60	23.70	7.90	31.60	5.00 (21)	Nil	5.00	Nil	5.00
2004-05	5.00	46.01	34.51	11.50	46.01	12.25 (35)	3.68 (32)	20.93	13.37 (64)	7.56
2005-06	7.56	50.16	37.62	12.54	50.16	13.27 (35)	6.49 (52)	27.32	20.46 (75)	6.86
2006-07	6.86	62.05	46.54	15.51	62.05	18.81 (40)	7.27 (47)	32.94	23.34 (71)	9.60
<b>Total</b>		<b>199.20</b>	<b>149.40</b>	<b>49.80</b>	<b>199.20</b>	<b>49.33 (33)</b>	<b>17.44 (35)</b>		<b>57.17</b>	

(Source: Departmental records)

Figures in bracket are in percentage

Against a releasable share of Rs.149.40 crore (2002-07), the Central Government released only Rs.49.33 crore, which was only 33 per cent of its share. The State Government was to release a sum of Rs.49.80 crore (2002-07) as its share; but it released only Rs.17.44 which was only 35 per cent of its share affecting the implementation of the programme adversely.

As mentioned in paragraph 3.3.1, there was court intervention and as such the programme implementation started only in March 2004. During 2003-07 the Centre short released its share every year ranging between 60 per cent to 78.70 per cent. Similarly the State also short released its share ranging between 48.25 per cent to 100 per cent. However, even the available funds could not be utilised. Utilisation of funds ranged between nil to 75 per cent of the available funds.

The SMA was supposed to pass on the amounts released by the Central and State Governments without delay to the District Project Officers (DPOs) except the amounts sanctioned for the text books, Innovative Education for Disabled and teachers training which were to be executed by SMA itself so as to enable them to execute the programme in right earnest. But it was seen that out of Rs.66.77 crore received from the Government (Central: Rs.49.33 crore; State: Rs.17.44 crore), the SMA released only Rs.57.17 crore to the DPOs



holding up with it a sum of Rs.9.60 crore which constituted around 14.50 *per cent* of the released amount. Also these funds were released late to the DPOs with delays ranging from 7 to 11 months.

### **3.3.8.2 Temporary diversion of funds**

Guidelines of SSA do not permit loaning out of SSA funds to any publisher of text books. However, the SMA loaned a sum of Rs.1 crore to the Board of Secondary Education, Manipur (BSEM) during February 2005 with the condition to repay it within six months from the date of the loan along with interest applicable from time to time as per United Bank of India rates.

The loan was recovered during October 2005 by way of adjustment against bills payable to BSEM. But out of the admissible interest of Rs.7.16 lakh due on the loan only Rs.3.80 lakh was recovered in August 2006 leaving Rs.3.36 lakh unrecovered (September 2007).

The Department stated that the due amount of interest would be adjusted from the payments to be made to the Board of Secondary Education Manipur (September 2007).

## **Programme Implementation**

### **3.3.9 Pre-project activities**

Pre-project activities such as household survey, procurement of furniture and equipment for opening of office and community mobilization *etc.* should have been completed during 2000-01 itself. The GOI released grants-in-aid of Rs.36.16 lakh in February 2001 and Rs.109.93 lakh in May 2001 for undertaking the pre- project activities in the State.

The State Government, however, released Rs.36.16 lakh to the SMA during March 2002. Further funds were released only after the court case was dismissed in September 2003. However, only Rs.101.11 lakh was released by the State Government to the SMA in December 2003. The balance amount (Rs.8.82 lakh) was yet to be released for utilization (May 2007).

Thus, due to delay in release of funds, the pre-project activities could not be undertaken in time. The Department stated (September 2007) that the State Government would release the remaining amount (Rs.8.82 lakh) to SMA. However, the fact remains that the programme had suffered for want of funds.

### **3.3.10 Habitations having no access to primary schools**

As per norms, new primary schools were to be opened only in those areas which did not have any school within one kilometre of a habitation. As per the information furnished by the SPD (June 2007), out of 4,850 habitations in the State, 1,349 habitations (28 *per cent*) were still without access to primary schools and EGS as of March 2007. Thus, there is an urgent need to open the required number of primary schools in the un-served habitations for covering the out-of-school children under the programme.

### **3.3.11 Coverage of Out-of-School Children**

The main objective of SSA was to ensure that all the children in the age group 6 to 14 years are enrolled in schools, EGS, alternative schools and back to school camps by 2005. The SMA could not achieve this objective even as of March 2007. The State had 69,005 children out of school at the end of 2006-07 which constitutes 12 *per cent* of total child population (5,56,540) of the State. Though funds less than actual allocation were released, funds were not a constraint as even the short released funds were not fully utilised (**Appendix 3.8**).

It was observed that SMA did not initiate any serious action in respect of various interventions for enrolling the out-of-school children during the years 2004-07. The physical achievement in respect of EGS was only 47.55 *per cent*, for back to school camps, it was a meagre 4.57 *per cent* and for residential bridge courses, it was 55.70 *per cent*. In case of remedial teaching, physical achievement at the end of 2006-07 was nil. Though there was a provision of Rs.18.23 crore for these interventions during 2004-07, the financial achievement was only Rs.3.08 crore which was only 16.90 *per cent* of the provision. Thus, the funds for the programme could not be fully utilised leading to delays in implementation of the programme. Details are given in **Appendix 3.9**.

These findings show that there was no proper planning, no focus to provide appropriate direction in any of the activities of the SMA.

### **3.3.12 Education for girls and SC/ST children**

The commitment of the SSA to universalise primary education necessarily implies equal and universal participation of all children regardless of religion, caste, creed, sex, *etc.* Towards this end, special attention to certain disadvantaged groups of children would be imperative if the goal of universal elementary education was to be achieved.

The financial target during the last three years (2004-07) for girls' education was Rs.264.45 lakh for various interventions. The State had sanctioned Rs.79.95 lakh during 2005-06 for girls' education. However, only an amount of Rs.20.75 lakh could be utilised during the year. The total expenditure incurred up to March 2007 was only Rs 51 lakh.

For education of SC/ST children, the SMA fixed a financial target of Rs.264.70 lakh for various interventions during the last three years (2004-07). However the financial achievement was only Rs.105.48 lakh (40 *per cent*). The following table shows expenditure for education of girls and SC/ST children:

**Table No. 3**

(Rupees in lakh)

Year	Expenditure	
	Girls Education	SC/ST
2004-05	7.50	42.48
2005-06	20.75	29.00
2006-07	22.75	34.00
Total	51.00	105.48

(Source: Departmental records)

As can be seen above, the financial achievement in regard to girls education was only 19 *per cent* whereas the achievement was only 40 *per cent* in respect of interventions meant for SC/ST children.

Thus, the SMA failed to achieve the financial target for education of special focus groups.

### 3.3.13 Education Guarantee Scheme/Alternative and Innovative Education

The SMA had opened 971 EGS and 1,048 AIE centres till the end of 2006-07, with the involvement of 59 NGOs. During 2002-04, no EGS/AIE centres were opened in the State. During 2004-07, the SMA fixed a target to enrol 3,37,857 of out-of-school children in EGS/AIE centres at an estimated expenditure of Rs.30.54 crore. However the SMA could enrol only 1,37,041 out-of-school children at an expenditure of Rs.5.29 crore. The physical and financial achievement was only 40.56 and 17.32 *per cent* respectively.

### 3.3.14 Irrational deployment of teachers

According to SSA programme guidelines, one teacher was to be appointed for every 40 children in primary and upper primary schools. Records of SMA revealed that as on 31 March 2007, the ratio was higher than the prescribed norm as shown below:

**Table No. 4**

Type of School	No. of schools			Number of		Teacher pupil ratio
	Primary	Upper primary	Total	Teachers	Pupils	
Government	2029	509	2538	12506	249264	1: 20
Government Aided	453	618	1071	2150	230810	1:107

(Source: Departmental records)

The above table discloses that less number of students had been enrolled in Government schools. It is evident that the programme implementation authority laid less emphasis on the key objective of enrolment of all children in the age group of 6-14 years but paid more attention to appointment of teachers. The aided schools, on the other hand, were functioning with very few teachers, with teacher pupil ratio being 1:107 defeating the objective of due care and attention to each pupil.

Although the Government had surplus teachers almost everywhere, 396 of the Government primary schools, which constituted 20 *per cent* of Government

primary schools, were functioning with only one teacher as on 31 March 2007. This indicated that the SMA ignored the aspect of proper utilization of the appointed teachers.

The Department stated (September 2007) that the number of single teacher schools had been reduced to 245 as per district plan 2006-07 as a result of rationalisation of placement of teachers by the Education Department.

**3.3.15 *Non setting up of more upper primary schools to meet the prescribed scale***

As per SSA norms, the ratio of upper primary schools to primary schools should be 1:2 by March 2007. However, as on 31 March 2007, there were 661 Government upper primary schools and 2,157 Government primary schools in the State. The ratio thus worked out to 0.60:2.

The PAB in its meeting held in May 2005 recommended opening of 41 primary and 41 upper primary schools. But SMA has not taken any action for their opening ostensibly due to ban on recruitment of teachers by the State Government. The fact remains that there was no need to recruit more teachers in view of very high teacher pupil ratio of 1:20 as against the norm of 1:40 in the State. Only the deployment of teachers need to be rationalised. Due to lack of planning, the programme was a non starter.

**3.3.16 *Computer aided learning (CAL) for upper primary students***

Under this intervention, a total of 510 upper primary schools were to be covered on a pilot basis across the nine districts of the State by selecting 10 to 15 schools from each block; and these schools were to be designated as SSA model schools. Each such school was to be provided with one Computer, one Dot Matrix Printer and one UPS system. A minimum of two teachers from each school was to be trained to show basic operations of computer to the students in the class rooms. For this, additional class rooms were to be provided.

However, the programme was taken up only in 2005-06 and that too, only in one district, Bishnupur at a cost of Rs 13.68 lakh. This was also spent only on procurement of computers, training material and furniture. During 2006-07 against a sanction of Rs.35 lakh, the SMA could spend only Rs.11.75 lakh on computer literacy programme involving 2,580 students of 64 upper primary schools and 90 teachers of three districts (Imphal East, Senapati and Bishnupur).

Thus, the objective of computer learning programme for the upper primary students of the State could not be achieved.

**3.3.17 *Teaching learning equipment***

According to the guidelines of SSA, a one time grant of Rs.50,000 for Teaching Learning Equipment (TLE) was admissible to each Upper Primary

School (Class VI to VIII) not covered by the erstwhile Operation Black Board Scheme.

Audit scrutiny revealed that in Churachandpur district, the Chief Executive Officer, Autonomous District Council had sanctioned (September 2005) this one time grant to 72 Junior Basic Schools (Class I to V), which did not fall within the category of Upper Primary School. Thus, the grant of Rs.36 lakh<sup>1</sup> paid to these schools was irregular.

The amount of TLE was to be spent as per local specific requirement to be determined by the school committee by deciding the best mode of procurement, in consultation with teachers. School committee may also recommend district level procurement if there is advantage of scale. However, it was noticed that 33 TLE items and sports material in respect of 372 upper primary schools of eight districts for Rs.1.86 crore were purchased by floating tenders centrally by the SMA without consulting the school committees in violation of the guidelines. (Details are shown in **Appendix 3.10**). Thus the programme suffered from lack of control and direction.

The Department stated that supply order was placed by the then SPD in 2005 without informing any other SSA functionary.

### **3.3.18 Training of teachers**

Teachers' training plays an important role in ensuring quality education in a fast evolving world. Under SSA, training was to be imparted to all teachers.

#### **3.3.18.1 Inadequate training to teachers**

SSA guidelines lay down that every year all the teachers should be given 20 days' in- service training, 60 days refreshers course for untrained teachers and 30 days orientation programme for newly employed teachers. As of March 2007, against a total of 14,656 teachers of primary and upper primary schools, only 5,998 teachers were trained leaving 8,658 teachers untrained which constitute 59 per cent.

The Department stated (September 2007) that despite taking up all training programmes regularly, the coverage was not up to the expected target because of limited intake capacity and assured that efforts would be made to impart the requisite training to all the untrained teachers. It was also stated that as a step forward towards the goal, the 20 day in-service training programme will be changed to a 10 day training programme so as to cover more in-service teachers.

### **3.3.19 Distribution of free text books**

Text books are an indispensable feature of imparting proper education to the children. As per norms of SSA, free text books were to be provided to all girls and SC/ST children at primary and upper primary levels.

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<sup>1</sup> Rs. 36 lakh = 72 schools x Rs.50,000.

### 3.3.19.1 Delay in distribution of free text books

There were delays in distribution of text books on many occasions. In Imphal West district, for the academic session 2005-06, text books for Mathematics and English could be distributed only in June 2005; the rest were distributed in September 2005. In Wangoi block during 2006-07, 2,931 out of 9,243 children were not given free textbooks till May 2007.

During 2005-06, class I children in Thoubal district were given textbooks only in October 2005. In Churachandpur district, class I children and upper primary children had to suffer till September 2005 and November 2005 respectively and in the year 2006-07 all the beneficiaries of the district had to wait for the textbooks till July 2006. Details of the cases of delay in distributing the textbooks district-wise are as under:

**Table No. 5**  
**Statement of delay in distribution of free text books**

Year	Name of Districts	Start of academic Session	Month of distribution	Delay in months
2005-06	Imphal west	February 2005	June 2005	4
2005-06	Imphal west	February 2005	September 2005	7
2005-06	Imphal West -II	February 2005	June 2005	4
2005-06	Thoubal	February 2005	October 2005	8
2005-06	Churachandpur	February 2005	September 2005	7
2005-06	Churachandpur	February 2005	November 2005	9
2006-07	Churachandpur	February 2005	July 2006	5

(Source: Departmental records)

It is evident from the above table that there was a delay of four to nine months in distributing free textbooks in the 2005-06 and 2006-07 academic years, which affected the programme adversely.

### 3.3.19.2 Short issue of free text books

There were 3,44,462 and 3,68,220 eligible children during 2005-06 and 2006-07 respectively in the State. However, the SMA distributed free textbooks only to 2,71,770 and 2,82,350 children respectively during these two academic sessions at a total cost of Rs.10.30 crore. Thus 72,692 girl students (21 per cent) and 85,870 SC/ST students (23 per cent) had been deprived of the benefit of free text books during the years 2005-06 and 2006-07 respectively.

### 3.3.20 Early childhood care and education (ECCE)

Under the SSA, due recognition has been given to early childhood care and education in the three to six years age group as a precursor to improving enrolment and participation of children in the schooling system. ECCE provides basic pre-school facilities to these children. Accordingly, the programme envisages a provision of Rs.15 lakh per year for every district to plan the intervention under ECCE.

Although ECCE scheme is a vital component of the SSA programme and despite there being adequate provision of funds (Rs.4.05 crore) for it, the

SMA provided only Rs.1.02 crore to the nine districts during the three years 2004-07, which amounts to only Rs.3.78 lakh per district per annum. Scrutiny of records revealed that no activity was carried out under the scheme. Thus, many children, especially in the age group of three to six years, who are also first generation learners, were denied the opportunity of access to basic pre-school facilities

### 3.3.21 *National Programme of Nutritional Support for Primary Education*

It was observed in audit that the Government of Manipur could not extend the Mid-day-meal Scheme to children belonging to 2,019 EGS and AIE centres (EGS: 971 and AIE: 1,048) till 2006-07 due to non finalisation of modalities of implementation of the scheme in those centres and no fruitful steps were taken to bring the EGS and AIE centres under the scheme as of March 2007. As a result, 55,110 children attending EGS and AIE centres were deprived of the benefits provided under the scheme during the year 2006-07.

### 3.3.22 *Deprived urban children*

An important category of children who need special interventions belong to the urban poor. These children are not only indigent but also often deprived of familial support and proper educational environment. SSA therefore requires the State to formulate perspective plan for the urban children and evolve a strategy for education of the poor and deprived urban children. It was observed that no such deprived urban children had been identified and no funds for their identification were proposed in the State till 2006-07.

The Department stated (June 2007) that the SPO is trying to identify the urban deprived children and after the identification process, it will formulate perspective plan for urban deprived children.

### 3.3.23 *Facilities to children with disabilities*

As per the framework for implementation of SSA, every child with special needs, irrespective of the kind, category and degree of disability, should be given education in an appropriate environment.

As of 2006-07 the SMA, in association with the Department of Medical and Health Services, identified 7,411 disabled children, of which, 4,739 children were enrolled in schools leaving 2,672 children (36 per cent) out-of-school/EGS/AIE. The year-wise allocation and expenditure on integrated education for the disabled children is given below:

**Table No. 6**

(Rupees in lakh)

Year	Allocation	Expenditure
2004-05	20.36	19.27
2005-06	33.82	16.94
2006-07	44.47	16.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>98.65</b>	<b>52.21</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

The SMA had procured aids and appliances worth Rs.10.58 lakh during November 2005 to November 2006 for distribution to the disabled children. However, the appliances were not yet distributed for want of beneficiary list from the medical authorities (May 2007).

### **3.3.24 Management cost**

The SSA guidelines envisage that the management cost during a year should not be more than six *per cent* of the total cost separately for each district and also for the entire State. Audit scrutiny however revealed that the SMA incurred Rs.4.72 crore as management cost out of the total expenditure of Rs.57.17 crore during 2004-07. The management cost as per norms should not have been more than Rs.3.43 crore. Thus, the SMA incurred an extra expenditure of Rs.1.29 crore on management cost in contravention of the SSA guidelines.

The Department stated (September 2007) that the details of actual expenditure of all districts and SPO are being collected and strict guidelines would be issued by the SPO so that this does not recur in future.

### **3.3.25 Civil works**

SSA prescribed that civil work planning should be based on a school-wise infrastructure survey which should cover the number of children, number of teachers, existing infrastructure like class rooms, toilets, drinking water facilities, boundary walls *etc.* and the gaps in infrastructure.

The participation of the community in all civil work activities is mandatory in order to ensure a sense of ownership. SSA encourages use of local construction material and low cost technologies.

#### **3.3.25.1 Constructions taken up without infrastructure survey**

The SMA had taken up construction of 583 school buildings during the period 2004-07 (BRC<sup>2</sup>: 33, CRC<sup>3</sup>: 93, buildingless primary schools: 350, buildingless upper primary schools: 61 and dilapidated primary schools: 46) at a cost of Rs.17.28 crore up to March 2007. No infrastructure survey was conducted as required in accordance with the programme guidelines. Thus, Audit was unable to verify whether the initiative taken for infrastructure development was based on actual requirement of the centre and the schools selected for construction of buildings. It was further observed that the SMA prepared one common estimate for each of the category; i.e., one for BRC, one for CRC *etc.* and got the building constructed according to such estimates in valley as well as hill districts without considering the local topography.

It was also seen that each estimate was framed without any consideration for removal of architectural barriers for easy access by the physically challenged children/earthquake resistant structure, eco-friendly building material, rain harvesting although provision of such consideration was mandatory as per

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<sup>2</sup> Block Resource Centre

<sup>3</sup> Cluster Resource Centre



SSA guidelines. In none of the districts was there any community participation in such construction work although this was also mandatory as per the framework of the programme.

The Department stated (September 2007) that Village Education Committees (VECs) were involved in taking up civil work programme in the districts. However, audit did not find any evidence of their participation in civil work programmes in the selected districts.

#### **3.3.25.2 Lack of co-ordination**

Records of SMA disclosed that the Education Department had a weak administrative infrastructure for planning and implementation of a programme of the size and scale of SSA. At the SMA level, no full time officer had been deployed to look after the activities of SSA. This has had a telling effect on implementation of the programme as discussed below:

The programme guidelines provide for creating synergy between SSA and other ongoing elementary education programmes and schemes in the State. However, the SMA failed to coordinate with other similar ongoing elementary education programmes. As a result, seven new school buildings worth Rs.17.50 lakh in Imphal West and Churachandpur districts were constructed during 2004-05 even though the buildings of these seven schools had already been constructed by the Education Department with Non-lapsable Central Pool of Resources during the financial year 2002-03.

#### **3.3.25.3 Lack of infrastructure**

Scrutiny revealed that out of 2,538 primary and upper primary schools in Manipur, 309 schools were still without buildings and 874 were in dilapidated conditions. These constituted 47 *per cent* of the total number of primary and upper primary schools.

Out of 2,538 schools, only 209 schools (8 *per cent*) had separate toilet for girls. Even under this scenario, the Project Approval Board (PAB) disapproved proposals for construction of toilet or drinking water facilities during 2006-07. Reason for this was not intimated to Audit.

Fifty-four schools from nine blocks of three districts were selected by Audit for physical verification of the school infrastructure. It was found that out of the 54 schools, 52 (96 *per cent*) were without electricity, 38 (70 *per cent*) without drinking water facilities and 48 (89 *per cent*) without girls' toilet. Thus, the programme lacked focus and direction - there were no targets, no milestones. (Details shown in **Appendix 3.11**).

#### **3.3.25.4 Maintenance grants**

A repair and maintenance grant of Rs.4,000 per school per year is allowed to all Government schools having up to three class rooms. The grant was releasable on receipt of a specific proposal from the school authorities.

Scrutiny of records revealed that there were 1,460 government schools in the State having up to three class rooms. These schools were paid maintenance grant of Rs.5,000 per school during 2004-05 and 2005-06 without receipt of specific proposals from the school authorities violating the SSA norms, thereby resulting in an excess payment of Rs.29.20 lakh<sup>4</sup>. However, no maintenance grants were released to any of the schools during 2006-07.

The Department stated (September 2007) that after review of the district reports and in accordance with specified norms of SSA, corrective action would be taken.

### **3.3.26 Monitoring and evaluation**

For community-based monitoring system, every school is to have a notice board to notify all the grants received by the school with the details thereof. All reports sent to the block and the district level with regard to enrolment, attendance, incentive *etc.* will have to be displayed on the school notice board and periodic monitoring teams are to make random visits to selected schools. Also, financial monitoring is important in developing demystified community based approaches that allow for social audit. All financial monitoring has to work within a system of social monitoring with full transparency.

Though the SMA has arrangement for monitoring and evaluation of the programmes, there was nothing on record to show that these monitoring arrangements had ever been practised in the State after the launching of the programme. Moreover, no research, evaluation and monitoring for making the programme effective were done by the SMA in partnership with any institution or Non Government Organisations (May 2007).

The SMA stated (September, 2007) that there was no resourceful monitoring institution in the State except the Manipur University which was the only institute recognised by the Union Ministry of Human Resource Development for implementation of SSA programme and that efforts are being made for monitoring and evaluation of the programme in association with the Manipur University.

### **3.3.27 Internal Audit**

The SSA manual on financial management and procurement provides for internal audit of the programme. However, the SMA had neither evolved any system of internal audit nor made any arrangement with any other organization for carrying out this activity.

The Department stated (September 2007) that action has been taken to engage an internal audit officer for the SSA and the process is under way. However, the fact remains that there is no internal audit wing for the SSA in the State.

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<sup>4</sup> 1460 schools x Rs.1000 x 2 years = Rs.29.20 lakh

### **3.3.28 Conclusion**

The target of bringing all the children in the age group of 6-14 years to school could not be achieved due to ineffective planning and tardy implementation of the scheme as brought out in the preceding paragraphs. Delays in implementation of various interventions have adversely affected the programme in the State. Consequently, nearly 12 *per cent* of the children in the State are still out of school, 28 *per cent* of the habitations do not have access to school, 20 *per cent* of the primary schools still have single teachers and 59 *per cent* of teachers remained untrained. As a result, the objective of providing elementary education of satisfactory quality with emphasis on education for life was totally frustrated.

### **3.3.29 Recommendations**

- SMA should initiate a methodical study to assess the total number of out-of-school children, and evolve measures within a specific time frame to bring them to school.
- State Government should release its full matching share in time for ensuring effective implementation of the programme.
- SMA should evolve an effective monitoring system to ensure optimum utilisation of physical and financial resources to achieve the goal of the programme.
- Deployment of teachers across the State needs to be rationalised so that their services are utilised optimally.
- Adequate training should be provided to all teachers.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OF SCHEDULED  
CASTES AND SCHEDULED TRIBES**

**3.4 Educational Development of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Manipur**

The Department for Development of Tribals and Scheduled Castes was implementing various schemes for the educational development of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in Manipur during 2002-07. Non-governmental organisations were also involved in the implementation of the schemes. Performance review revealed that the schemes were not being effectively implemented in the State thereby resulting in the target groups being deprived of most of the benefits provided under these schemes.

*Highlights*

There were substantial savings of 27 per cent in Post Matric Scholarship Scheme for SCs indicating poor budgeting and low coverage.

(Paragraph 3.4.10)

Five hostel buildings had been used as colleges/schools, defeating the purpose for which the buildings were constructed.

(Paragraph 3.4.12)

There was delay ranging from 6 to 20 months in supply of books by the firms thereby depriving timely benefits to the SC/ST students.

(Paragraph 3.4.13.4)

Ashram school buildings are in a dilapidated state and no requisite facilities were provided to the students due to lack of funds. The buildings have become unsuitable for running classes.

(Paragraph 3.4.14)

The hostel/residential/non-residential schools run by Non Government Organisations suffered from lack of funds and were unable to provide basic amenities to SC/ST students.

(Paragraph 3.4.15.1)

Gross drop out rate of ST students remained alarmingly high throughout the years for all age groups.

(Paragraph 3.4.16)

**3.4.1 Introduction**

Education is not only a basic requirement but also the most effective instrument of social empowerment and economic betterment. The State has a constitutional responsibility of promoting education amongst the weaker sections of the society and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and

Scheduled Tribes (STs). The State Government has been implementing various schemes with financial support from the Central Government and also from its own resources for enabling the SCs and STs to upgrade their educational level and skills.

The schemes implemented in Manipur for development of education of SCs and STs are as follows:

- Post Matric Scholarship (PMS) Scheme;
- Book Bank Scheme;
- Hostels for SC/ST boys and girls;
- Grant-in-aid to Voluntary Organisations working for the welfare of SCs/STs (projects related to setting up of residential/non-residential schools and hostels); and
- Scheme for establishment of Ashram Schools in Tribal Sub-Plan areas.


### **3.4.2 Organisations Set up**

The educational development schemes for SC and ST communities were being implemented by the State Government Directorates and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) which received financial, technical and administrative support from the GOI /State Government.

The Department for Development of Tribals and Scheduled Castes acts as the nodal agency for the overall development of SCs and STs in the State. The Department is headed by a Principal Secretary who is assisted by one Joint Secretary and one Under Secretary. At the Directorate level, a Director assisted by two Joint Directors, five Deputy Directors, nine Assistant Directors, one Executive Engineer, eight Assistant Engineers, 26 Section Officers and one Accounts Officer look after the implementation of various schemes.

The organisational set-up of the Department is shown below:

**Chart No. 1**



### **3.4.3 Scope of Audit**

The performance review focused on the implementation of various schemes in the State for the educational development of SCs and STs during the period 2002-07.

For this purpose, records of the Department for Development of Tribals and Scheduled Castes, the Directorate of University and Higher Education, four Girls' Colleges, 17 other Colleges, 10 Senior Secondary Schools, 10 High Schools, 10 Middle Schools, 10 Primary Schools, seven Hostels for SCs and STs and seven NGOs (a total of 77 units) in the test-checked districts (selected by random sampling) of Imphal East and Imphal West (taken as a single capital district), Senapati, Ukhrul, Thoubal and Bishnupur were test-checked during July to September 2006 and April to June 2007.

### **3.4.4 Audit objectives**

The objectives of the review were to see whether:

- planning for implementation of various schemes launched for the educational development of SCs and STs was effective and based on reliable and acceptable data;
- the allocation, release and utilization of funds earmarked for various schemes were judicious, adequate and effective;
- the efforts of the State Government resulted in improving the educational indicators i.e. literacy rate, gross enrolment ratio, gross drop-out rate and gender parity index;
- the implementation of various programmes through NGOs was effective; and
- the monitoring system at various levels was functioning effectively.

### **3.4.5 Audit criteria**

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Guidelines of the schemes issued by GOI;
- Mechanism prescribed for identification of beneficiaries;
- Performance indicators such as literacy rate, gross enrolment ratio and gender parity index; and
- Prescribed monitoring mechanism.

#### **3.4.6 Audit methodology**

Audit methodology included holding of an entry conference (June 2006) with the officers of the Department, briefing them about the objectives and scope of the review and seeking their cooperation in the conduct of Audit. Relevant data and documentary evidence were obtained by a scrutiny of the Departmental records maintained by the Directorate and various schools and colleges in the State. Response to questionnaires were analysed, meetings and discussions were held and joint inspections of hostels and schools were carried out. Audit findings, conclusions and recommendations were discussed with the officials of the Directorate in an exit conference (September 2007) and their views have been incorporated in the review as appropriate.

#### **Audit findings**

Audit findings are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### **3.4.7 Planning**

Audit scrutiny revealed that no reliable database was available with the Department with regard to the beneficiaries. This had an adverse impact on the planning process for implementation of the scheme.

##### **3.4.7.1 Identification of beneficiaries**

Audit scrutiny revealed that the Department had no mechanism to ascertain whether identification of beneficiaries under each scheme had been correctly done. Data on beneficiaries was collected from various educational institutions which receive applications for grant of scholarships from eligible students and aggregated at the Directorate level. No independent physical verification or survey of beneficiaries was conducted to assess the reliability of the data. As such, data available with the nodal Directorate was far from reliable.

The Department stated (June 2007) that the survey work was not taken up due to the prevailing law and order situation in the State.

Audit scrutiny also revealed that the eligibility for award of scholarship to the applicants was determined on the basis of certificates/documents furnished by them. However, there was no evidence of any verification being conducted by the Department to identify any bogus cases of scholarships being granted. In the absence of any checks, the possibility of ineligible students getting the benefit of scholarship and the targeted group not getting the benefit cannot be ruled out.

The Department stated (February 2007) that it was proposing to computerise the scholarship section to identify easily the bogus applicants. However, audit scrutiny did not find any evidence of initiation of computerisation of the scholarship section (June 2007).

### 3.4.8 Financial management

The summarised financial position of the schemes during 2002-07 is given below:

**Table No.1**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Budget provision	Central assistance released	Funds provided by the State Government	Total funds available	Total expenditure	Savings(-)/ Excess (+)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) (3+4)	(6)	(7) (6-5)
2002-03	10.52	9.82	1.13	10.95	10.01	(-) 0.94
2003-04	11.54	10.96	2.32	13.28	11.35	(-) 1.93
2004-05	8.32	13.78	1.67	15.45	15.32	(-) 0.13
2005-06	24.31	15.10	3.36	18.46	18.53	(+) 0.07
2006-07	16.54	14.69	1.00	15.69	15.99	(+) 0.30
<b>Total</b>	<b>71.23</b>	<b>64.35</b>	<b>9.48</b>	<b>73.83</b>	<b>71.20</b>	<b>(-) 2.63</b>

Source: Departmental records

During 2002-05, there was saving of Rs.3 crore while during 2005-07, there was an excess expenditure of Rs.0.37 crore. This has led to overall savings of Rs.2.63 crore during these years.

#### 3.4.8.1 Allocation, release and utilisation of funds in each scheme

It was observed that funds were being released at the fag end of the year in most cases during the period under review. This resulted in delays in release of scholarships to beneficiaries. It was also observed that the State Government was not releasing its matching share in time. As the students would have moved to higher classes by the time the funds were released, there is a possibility that the students could not have claimed their scholarship.

While admitting the audit observation, the Department stated (June 2007) that due to precarious financial position of the State, it was not able to release its share in time.

The availability and utilisation of funds under each of the schemes implemented by the State are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### *Programme implementation*

#### 3.4.9 Pre-matric schemes not taken up

Financial assistance to the pre-matric SC/ST students is essential so as to enable them to reach post-matric level. It was observed that the Government did not take up any programme for the pre-matric SC/ST students including the pre-matric scholarship scheme for children, whose parents are engaged in unclean occupation in the State. The objective of the post matric schemes for



the SC/ST students cannot be achieved unless pre-matric schemes covering the needy SC/ST students are implemented for upgrading the skills of the students to enable them to reach post matric level.

The reasons for not taking up of various pre-matric financial assistance schemes for the SC/ST students were not on record.

#### 3.4.10 Post Matric Scholarship Scheme

Post Matric Scholarship Scheme (PMS) is a 100 *per cent* Centrally assisted scheme. The objective of the scheme is to provide financial assistance to the SC/ST students domiciled in Manipur studying at post matriculation levels to enable them to complete their education without economic constraint. The scheme is presently open to all SC/ST students whose parental annual income is less than Rs.1 lakh. The scholarships are awarded by the State Government to all eligible candidates. The assistance includes provision of maintenance allowance, reimbursement of compulsory non-refundable fees, thesis typing/printing charges, study tour charges, book allowance for students pursuing correspondence courses and special provisions for students with disabilities.

The details of budget allocation and Central assistance released for implementation of the PMS for SC students during 2002-07 are given below.

**Table No.2: Scheduled Castes**

**(Rupees in lakh)**

Year	Budget Provision	Central Assistance Released	Actual Expenditure	Savings	Percentage of savings
2002-03	32.10	75.07	40.49	34.58	46
2003-04	76.00	117.35	75.99	41.36	35
2004-05	38.77	125.49	122.89	2.60	2
2005-06	108.13	129.03	24.00	105.03	81
2006-07	237.33	237.00	236.99	0.01	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>492.33</b>	<b>683.94</b>	<b>500.36</b>	<b>183.58</b>	<b>27</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

Audit scrutiny disclosed that during 2002-06, against the budget allocation of Rs.255 lakh for PMS for SCs, Central assistance released was Rs.446.94 lakh, which is 75 *per cent* more than the budget allocation. During 2002-07, against the total Central assistance of Rs.683.94 lakh, expenditure incurred was only Rs.500.36 lakh with savings being Rs.183.58 lakh which is 27 *per cent* of the total release, which is reflective of the lackadaisical attitude of the Department in implementation of the scheme.

The details of budget allocation and Central assistance released for implementation of the PMS for ST students during 2002-07 are given below.

**Table No.3: Scheduled Tribes**

(Rupees in lakh)

Year	Budget Provision	Central Assistance Released	Actual Expenditure	Savings	Percentage of savings
2002-03	907.22	907.21	858.01	49.20	5
2003-04	968.93	978.13	831.56	146.57	15
2004-05	626.38	1252.21	1242.67	9.54	1
2005-06	1843.97	1236.87	1227.56	9.31	1
2006-07	1316.45	1316.45	1316.45	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>5662.95</b>	<b>5690.87</b>	<b>5476.25</b>	<b>214.62</b>	<b>4</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

The wide gap between budget forecast and Central assistance received indicates inadequate and unrealistic assessment of requirement of funds for disbursement of scholarships to students of SC/ST categories. The Department, however, stated (June 2007) that generally budget provision is made on the basis of requirements projected. The reply is not acceptable as the budget provision was in most cases more than the actual expenditure during the period. The Department also stated (October 2006) that the savings have occurred because of late release of funds by the Central Government. The reply is not tenable as the carry forward funds could have been utilised in subsequent years.

#### **3.4.10.1 Release of scholarship funds and procedure for disbursement**

Scholarships were disbursed by the Department through the college/school authorities. It was observed that in most of the cases funds for a year were released at the fag end of the year resulting in delay in disbursement of scholarships.

Audit scrutiny also disclosed that though acquittance was obtained from the students in prescribed forms in the educational institutions as a proof of disbursement, the actual disbursement of scholarships was not made in the presence of a public representative or member of Gram Panchayat as required under the norms of the scheme. Audit was therefore unable to verify the actual disbursement of scholarships to SC/ST students and the possibility of genuine beneficiaries being deprived of the benefits of the scheme cannot be ruled out. The procedure adopted was unreliable and open to possibility of fraud.

#### **3.4.10.2 Shortfall of coverage of students under PMS**

In 28 colleges/higher secondary schools test-checked, against 24,000 eligible students enrolled during 2002-07, the number of students covered under PMS was only 16,269 students, the shortfall in coverage being 7,731 students *i.e.*, 32 per cent. The details are shown in the table below:

**Table No.4****(In numbers)**

	Scheduled Caste			Scheduled Tribe		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Enrolment	1598	2001	3599	10386	11339	21725
Dropout	87	147	234	557	533	1090
Eligible students	1511	1854	3365	9829	10806	20635
PMS beneficiaries	998	1443	2441	6381	7447	13828
Short fall in coverage	513	411	924	3448	3359	6807

Source: Departmental records

The Department had no information regarding coverage of disabled students under the scheme. This indicates that the scheme was not implemented in right earnest.

#### 3.4.10.3 Coverage of 30 per cent of girl beneficiaries

It was noticed that the coverage of girl beneficiaries under Post Matric Scholarship schemes for SC/ST students was above 30 per cent (**Appendix 3.12**). However in case of hostels for SC/ST students, it was observed that only 24 per cent of the hostels were exclusively constructed for girl students though they constituted 44 per cent of the total SC/ST student population in post matric classes in the State (**Appendix 3.13**). The Department stated (June 2007) that it had not adopted any separate system for promoting gender equality and facilities were being made available to all eligible students irrespective of their gender and that all efforts were being made to achieve minimum 30 per cent coverage of girls in all schemes.

#### 3.4.10.4 Efforts in improving educational status and skills of SC/ST students

Scrutiny revealed that the nodal Department had no information on the academic achievements of SC/ST students. The Department stated (October 2006) that the educational institutions were not forwarding any information on completion of various courses where scholarships had been provided. The year-wise targets and achievements in case of PMS are depicted in the following table:

**Table No.5****(In numbers)**

Year	Scheduled Castes		Scheduled Tribes	
	Target	Achievement	Target	Achievement
2002-03	3,877	1,187	34,921	32,153
2003-04	4,155	2,744	36,653	30,274
2004-05	3,018	2,149	34,512	31,427
2005-06	3,583	2,721	34,570	32,796
2006-07	3,184	2,816	35,420	33,183
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,817</b>	<b>11,617</b>	<b>1,76,076</b>	<b>159,833</b>

(Source: Departmental Records)


During 2002-07, against the target of 17,817 SC beneficiaries under PMS the achievement was 11,617 only, the shortfall being 6,200 (35 per cent). And against the target of 1,76,076 ST beneficiaries under PMS, the achievement was 1,59,833 only, the shortfall being 16,243 (nine per cent). The Department

stated that reasons for shortfall in achieving the targets included submission of incomplete documents by the students, higher income level of SC/ST families, and late release of funds by Government of India *etc.*

### 3.4.10.5 Enrolment of SC/ST students decreased

Audit scrutiny of records of the Department of Education revealed that the enrolment of SC/ST students in post matric classes in educational institutions had a decreasing trend during 2002-07 as shown in the following chart:

Chart No.2



Enrolment of SC students decreased from 2,705 (Boys: 1,525; Girls: 1,180) in 2002-03 to 875 (Boys: 474; Girls: 401) in 2006-07. Likewise the enrolment of ST students also decreased from 19,715 (Boys: 10,837; Girls: 8,878) in 2002-03 to 6,719 (Boys: 3,757; Girls: 2,962) in 2006-07 (*Appendix 3.13*).

The reasons for the same could not be furnished by the Department (June 2007).

### 3.4.10.6 Norms of Post Matric Scholarship were not adhered to

All norms prescribed were to be observed while disbursing scholarship such as fees, maintenance allowance, study tour charges *etc.* Audit scrutiny disclosed that during 2002-07 the Department had paid maintenance charges of Rs.35.70 crore (Rs.2.84 crore for SCs and Rs.32.86 crore for STs). However, maintenance charges paid to students who were availing of free boarding and lodging were not on record and no verification was being carried out at the time of payment of the scholarships. This increased the possibility of free boarders getting benefit of full scholarships. Further, the Department did not assess the progress and conduct of the scholars for continuation of their scholarship, as required under the norms.

### 3.4.11 Hostel facilities for SC/ST students

In order to enable the SC/ST students in middle schools, higher secondary schools, colleges and universities to pursue their studies in major educational centres, the Union Government formulated schemes for providing hostel facility to SC/ST girls and boys. The funding pattern of the scheme between the Central and the State Governments is 50:50 basis for construction of hostels. NGOs are also eligible to receive assistance on sharing basis at 45:45:10 (Union: State: NGO) under the scheme.

Details of assistance released and expenditure incurred on the scheme during the review period is given below:

**Table No. 6**

Year	Assistance released <sup>1</sup>			(Rupees in lakh)	
	Union	State	Total	Actual Expenditure	Savings
<b>Scheduled Castes</b>					
2002-03	–	1.00	1.00	1.00	–
2003-04	–	–	–	–	–
2004-05	–	–	–	–	–
2005-06	–	–	–	–	–
2006-07	–	–	–	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>	<b>–</b>
<b>Scheduled Tribes</b>					
2002-03	–	26	26.00	–	26.00
2003-04	–	123	123.00	123.00	–
2004-05	–	5	5.00	5.00	–
2005-06	142.70	213	355.70	355.70	–
2006-07	–	–	–	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>142.70</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>509.70</b>	<b>483.70</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>142.70</b>	<b>368</b>	<b>510.70</b>	<b>484.70</b>	<b>26</b>

(Source: Departmental Records)

During 2002-07, a total assistance of Rs.510.7 lakh (Central: Rs.142.70 lakh; State: Rs.368 lakh) was released for construction of 35 hostels for SC/ST students. However, expenditure incurred for construction of hostels for the ST students was only Rs.484.70 lakh resulting in savings of Rs.26 lakh (five per cent). Audit scrutiny also revealed that during the above period, an amount of only Rs.1 lakh was released by the State Government towards maintenance of hostels for SCs.

#### 3.4.11.1 Construction of hostels was not need based

It was observed that the construction of hostels for SC/ST boys and girls was not need based. Test-check of 28 colleges/higher secondary schools and all middle schools/high schools revealed that only one college, that is, the Pettigrew College at Ukhrul had two hostels- one each for ST boys and girls completed during 1985 and 2005 respectively, in its premises.

<sup>1</sup> Figures of Budget allocation in case of these schemes were not available with the Department.

**3.4.11.2 Delays in construction of hostels**

It was observed that the construction of hostel buildings were not completed within the prescribed period of two years. In most cases, the delay ranged from four to 17 years. During 2003-06, construction of 35 new SC/ST hostels was sanctioned, of which, construction of only 25 hostels was completed (March 2007). The remaining 10 hostels were not completed (June 2007) ostensibly due to non-release of the Central assistance during 2002-05. The Department had no means of ascertaining the progress of construction works. It was also observed that the State share was released at the fag end of the year, thereby adversely affecting its utilisation.

The status of construction of new hostels is depicted in the table below:

**Table No. 7**

(Rupees in lakh)

Year	No of hostels sanctioned	Sanctioned amount	No of hostels completed	No of hostels under construction
2003-04	5	411.78	5	-
2004-05	1	10.00	1	-
2005-06	29	455.96	19	10
2006-07	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>877.74</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>10</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

During 2002-03 to 2005-06 (up to December 2005), a total amount of Rs.5.60 crore was drawn through nine AC bills for construction of hostels for ST boys and girls. However, DCC bills in support of the AC bills remained outstanding (May 2007) due to which, Audit was not in a position to verify the expenditure incurred against the drawn amount. The Department stated (June 2007) that due to non-submission of utilisation certificate for construction of residential school by the Manipur Tribal Development Corporation (MTDC), the DCC bills were pending submission. The reply is not tenable as DCC bills should have been submitted within one month from the date of drawal of the concerned AC bill.

An amount of Rs.1.75 crore was drawn (March 2006) by the Department through fully vouched contingent bills for payment to eight different contractors for undertaking construction of ten hostels (eight for boys and two for girls) for ST students through limited tender and work orders were issued for Rs.1.86 crore. Out of Rs.1.75 crore, expenditure incurred on payment of contractors bills was Rs.1.27 crore and the balance amount (Rs.0.48 crore) was credited to the account of the DDO of the Department and remained unutilised (June 2007).

Further, the Department did not maintain the details pertaining to occupation of the completed hostels. Following instances were noticed by Audit during the course of the review:

- The construction of hostel (January 2006) at Emmanuel English School at Thiyam Konjin, Thoubal District (estimated cost: Rs.10 lakh) stipulated to be completed by June 2006 remained incomplete (June 2007).

- The construction work of the Boys' hostel in Pettigrew College Complex in Ukhrul district taken up in May 1998 at an estimated cost of Rs.56 lakh appeared to have been abandoned. The Department stated (May 2007) that construction of ST Boys' Hostel for Pettigrew College was under progress and an expenditure of Rs.28 lakh had already been incurred (October 2006). However, in the joint inspection carried out (May 2007), it was found that the three blocks of the hostel were repaired and renovated, the kitchen was under construction, and ground levelling work was yet to be completed though compound fencing and electrical installation had been completed.
- During 2002-03, the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs released Rs.2.50 crore for construction of a residential school at Gamnom-Sapormeina (Senapati District) and stipulated the date of completion as October 2004. The amount (Rs.2.50 crore) had been deposited with the MTDC to take up the construction of residential school as deposit work. As of May 2007 the Corporation had incurred an expenditure of Rs.2.10 crore and the school building, boys' and girls' hostel, kitchen-cum-dinning hall had been completed but toilets and residential quarters remained incomplete. The building was thus not ready for use as residential school.
- The ST hostel building at Sangaiprou Kabui village in Imphal West District had been constructed on the first floor of an existing structure for which an amount of Rs.3 lakh had been sanctioned (February 2004) by the Department out of which, an amount of Rs.2.91 lakh had already been spent (October 2006). The work which was stipulated to be completed by June 2006, remained incomplete (May 2007).
- Joint inspections with the management of hostels revealed that they lacked basic amenities. It was noticed that facilities such as toilets, electricity, dining hall, kitchen, TV sets *etc.* are provided only at Adimjati SC/ST combined Girls' Hostel at Imphal and such facilities are not provided in other hostels of test-checked districts of Ukhrul, Thoubal, and Senapati. This put the inmates of these hostels to hardships and denied them congenial environment for education. Audit scrutiny also revealed that this was one of the main reasons for non occupation of hostels by the students in the test-checked schools/districts.
- During joint inspection of four hostels viz. Pettigrew boys hostel and Pettigrew girls hostel at Ukhrul and combined hostel for SC/ST boys and combined hostel for SC/ST girls at Imphal, it was noticed that no warden had been posted in three hostels viz, ST Boys; Girls Hostels at Pettigrew College,Ukhrul and combined hostel for SC/ST Boys at Imphal. Thus, these hostels lacked supervision and control.

#### **3.4.12 Utilisation of infrastructure created under various schemes**

Five hostels for ST students constructed at United College, Chandel District (capacity 120); Damdei College, Senapati District (capacity 120); Tamenglong College, Tamenglong District (capacity 120); Tamenglong Higher Secondary School, Tamenglong District (capacity 120) and Lamka

College, Churachandpur District (capacity 60) had been used as colleges/school buildings. Thus, the intended purpose of the scheme for providing hostel was defeated. The Department admitted (June 2007) that these hostels were being used as general college/school buildings due to shortage of school buildings.

### **3.4.13 Book Bank Scheme (BBS)**

Under the scheme, Central assistance is provided to the States on 50:50 basis. The objective of the scheme is to provide SC/ST students access to the latest books and to reduce the drop-out ratio of these students who had been receiving PMS for pursuing professional courses such as Medical, Engineering, Agriculture, Veterinary, Polytechnic, Law, Chartered Accountancy, Business Management and Bio-sciences. The purchase of books for the book banks is restricted to prescribed text books only. One set of books is required to be purchased for two students in case of all professional courses except in respect of Post Graduate Courses and Chartered Accountancy where one set is to be purchased for each student.

Though the scheme was merged with the PMS during the 10<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan, the amount of PMS was not found to have been increased to accommodate the BBS component during 2003-06. The Department stated (May 2007) that it had sought a clarification from the GOI as to how the BBS with 50:50 funding basis could be merged with 100 per cent Central assistances scheme of PMS.

#### **3.4.13.1 Book banks not established in all recognised colleges**

Scrutiny of records at the nodal Directorate revealed that only five<sup>2</sup> book banks were established by the Tribal Development Department during 1980-81 to 2002-03. Regarding establishment of new book banks, the Department stated (June 2007) that only technical institutions qualify for establishment of a book bank. However, Audit scrutiny revealed that no book bank was set up in the Manipur University though professional courses such as Business Management courses are being offered in this University. The Department stated (June 2007) that prior to merger of the scheme with PMS, the University had never applied for establishment of a book bank.

#### **3.4.13.2 Prescribed norms for purchase of books**

Audit scrutiny revealed that books were purchased without observing codal formalities and the prescribed ratio was not maintained. The norms for issue of one set of books for two students of professional courses and one set of books for each student of post graduate courses were not fulfilled depriving the students of the intended benefits of the scheme.

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<sup>2</sup> Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), Imphal, Central Agricultural University (CAU), Iroisemba, Imphal, Government Polytechnic, Takyelpat, Imphal, LMS Law College, Imphal and Manipur College of Technology (MCT), Imphal.



### **3.4.13.3 Proper procedures were not adopted in purchase of books**

The Directorate did not adopt proper procedures in procurement of books for the book banks. Audit revealed following instances where procedures were not followed.

- An amount of Rs.8 lakh was drawn (March 2005) on AC Bill for purchase of books out of which a sum of Rs.6.31 lakh only was utilized (May 2007). Relevant DCC Bills for the whole amount remained outstanding (May 2007). Audit was, therefore, unable to verify whether the books were actually purchased or not. The Department stated (June 2007) that after utilising the remaining Rs.1.69 lakh for purchase of books, necessary DCC bills for the whole amount would be submitted. The reply is not tenable as DCC bills should have been submitted within a month from the date of drawal of the AC bill.
- Another amount of Rs.8 lakh was drawn (March 2006) on a fully vouched contingent bill (instead of AC Bill) for purchase of books/furniture under the scheme on the basis of a fictitious certificate of receipt recorded on the body of suppliers' bill. The Department stated (June 2007) that as the Finance Department turned down the proposal for drawal of the amount on AC bill at the fag end of the financial year, the Department had to opt for fully vouched contingent bill by certifying receipt of books on the body of the supplier's bills. Audit scrutiny in May 2007 revealed that out of Rs.8 lakh a sum of Rs.4.65 lakh had been spent on purchase of books and balance amount of Rs.3.35 lakh was deposited in the bank account of the DDO which resulted in blocking of funds.

### **3.4.13.4 Delay in supply of books**

Audit scrutiny of records in the nodal Directorate and the five Book Banks in the State revealed that there was delay of six to 20 months in supply of books valuing Rs.12.87 lakh by the firms resulting in delayed issue of books to the Book Banks by the Department (**Appendix 3.14**). Till May 2007, 71 sets of books (Medical: 61 sets; Law: 10 sets) valuing Rs.4.75 lakh were not issued by the Department. As a result, the benefits of the scheme had not reached the SC/ST students in time. Thus, the whole objective of the scheme was defeated.

### **3.4.14 Setting up of Ashram Schools in Tribal Sub Plan Areas**

This scheme is a Centrally Sponsored scheme for promoting and extending educational facilities in tribal areas on the pattern of old *Gurukul* type of education. The expenditure on the scheme is to be shared between the Centre and the State on 50:50 basis. Funds are provided under the scheme for construction of school buildings from primary school to senior secondary school level, and also for upgrading the existing primary schools. During the period 2002-07, no Central assistance was received by the State.

It was observed that five Ashram Schools (two primary and three secondary schools), were set up at Senapati, Tamenglong and Chandel districts during

1979 to 1986. During the last five years (2002-07), the total number of students enrolled in the Ashram schools was 3,235 only. However, the school buildings were in dilapidated state and requisite facilities were not being provided to students due to lack of funds. During February and March 2004, a total amount of Rs.9 lakh was sanctioned by the Commissioner, Tribal Development Department as State share for extension of the existing Ashram Schools at Langol (Chandel District), Maram (Senapati District) and Noney (Tamenglong District). The whole amount was drawn in March 2004 through AC bill and no DCC bill was submitted in support of this AC bill (May 2007) due to which, Audit was not in a position to verify whether the extension works of Ashram Schools had been carried out or not. As per the Statement furnished (August 2006) by the Executive Engineer of the Department, no new Ashram Schools were constructed during 2002-07.

The Deputy Director, Ashram Schools admitted the facts and stated (May 2007) that facilities like free text books, stationery, uniform, supplementary nutrition programme, teaching aids, games and sports items, and educational excursion could not be provided due to tight fund position. Lack of proper care and accommodation in the area became one of major factors for low rate of admission in these schools.

### 3.4.15 *Implementation of Residential/Non Residential schools and hostels through Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)*

#### 3.4.15.1 *Grant-in-aid to Voluntary Organizations working for the welfare of SCs/STs*

The objective of the scheme is to ensure overall improvement and development of the SCs/STs through voluntary efforts in the fields of education, health and sanitation, environment, in addition to need based socio-economic uplifting efforts and other relevant activities. Under this scheme, funds are provided to the extent of 90 *per cent* of the estimated expenditure by the Government and the voluntary organisation is expected to meet the remaining 10 *per cent* expenditure.

The details of funds released to seven test-checked NGOs are given below:

**Table No.8**

(Rupees in lakh)

Year	Grant-in-aid to Voluntary Organisations working for					
	Scheduled Castes			Scheduled Tribes		
	No. of NGOs	Grant-in-aid released	Utilisation	No. of NGOs	Grant-in-aid released	Utilisation
2002-03	1	6.28	6.28	6	78.07	78.07
2003-04	1	6.26	6.26	6	42.91	42.91
2004-05	1	6.23	6.23	6	13.91	13.91
2005-06	1	6.26	6.26	6	29.39	29.39
2006-07	1	6.21	6.21	6	26.96	26.96

(Source: Departmental records)

NGOs have received substantial funding for setting up and running hostels and residential schools for SC/ST students in the State. In order to assess the effectiveness of implementation of this scheme, Audit conducted joint inspection of facilities provided to the school being run by some of the NGOs.

During the joint inspection conducted in September 2006 and May 2007, the following irregularities were noticed in the hostels/residential/non-residential schools:


- The hostel building at Gopibung, consisting of six big rooms with a capacity of 100 students was constructed by the Association from its own funds. Central assistance of Rs.5 lakh was released during 2002-04. As no grants were released during the years 2004-07, the number of inmates had to be reduced to 90/80 students during these years.
- The Society was running a hostel for ST students of the Chil Chil Asian Mission School run by the Society. During the period up to 2003-04, the number of hostellers was 150. However, the utilization of the hostel was restricted to 100 students from 2004-05 onwards as the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MTA), restricted the grant to cover only 100 students. The full capacity of hostel (150 students) could not be utilized due to restriction in sanctioning the grant by the Ministry. The Department could have taken steps to fill the gap in finances.
- Two ST Student hostels were being run by an NGO at Wangbal (Thoubal District) and Salemthar (Chandel District). The hostels had a capacity of 200 and 102 ST boys and girls respectively. Though the NGO claimed grants from MTA for the full strength of hostellers, the grant received was restricted to 141 inmates for Wangbal Hostel and 90 inmates for Salemthar Hostel. As per the NGO, this curtailment posed acute financial problems in smooth running of the hostels.
- The NGO was running a non-residential school for 100 students at Ayokpa Kabui, Keinou Village (Bishnupur District) having classes from I to V in a rented building being used as school. Central assistance amounting to Rs.8.34 lakh was released for the years 2002-04. However, no Central grants for the years 2004-07 were released (May 2007) due to which the school authority stated that it was facing financial problems and could not distribute books to students.
- The NGO was running a hostel for ST boys and girls at Senapati District Headquarters. Central assistance amounting to Rs.18.01 lakh was released for the years 2002-04. No grants were released by MTA during 2004-07. Due to non-release of grant by MTA from 2004-05 onwards, the Society failed to run and maintain the hostel. The hostel building for both boys and girls with CGI roofing and kutch wall were dismantled in January 2006. The Department stated (June 2007) that due to non-receipt of grant from MTA the Organisation had stopped running the hostel. Thus, there were no functional hostels as of June 2007.

The above instances revealed that lack of financial assistance was the major constraint faced by the NGOs in running the schools/hostels for the welfare of SCs/STs. This had forced the NGOs to curtail the number of inmates, distribution of books and other facilities.

### 3.4.16 High rate of gross drop out of ST students and cases of mid-way drop out

Audit scrutiny revealed that Gross Drop Out rates of ST students remained alarmingly high throughout 2002-07 for all the age groups. The details are shown in the chart given below:

Chart No.3



In most of the cases, the drop-out rates were above 50 per cent. In classes I-V for ST boys it actually increased from 38 per cent (2002-03) to 49 per cent (2006-07). Likewise, for ST girls, the drop out rate had increased from 52 per cent (2002-03) to 58 per cent (2006-07).

Audit scrutiny revealed that there were instances of SC/ST students dropping out midway through the academic session. In the selected districts, the number of drop out students was 1,324 (Male: 644; Female: 680) in 20 Colleges and eight higher secondary schools during 2002-07 (*Appendix 3.12*). Reasons for such drop outs were not on record in the Department or the educational institutions.

#### Monitoring and evaluation

### 3.4.17 Ineffective monitoring and evaluation system at various levels

Audit scrutiny disclosed that there was no effective monitoring system in place in the State for watching the performance of schemes for educational development of SC/ST students. No record of any monitoring by the Department or the district authorities was available. The prescribed reports/returns were not being submitted by the implementing agencies regularly. No independent evaluation of implementation of the schemes had been carried out.

The Director, Local Funds, who acts as the Internal Auditor for the State Government, had not conducted any audit of the transactions pertaining to the implementation of these schemes either in the Department or in the Government run educational institutions.

The Department did not have any information on improvement in basic educational indicators in case of SC/ST students. The Department stated (February 2007) that such information like retention of ST students in schools, *etc.* was not being collected from the educational institutions.

In its reply, the Department admitted (June 2007) that no evaluation has ever been carried out by any independent agency. It further stated that it was not possible to monitor various schemes effectively and that in case of NGOs, the progress reports were being submitted by the organisations directly to Ministries. The reply of the Department is not acceptable as in the absence of monitoring, it would not be able to assess whether its initiatives are having the required impact on the development of education among the SC/ST students.

#### **3.4.18 Conclusion**

The State Government did not have a reliable database relating to the beneficiaries of various schemes for development of education of SC and ST students. Planning was deficient as the Department has not taken any steps to identify the beneficiaries. The buildings of Ashram Schools were in a dilapidated state and have become unsuitable for running classes. The requisite facilities were also not provided due to lack of funds. The Book Bank Scheme was dysfunctional with low availability of books and non availability of new books in prescribed numbers.

Construction of hostels for SC/ST students was affected by improper award of works, financial irregularities and delays. Many hostels lacked basic amenities putting the inmates to discomfort. The State Government had no control over NGOs involved in providing SC/ST hostels and other facilities. The NGOs suffered from lack of funds and facilities offered by them reflected this aspect.

Upgrading of educational level and standard of SC/ST students at post-matric level had been adversely affected as the State Government did not take up any scheme for the development of education for these students at the pre-matric level.

#### **3.4.19 Recommendations**

- The State Government should immediately evolve a comprehensive mechanism to identify and ascertain the actual number of beneficiaries for various schemes.
- Pre-matric scholarship scheme should be implemented in the State to enable the SC/ST students to reach post-matric level.
- Adequate attention should be given to arrest the decline in enrolment and drop-outs of SC/ST students in educational institutions.
- Book Bank scheme should be reviewed and supply of books to the students in prescribed numbers should be ensured.
- The existing Ashram Schools should be improved and put to use by providing requisite facilities.

- The Department should monitor the construction of hostels for SC/ST students to ensure that they are built timely, and are equipped with all required amenities.
- The activities of the NGOs should be supervised to ensure that they are providing the minimum required facilities to SC/ST students.
- The Department should evolve a system of feed back from all educational institutions regarding educational indicators *viz.* enrolment, drop-out and completion of courses, pass percentage *etc.* so as to take necessary corrective action.