## **Chapter IX**

## Conclusion

The status of devolution of funds for urban governance disclosed that ULBs are dependent on Central/State Governments. In addition, the ULBs do not have powers to appoint personnel – officers/officials. The lack of capacity, both in terms of funds and functionaries, tends to affect the implementation of SWM activities.

The test-checked ULBs had not conducted any survey during the period 2010-16 but had adopted per capita estimates that had low level of reliability. The per capita estimates adopted were also not realistic. Action plans and strategy documents envisaged in the State policy formulated in 2004 was not prepared and State policy and strategy in accordance with the SWM Rules, 2016 was yet to be formulated. ULBs neither prepared short term nor long-term plans. DPRs prepared during 2016 were deficient. The State Government did not operationalise any waste minimisation strategy during the review period and ULBs did not take up initiatives to promote waste minimisation activity exclusively other than TMC, Kumta.

Though requisite committees were formed at the State level, the District and ULB level Committees were not formed in any of the test-checked districts leading to poor support for effective implementation of SWM plans.

Dedicated SWM Cell was absent at ULB level. There was shortage of manpower in all cadres *viz*. Environment Engineer (32 *per cent*); Health Inspectors (70 *per cent*) and *Pourakarmikas* (65 *per cent*).

None of the test-checked ULBs assessed the requirement of capital and revenue funds for SWM activities until the preparation of DPRs and hence, they were unaware of the resource deficit. Though DPRs prepared during 2016-17 assessed the resource deficit, these failed to address measures for bridging this deficit. But audit did not come across any instance of ULB asking for funds from the State Government.

ULBs did not utilise the funds provided for creation of capital assets by the Central and State Finance Commissions. In comparison, funds allocated for revenue expenditure were utilised in full by the ULBs. The expenditure on SWM was not commensurate with the funds available resulting in accumulation of balances to the tune of ₹93.19 crore at the end of March 2017.

There was an appreciable increase in the number of test-checked ULBs collecting SWM cess and the quantum of cess increased significantly during the period 2012-13 to 2016-17. The test-checked ULBs were not collecting cess from places of public worship, occupiers of buildings/shops owned by ULBs and Government buildings as these properties were either exempt from payment of property tax or service charges. ULBs also did not levy cess on vacant lands despite the enabling provisions. Consequently, the ULBs lost revenue of ₹3.07 crore during the period 2012-13 to 2016-17. There was short accounting of cess of ₹5.41 crore in six ULBs and HDMC alone short accounted to the extent of ₹5.11 crore.

Ten ULBs diverted funds of ₹3.81 crore for works and purchase of equipment/machinery/vehicles related to UGD purposes and other activities not connected with SWM. CMC, Sira diverted ₹15.80 lakh resulting in non-achievement of intended objective of constructing bio-methanation plant, purchasing secondary storage containers, *etc*.

The IEC activities did not specifically focus on segregation of special waste and did not emphasise 'not to bury' and 'not to burn' waste.

Segregation of waste at different levels was either absent or partial in all the test-checked ULBs. The State/District/ULBs did not notify the classification of items as domestic hazardous waste and therefore, the need to segregate them separately was not publicised. Consequently, segregation of domestic hazardous waste was not done. Similarly, sanitary waste was not collected separately. Hence, mixed waste was transported to landfills.

Ward-wise collection of waste was absent in six of the test-checked ULBs and it was partial in nine ULBs. The test-checked ULBs did not carry out street sweeping of 6,935 (83 *per cent*) out of 8,324 km of roads on daily basis. Occupational waste (cut *beedi* leaves and ash) was mixed with regular MSW during collection. Shortage of primary collection vehicles was to the extent of 57 *per cent*.

Open vehicles and vehicles without necessary partition were used for transportation of waste. Absence of functional GPS and tracking systems resulted in unauthorised dumping of waste near the bank of River Kabini in CMC, Nanjangud.

The test-checked ULBs were able to process only 26 *per cent* of waste collected during the review period. This was because of non-creation of required infrastructure and under-utilisation of infrastructure created. Eleven ULBs processed waste through composting and only three ULBs adopted biomethanation technology.

The ULBs were operating disposal facilities without valid authorisation from KSPCB and necessary environmental clearance. The required buffer zone round the landfill sites were not maintained. Activities that do not conform to the provisions of MSW/SWM Rules were taken up in the landfill sites. Many of the landfills test-checked lacked basic infrastructure such as waste inspection facilities, weighbridge, fire-fighting equipment, toilet, *etc*. There was evidence of unscientific dumping and burning of mixed waste in the landfills.

The above lapses indicate lack of basic monitoring by ULBs and district /State level authorities to ensure compliance to statutory requirements and posed a serious threat to the environment besides leading to health hazards.

The absence of proper segregation of waste led to mixing of MSW with plastic waste, bio-medical waste, e-waste and slaughterhouse waste. The ULBs did not comply with the directions/instructions stipulated under the various acts and rules governing management of special waste.

Plastic waste, though found feasible for use in laying of roads, was not used for the purpose. This not only resulted in mismanagement of plastic waste but also in environmental degradation and death of cattle. Health care institutions were functioning without authorisation and resorting to unauthorised disposal of biomedical waste.

Test-checked ULBs did not collect and channelise e-waste to authorised dismantlers/recyclers and e-waste was found mixed with MSW. Slaughterhouses in the test checked ULBs were functioning without authorisation and slaughterhouse waste was not managed properly. Thirty-two of the 35 test-checked ULBs were yet to identify sites for disposal of construction and demolition waste. Consequently, construction debris was dumped on roadsides, near water bodies and low-lying areas. Inefficient management of special waste would lead to environment degradation, pollution and health hazards besides affecting the aesthetics of the cities/towns.

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