

## CHAPTER - II

### PERFORMANCE AUDITS

This chapter contains three performance audits on ‘Inner Layer Security of the coast of Gujarat State’, ‘Management of Bio-Medical Waste in Government-sector hospitals’ and ‘Implementation of Integrated Child Development Services’.

#### HOME DEPARTMENT AND AGRICULTURE & CO-OPERATION (FISHERIES) DEPARTMENT

##### *2.1 Inner Layer Security of the Coast of Gujarat State*

###### *Executive summary*

*The Government of India (GOI), Ministry of Home Affairs approved (January 2005) Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) which envisaged strengthening the infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas to check and counter illegal cross border activities. Accordingly, State Government prepared (May 2005) five years’ Perspective Plan under the CSS for establishing 10 Coastal Police Stations (CPS), 25 Coastal Check Posts (CCP) and 46 Coastal Out Posts (COP), up-gradation of police stations, setting up of watch towers, camel patrolling and augmentation of Sagar Rakshak Dal. During performance audit covering six districts comprising eight CPSs, the following was noticed.*

- *The Government of India approved (January 2006) the Perspective Plan for setting up of 10 CPSs, 25 CCPs and 46 COPs, providing 30 boats, vehicles and furniture/equipments. The State Government had not taken any action to implement the remaining components from State funds.*
- *The locations of four CPSs were changed for geographical and administrative convenience. Also, the locations identified for some CCPs/ COPs were found water-logged and hence CCPs/ COPs were constructed deep inside the mainland at six places of Ahmedabad and Banaskantha districts.*
- *The Construction of five out of 10 Coastal Police Stations was delayed for periods ranging 73 to 535 days. The work of 23 CCPs and 29 COPs executed with pre-cast concrete slabs was of inferior quality.*
- *In selected districts, out of 50 CCPs/COPs completed, 36 (72 per cent) remained non-operational as police personnel were not deployed.*
- *In the absence of demand from State Government to GOI, dedicated jetties were not constructed to maintain secrecy. The marine exclusive intelligence and investigation wing at each CPS as envisaged in the Standard Operation Procedure was not established. Shortfall in sea*

*patrolling ranged between 78 per cent and 91 per cent; night patrolling was zero to 34 per cent. Boat repair facility was at a distant place and delay in repairing of patrolling boats ranged from four to 13 months.*

- *No effective steps were taken by Agriculture and Co-operation (Fisheries) Department for preventing Indian fishermen crossing International Maritime Boundary Line. The Boat Movement Token System to keep watch on fishermen/vessels was found to be ineffective. Satellite based vessels tracking and warning device system sanctioned at a cost of ₹ 46.16 crore (May 2008) to caution fishermen before approaching international boundary was not established.*
- *Shortage of manpower was 35 per cent and 46 per cent in policing staff and crew members respectively. Out of the trained staff, 69 per cent was deployed for other duties. The monitoring mechanism envisaged in the CSS was not established.*

### **2.1.1 Introduction**


Gujarat has 1,640 kms long coast line spread over 13 districts. Due to its sea route proximity with Pakistan, it holds very high strategic importance from the perspective of internal security of the country. Coastal security arrangements consist of three tiers, of which 0-12 nautical miles (NM) are protected by Coastal Police of the States, whereas beyond 12 NM to the high-seas, the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy are responsible for protection.

With a view to strengthening the capabilities of State Police Forces for securing the coast from illegal cross border and criminal activities using sea and coast, a Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) was formulated (January 2005) by Government of India (GOI) for implementation by the State Governments. GOI directed (February 2005) the State Governments to prepare five years Perspective Plan for CSS Phase-I. The entire Plan aimed to set up 10 Coastal Police Stations (CPS), 25 Coastal Check Posts (CCP) and 46 Coastal Out Posts (COP), besides providing interceptor boats, vehicles and equipments to each CPS for effective surveillance of coastal areas.

### **2.1.2 Organisational set-up**

The Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department was responsible for maintenance of law and order and internal security of the State. The Director General of Police (DGP) was in overall charge for implementation of CSS, who was assisted by Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Coastal Security and Intelligence. At district level, the Superintendents of Police (SP) implemented the CSS through Coastal Police Stations (CPS), Coastal Check Posts (CCP) and Coastal Out Posts (COP). Gujarat State Police Housing Corporation Limited (GSPHCL), Gandhinagar (a State PSU) was responsible for construction works under CSS.

## Organogram for implementation of inner layer security of the coast of Gujarat State



The Commissioner of Fisheries (CF), Gandhinagar working under Agriculture and Co-operation (Fisheries) Department was responsible for implementation of security related fisheries schemes like (i) providing satellite based vessels tracking and warning device, (ii) issue of boat movement token, (iii) providing biometric identity card to fishermen, etc. These schemes were being implemented through district level offices of Fisheries Department headed by Assistant Directors of Fisheries (ADF)/Superintendents of Fisheries (SF).

### 2.1.3 Audit objectives

The performance audit was conducted to assess whether –

- the perspective plan was prepared after proper survey and investigation for identification of location of CPSs/CCPs/COPs;
- the financial management was efficient and effective;
- the infrastructure created under CSS was utilised efficiently and effectively for innermost tier security;
- the security related fisheries schemes were implemented effectively and efficiently;
- adequate technically trained manpower was provided; and
- effective monitoring, evaluation and control mechanisms were in place.

### 2.1.4 Audit Criteria

The performance was assessed with reference to –

- Five years' Perspective Plan for coastal security;
- Gujarat Financial Rules and regulations;
- Standard Operating Procedure for coastal security issued by GOI;
- Guidelines and instructions issued by GOI/State Government for schemes of Fisheries Department; and
- Prescribed monitoring/evaluation mechanisms.

### **2.1.5 Scope and methodology**

During performance audit, records for the period 2005-12 relating to conception, planning, implementation and evaluation of CSS Phase-I at Secretariat (Home and Agriculture & Co-operation Departments), DGP, DIGP, GSPHCL and Commissioner of Fisheries were test checked between January 2012 and June 2012. At field level, out of 13 coastal districts, offices of SPs of all four sensitive districts (Jamnagar, Junagadh, Kachchh and Porbandar) having proximity with Pakistan were selected due to increased security risk prevailing there and offices of SPs of two other districts (Bhavnagar and Valsad) were selected on random basis. Thus, out of 10 CPSs, Eight<sup>1</sup> CPSs established in six selected districts were covered in audit.

An Entry Conference was held (March 2012) with Deputy Secretary (Law and Order), Home Department and Secretary, Agriculture and Co-operation (Fisheries) Department. In addition to collecting and analysing statistical data, site visit of a few jetties and CCPs/COPs were conducted. Physical evidence was obtained in the shape of replies to audit queries, copies of documents, photos/maps, etc. Exit Conference was held with Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department (October 2012) and with Secretary, Fisheries Department (November 2012) to explain the audit findings. The views expressed by Government during Exit Conference were duly taken into account while finalising this report.

## **Audit findings**

### **Planning**

#### **2.1.6 Perspective Plan for coastal security**

The long term Perspective Plan provides strategies and work plan for deploying resources and setting performance indicators for successful implementation of scheme/programme. The State Government prepared (May 2005) five years Perspective Plan for CSS (Phase-I) for the security of the coastal areas which included –

- Establishment of 10 new CPSs with necessary infrastructure;
- Equipping each CPS with two 12 tonne boats and one 5 tonne boat with communication equipments and weaponry for sea patrolling in the defined area;
- Setting up of 25 Coastal Check Posts (CCP) to check the movement of vehicles/persons in coastal area and 46 Coastal Out Posts (COP) for effectively policing the entire coastal area;
- Up-gradation of 39 existing Police Stations;
- Setting up of 90 watch towers at strategic locations to ensure round the clock surveillance on the seashore;

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1 (i) Bedi, (ii) Bhavnagar Port, (iii) Mundra, (iv) Nava Bandar (v) Navi Bandar (vi) Okha (vii) Somnath and (viii) Vadinar

- Patrolling on 53 camels where motorable roads adjacent to coast do not exist or vehicle patrol is not possible due to difficult landscape; and
- Increase the strength of *Sagar Rakshak Dal* from 4,000 to 12,000 to keep watch on the suspicious movements along the coast and to assist the police in patrolling.

The Government of India approved (January 2006) the Perspective Plan for an outlay of ₹ 58.43 crore for setting up of 10 CPSs, 25 CCPs and 46 COPs, providing 30 boats, vehicles and furniture/equipments, however, the remaining components<sup>2</sup> proposed by the State Government were not approved and also no action to implement them from State funds was taken. Thus, the comprehensive plan made for coastal security of the State was not fully implemented.

The State Government stated (September 2012) that plan for ₹ 392.47 crore was submitted to GOI (May 2005), but only ₹58.43 crore was sanctioned. The reply of the Government is not acceptable as State should have strived to finance the remaining components proposed for coastal security.

### 2.1.7 Deficient planning

The Perspective Plan envisaged establishing CPSs/CCPs/COPs at the strategic places identified after detailed survey. The details of location of CPSs proposed/established is shown in the **Map-1** below –

**Map-1: Ten Coastal Police Stations established in the State**

Locations of CPSs were changed for geographical situation and administrative reason



Source: Information provided by Additional Director General of Police

<sup>2</sup> Up-gradation of police stations, setting up of watch towers, camel patrolling and augmentation of Sagar Rakshak Dal

Only one Coastal Police Station was established in the sensitive Kachchh district with coast line of 238 kms

As could be seen from the map that locations of four CPSs<sup>3</sup> were changed. Scrutiny of the implementation of the Perspective Plan approved by the GOI revealed the following –

■ Jamnagar and Kachchh districts are at utmost proximity with maritime border of Pakistan and hence sensitive for coastal security. However, to cover entire coast line of 238 kms of Kachchh district only one CPS (Mundra) was established (July 2007). Audit observed that later on, two boats were diverted (one boat each from Hazira and Pipavav CPS) and stationed at Jakhau (Kachchh district) for patrolling, which was inadequate to cover long coastal line.

Sensitive coast line between Dwarka and Harshad left without coastal patrolling

■ Similarly in Jamnagar district, due to change of location of two CPSs (Bhatia to Vadinar and Harshad to Okha), the entire coast line stretch between Dwarka and Harshad was left without any coastal patrolling. On the other hand, all three CPSs of Jamnagar districts were established in one stretch between Bedi and Okha.

The reasons attributed by concerned SPs for changing locations were geographical situation and administrative convenience. Thus, geographical situation and administrative convenience were given primacy rather than security perception.

The Government stated (September 2012) that in view of the flexibility given in the High Level Empowered Committee (HLEC) meeting (November 2005) to State Government, it was decided to change the locations. The reply of the Government is not justified as the Perspective Plan was required to have been prepared after proper survey and analysis of threat perception.

During Exit Conference, Government explained that original locations were changed as the same were away from coast-line and facility of jetty also not available. The contention of the Government is not acceptable as long stretch without police presence could adversely affect coastal security.

## **Financial Management**

### **2.1.8 Funding Pattern**

The CSS envisaged 100 *per cent* assistance from GOI for non-recurring expenditure on construction of CPSs/CCPs/COPs, interceptor boats, vehicles, equipments/furniture and recurring expenditure on POL of boats, maintenance of boats and training of staff. The cost on establishment of manpower was to be borne by the State Government.

#### **2.1.8.1 Receipt of funds and expenditure incurred for CSS**

Due to under-utilization of patrolling boats, there was savings of ₹3.77 crore on POL

Details of funds released by GOI/State Government and expenditure incurred under various components of CSS during 2005-2012 are shown in **Table 1** as follows –

<sup>3</sup> Jamnagar District; (i) Bhatia to Vadinar, (ii) Harshad to Okha; Junagadh District; (iii) Dewada to Nava Bandar; Kachchh district (iv) Bhadreswar to Mundra

**Table-1: Details of funds provided and expenditure incurred under CSS****(Rupees in crore)**

Name of Scheme/Programme	Funds available	Expenditure incurred	Excess (+)/ Saving (-)
Construction of buildings for CPSs/CCPs/COPs	6.65 <sup>4</sup>	7.85	(+) 1.20
Purchase of vehicles (Jeeps - 20 and Motorcycles-101)	1.41	1.13	(-) 0.28
Purchase of furniture/equipments	1.00	0.98	(-) 0.02
Coastal Security (POL)	7.52 <sup>5</sup>	3.75	(-) 3.77
Establishment	23.04	22.71	(-) 0.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>39.62</b>	<b>36.42</b>	<b>(-) 3.20</b>

**(Source: Data provided by Home Department)**

As against the available funds of ₹6.65 crore for construction of CPSs/CCPs/COPs, excess expenditure of ₹1.20 crore was incurred by GSPHCL from its own funds. The GSPHCL requested (October 2011) State Government for arranging the reimbursement of excess expenditure from GOI. However, no such proposal was made by the State Government to GOI.

### **2.1.9 Non-submission of audited Utilisation Certificates**

The GOI released (December 2009) ₹1.66 crore towards POL expenses for the year 2009-10. Subsequent assistance was payable on submission of audited Utilisation Certificates (UC) along with details of number of hours of patrolling carried out, their mileage, areas patrolled with dates, seizures/arrests if any, etc. The State Government had incurred an expenditure of ₹3.75 crore (2009-12) on POL. However, no UC was submitted in respect of expenditure incurred, therefore, expenditure of ₹2.09 crore was not reimbursed by GOI.

The Government accepted (September 2012) the audit finding. Additional Chief Secretary agreed during Exit Conference that the UCs would be sent to GOI.

## **Programme management**

### **2.1.10 Creation of infrastructure**

Government of India allotted (2005-07) ₹6.02 crore to GSPHCL for construction of 10 CPSs, 25 CCPs and 46 COPs. Of the above GSPHCL constructed 10 CPSs (**Appendix-IV**), 22 CCPs (**Appendix-V**) and 42 COPs (**Appendix-VI**) at an expenditure of ₹7.07 crore.

<sup>4</sup> Including ₹ 0.63 crore received as interest on ₹ 6.02 crore released by GOI

<sup>5</sup> State Government provided funds in budget, GOI allotted ₹ 1.66 crore (2009-10) thereafter, no reimbursement claim was submitted by State Government to GOI

### 2.1.10.1 Delay in completion of construction

Scrutiny of records of GSPHCL revealed that construction of five out of 10 CPSs was delayed for periods ranging from 73 to 535 days as detailed in **Table-2** below –

**Table-2: Delay in completion of works of Coastal Police Station**

(Rupees in lakh)

Name of Coastal Police Station	Estimated Cost	Stipulated date of completion	Actual date of completion	Actual expenditure	Delay/ days
Okha	22.31	11.8.2008	28.1.2010	19.77	535
Bedi	25.75	17.7.2008	21.5.2009	27.68	308
Somnath	22.43	14.6.2007	3.10.2007	20.42	111
Vadinar	21.64	7.12.2007	15.3.2008	23.52	99
Hazira	24.22	30.6.2007	11.9.2007	25.52	73

(Source: Information collected from GSPHCL)

The GSPHCL attributed (May 2012) the delays to non-availability of Sulphur Resistant cement in the market and increase in cost of materials like steel, bricks, cement etc. The reply was not tenable as construction of other five CPSs with same design was completed during same period with only nominal delays.

### 2.1.10.2. Avoidable expenditure

- GSPHCL received offers (October 2006) for construction of Pipavav and Navi Bandar CPSs, which were rejected as the quotations were found to be on the higher side<sup>6</sup>. However, on re-invitation, the offers were accepted at still higher rates which resulted in an avoidable extra expenditure of ₹32.29 lakh as shown in **Table-3** below –

**Table-3: Details of tender rates for two works**

Name of work	CPS, Pipavav	CPS, Navi Bandar
Estimated Cost	₹24.79 lakh	₹23.93 lakh
Month of invitation of first tender	October 2006	October 2006
Lowest offer received	₹27.55 lakh	₹27.88 lakh
Month of invitation of final tender	July 2008 (sixth attempt)	June 2007 (fourth attempt)
Tendered Cost accepted	₹54.93 lakh	₹32.79 lakh
Avoidable expenditure	₹27.38 lakh	₹4.91 lakh
<b>Total avoidable expenditure</b>	<b>₹ 32.29 lakh</b>	

(Source: Information collected from GSPHCL)

The GSPHCL stated (May 2012) that they expected lower rates due to commencement of e-tendering, which had not happened and considering urgency of works, tenders on re-invitation with higher rates were accepted. The reply was not acceptable as tenders which were rejected, were first invited in October 2006. The Company resorted to re-tendering for two

<sup>6</sup> 11 per cent and 17 per cent above the estimated cost



years/one year till sixth/fourth attempt. Moreover, rates quoted were above 11 per cent and 17 per cent of Estimated Cost (EC) during first invitation, while the accepted tenders were 122 per cent and 37 per cent respectively above the EC.

- The SP, Bhavnagar identified (December 2005) land belonging to Gujarat Maritime Board for Bhavnagar Port CPS. The agreement was executed (February 2008) with GMB with a delay of over two years and possession of land also delayed till May 2008. Due to lack of co-ordination between the two departments, transfer of land was delayed for more than two years which resulted in increase in estimated cost by ₹12 lakh. The work was completed in June 2009 at a cost of ₹40.35 lakh. The SP, Bhavnagar admitted (May 2012) that land acquisition was delayed due to long procedural work.

Government admitted (September 2012) that delays occurred due to lack of interdepartmental coordination.

### 2.1.10.3 Inferior quality works of CCPs/COPs

**Leakages of roof of CCPs and COPs constructed with pre-fabricated slabs were reported**

The GSPHCL completed works of two CCPs and 17 COPs with conventional method of construction<sup>7</sup> at a cost of ₹1.13 crore. To speed up completion of remaining 52 works (23 CCPs and 29 COPs), the Working Committee of GSPHCL decided (December 2008) to execute works on experimental basis with pre-cast concrete slabs for the whole structure, though the Chief Engineer, GSPHCL expressed (November 2007) the view that pre-cast concrete work would be of inferior quality with a lesser lifespan compared to conventional work. Disregarding this expert advice, GSPHCL awarded (May 2009) works for 52 CCPs/COPs with tendered cost of ₹3.60 crore which was completed at a cost of ₹3.58 crore.



(Picture showing erection of precast panels for CCP/COP)


Eventually, the quality of pre-cast structure was found inferior as leakage from the roof joints and damage to the flooring was reported by the field offices.

While accepting the inferior quality of work, GSPHCL stated (June 2012) that leakage/damage would be repaired by the agency within the liability period. Since there was already an expert opinion against pre-cast structures, the reply of GSPHCL was not acceptable.

<sup>7</sup> Brick work of walls and in-situ casting of roofing slabs

#### 2.1.10.4 Construction of CCPs/COPs at non-coastal area

The DGP directed (October 2005) SPs to initiate proceeding for acquisition of land for CCP/COP and keep in touch with GSPHCL for taking up construction work at the earliest. However, work of three CCPs<sup>8</sup> and four COPs<sup>9</sup> were not taken up as land acquired by the SPs were in low lying areas and were submerged in water during high tide and flood.



While executing of the work, the contractor completed pre-casting work of panels and erected them at six places (Ahmedabad City and Banaskantha district) other than the CCP/COP sites, while one structure for Rayon Naka CCP remained un-erected. Thus, an expenditure of ₹48.23 lakh incurred on these panels could not be utilised for the purpose of coastal security.

The GSPHCL stated (June 2012) that SPs concerned did not arrange for suitable land to be provided for CCPs/COPs. Thus, no alternate suitable land was provided by SPs and GSPHCL also awarded the work without considering suitability of site.

The Government stated (September 2012) that identified places were found unsuitable for construction due to water logging problem therefore, the locations were changed. The reply of the Government was not acceptable as the land was acquired without considering its suitability. Further, utilisation of pre-cast panels at Ahmedabad city and Banaskantha district, being far away from coastal line, would not add any value to the coastal security.

#### 2.1.11 Non-operating of CCPs/COPs

**36 CCPs/COPs remained non-operational**


The CCPs and COPs were established for effective policing of the entire coastal area by checking the movement of vehicles/persons in coastal area. It was observed in selected districts that out of 21 CCPs and 29 COPs completed, all the CCPs and 15 COPs remained non-operational (March 2012) due to shortage of staff.

8 (i) Veraval Rayon, (ii) Devka and (iii) Ghantia Tran Rasta (Junagadh district)

9 (i) Aasharmata, (ii) Dholupir in Kachchh district, (iii) Ozal Machhivad in Navsari district and (iv) Kosamba in Valsad district

In 14 COPs, two to three personnel of the rank of Assistant Sub Inspectors/Head Constables/Constables (29 per cent to 43 per cent) only were posted against the overall sanction of seven posts and hence operated with skeleton manpower.

Further, as per Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), CCPs/COPs were to be equipped with furniture, communication (telephone and wireless) equipments, computer, investigation kits and arms. Field visits (10 COPs) and information collected (four COPs) revealed that except seven COPs, where furniture was provided, no item as per SOP was provided in any of the 14 COPs.







SPs of the concerned districts attributed (February-May 2012) reasons for non-operation of CCPs/COPs to shortage of staff. Thus, operation of the CSS did not make any practical difference so far as cross-border security threat perception was concerned.

The Government stated (September 2012) that all CCPs and COPs were functioning and maximum possible police personnel were posted therein. The reply of the Government was not correct as during audit test check a few COPs were found functioning that too with internal re-deployment of staff.

### 2.1.12 Non-creation of Jetties

**Dedicated jetties for CPSs as provided in Standard Operating Procedure have not been constructed**

The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) envisaged construction of all-weather jetty for each CPS with adequate draft and should be constructed away from jetties used by fishermen to maintain secrecy of police operations. High Level Empowered Committee (HLEC) (November 2005) decided to allot additional funds for construction of jetties on submission of estimates and demands to Ministry of Home Affairs by the concerned State. However, no demand was sent by the State and no jetty was constructed for any of 10 CPS in the State (March 2012). In the absence of dedicated jetties for Police operations, CPSs utilised the jetties owned and controlled by the GMB or private (captive/commercial) entities.

	
<p><b>Bedi CPS - Jetty owned by GMB; area remained dry during low tide</b></p>	<p><b>Bhavnagar Port CPS – Jetty owned by GMB; patrolling possible as and when log-gate opened during high tide</b></p>
	
<p><b>Nava Bandar CPS – Private captive Jetty owned by Ambuja Cement Company Private Limited—not convenient for small boats. Hence boats were kept alongside of dredger</b></p>	<p><b>Navi Bandar CPS –Jetty owned by GMB at Porbandar; facility being shared with Indian Coast Guard and local fishermen, causing problem due to congested area</b></p>

Joint field visit of test checked CPSs revealed that jetties used were not appropriate for smooth and secure operations.

- At Bedi Port and Bhavnagar Port patrolling was possible only during high tide as Ports remained dry during low tide;
- Jetties at Somnath and Porbandar CPSs were very congested as same were also used for fishing operation by the local fishermen;
- CPS Nava Bandar and Mundra were utilising private jetties which were located at a distance of 41 kms and 14 kms respectively from the CPS;
- GMB jetty at Okha was very badly damaged and was not repaired.

The Government stated (September 2012) that there was no sanction for jetties in Phase-I of the Scheme and that jetties of GMB were used, which were quite safe and secure as they were under the operational control of GMB and capable of maintaining confidentiality.

The Government also stated that SOP provided for one jetty for each CPS, whereas only five jetties were sanctioned in Phase-II in the State; that the expert opinion estimated expenditure of around ₹2.50 crore per jetty, but only ₹50 lakh were sanctioned. The reply added that police boats were receiving priority at Somnath and Porbandar jetties. It was also stated that Nava Bandar and Mundra CPSs were utilising nearest jetties and repairs of the GMB Okha jetty was to be carried out by the GMB.

The reply of the Government was not justified as the SOP provided for independent jetty for each CPS and utilisation of private jetties or damaged jetties would result in compromising police requirements.

### **Operational activities**

#### **2.1.13 Non formation of Marine exclusive Intelligence and Investigation wing**

**In absence of instruction from Government, Marine exclusive intelligence and investigation wing was not formed in any district**

The SOP provides that each CPS should establish an exclusive intelligence wing for collection of actionable intelligence and inputs on weak areas on coastal security. The Investigation Wing responsible for collection of information about suspicious activities, movements of suspects, their places of residence/visit, communication modality, sources of finance, etc. was to be formed. However, no such intelligence and investigation wing was formed in test checked CPSs. The SPs replied (February-May 2012) that no instruction was received from Government for forming intelligence and investigation wings.

The Government stated (September 2012) that new Intelligence Centres were opened in the coastal area, where State IB in coordination with Central agencies was gathering actionable information and providing to Coastal Police.

The reply of the Government is not acceptable as the SOP provides for establishing exclusive intelligence with each CPS, which has not been done so far.

#### **2.1.14 Patrolling**

Coastal patrolling is an essential activity for effective prevention of infiltration and unlawful activities like smuggling of arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs etc. For many years, the trawlers hired by the State Police for patrolling had proved ineffective as hired trawlers did not match the speed boats used by the criminals.

For effective patrolling along the sea coast, the GOI allotted (between May 2009; January 2012), 30 interceptor boats (two 12 tonne boats and one 5 tonne boat for each CPSs) to the State.

The efficiency and effectiveness of boats for coastal patrolling as noticed in test checked CPSs is discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

##### **2.1.14.1 Under-utilisation of patrolling boats**

**Out of three boats allotted to each CPS, one boat only was utilised**

The Government of India instructed (September 2009) that each boat should be used for patrolling for a minimum 120 hours in a month with a yearly tasking of minimum 1,400 hours which was revised (October 2010) to 150 hours and 1,800 hours respectively. The deficient tasking in a month was to be carried forward to the subsequent months to achieve the yearly tasking.

However, in test checked CPSs, due to non-availability of staff only one boat out of three was operated for daily patrolling. Therefore, there was shortfall in patrolling ranging between 78 per cent and 91 per cent (**Appendix-VII**) in eight selected CPSs.

Police Sub Inspectors (PSI) of CPSs attributed (February-May 2012) reasons for the shortfall to shortage of crew members. The Government stated (September 2012) that patrolling of four hours each in morning and evening was being carried out as per instructions of Ministry of Home Affairs, trained crew have been deployed and recruitment of more crew members was in process.

The reply of the Government is at variance with the replies furnished by the concerned PSIs with regard to quantum of patrolling and availability of crew.

#### **2.1.14.2 Inadequacies in night patrolling**

**In absence of instructions night patrolling was negligible**

The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides for night patrolling depending upon fishing activities. Night vision binoculars were also provided to each boat for the purpose. However, no specific criteria for night patrolling were fixed by the State Government. As a result, night patrolling to total patrolling hours remained negligible (**Appendix-VII**). Audit observed that –

- No night patrolling was conducted by Bhavnagar Port and Vadinar CPSs;
- Night patrolling done by Nava Bandar, Mundra, Okha, Navi Bandar, Bedi and Somnath CPSs were three, four, five, 11, 24 and 34 *per cent* respectively against the total patrolling hours.

The Government stated (September 2012) that SOP for coastal patrolling was followed scrupulously up to 8.00 pm. The reply of the Government was not acceptable as (i) night patrolling was required to have been continued depending upon fishing activities after 8 pm in the night and (ii) some CPSs had not carried out night patrolling and the remaining CPSs conducted negligible patrolling.

#### **2.1.15 Checking of fishing boats and boarding operations**

The SOP provides for checking of fishing boats during patrolling and boarding operation,<sup>10</sup> which would ensure prevention of infiltration by hostile forces, smuggling of arms/ammunitions, smuggling of contraband, etc. However, no specific guidelines were issued by State Government on selection of boats/boarding operations and number of boats/boarding operations to be subjected to checking.

In absence of any guidelines, performance of CPSs varied. Number of boats checked and boarding operations carried out during 2009-12 by CPSs ranged from 337 to 2598 and from zero to 499 respectively. Not a single case of seizure/arrest was reported by CPSs after checking/boarding operations.

Government stated (September 2012) that fishing boats were being checked regularly and that till date 18,742 boats had been checked during patrolling and seven offences registered.

#### **2.1.16 Delay in repairing of boats**

**Delay of four to 13 months reported for repairing patrolling boats**

The patrolling boats pressed for coastal patrolling were sophisticated machinery and required technical supervision and regular service for smooth operations. The GOI entered (January 2010) into agreement with Goa Shipyard Limited

<sup>10</sup> Means boarding at intercepted boat/ship/vessel and searching them

(GSL), Goa for annual maintenance of boats for four years. Since the service provider was selected from Goa, the time required by the technicians in attending to faults hampered timely servicing of boats.

For major faults, the engines were sent to Goa for repair. Audit scrutiny of field records revealed that in many cases, the technicians of GSL responded only after repeated calls/reminders. In test checked CPSs, it was observed that in 10 cases there was substantial delay in repairing, ranging from four to 13 months.



A request for opening a service unit in Gujarat was made by State Government only in March 2010.

The Government admitted (September 2012) that GSL was attending to repairs after repeated calls and that the issue was raised at various fora by the State. An office premises had also since been allotted (June 2012) to the GSL at Porbandar.

### ***Fisheries related security concerns***

There were 102 marine fishing centers on Gujarat coast and about 22,000 fishing boats going to sea. As per last census (2007) conducted by Commissioner of Fisheries, there were over 1.40 lakh active fishermen in the State. As the State has the longest coastline (1640 km) in India and has international maritime boundary with Pakistan, it was necessary to keep a constant watch on the movement of the fishermen and their vessels.

To assist the security agencies like Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Police for ascertaining the identity of the fishing boat and its crew members, GOI/State Government introduced various schemes/projects as discussed in succeeding paragraphs. All activities relating to fishing/fishermen were under the charge of Commissioner of Fisheries under Agriculture and Co-operation Department.

#### ***2.1.17 Vessels tracking and warning system***

Since the State shares International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) with Pakistan, there were instances of Indian and Pakistani fishermen crossing/straying into the boundary of the other, which was a source of concern. Despite declaring the area of five NM along with IMBL as 'No Fishing Zone', lure of fish catch in the area tempted fishermen to enter the zone as well as to cross the IMBL.

**Tracking and warning system for fishermen not established**

The information with Commissioner of Fisheries (CF) showed that 612 Indian fishing boats and 430 Indian fishermen were in custody with Pakistan (June 2012). To caution Indian fishermen before they approach the international boundary, State Government decided (May 2008) to provide satellite based vessels tracking and warning device system to 12,000 fishing boats and ₹46.16 crore<sup>11</sup> was placed at the disposal of GMB for procurement of the system.

However, GMB had not even finalised the tenders for purchase of the system (June 2012). GMB stated (June 2012) that tenders for procurement of the system were invited (August 2007), but Tender Acceptance Committee of the Government rejected (August 2010) the tender as it was stated to be supported by fraudulent documents. However, no fresh attempt was made for procurement of the system. Thus, vessels tracking and warning system to the fisherman was yet to be installed and funds amounting to ₹46.16 crore were blocked for over two years.

During Exit Conference, Government accepted the audit observation and stated that they had initiated the procedure for taking the funds back from GMB and further utilisation in consultation with Indian Space Research Organisation for the system.

**2.1.18 Issuance of token to fishing boats**

**Boat movements were registered on boarding and landing without physical verification**

The State Government introduced (September 2009) a system of issuing 'Boat Movement Token' to each fishing vessel venturing into sea. The Fisheries Guard was to maintain log book for boat movement and fill in details like registration number and name of boat, name and identity card number of crew members, date of venturing into sea and expected date of return, etc. The fishing vessels along with crew members and their identity were to be checked on venturing and their return from sea to ensure that all fishermen who had gone for fishing had indeed returned.

Joint field visit of landing points of fishing boats by Audit and Fisheries-officials revealed that the details furnished by *tandel*/owner of fishing vessels at the time of venturing to/returning from sea were not being cross-checked physically by the Fisheries Guards. As such, purpose of watching the movement of fishing boats and its crew members on security grounds was defeated.

The Assistant Director of Fisheries, Porbandar stated (June 2012) that they maintained details in registers as no specific instructions were received from CF for physical verification of crew members of fishing vessels. The reply was not justified as details of activities to be undertaken, as furnished by CF to audit, showed provision of physical verification of crew members.

The Assistant Director of Fisheries, Jamnagar stated (May 2012) that due to large number of boats, it was not possible to check every boat daily with the one Guard available. He also stated that random checking was done. The reply was not in conformity with instructions of CF.

During Exit Conference, Government stated that they had planned to install computerised system for issuing token to fishing boats to make it more effective.

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<sup>11</sup> ₹29.62 crore (2008-09) and ₹ 16.54 crore (2009-10)



### 2.1.19 Biometric Identity Card to coastal fishermen

Ministry of Agriculture, GOI, introduced (December 2009) a scheme to provide Biometric Identity Card to coastal fishermen for their identity on the sea. The scheme envisaged –

- (i) Data collection and authentication;
- (ii) Personalisation and production of biometric identity cards;
- (iii) Key management system;
- (iv) Establishment of central server; and
- (v) Continuation of support to the project.

The responsibility of data collection and authentication was entrusted to the Fisheries Department and the work of capturing of digital photographs and biometric details, preparation of biometric card was awarded to Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Bangalore.

Scrutiny of records revealed that in the absence of any co-ordination between the Fisheries Department and BEL, data collection and biometric details collection were not carried out simultaneously. As a result, the work had not progressed as shown in **Table-4** below –

**Table-4: Details showing progress of issue of Biometric Identity Cards to fishermen**

Paper Based Data collected by Fisheries Department (October 2010)	1,48,273
Of which BEL captured biometric details (photograph and finger prints)	1,35,567
Of which both of the above matches each other	1,28,545
Data entry pending	7,022
Number of Data Entries, in respect of which Biometric details were not captured	19,728

**(Source : Data collected from Commissioner of Fisheries)**

In the review meeting (November 2010) chaired by Joint Secretary (Fisheries, GOI), it was decided that work of data collection should be completed before 15 December 2010 and issuance of card should commence from the first week of January 2011.

The CF stated (June 2012) that the work of preparation of cards was pending with BEL and requests were made to BEL and GOI for early issuance of biometric cards.

During Exit Conference, the Government stated that they had distributed 86,000 Bio-Metric cards to fishermen and the GOI was requested (September 2012) to provide Card Readers to Coastal Police and Coast Guard. Non-availability of Card Readers with the Coastal Police defeated the whole purpose of distribution of bio metric cards to fishermen.

### **2.1.20 Uniform colour code for fishing boats**

Only 6,675 out of 22,000 boats adopted the uniform colour code prescribed by the Gujarat Fisheries Act, 2003

The Gujarat Fisheries Act, 2003 provides that the owner of fishing vessel shall carry out its activity of fishing only after obtaining license from the Licensing Officer. As provided in the Act, one of the conditions for obtaining license was that the top of wheel house or canopy shall be painted with orange colour on which the registration number of the vessel shall be written in black colour for identification from distance or air.

The CF directed (May 2011) field offices to withhold permission for fishing to the vessels not complying with colour code. However, only 6,675 boats out of total 22,000 fishing boats had followed the colour code (April 2012).

The CF stated (April 2012) that maintenance of colour code involves additional cost to the boat operator and they were unwilling to spare one or two days during fishing seasons. The reply was not acceptable as the work should have been attended to during non-fishing monsoon season. It was noticed that strict action was not taken by field offices for imposing the colour code and token for fishing operation was issued to all boats routinely despite violation of statutory provisions regarding colour coding.

The Government stated during Exit Conference that majority of the boats had complied with the provisions and boat licenses were not renewed in case this was not complied with.

### **Manpower management**

#### **2.1.21 Insufficient Manpower**

Shortage of police personnel and crew members was 35 per cent and 46 per cent respectively

Scrutiny of sanctioned strength and men-in-position for police personnel (**Appendix-VIII**) and crew members (**Appendix-IX**) revealed that there was shortage of 35 per cent of police personnel and 46 per cent of crew members in selected CPSs (March 2012). The shortage of staff adversely affected effectiveness of coastal security works, particularly coastal patrolling as mentioned in paragraph 2.1.14.1.

As per SOP, five police personnel were to join in boat patrolling. However, during test check it was noticed that one or two police personnel were engaged for patrolling.

The Government admitted (September 2012) that crew members were posted to the CPSs depending upon availability.

#### **2.1.22 Training**

60 per cent of staff deployed for costal security was untrained

Training in seafaring skill was an essential component of the coastal security work for the personnel selected for marine police. It was decided in HLEC meeting (November 2005) that though the Coast Guard would impart training during the initial years, a Marine Police Training Institute would be established for training of the marine police personnel. The Director General (Border Security Force) had agreed to allotment of land at Koteswar (Kachchh) for setting up the training institution. However, effective steps were not initiated for setting up the Training Institute and marine personnel remained untrained.

As per information collected from test checked SP offices, 273 police personnel were given coastal training. Test check of CPSs revealed that, out of 211 police staff engaged in coastal security work (March 2012), only 85 personnel (40 per cent) were trained in coastal training by the Coast Guard. Thus, out of 273 coastal trained staff, 188 personnel (69 per cent) were deployed for other than coastal security duty.

The Government stated (September 2012) that a proposal was sent to GOI (February 2012) to start a Marine Training Centre, but nothing concrete had been done. It was also stated that in absence of the training academy, personnel posted in marine Police Stations were being trained by the Navy and the Coast Guard and that concerned SPs had been instructed to post trained personnel in CPSs only.

The facts remained that little action was taken to train the coastal constabulary and that trained personnel were posted for other duties.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

#### **2.1.23 Monitoring of Coastal Security Scheme**

**The Committee to monitor physical and financial progress not been formed**

Coastal Security Scheme envisaged a Committee under the Joint Secretary in charge of the CSS to monitor the physical and financial progress of the scheme. However, the same had not yet been formed in the State (October 2012).

As instructed by GOI, the State Governments had to submit details of patrolling hours, area of patrol, cases of seizures/arrests, if any etc. every month to GOI along with utilisation certificate for POL expenditure. However, no such progress/performance report was furnished to the GOI by the State Government. Further, no monitoring system for submission of monthly or quarterly returns on patrolling was evolved.

It was observed that no specific instructions for route of patrolling, timing of patrolling, numbers of boats to check, etc. were issued by controlling officers. In the absence of active involvement of higher authorities, patrolling was done by CPSs in a routine manner.

#### **2.1.24 District Level Security Co-ordination Committee**

**District Level Security Co-ordination Committee not been formed in any district except Kachchh**

The SOP provides for constitution of a District Level Security Co-ordination Committee in the coastal districts under the chairmanship of Superintendent of Police, consisting of representatives of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the Customs and the Revenue Department. The Committee was to meet every month and review the security measures, including issues of co-ordination between various agencies. However, except Kachchh district, no such Committee was constituted in test checked districts. The concerned SPs did not furnish specific reasons for non-formation of Committees.

The Government stated (September 2012) that all the CPSs had been instructed to follow the instructions given in SOP.

### **2.1.25 Review of Coastal Security Scheme**

As provided in CSS, the Scheme was to be reviewed on the completion of the fifth year to assess the efficacy of the scheme. The provision of recurring expenditure beyond fifth year as well as replacement of boats, if any, was to be decided at the time of review. However, no review of CSS was taken up (June 2012).

The Government stated (September 2012) that necessary steps to review had since been taken.

### **2.1.26 Conclusion**

The locations for establishing CPSs were revised based on geographical and administrative convenience. There were delays in construction. Further, most of the CCPs/COPs constructed remained non-functional due to shortage of staff. Dedicated jetties were not constructed to maintain secrecy as no demand was sent by the State Government to GOI. Patrolling was deficient due to non-availability of sufficient crew. There were delays in repairing of boats as repairing facility was at a distant place. Vessels tracking and warning system and issuance biometric identity cards to fishermen failed to take off. Boat Movement Token System for fishermen was also not effective. Manpower was deficient and most of the trained personnel were deployed for other duties. Monitoring and evaluation of the scheme were not taken up.

### **2.1.27 Recommendations**

- The perspective plan formulated as per requirement of the State should be implemented;
- CPSs should be established at all the strategic locations with due consideration to threat perception and sensitive areas should be given special attention;
- Adequate manpower should be provided and completed establishments should be made operational;
- Fishermen related security schemes should be implemented.

The matter was reported to Government in Home Department and Agriculture and Co-operation (Fisheries) Department (July 2012), but reply of the Agriculture and Co-operation (Fisheries) Department has not been received.

**HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, FOREST &  
ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT AND URBAN HOUSING &  
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT**

**2.2 Management of Bio-Medical Waste in Government-sector  
Hospitals**

**Executive Summary**

*Bio-Medical Waste (BM waste) is generated during diagnosis, treatment or immunization of human beings or animals or research activities thereto. The Government of India (GOI) framed Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1998 (BMW Rules) to streamline the procedure for collection, handling, transportation and disposal of the BM waste. The performance audit of Management of Bio-Medical Waste in Government-sector hospitals has revealed following deficiencies.*

*There was no accurate data on BM waste from non-Government Health Care Establishments (HCEs). The implementation of BMW Rules was deficient as only 19 out of 80 Government HCEs test-checked had authorisation under BMW Rules. Further, in 56 Government HCEs, segregation of BM waste in colour coded containers had not been done and BM waste was mixed-up with Municipal Waste. The Common BM waste treatment facilities were not created as per norms and were not functioning properly. Feeding of BM waste in incinerators and autoclaving was found to be done manually. In some cases, BM waste was disposed off by burning/dumping. Deep burial of BM waste as per the Rules was not ensured. Studies on Task Force recommendations had not been taken up.*

**2.2.1 Introduction**

Bio-Medical waste (BM waste) is generated during diagnosis, treatment and immunization on human/animal/research. The BM waste and by-products are poisonous and pollutants and can cause injuries and therefore, its management is an integral part of health care.

In order to streamline the procedure for collection, handling, transportation and disposal of the BM Waste, the Government of India (GOI) framed Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1998 (BMW Rules) under the provisions of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The BMW Rules apply to all occupiers<sup>12</sup> handling the BM Waste in any form.


Health and Family Welfare Department provides health and medical services to the public through Civil Hospitals attached to six Medical Colleges, 62 District/Taluka Hospitals, 318 Community Health Centres (CHCs) and 1,158 Primary Health Centres (PHCs). Medical services/education is also rendered by certain Urban Local Bodies. There were 13 Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facilities (CBWTF) that facilitated treatment of the BM Waste of all Sectors (March 2012).

<sup>12</sup> Occupeer in relation to any institution generating the BM Waste includes a hospital, nursing home, clinic, dispensary, veterinary institution, animal house, pathological laboratories, blood banks by whatever name called and means a person who has control over that institution/premises

### 2.2.2 Organisational set up

The Principal Secretary, Forest and Environment Department is in overall charge of implementation of the BMW Rules. The Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB), being the nodal agency, coordinates/monitors the activities and enforces the BMW Rules through its 21 Regional Offices.

#### Organisational Chart



The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department is to ensure that BM Waste is handled without any adverse effect to human health and environment. He is assisted by the Commissioner and Additional Directors of Medical Education, Medical Services, Health and Family Welfare.

### 2.2.3 Audit coverage and methodology

The performance audit was conducted (January-July 2012) by test check of records (2007-12) of Principal Secretary, Forest and Environment Department, Commissioner/Additional Directors of Health Services, six Civil Hospitals attached to the Medical Colleges, 100 per cent District Hospitals, 50 per cent Taluka Hospitals, 25 per cent CHCs, 10 per cent PHCs – all of districts in which the selected Medical College Hospitals were located (selected districts), three Hospitals and 10 per cent Urban Health Centres of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), six Regional Offices of GPCB and 50 per cent Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facilities (CBWTF) of the selected districts. Sampling of units was made by ‘Simple Random Sampling without Replacement’ methodology.

An Entry Conference was held (June 2012) with Additional Director of Medical Services along with representatives of other line departments/authorities to discuss the audit objectives and methodology. An Exit Conference was held (October 2012) with Deputy Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department

to explain the audit findings and solicit departmental explanations. The views expressed during Exit Conference were duly taken into consideration.

#### **2.2.4 Audit objectives**

The objectives of the performance audit were to ascertain whether –

- assessment of quantum of waste being generated was made;
- implementation of BMW Rules was effective; and
- effective monitoring was done to measure operational standards as specified in the Rules.

#### **2.2.5 Audit criteria**

In order to achieve the audit objectives, following were the sources for audit criteria –

- Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 1998;
- Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) guidelines on bio-medical waste handling and disposal; and
- Monitoring standards prescribed by CPCB.

### **Audit findings**

#### **2.2.6 Lack of information regarding quantum of BM Waste**

The BMW Rules provide that every occupier of an institution generating, collecting, receiving, storing, transporting, treating, disposing and/or handling BM waste in any manner was required to obtain authorisation from GPCB and occupier/operator to maintain records in respect of BM waste handled during the year and has to submit an annual report to the prescribed authority.

In order to take stock of the quantum of BM waste generated in the State, Health Care Establishments (HCEs) were to be listed. However, Health Department was registering only Government HCEs and no authority was designated with the task to take stock regarding the non-Government HCEs. Hence, the information regarding non-Government HCEs was not available with the Department.

Similarly, Forest and Environment Department was also not having any foolproof mechanism to enlist the HCEs. In the absence of which, the quantum of BM waste being generated in the State could not be precisely assessed.

The Health Department stated (June 2012) that since the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 was not adopted in the State, non-Government HCEs were not being registered with the Department. The reply of the Health Department is not acceptable as the BMW Rules are applicable to all persons, who generate, collect, receive, store, transport, treat, dispose or handle BM Waste in any form. The BMW Rules have been made under Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which extends to the whole of India.

### 2.2.7 Disposal of untreated BM waste

The details of BM Waste generated and treated during 2007-12 are as detailed in Table 1 below –

**Table 1: Details showing BM waste generated and treated/untreated**

Sr. No.	Year	Number of HCEs	Approximate BM Waste generated	BM Waste treated	BM waste disposed off untreated	Percentage of untreated waste
			In kilogram/day			
1	2007-08	25093	22747	10000	12747	56
2	2008-09	25714	25765	15000	10765	42
3	2009-10	25684	16565	16565	0	0
4	2010-11	26286	20090	20090	0	0
5	2011-12	30257	28570	28570	0	0

(Source: GPCB's Annual Reports)

**Untreated Bio-Medical Waste disposed off by HCEs**

The GPCB stated (July 2012) that for disposal of untreated BM waste, Board issued 2864 notices (2007-12). During Exit Conference, officers from GPCB assured that proper disposal of BM Waste would be given utmost importance.

### **Implementation of Bio-Medical Waste Rules**

#### 2.2.8 Health Care Facilities running without authorisation

According to Rule 8(1) of the BMW Rules, every occupier of an institution generating (handling not less than 1,000 patients *per* month), collecting, receiving, storing, transporting, treating, disposing and/or handling BM Waste in any manner was required to obtain authorisation from GPCB. Scrutiny of the Annual Reports submitted by GPCB to CPCB revealed that a large number of HCEs were running without authorisation.

**Out of 80 Health Care Establishments test checked, 61 were operating without authorisation from GPCB**

Out of the test checked 80 HCEs, only 19 had authorisation as required under the Rules. In rest of the HCEs either the information regarding authorisation was not available or the HCEs were operating without obtaining the same from GPCB.

#### 2.2.9 Non-segregation of BM Waste

The BM waste is classified in 10 categories (**Appendix-X**) under the BMW Rules. Segregation is the first step in the entire process of BM waste management and its improper segregation results in mixing of other wastes with BM waste rendering the other wastes also toxic and hazardous. As about 15 *per cent* of hospital waste is hazardous, proper segregation could considerably reduce the quantity of waste as well as cost of treatment and disposal. Rule 6(2) of BMW Rules provide that the waste shall be segregated at the point of generation and collected into appropriate colour coded bags at the point of generation indicated in **Table-2** as follows –



**Table-2: Statement showing the colour coded bags and their treatment**

Colour Code	Type of waste	Type of treatment
Yellow	Potentially infectious non-plastic waste	Incineration/ Deep burial
Red	Potentially infectious plastic waste	Autoclave/Microwave/Chemical treatment
Blue/white	Waste sharps	Autoclave/Microwave/Chemical treatment/ Shredding
Black	Discarded medicines, chemical waste, incineration ash	Disposal in secured landfill

**Out of 80 HCEs test checked, segregation of BMW was not done in 56 HCEs**

Test check of the records in the 80 Health Care Establishments (HCEs) revealed that in 56 HCEs segregation was not done as per requirement. This resulted in improper segregation and consequential improper treatment posing health hazards.

### **2.2.10 Mixing up of BM Waste with Municipal solid waste**

**In 58 HCEs out of 80 test checked, BMW was being mixed up with Municipal solid waste**

Rule 6 (1) of the BMW Rules provides that BM waste was to be kept separate from other wastes and the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) were to pick up the segregated non-BM solid waste as well as treated BM waste for disposal at the Municipal dumpsite. However, out of 80 HCEs test checked, BM waste was found mixed up with Municipal solid waste (MSW) in 58 HCEs (73 per cent).



**Mixing of BMW with Municipal Solid Waste- Sir Sayyajirao Gaikwad Hospital- Vadodara (1 May 2012)**



**BMW thrown in Municipal waste container- CHC Hospital- Chhota Udepur, Vadodara (8 May 2012)**

This waste was disposed off in open landfill site, which was in contravention to the BMW Rules. In addition, the waste could cause infectious diseases to those human/animal/birds arriving at the landfill sites, including the employees of ULBs, rag pickers, etc.

While accepting audit observations, GPCB issued notices (July 2012) to HCEs for violating BMW Rules. The Government stated (October 2012) during Exit Conference that shortage of skilled manpower was one of the reasons for non-adherence to the provisions of the Rules. The reply of the Government was not justified as the subject matter relates to disposal of hazardous BM waste.

### ***2.2.11 Delayed collection of the BM waste***

Rule 6(5) of the BMW Rules provides that no untreated BM waste shall be kept stored beyond a period of 48 hours. When it becomes necessary to store the waste beyond 48 hours, prior permission of the prescribed authority was necessary.

Joint visit at the hospitals with GPCB officials revealed non-collection of the BM waste (for two or more days) by the Common Bio-Medical Treatment Facilities (CBMWTF) operators beyond 48 hours. The concerned hospitals stated (March-July 2012) that they would henceforth inform the GPCB when delays happened beyond prescribed time limit in lifting the BM waste.

While accepting audit observations, GPCB issued notices (July 2012) to HCEs for violating BMW Rules.

### ***2.2.12 Non-repairing of inoperative incinerators***

The Health and Family Welfare Department installed (between 1999 and 2009) 41 incinerators for treatment of BM Waste in different Taluka hospitals and District hospitals across the State at a cost of ₹1.99 crore. These incinerators remained inoperative for a period ranging from four to 10 years due to repeated breakdowns and operational problems. The incinerators were not got repaired, instead, the Hospitals obtained membership of CBWTFs operating in their areas for treatment of the BM Waste generated.

In addition to the above, six Civil Hospitals attached with Medical Colleges were also having their own incinerators for treatment of the BM waste, but they were not more (three in 2006; Ahmedabad 2009; Civil Hospital Vadodara January 2012; Civil Hospital, Surat April 2012) being utilised.

### ***2.2.13 Operation of individual incinerators by HCEs***

Out of 80 HCEs test checked, 59 HCEs were members of CBWTFs, 18 were adopting deep burial method disposal and remaining three HCEs (Motibanugar, Navi Pardi and Sarbhon) were neither member of CBWTF nor having deep burial facility. Out of 80 test checked HCEs, only three HCEs (Ahmedabad, Surat and Vadodara) had their own incinerators, which were procured (1981-1999) at a total cost of ₹31.80 lakh.

The records of these hospitals having incinerators revealed as under –

### **2.2.13.1 Civil Hospital, Surat**

According to Schedule-V(A) and (B) of the BMW Rules, while operating incinerators, the temperature of the primary chamber was to be maintained at  $800\pm 50^{\circ}\text{C}$  and the secondary chambers residence time was to be kept at  $1050\pm 50^{\circ}\text{C}$  for at least one second.

- (i) Temperature of primary chamber ranged between  $490-430^{\circ}\text{C}$  and temperature meter of secondary chamber was not in operation;
- (ii) Water used for cleaning site of incinerator was discharged into the drain of Surat Municipal Corporation (SMC) without any treatment;
- (iii) The incinerator did not have any mechanical device (such as belt conveyer etc.) for conveyance and the waste was being fed manually;
- (iv) As the port hole size was inadequate, the GPCB could not measure the stake emission; and
- (v) The incinerator had only a dust collector as air pollution control device (APCD) and was not equipped with any other APCD, such as high pressure venture scrubber for more effective control over pollution.

When improper functioning of incinerators was brought to notice, hospital authorities outsourced (April 2012) the disposal of BM Waste.

The Government stated (October 2012) during Exit Conference that due to operational problems and frequent break downs and in absence of any alternate arrangements outsourcing was resorted to. However, the fact remained that infrastructure remained unutilised and expenditure incurred thereon remained unfruitful.

### **2.2.13.2 Sir Sayyajirao Hospital (Civil Hospital), Vadodara**

- (i) The Hospital had incinerators for treatment of BM waste of yellow category, which was being utilised till January 2012. However, the hospital has not obtained Consolidated Consent and Authorisation (CCA) from GPCB under the provisions of Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989 to operate the same and were being utilised without GPCB's authorisation;
- (ii) There was no recordings of the temperatures of the chambers, in absence of which maintenance of operational parameters could not be ascertained;
- (iii) There was no graphic or computer recording devices to automatically and continuously monitor and record dates, time of day, load identification number and operating parameters throughout the entire length of the incineration cycle;
- (iv) A diesel incinerator was lying idle in inoperative condition (September 2009);

- (v) The electrical incinerator broke-down during 17 November to 30 November 2011 on account of burning of the furnace during which period 1404 kg BM waste was reported to have been treated. However, details of its disposal were not available. In such circumstance BM waste was disposed off without treatment;
- (vi) The temperature of the chambers of the incinerator was not maintained at the required range. Incinerating the BM waste at lower temperatures was fraught with the risk of emission of fatal substances such as dioxins, furans, etc. which were carcinogenic in nature.

The hospital authorities while accepting failure in providing service by annual maintenance contract (AMC) providers, stated (July 2012) that the AMC was terminated and disposal of BM waste was outsourced from February 2012.

#### ***2.2.14 Common BM Waste treatment facilities***

A Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment Facility (CBWTF) is set up and operated by private players with the consent of GPCB, where BM waste generated from a number of HCEs is treated. The CBWTF are submitting quarterly and annual reports to the GPCB.

In all, 13 CBWTFs were operating across the State. From the joint visit of five CBWTFs with GPCB officials, following were noticed –

##### ***2.2.14.1 Incinerators***

- (i) As per Central Pollution Control Board guidelines only one CBWTF was allowed to cater the need of up to 10,000 beds in a radius of 150 km. Scrutiny of the quarterly statements furnished by the operators of the CBWTF to the Regional Offices (Surat and Vadodara) revealed that two CBWTF had exceeded the limit of 10,000 beds and were covering more beds in the absence of facility in the area. Similarly, CBWTF at Rajkot was covering approximately 250 km as no other facility was available in the area. GPCB stated (July 2012) that they have received total five new proposals and consent to establish CBWTF at Anand, Amreli, Valsad, Bhuj (Kachchh) and Palanpur. During Exit Conference, GPCB agreed to the audit observation and stated that new CBWTFs were under consideration and on their being established, the prescribed norms would be complied with. However the fact remained that in violation of the CPCB guidelines two CBWTFs covered more beds/area.
- (ii) During scrutiny of the records of two CBWTF, it was found that some of the hospitals were sending waste in blue bags or in yellow bags only, which reflected improper segregation of the BM Waste. None of the hospitals sent potentially infectious plastic waste in red bags, which led to improper handling of waste. Mixed-up waste was being disposed by the CBWTF according to the colour of the container bag.

- (iii) According to the operating standards in respect of the incinerators the Combustion Efficiency shall be at least 99.00 *per cent*, however, GPCB had not carried out the test till date as the facility for the same was not available with them.
- (iv) Out of these five incinerators, two were having mechanical devices for waste feeding, however, at other three sites of CBWTF, waste feeding was being done manually. CBWTF, Quantum had hydraulic device for waste feeding, however at the time of visit, the same was not functional and the waste was being fed manually.



Similarly, in Distromed CBWTF the operator had two incinerators (one having capacity of 100 Kg/hour and the other having a capacity of 200 Kg/hour). The bigger incinerator was equipped with mechanical device for waste feeding, however, the smaller one, which was operational at the time of visit, was not having any such device and the waste was fed manually.

- (v) Out of 43, 12 hospitals/clinics were not giving their BM waste to the CBWTF for disposal though they have obtained the membership; however, the reasons for the same were not available on record.


While accepting audit observations, GPCB issued notices (July 2012) to HCEs for violating BMW Rules. The Government also admitted the audit observations and stated (October 2012) during Exit Conference that the CBWTFs were directed to install mechanical devices.

### **2.2.14.2 Autoclaving**

Autoclaving (steam sterilization) is prescribed for disinfecting and treating micro-biology and bio-technology waste, sharp waste and soiled waste. As per BMW Rules, each autoclave should have graphic or computer recording devices which will automatically and continuously monitor and record dates, time, load identification number and operating parameters throughout the autoclave cycle. Graphic/Computer recording devices were available with three CBWTFs. However, in respect of Samvedana and Care CBWTFs the same was being done manually.

### 2.2.15 Burning of BM Waste in the HCEs

The treatment/disposal of BM Waste by incineration/deep burial, autoclaving shredding etc. depends on the type of the waste. Burning of BM waste is nowhere prescribed as a mode of treatment in the Rules. However, joint inspection of 80 HCEs revealed that in 48 HCEs the BM Waste was being disposed by burning.



While accepting audit observations, the GPCB issued notices (July 2012) to HCEs for violating BMW Rules.



### 2.2.16 Deep burial

The BMW Rules provide for deep burial of Category-1 and Category-2 of BM waste in towns having a population of less than five lakh and in rural areas. The location of the site of the deep burial was to be identified in consultation with the GPCB.



In the test checked HCEs, 18 PHCs resorted to deep burial method for waste treatment without adding any layer of lime and soil. In addition to this, following deviations from BMW Rules were also observed –

- (a) In PHC Samlaya (Vadodara), the site of deep burial was not being utilised for the last two years. On opening the pit during joint visit, it was found that the same was one metre in depth and did not have any trace of BM waste having been buried there. Instead, the BM waste was being disposed of by burning and mixing with solid waste handled by civil body. In PHC Sandhasal (Vadodara), the deep burial site was found uncovered.

- (b) The PHC, Motibanugar (Jamnagar) was neither a member of Common Treatment Facility nor it had any deep burial system for disposal of the BM Waste. Only one sharp pit was available in the PHC which was not in use for a long time. Hence, all the waste generated was being disposed unscientifically in an open *kutchha* pit, flouting all Rules.

<b>PHC, Motibanugar, Jamnagar</b>	
	
<b>Sharp pit not being utilised (21 July 2012)</b>	<b>BMW burnt and thrown recklessly (21 July 2012)</b>

- (c) PHC- Chanod (Vadodara) used deep burial method for disposal of BM Waste generated by it. However, the said pit was destroyed and was not being utilised for last two-three years. Since then the hospital was throwing all its waste in an open well (adjacent to the tank through which water was supplied in the village) which was located in the middle of the village. However, no steps were taken by hospital authorities or the Health Department or by GPCB in the matter.

<b>Open well used for dumping BMW near the water Tank; PHC-Chanod; Vadodara (3 July 2012)</b>	
	

- (d) PHC Bhatia (Jamnagar) used an open site for dumping the BM Waste. The location of the site was adjacent to the Staff quarters constructed for the hospitals staff which was one kilometre away from Hospital.

Open site used for dumping BMW near the Staff Quarters; PHC-Bhatia; Jamnagar (20 July 2012)



(e) Despite being a member of CBWTF, CHC Savli (Vadodara) was dumping its BM Waste in a pond and in an open well.

Dumping of BMW near the pond , CHC- Savli Vadodara (3 July 2012)



Hence, the practice of deep burial adopted by these HCEs was without any safeguards.

During Exit Conference, the Government (Health Department) accepted the audit observation and stated that deep burial would be gradually stopped and discontinued from places where CBWTF was available. It was also assured that deep burial would be closely monitored.

### ***2.2.17 Non maintenance of blood and mercury spillage management kits***

Mercury is utilised in variety of medical devices. As it is a powerful neurotoxin, great care is required to protect people from its spills. Similarly, blood spillage also requires greater care for disposal in order to avoid any undesired incidents. However, out of the test checked 80 HCEs only five HCEs<sup>13</sup> had mercury and blood spillage management kits.

While accepting audit observations, the GPCB issued notices (July 2012) to HCEs in the matter.

13 Ahmedabad- Civil Hospital, Sola Hospital, PHC- Jetalpur; Surat- Civil Hospital; Vadodara- Jamanabai Hospital



## **Monitoring**

### **2.2.18 Non implementation of Task Force recommendations**

According to Rule 9 of the BMW Rules, the State Government was required to constitute an Advisory Committee to advise the State Government and GPCB on matters relating to the implementation of BMW Rules. Forest and Environment Department constituted the Committee in December 1998. The Committee, however, met only once (April 2004) since its inception. In addition to this, a Task Force (Advisory Group) was also constituted (March 2005) by GPCB for effective implementation of the Rules with Member Secretary, GPCB as its Chairman and 14 other members. The first meeting of the Task Force was held in March 2005. In the first meeting of the Task Force, Action Plan for BM Waste Management was prepared. Following activities were identified for better implementation of the BMW Rules in the State –

- (i) GPCB would explore the possibility of grading/categorisation of health care as ‘Green Hospital’ based on their compliance of BMW Rules. However, no progress has been made in this matter. The GPCB stated that grading of the Hospitals based on their compliance to BMW Rules was not easy so there was no progress.
- (ii) It was decided to set up at least one pilot plant on ‘Deep burial’ per region for study/demonstration to create awareness. However, the same did not materialise.
- (iii) It was also decided to carry out a study for ‘Normative assessment of waste generation in different specialty of Health Care Units in Gujarat’.

However, the GPCB has not conducted any such study. In reply, the GPCB stated that standard thumb rule for calculation of generation of BMW is adopted.

During Exit Conference, GPCB stated that grading of hospitals, based on their compliance to BMW Rules required manpower and that due to staff crunch, no progress had been made. GPCB also stated that deep burial was not much encouraged and hence the recommendation of Task Force could not be implemented. GPCB agreed to carry out ‘Normative Study of Waste Generation’ in the coming years.

### **2.2.19 Non imposition of Penalty**

As per the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, failure to comply with or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act, would entail imprisonment and/or fine. However it was observed that though the GPCB issued 2,864 notices for violation of BMW Rules (2007-12), but no penalty was imposed as there was no follow up action after issue of notices. Year-wise details of these show cause notices are as given in **Table 3** as follows –

**Table 3: Statement showing year-wise details of the show cause notices**

Sr. No.	Year	No. of notices issued by GPCB
1	2007-08	47
2	2008-09	117
3	2009-10	68
4	2010-11	509
5	2011-12	2,123
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,864</b>

The GPCB replied (July 2012) that according to the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act for violation/non-compliance of the Rules, cases under Section 15 of Environment (Protection) Act are required to be filed before Court of Law and that no court has till date imposed any fine and/or penalty to any HCE. Records revealed that as no court case has been filed by GPCB (till 2011-12) for such violation, no further penal action could be taken against the erring HCEs, which reflected laxity on the part of the GPCB in enforcement of the Rules.

### **2.2.20 Record Keeping**

According to Section 11 of BMW Rules, every authorised person shall maintain records of generation, collection, reception, storage, transportation, treatment, disposal and/or any form of handling of BM waste. However, out of 80 HCEs test checked, only 12 HCEs were keeping proper records and 45 HCEs were maintaining the record on the basis of the collection cards supplied by the CBWTF operator and 23 HCEs were not maintaining any record in respect of the waste generated in the Hospital.

## **Funding**

### **2.2.21 Non-availment of Central Sector Scheme**

The Ministry of Environment and Forests (Government of India) was implementing (August 2010) the Central Sector Scheme (CSS) for setting up of Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities on Public Private Partnership (PPP) basis for environmentally sound disposal of BM Waste. Under the scheme, GOI provided 25 per cent of the total project cost as Central subsidy limited to a maximum of one crore rupees, subject to matching grant of 25 per cent by the State concerned. Accordingly, the Ministry of Environment and Forests invited proposals (August 2010) along with Detailed Project Report (DPR) for providing subsidy for setting up of Common BM Waste Treatment Facilities (CBWTFs).

Central Pollution Control Board directed (July 2011) GPCB to review and examine the necessity for setting up of additional CBWTFs and to submit project proposals to the Ministry of Environment and Forests within a period of six weeks for sanction of Central Government assistance during 2011-12.

The GPCB replied (July 2012) that they have not received any proposal for obtaining assistance for setting up of CBWTFs on PPP mode by any agency during 'Vibrant Gujarat' Summit in 2011. In all, five MOUs were signed (2011) by project proponents for setting up of CBWTF in different part of the Gujarat and project proponents were made aware about this particular scheme.

However, the fact remained that no such project proposal was submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Forests which resulted in loss of GOI assistance.

### **2.2.22 Conclusion**

The assessment of generation of BM Waste was deficient as the State Government had no accurate data on BM waste generated by non-Government HCEs on the plea that they need not be registered. As the BMW Rules, 1988 are applicable to all persons who generate and handle BM Waste in any form, it was incumbent upon them to obtain authorisation from the GPCB. Health Care Establishments of Government violated the BM Waste (Management and Handling) Rules regarding segregation, mixing, collection, treatment, etc. Common BM Treatment Facilities were not created as per norms and were not functioning properly. Mechanical handling and deep burial of BM Waste as per the Rules were not ensured. Recommendations of Task Force were also not implemented.

### **2.2.23 Recommendations**

- Data base on non-Government Health Care Establishments may be prepared;
- Bio-Medical Waste may be got segregated and collected in colour coded containers within the prescribed time limit and treated in accordance with the BMW (Management and Handling) Rules;
- Norms regarding mechanical handling, deep burial, etc. of BM Waste may be followed; and
- Recommendations of the Task Force may be got implemented.

The matter was reported to Government (August 2012); their reply has not been received (December 2012).

## WOMEN AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

### 2.3 Implementation of Integrated Child Development Services

#### Executive Summary

*The Government of India (GOI) launched (1975) the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) to promote holistic development of children, expectant and lactating mothers and adolescent girls through package services comprising supplementary nutrition, immunization, health check-ups, nutrition and health education and informal pre-school education of children. The performance audit of implementation of ICDS revealed following deficiencies.*

- *Against the requirements of 75,480 Angan Wadi Centres (AWCs), 52,137 (69 per cent) AWCs were sanctioned and 50,225 AWCs were in operation in the State thereby a population of 1.87 crore was deprived of the benefits of ICDS. Though GOI directed (November 2008) State Government to submit proposal for additional projects based on revised population criteria, no proposal was forwarded by the State Government.*
- *In the 123 projects in eight test checked districts, basic amenities (building, safe drinking water and toilets) were not available in nine per cent to 40 per cent of the AWCs. Out of 3,333 AWCs proposed to be constructed from National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) loan, only 1,979 AWCs were constructed.*
- *Though there were 223.16 lakh eligible beneficiaries under Supplementary Nutrition (SN) Programme, 63.37 lakh beneficiaries were left out. As against the target of 300 nutrition days annually, shortfall in providing supplementary nutrition was up to 96 days. Every third child in the State was reported as underweight. Shortfall of 27 per cent to 48 per cent was noticed in the implementation of Nutrition Programme for Adolescent Girls.*
- *Records regarding immunization programme were not available with AWCs. Though funds for purchase of the medical kits were provided, the same were not purchased by the District Development Officers (DDOs).*
- *Of the 34.28 lakh children registered in the AWCs of selected districts, only 26.94 lakh children enrolled for pre-school education. There was shortfall in supply of pre-school kits. The tri-cycles procured for kids in the test checked district was of poor quality.*
- *As against the sanctioned strength of 54 Child Development Project Officers (CDPOs)/Assistant CDPOs (ACDPOs) and 220 Supervisors in selected projects, shortage of 20 CDPOs/ ACDPOs (37 per cent) and 19 Supervisors (nine per cent) was noticed. Shortfall up to 52 per cent and 50 per cent in field visits of CDPOs and Supervisors respectively was also noticed in test checked districts during 2007-12. Also, in 320 selected AWCs, there was shortfall up to 26 per cent*

***visits of Anganwadi workers to households and there was negligible implementation of Information, Education and Communication component.***

### **2.3.1 Introduction**

The GOI launched (October 1975) Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) to promote holistic development of children of the age group of 0-6 years, expectant and lactating mothers and adolescent girls aged 11-18 years. The programme was *cent per cent* funded by GOI till 2008-09 and thereafter, shared by GOI (90 *per cent*) and State Governments (10 *per cent*), except for expenditure on Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP), which was borne by GOI and State Governments at 50 *per cent* each.

Under the ICDS, Kishori Shakti Yojana, Nutrition Programme for Adolescent Girls (upto 2009-10) and Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls were also implemented.

The objectives of the ICDS were to (i) improve the nutritional and health status of children aged 0-6 years; (ii) reduce mortality, morbidity, malnutrition and school drop-outs; (iii) lay foundation for psychological/physical/social development of children; (iv) enhance capability of the mother to look after normal health and nutritional needs of the child through proper nutrition and health education; and (v) achieve effective co-ordination of policy and implementation among the various departments to promote child development. These objectives were planned to be achieved through a package of services consisting of supplementary nutrition, immunization, health check-ups, nutrition and health education and non-formal pre-school education of children aged 3-6 years.

Implementation of ICDS covering the period 1992-99 was previously reviewed during September 1998 to May 1999 and paragraph 3.4 on the audit findings was included in the Audit Report for the year ended March 1999. The recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee have not been received (September 2012).

### **2.3.2 Audit objectives**

The objectives of the performance audit were to assess whether –

- planning for the implementation of the scheme was oriented towards achievement of scheme objectives;
- funds provided were used economically and efficiently;
- the infrastructure was adequate for effective delivery of services under the scheme;
- service packages under the scheme were effectively delivered to the beneficiaries;
- staff deployment and training for skill up-gradation was based on the requirements of the scheme; and
- effective system for monitoring and evaluation of programme existed.

### **2.3.3 Audit criteria**

The implementation of the various components of the ICDS was assessed with reference to the following –

- Guidelines and instructions issued by the GOI for selection of beneficiaries and opening of AWCs;
- Norms of SNP and delivery of different packages of services; and
- System for monitoring instituted by the Government.

### **2.3.4 Organisational set-up**

The Secretary, Women and Child Development Department (WCDD) was responsible for the overall implementation of ICDS and the Director of Women and Child Development (Director) was the implementing and coordinating officer. At district level, the programme was implemented by the District Programme Officer (DPO), who was assisted by Child Development Project Officers (CDPOs) at project level and Supervisors at Angan Wadi Centres (AWCs). Services were delivered through AWCs in village or urban ward by trained female Angan Wadi Workers (AWWs) and Helpers (AWHs) to whom honorarium fixed from time to time was being paid.

### **2.3.5 Audit coverage and methodology**

The performance audit covering the period 2007-12 was conducted (July-December 2011 and April-June 2012) through test check of records of Secretary, WCDD, Director of Women and Child Development, eight out of 26 DPOs and 32 CDPOs selected by Simple Random Sampling without Replacement method. Records of 320 AWCs were also test-checked.

An Entry Conference was held (November 2011) with Secretary, WCDD to explain the audit objectives, audit criteria and methodology. Audit findings and recommendations were also discussed (January 2012) with the Secretary in an Exit Conference.

## **Audit findings**

### **Planning**

#### **2.3.6 Non-mapping of projects**

The GOI instructions provide that AWCs were to be opened for a population of 400-800 (rural and urban projects) and 300-800 (tribal projects). Mini-AWCs (MAWCs) were to be opened for a population of 150-400 (rural and urban projects) and 150-300 (tribal projects).

Before opening of AWCs and MAWCs, mapping of the projects to identify villages inhabited by weaker sections of the society was required to be done for timely opening of the AWCs. However, Director had no information regarding the actual distance of AWCs from the habitations.

**Mapping for AWCs was incomplete**

The Government stated (September 2012) that as against 52,137 AWCs sanctioned by the GOI, mapping of 50,133 AWCs has been completed. However, completion of this work could neither be traced from the records of the Director nor the office could produce any records to audit in this regard.

### 2.3.6.1 Shortfall in coverage of population

Against requirement of 75480 AWCs, only 50,225 were in operation

Considering a population of 6.04 crore of the State (2011 census), 75,480 AWCs were required, against which 52,137 (69 per cent) AWCs were sanctioned and 50,225 were in operation (March 2012).

The Director attributed (January 2012) reasons for non-operation of the sanctioned AWCs to non-availability of eligible/qualified AWW/AWH, time taking recruitment process, imposition of code of conduct in connection with elections and shortage of staff. Failure to operationalise AWCs resulted in denial of benefits to the targeted population and loss of GOI assistance of ₹10.38 crore.

The Government attributed (September 2012) non-submission of proposals for more AWCs to non-receipt of demand from DPOs and Municipal Corporations. The reply of the Government was not justified in view of the fact that DPOs and Municipal Corporations should have been asked to submit requisite proposals so that the benefits of the ICDS could be made available to the needy.

### 2.3.7 Opening of new Anganwadi Centres

A population of 1.87 crore deprived of the benefits of ICDS

Position of opening new AWCs under Phase-III and Phase-IV *vis-à-vis* deficit in number of AWCs was as shown in **Table-1** below –

**Table-1: Details showing opening of new AWCs under Phase-III and Phase-IV**

Particulars	Phase-III	Phase-IV
Commencement of programme	April 2007	October 2009
Forwarding of proposals by State Government to GOI	October 2007/July 2008	May 2010
Delay in submission of proposals	5 months/15 months	8 months
Number of AWCs/MAWCs proposed to be opened	3312 AWCs and 1126 MAWCs/ 1150 AWCs and 459 MAWCs	2433 AWCs and 813 MAWCs
Date of sanction by GOI	December 2008 and March 2010	January 2012
Number of Centres sanctioned	4462 AWCs and 1585 MAWCs	1911 AWCs
Short sanction of Centres out of the proposal	Nil	522 AWCs and 813 MAWCs
Number of Centres made operational	All	None; State Government has not issued orders (August 2012)
Overall requirement of Centres for the population of 6.04 crore (2011 census) in State	..	75,480 AWCs
Total number of Centres sanctioned	..	52,137 AWCs (March 2012)
Overall deficit of Centres	..	23,343 AWCs
Uncovered population	..	1.87 crore

Thus, a population of 1.87 crore was deprived of the benefits of ICDS. Government assured (September 2012) to make the AWCs operational shortly.

### 2.3.7.1 Irregular re-location of Centres

AWCs sanctioned by GOI relocated without following due process

The Government of India sanctioned (March 2010) additional 1150 AWCs and 459 MAWCs. These AWCs/MAWCs were to be made operational at specific places in Ahmedabad, Banaskantha and Rajkot districts. But, Director ordered (December 2010) the relocation of these sites AWCs/MAWCs throughout the State.

The Government stated (September 2012) that Commissioner was competent to re-allot AWCs from one district to another in terms of State Government Resolution of September 2008. The reply is not correct as no such powers were vested with State authorities under the ICDS for relocation of AWCs.

### 2.3.7.2 Delay in opening Centres

Though the Supreme Court<sup>14</sup> ordered (December 2006) the immediate opening of new AWCs after they were sanctioned by the GOI, State Government issued orders (November 2010) for opening of these AWCs/MAWCs after a delay of six months. Orders for opening AWCs in minority area were issued (February 2011) after 11 months due to faulty identification of locations.

The Director attributed reasons for the delay to necessity of demand survey before allotment of AWCs. The reply was not acceptable as the places for the AWCs were required to be identified before proposals were forwarded (July 2008) to GOI.

The Government stated (September 2012) that financial and administrative approval from the Government took some time, followed by delays at field level.

### 2.3.7.3 Inconsistent statistical data

Scrutiny of records revealed that there was variation between the data of Women and Child Development Department (WCDD) and selected DPOs in respect of the number of AWCs sanctioned and operational (31 March 2012) as shown in **Table-2** below –

**Table-2: Variation between the figures of WCDD and selected DPOs**

District	Number of AWCs as on 31 March 2012				Variation	
	WCDD figures		DPO figures		(WCDD to DPO figures)	
	Sanctioned	Operational	Sanctioned	Operational	Sanctioned	Operational
Junagadh	2,589	2,588	2,589	2,577	0	-11
Jamnagar	1,824	1,824	1,874	1,874	+50	+50

(Source: Data provided by State nodal department and selected districts)

Thus, the data available with WCDD needs to be reconciled with that of DPOs.

<sup>14</sup> While disposing a Civil Application filed (2001) by the Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties in connection with various problems in implementation of ICDS



The Government attributed (September 2012) the data variation to typographical error in Junagadh and accepted the error in so far as Jamnagar was concerned and assured to adjust the same against the new sanctions as and when received. However, the reply was silent as to how the expenditure sanctions were issued to these AWCs.

#### **2.3.7.4 Non-submission of proposals for projects**

The Government of India directed (November 2008) the State Government to submit proposal for additional projects based on revised population criteria, however, no such proposal was submitted (June 2012). As a result, 202 projects were handling more than 125 AWCs without augmentation of staff (March 2012).

During Exit Conference (January 2012), the Secretary (WCDD) stated that action would be taken to demand more projects and AWCs and that DPOs were also directed (December 2011) to submit proposals for opening of new projects.

### **Financial Management**

#### **2.3.8 Funding Pattern**

Funds for implementation of ICDS were obtained through Demands for Grants as shown in **Table-3** below –

**Table-3: Details of Demands and Heads of Accounts operated for ICDS implementation**

<b>Demand No.</b>	<b>Details</b>	<b>Major/Minor/Sub/ Detailed Head of Account</b>
106	ICDS General	2236-02-800-02
96	ICDS Tribal	2236-02-796-02
95	Special Nutrition Programme	2235-02-800-01
106	Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Adolescent Girls (Sabla) General	2236-02-800-14
96	Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Adolescent Girls (Sabla) Tribal	2236-02-796-09
95	Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Adolescent Girls (Sabla) SCP	2235-02-800-02


The Funds obtained in respect of ICDS were allotted by the Director to the District Development Officers (DDOs) of the respective District Panchayats. The funds so received by DDOs were deposited in the PLAs with the Treasury. The PLAs with the DDOs were common for all funds received from different functional Departments and a Cash Book was maintained by the Accounts Officer of the District Panchayat. However, there was no separate Cash Book for ICDS or any other programme.

The DDOs distribute certain portion of the funds to the Taluka Development Officers (TDOs) of the Taluka Panchayats, who deposit them with the Sub-Treasuries.

The ICDS Branches at Taluka and District levels maintain accounts for the expenditure incurred towards implementation of the Scheme. Based on the

Statement of Expenditure furnished by the CDPO of Taluka Panchayat, the DPO of the District Panchayat furnishes details of expenditure to the Nodal Officer and Utilisation Certificates are furnished to GOI accordingly.

The flow of funds from GOI to the implementing officer was as shown below –



### 2.3.8.1 Outlays and expenditure

During 2007-12, a sum of ₹1,144.63 crore under Non-Plan (General) and ₹1,408.95 crore under Plan (SNP) were released, against which ₹1,145.92 crore and ₹1,450.09 crore respectively were spent. The year-wise details are as given in **Table-4** below –

**Table-4: Details of release of grant and expenditure there against**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Expenditure during the year	of which GOI			Share released by State Government	Total funds available <sup>15</sup>	Closing Balance <sup>16</sup>
		Share Admissible <sup>17</sup>	Opening Balance available	Funds released			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>ICDS General (Non- Plan)</b>							
2007-08	115.56	115.56	(+)2.83	110.51	0.00	113.34	(-)2.22
2008-09	155.96	155.96	(-)2.22	164.92	0.00	162.70	(+)6.74
2009-10	208.52	187.67	(+) 6.74	156.32	20.85	163.06	(-)24.61
2010-11	241.08	216.97	(-)24.61	185.42	24.11	160.81	(-)56.16
2011-12	424.80	382.32	(-)56.16	440.02	42.48	383.86	(+)1.54
<b>Total</b>	<b>1145.92</b>	<b>1058.48</b>		<b>1057.19</b>	<b>87.44</b>	<b>983.77</b>	
<b>ICDS Supplementary Nutrition (Plan)</b>							
2007-08	121.73	60.87	(-)3.53	38.55	60.87	35.02	(-)25.85
2008-09	130.84	65.42	(-)25.85	74.64	65.42	48.79	(-)16.63
2009-10	246.91	123.45	(-)16.63	86.96	123.45	70.33	(-)53.12
2010-11	420.47	210.23	(-)53.12	119.86	210.23	66.74	(-)143.49
2011-12	530.14	265.08	(-)143.49	363.90	265.07	220.41	(-)44.67
<b>Total</b>	<b>1450.09</b>	<b>725.05</b>		<b>683.91</b>	<b>725.04</b>	<b>441.29</b>	

(Source: Data furnished by Director ICDS, Gandhinagar)

<sup>15</sup> This column is sum total of Columns 4 and 5

<sup>16</sup> Column 7 minus Column 3

<sup>17</sup> Prescribed percentage of total expenditure (Column 2)

Thus, release of Central funds was less than the eligible share of expenditure incurred by the State. Short release of Central grant under Plan increased from ₹3.53 crore in 2007-08 to ₹44.67 crore in 2011-12.

The Government stated (September 2012) that quarterly Statement of Expenditure and Utilisation Certificates were being furnished to GOI from time to time, but reimbursements were not received.

### ***2.3.9 Defective and incomplete financial records***

#### ***2.3.9.1 Incomplete Grant Registers***

In the selected eight districts, grants were released in four to five annual installments during the period covered under audit. To verify correct accounting of grants released by WCDD to Districts and Districts to Projects, Audit test checked Grant Registers maintained by DPOs and CDPOs of selected units.

Test check of Grant Registers of DPOs revealed that entries of receipt and disbursement of grants and date of release of grant to CDPOs were not recorded in the Registers. Similarly, at Project level, Grant Registers were not maintained or entries made were incomplete. Due to non/improper maintenance of Grant Registers, Audit could not verify correctness of accounts.

The Government stated (September 2012) that DPOs were directed to maintain Grant Registers properly.

#### ***2.3.9.2 Differences of figures of grant releasing/receiving units***

The reconciliation of grants accounted for by receiving units was not carried out by releasing units. This has resulted in huge difference in release/receipt of grants by respective units. The Government stated (January 2012) that DPOs were directed to reconcile the difference.

#### ***2.3.9.3 Differences between closing and opening balances***

Audit scrutiny revealed that in the Statement of Expenditure, there was a difference of ₹5.56 crore between OB of current year and CB of previous year in respect of five selected districts except DPO, Ahmedabad, where expenditure statements were not prepared for all the five years. DPOs agreed to reconcile the difference and intimate to audit.

The Government instructed (September 2012) the DPOs to get the difference reconciled.

### ***2.3.10 Other financial irregularities***

Scrutiny of records of Director/selected field offices revealed irregularities, shown in **Table-5** as follows –

Table-5: Details showing irregularities noticed

Sl. No.	Nature of irregularity	Money value, if any	Remarks/Audit observations
1	Parking of funds in Personal Leger Accounts (PLA)	₹116.01 crore	Rule 193 of Gujarat Financial Rules, 2000 provided that money should not be withdrawn, unless it was required for immediate disbursement. Amount withdrawn and deposited in PLA increased from ₹22.13 crore (April 2007) to ₹116.01 crore (March 2012); thus funds were released without requirement
2	Irregular expenditure	₹1.04 crore	Amount was spent (2009-10) on printing of growth chart (₹94.94 lakh) and recipe books (₹8.74 lakh) against the grant of Information, Education and Communication
3	Excess expenditure	₹6.37 lakh	Against the admissible amount of ₹2 lakh per annum, Director booked ₹10.37 lakh (2009-10 and 2010-11) towards electrification and furniture
4	Unauthorised expenditure on inadmissible item	₹6.30 lakh	Secretary WCDD sanctioned (2008-09) purchase of car under monitoring and evaluation, which resulted in unauthorised expenditure on inadmissible item under monitoring and evaluation

The Government stated (September 2012) that grants under the State Budget were released to the concerned DDOs on the basis of their estimated and planned requirements. As regards the irregularities, it was stated that all the DDOs and POs had been asked to provide details regarding the utilisation of plan/non-plan grants kept in the PLA.

### Infrastructure

Angan Wadi Centre is the focal point for delivery of ICDS. In order to discharge the functions effectively, the AWCs require basic infrastructure facilities, such as buildings with store, kitchen and toilets, drinking water, utensils, furniture etc.

#### 2.3.11 Absence of basic infrastructure

Out of 50,225 AWCs operational (March 2012), 20521 AWCs were being operated from non-Government buildings. Information on infrastructural facilities in respect of 2,664 AWCs was not available with the Director.

The Government stated (September 2012) that these 2,664 AWCs were being operated from non-Government buildings, which included rented buildings, school buildings, community halls, houses of AWWs, open-space and beneath trees. However, the details of which were not furnished by the Government.

Basic amenities were not available in sizable number of AWCs

As such, some of the AWCs were working in open spaces or beneath the trees. Thus, the Government failed to provide proper infrastructure for locating these AWCs.

In the 123 projects in eight test checked districts (consisting of 18,510 AWCs), basic amenities (building, safe drinking water and toilets) were not available in nine per cent to 40 per cent of the AWCs, shown in **Table-6** as follows –

**Table-6: Statement showing details of basic facilities not available in AWCs**

Name of District	No. of projects	No. of AWCs	Non-availability of basic facilities		
			Building	Safe drinking water	Toilet
Junagadh	18	2,588	115	616	847
Jamnagar	13	1,824	143	384	665
Mehsana	13	1,896	17	367	217
Sabarkantha	20	3,264	447	1,561	1,409
Ahmedabad (Rural)	13	1,600	359	875	2,562
Anand	13	1,979	149	221	179
Surat	17	2,634	5	937	287
Panchmahals	16	2,725	435	1,065	1,242
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>18,510</b>	<b>1,670</b>	<b>6,026</b>	<b>7,408</b>
<b>Percentage</b>			<b>9</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>40</b>
State	336	50,225	2,664	17,281	18,321
State average				34	36

(Source: Director ICDS, Gandhinagar)

Non-availability of basic infrastructure facilities in AWCs had adverse impact on the delivery of services to the beneficiaries. Data regarding provision of separate kitchen/store, furniture, play-ground, etc. was also not available with the Director.

AWCs were functioning in congested area, *kutchha* buildings and cattle shed



Vankla AWC, Project Mandvi-1

Umbhed-1 AWC, Project Kamrej



A well maintained, clean and tidy AWC of Kalol Project  
(Panchamahals district)

During field visits of AWCs of the selected projects, it was observed that though there were a few exceptions of well maintained AWCs, most of them were functioning in congested space, *kutcha* buildings and cattle shed.

The Government stated (September 2012) that action would be taken to solve the problems.

### 2.3.12 Slow progress in construction of AWCs

Construction of large number of AWCs was incomplete



Jamnagar (Urban)-1 with dumpings

In order to provide proper accommodation to the AWCs, Government decided (August 2009) to construct new buildings with the financial assistance (loan) from the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD).

The funds were placed (2010-11) with Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan for undertaking the construction of AWCs.

Details regarding number of units proposed for construction, its cost, progress of work, etc. (March 2012) are as given in **Table-7** as follows –

**Table-7: Details showing construction of AWCs out of NABARD loan**

Government share	₹15 crore
NABARD loan sanctioned (November 2009)	₹85 crore
Number of AWCs proposed to be constructed	3,333 units
Unit cost	₹3 lakh
Due date of completion	31 March 2012
Number of units completed (June 2012)	1,979 units
Number of units in progress (June 2012)	713 units
Number of units, construction not commenced (June 2012)	641
Expenditure incurred (June 2012)	₹85.35 crore

The Director attributed non availability of land and site disputes, non finalisation of list of centres, local level problems, non-opening of bank account, etc. for delay/non-commencement of construction of the remaining AWCs.

The Government, while narrating the further progress achieved in completion of the works, stated (September 2012) that construction of AWCs was being undertaken with the State's own resources.

### **2.3.13 Unfruitful expenditure and blocking of funds on Mobile Vans**

To cater to the needs of children of labourers, agarias and slums-dwellers, and those living in interior, scattered and tribal areas, etc., the WCDD released ₹2.21 crore for purchase of 46 vehicles for Mobile AWCs. The vehicles were allotted to District Panchayats/ Municipal Corporations, who were to bear the expenditure on maintenance including salary of driver and POL. Audit observations are shown in **Table-8** as follows –

**Table-8**

Location	Value	Audit observation
DPO, Surat	₹2.50 lakh	Mobile van allotted (April 2010) was not utilised even for a day for want of fund for POL and salary for driver.
Surat Municipal Corporation, Surat	₹5 lakh	Two mobile vans allotted (February 2008) were utilised for survey of non-covered ICDS areas under Urban Projects 2 and 3; van for Urban Project-2 ran for 3,411km in seven months and van for Urban Project-3 for 4,372 km in nine months.
Vadodara Municipal Corporation, Vadodara	₹5 lakh	Two mobile vans allotted (September 2008, March 2009) to Urban Project 1 and 2 were not utilised for 21 months (Project 1) and 8 months (Project 2) due to non renewal of contract of supply of cooked food and irregular supply of ration respectively.
10 DPOs, 5 Municipal Commissioners and Development Supporting Agency (Tribal)	₹1.72 crore	Director distributed (March 2011) the amount for purchase of 26 Mobile Vans costing ₹6.60 lakh each. None of the grantees purchased the vehicle as the local bodies concerned were not prepared to bear cost of POL and salary of driver.

While replying (September 2012) the audit observations, the Government stated that services were being rendered through 46 mobile vans. The reply is not correct as test check of records revealed that five mobile vans were not in operation; further, mobile vans were also not purchased out of ₹1.72 crore sanctioned to 10 DPOs, five Municipal Commissioners and Development Supporting Agency.

## Services under ICDS

### Supplementary Nutrition Programme

The Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) aimed to improve the health and nutrition status of children in the age group of six months to six years (6m-6y), pregnant women, lactating mothers and adolescent girls. SNP provided (January 2010) for supply of 500 calories and 12-15 gram protein per day for children between 6m-6y of age and 800 calories and 22-25 gram protein for malnourished children. Pregnant women, lactating mothers and adolescent girls were to be supplied 600 calories and 18-20 gram protein.

Supply of the food module comprised a variety of food items acceptable among children. Provision of breakfast in addition to one meal was also made (January 2010) for children in the age group of three to six years. Apart from this, food grains as Take Home Ration (THR) were to be distributed to children in the age group of 6 months to 3 years, pregnant women, lactating mothers and adolescent girls.

#### 2.3.14 Targets and achievements

**Beneficiaries left out from SN programme were 63.37 lakh**

The Supreme Court ordered (October 2004) to provide supplementary nutrition as per norms to all the eligible beneficiaries of AWCs. Audit scrutiny revealed that as against 223.16 lakh children aged 6 months to 3 years, pregnant women and lactating mothers enrolled (2007-12), target fixed was only 170.32 lakh beneficiaries (76 per cent) in the State. Out of these, only 159.79 lakh actually benefited, thus 63.37 lakh beneficiaries were left out. The position of category-wise coverage and uncovered beneficiaries in 32 projects selected for detailed scrutiny is as given in **Appendix-XI** and **Appendix-XII** respectively. Non provision of supplementary nutrition to all the enrolled beneficiaries defeated the objective of achieving universalisation of the scheme as envisaged.

While accepting audit observation, the Government stated (September 2012) that achievements had since started to improve.


#### 2.3.15 Non-achievement of targeted nutrition days

Supplementary Nutrition was to be served to the beneficiaries for 25 days in a month and 300 days in a year. However, AWCs delayed submission of indents to Director which coupled with delay in distribution of ration by the suppliers led to non-serving of SN for up to 96 days during 2007-12.

#### 2.3.16 Nutritional status

Percentage of children in red category showed increasing trend during 2007-12 (0.65 per cent to 4.66 per cent) as shown as follows.






As per National Family Health Survey-3 (2005-06) in Gujarat, every second child below five years, every third women and every second adolescent girl were underweight. However, despite providing SN to targeted children during 2007-12, Monthly Progress Report (March 2012) states that every third child was underweight.

The Government records revealed following reasons for static and high under nutrition –

- The Government focused more on nutritional status of children in the age group of 3-5 years whereas maximum under-nutrition was noticed in children between 0-3 years as shown in chart below –



- The Government focused only on weighing and recording, but not much on counseling and intervention under Nutrition and Health Education Programme under ICDS;
- Limited focus on addressing long term under nutrition, which was largely due to long term food deprivation and maternal under nutrition (among one-third of mothers).

During Exit Conference (January 2012), the Government stated that convergence of various initiatives resulted in reduction of child mortality from 50 deaths (2008) to 44 deaths (2010) out of every 1,000 birth and decrease in maternal mortality rates.

The reply was not justifiable as, in spite of the corrective steps, the percentage of malnourished children had steadily increased during 2010-11, showing a reduction during 2011-12. However, in 80 tribal projects of 11 districts percentage of moderate (yellow) and worst (red) malnourished children during 2011-12 ranged up to 44 *per cent* and five *per cent* respectively.

The Government while explaining the efforts made in this direction, stated (September 2012) that under-nutrition is a multifaceted issue that needed to be addressed.

### ***2.3.17 Supplementary nutrition to malnourished children***

**SN, as envisaged was not provided to children**

As per the prescribed norms, each identified malnourished child was to get 800 calories and 20-25 gram of protein per day. Scrutiny of records of eight selected districts revealed that despite 69,453 Grade-III beneficiaries identified as malnourished during March 2008-12, instead of the stipulated nutrition, the AWCs provided 500 calories and 12-15 gram of protein only to 25,673 (37 *per cent*) malnourished beneficiaries.

When pointed out, DPOs replied (June 2012) that the instructions would be followed in future. Thus, the scheme failed to reach 63 *per cent* intended beneficiaries and reached the remaining beneficiaries only partially.

#### ***2.3.17.1 Issuance of double quantity of ration***

Further, in Ahmedabad, Anand, Junagadh, Sabarkantha and Surat districts, double the ration was provided (69,901 beneficiaries) against the 29,072 actual beneficiaries identified. The excess issue of ration ranged between eight *per cent* (Surat) and 933 *per cent* (Sabarkantha). No explanation was furnished in respect of issuance of excess ration and issue of ration to beneficiaries in excess of the identified number.

The DPOs stated that entries will be checked and correct position will be intimated to audit.

### ***2.3.18 Quality of food***

#### ***2.3.18.1 Non-implementation of micro nutrients norms***

Government of India directives (January 2006) provided for supply of 50 *per cent* of micro nutrients as per recommended dietary norms through 80 grams of supplementary food to different target groups (6m-6y children, Pregnant and Lactating women and adolescent girls). However, this was not implemented in the State. CDPOs in the test checked projects stated (November/December 2011, June 2012) that a provision for expenditure on fruits (twice in a week) was being made in State budget (January 2010).

When pointed out, Government explained (September 2012) about the efforts made by them in this regard. The fact, however, remained that the GOI directives to provide 50 per cent of micro nutrients was not implemented.

### 2.3.18.2 Physical Monitoring of quality of food

#### Quality of food supplied was not as required

The Community Food Nutrition and Extension Units (CFNEUs) under the Food and Nutritional Board of the GOI were expected to visit AWCs to ensure the quality of food being served to the beneficiaries. However, in 18 out of 320 selected AWCs, CFNEU paid a visit only once in five years (2007-12). Samples of foods served were collected neither by the ICDS functionaries nor by CFNEUs for sending to Quality Control Laboratory (QCL) working under Food and Nutritional Board. DPOs attributed (November, December 2011 and June 2012) non-drawal of food samples to non-availability of vehicle and non-establishment of QCL in Gujarat. There were instances of supply of substandard food as under—

- The DPOs were to place the Dispatch Advice (DA) by 5<sup>th</sup> of every month with the flour mills for supply of the flour to the AWCs. The flour can be used for a period of 45 days after grinding of the wheat. During test check in Ahmedabad district, it was seen that flour was sent for testing after 20 to 22 days after grinding. There were cases of supply of flour after expiry of its life, in a few cases such flour had 15 grams of insects *per* 100 grams of flour. When such substandard flour was returned for replacement, the supplier re-dispatched it in new gunny bag after reprocessing. It was also reported that the reprocessed flour was not sent for testing thereafter. The Government stated (September 2012) that action had been taken against the supplier and security deposit forfeited.
- Renita Charitable Trust was providing prepared SN to AWCs under Urban Project-1 of Vadodara Municipal Corporation. There were reports in print/electronic media<sup>18</sup> that earthworms, etc. were found in the food supplied by them. Also, the quantity/ quality supplied was short/sub-standard. But, food samples were not taken and the Trust was allowed to continue supply till July 2010. The Director stated that the CDPO was charge sheeted (August 2011) for lack of supervision.
- MLA, Talaja (Bhavnagar district) during her surprise visit (15 December 2008) to Valukad AWC No. 3, observed that only 16 out of the 43 children enrolled with AWC were present. Extreme dirt prevailed in AWC all around and spices contained worms and insects. The AWW was unavailable when the MLA made the visit. DPO Bhavnagar reported (July 2009) that the District Primary Education Officer who investigated (April 2009) the matter instructed the AWW to keep the kitchen clean by using powder and water.

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18 Gujarat Samachar dated 31 July 2010, Divya Bhaskar dated 1 August 2010 and TV 9 News Channel

### 2.3.19 Nutrition programme for adolescent girls

The GOI launched for two years (2002-04), a pilot project of Nutrition Programme for Adolescent Girls (NPAG), in 51 selected districts of the country with 100 *per cent* Central assistance<sup>19</sup>, which was extended till 2009-10. In Gujarat, Dahod and Panchmahals districts were selected under NPAG.

Under the scheme, adolescent girls (11 to 19 years) weighing less than 35 kg were to be identified and provided 6 kg food grains per girl per month for three months free of cost irrespective of the financial status of their families. After three months, if their weight was found to be less than 35 kg, the same quantity of ration was to be provided for another three months.

Supervisors along with the AWWs were made responsible for checking the weight of five *per cent* of the girls and monitoring/reporting on the regularity of distribution of food grains from Fair Price Shops (FPS). The CDPO was to verify one *per cent* of cases randomly. There were significant shortfalls up to 48 *per cent* in achieving the targets, shown in **Table-9** as follows –

**Table-9: Details of target and achievement under NPAG**

(Number of beneficiaries)

Year	Target	Achievement	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
2006-07	2,41,866	1,26,796	1,15,070	48
2007-08	1,96,296	1,13,124	83,172	42
2008-09	1,79,669	1,30,295	49,374	27
2009-10	2,57,520	1,49,578	1,07,942	42

(Source: Director, ICDS, Gandhinagar)

Further, there were no records at AWCs and Project Offices to show that the girls were weighed regularly. Verification by Supervisors and CDPOs was also not carried out. Government accepted (September 2012) the irregular/insufficient supply of foodgrain.

### 2.3.20 Coverage under Kishori Shakti Yojana

The GOI launched (2000-2001) Kishori Shakti Yojana (KSY) as a component of ICDS for the benefit of girls from the age group of 11-18 years to provide them supplementary nutrition and vocational training in home-based skills. There was a shortfall of 5,84,604 in enrolment (2007-12) of eligible beneficiaries under Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP). Even out of the enrolled beneficiaries, 38,885 (2011-12) to 1,86,816 (2007-08) beneficiaries were not covered under SNP during the period 2007-12. Similarly, shortfall in imparting vocational training to enrolled beneficiaries ranged between 75 and 84 *per cent*. Thus, neither all the eligible beneficiaries were enrolled nor all the enrolled beneficiaries were provided with SN and vocational training thereby defeating the objective of the scheme.

**Shortfall ranging from 75 to 84 *per cent* in vocational training under KSY noticed**

<sup>19</sup> Grants of ₹5.87 crore released and expenditure of ₹5.33 crore incurred during 2007-09

The Director stated (January 2012) that in all the categories, number of beneficiaries covered doubled in 2010-11 from the base year 2007-08. The contention of the Director is not acceptable as the objective of the Scheme was 100 *per cent* coverage.

The Government stated (September 2012) that since adolescent girls worked in farms and engaged in domestic work, they were not regularly attending AWC, which resulted in shortfall in coverage. The fact remained that large number of eligible adolescent girls were left out of the benefits of the programme.

### ***2.3.21 Observance of Village Health and Nutrition Day***

To reduce the maternal and infant mortality from 172 to 100 (*per* one lakh birth) and 50 to 30 (*per* 1,000 birth) respectively, the Government decided (January 2008) to strengthen mother and child health services through observance of Village Health and Nutrition Day (VHND). Audit observed that the Director had no information on number of VHNDs targeted and actually conducted.

The Director stated (January 2012) that Health and Family Welfare Department was the nodal department for observance of VHNDs and maintenance of records. The Director also stated that 3,39,978; 3,84,412 and 2,49,776 VHNDs were held during 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 respectively. However, this could not be verified from the records of Health Department as no information on VHND was available with the Department.

The Government stated (September 2012) that records in this regard were being maintained by the Health Department. However, since the implementation is undertaken at AWC level, non-availability of even basic data would be detrimental to its successful implementation.

## ***Immunization programme***

### ***2.3.22 Immunization of children and women***

**There were deficiencies in immunization programme**

Health check-ups under the Scheme included ante-natal care of expectant mother, lactating mothers and children below six years of age, especially those who were born with congenital defects or were severely malnourished. Record cards of pre-natal and post natal care were to be maintained and immunization was to be carried out for, children under six years of age in the project areas (against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, polio, tuberculosis and measles) and expectant mothers (against tetanus).

The AWWs/AWHs were made responsible (January 2008) for motivating children and mother towards immunization. However, no records indicating number of children and women due for immunization and number immunized/left out were maintained by AWCs. Records of the Health Department showed deficit ranging nine *per cent* (2009-10) to 21 *per cent* (2008-09) in immunization.

The Government stated (September 2012) that the Health Department has since introduced E-Mamta Mother and Child Tracking System to follow up the dropouts.

### **Health care**

#### **2.3.23 Non-supply of medical kits**

**Medical kits were not supplied during 2007-12 to AWCs**

Scheme guidelines stipulated (March 2000) yearly supply of Medical Kits, especially in tribal areas, to AWCs before the onset of monsoon to prevent outbreak of water-borne diseases among the children. However, such kits were supplied only once (May 2009) during 2007-12 in the selected districts.

Grant of ₹8.22 crore was released during 2009-12 to District Panchayats for purchase of the medical kits, but the kits were not purchased by the DDOs. Thus, immediate medical care was not available to the AWCs to treat children.

The Director stated (January 2012) that kits were distributed during all the five years by district level offices (2006-07 and 2009-11) and State Nodal Department (2007-09). However, such supplies were not traceable in the records of AWCs.

Further, the Director had not evolved any mechanism to monitor proper distribution of medicines. Even the annual report on the number of kits procured and supplied to AWCs by DPOs and sent to GOI, was not available with the Director.

The Government stated (September 2012) that except for the DDOs of Dahod, Jamnagar and Navsari, none could procure the kits due to its high price *vis-à-vis* the quantum of grant allotted. Hence, orders had since been placed with Central Medical Store Organisation, Gandhinagar for procurement of kits.

### **Pre-school and non-formal education**

#### **2.3.24 Pre-school education**

Pre-School Education (PSE) is a crucial component of the package of services envisaged under the scheme, which aims at school readiness and development of a positive attitude towards education. PSE was to be provided in AWCs to children (3-6 years) through non-formal and play-way methods of joyful learning. To assist in imparting PSE, pre-school kits were to be provided.

##### **2.3.24.1 Short coverage of pre-school education**

**Shortage of 21 per cent of AWC children joining pre-School education noticed**

As per the data furnished by the Director, 34.28 lakh children (3-6 years) were registered (2007-12) in AWCs of selected districts for PSE. Of these, only 26.94 lakh (79 per cent) children attended pre-school as shown in Table-10 –

**Table 10: Children attended pre-school during 2007-12**

Year	Number of children			Percentage of shortfall
	Registered	Attended	Shortfall	
2007-08	6,59,691	5,09,418	1,50,273	23
2008-09	6,98,223	5,36,514	1,61,709	23
2009-10	6,48,627	5,03,858	1,44,769	22
2010-11	7,11,176	5,65,826	1,45,350	20
2011-12	7,10,375	5,78,748	1,31,627	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,28,092</b>	<b>26,94,364</b>	<b>7,33,728</b>	<b>21</b>

(Source: Monthly Progress Reports of State)

The DPOs of the test checked districts attributed (November/December 2011, June 2012) shortfall in attendance to migration of parents belonging to labour class, children joining parents at work site, illness, family circumstances and laziness. However, no documents were found on record. The Government endorsed (September 2012) the above reply.

#### **2.3.24.2 Non-purchase of pre-school kits**

**15 out of 32 projects did not purchase pre-school kits**

The Director provided (2008-12) funds to the tune of ₹15.98 crore to 26 districts for purchase of PSE kit at AWCs. However, PSE kits worth ₹6.53 crore (41 per cent) only were purchased (2008-12).

Scrutiny of records of selected CDPOs revealed that against eligible expenditure of ₹2.06 crore (2007-12) on PSE kits, 17 projects purchased PSE kits worth ₹35.11 lakh, while the remaining 15 projects did not buy kits. This resulted in short-delivery of the PSE component of the scheme.

No mechanism was in place to watch proper distribution of PSE kits as the Half Yearly Report sent to GOI on procurement and distribution of kits was not available with the Director.

The Director stated (January 2012) that kits were provided (2009-11) by UNICEF to 11,000 AWCs (22 per cent) of Banaskantha, Bhavnagar, Kachchh, Patan, Rajkot and Vadodara districts. Further, the kits were provided by the community to AWCs. The reply was not justified as there was no reason for the Director to release grants towards purchase of kits when the same was being provided by UNICEF/community.

The Government stated (September 2012) that efforts were being made to supply the pre-school kits.

### 2.3.24.3 Purchase of tri-cycles

The Director instructed (April 2011) for purchase of three to four tri-cycles within ceiling limit of ₹1,000 locally by AWWs.

Photo showing the broken tri-cycles dumped in the office of DPO, Junagadh (May 2012)



Scrutiny of records of DPO, Junagadh revealed that ₹1,000 were credited in bank account of each AWW.

Though the CDPOs certified non-availability of tri-cycles in local market, tenders for purchase of tri-cycles (7,731) were not invited. Instead the Programme Officer informally instructed one supplier of Ahmedabad to supply tri-cycles. In the absence of any specification prescribed by the Director, each AWW accepted poor quality of tri-

cycles, which were quickly broken. It was also observed that tri-cycles actually costing ₹250 per piece were supplied at the cost of ₹500.

This resulted in wasteful expenditure of ₹12.02 lakh, extra expenditure of ₹6.01 lakh, suspected malpractice in procurement and depriving the kids of intended benefits.

The Government stated (September 2012) that purchase of tri-cycles was being decentralised to take care of local needs and that purchase at DPO, Junagadh was being inquired into.

### **Nutrition and Health Education**

Nutrition and Health Education (NHE) was to be provided to all women in the age group of 15-45 years through mass media and other forms of publicity, special campaigns, home visits by AWWs, short courses, demonstrations of cooking/feeding and utilisation of programmes of Ministries of Health and Family Welfare/Agriculture.

### 2.3.25 Household visit by AWWs

For educating the target group, each AWW was required to conduct 125 house visits every month. Monthly Progress Reports of 320 selected AWCs revealed shortfall up to 26 per cent as shown in **Table-11** as follows –

**There was shortfall upto 26 per cent in AWWs house visits under Nutrition and Health Education**



**Table-11: Shortfall in visits of AWWs to household**

Year	Target	Actual cover- age	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
2007-08	4,80,000	3,53,967	1,26,033	26
2008-09	4,80,000	3,67,159	1,12,841	24
2009-10	4,80,000	3,70,223	1,09,777	23
2010-11	4,80,000	3,71,019	1,08,981	23
2011-12	4,80,000	3,59,509	1,20,491	25

(Source: MPRs of 320 selected AWCs)

The CDPOs attributed the shortfall of household visits of AWWs to meetings, leave and trainings.

The Government stated (September 2012) that increased emphasis would be placed on household visits and maternal counseling.

### **2.3.26 Demonstrations/Campaigns**

Scrutiny of records of the selected CDPOs revealed that no slide/film show, short term demonstrations were held during 2007-12. The CDPOs stated that there was no such facility at districts/projects/AWCs level, but NHE activities were done by organising Mahila Mandal meetings, food recipe competition, cookery shows, celebrations of nutrition week, etc.

### **2.3.27 Shortfall in providing Nutrition and Health Education to adolescent girls**

Details of adolescent girls<sup>20</sup> who received Nutrition and Health Education (NHE) during 2008-12 are shown in **Table-12** below –

**Table-12: Details of adolescent girls received NHE**

Year	Number of adolescent girls enrolled under KSY	Number of adolescent girls received NHE	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
2008-09	5,11,570	4,43,182	68,388	13
2009-10	5,50,962	5,00,093	50,869	9
2010-11	7,11,040	4,79,496	2,31,544	33
2011-12	2,48,623	1,85,365	63,258	25

It could be seen that shortfall in providing NHE to adolescent girls was up to 33 per cent. Thus, the scheme failed to achieve the intended purpose.

<sup>20</sup> NHE to women (above adolescent to 45 years) were being imparted through *Matru Mandal* (mothers' meeting)

The Government stated (September 2012) that adolescent girls in rural areas joined their parents in farm and engaged in domestic work and therefore did not attend AWCs regularly. The reply of the Government is not justified as AWWs could not motivate the targeted group to participate in the activity.

### **2.3.28 Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for empowerment of adolescent girls**

The GOI launched (March 2011) Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls or *Sabla*, merging the KSY and NPAG to address the multi-dimensional problems of adolescent girls. Using the platform of ICDS, *Sabla* was initially implemented in 200 selected districts across the country. In these districts, *Sabla* replaced KSY and NPAG. In the rest of the districts, KSY continued as before.

In Gujarat, Ahmedabad, Banaskantha, Dahod, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Narmada, Kachchh, Navsari and Panchmahals districts were selected for implementation of *Sabla*. Under the scheme, adolescent girls (11-18 years) were to be subdivided into two groups (11-14 years and 14-18 years). Interventions in health and personal hygiene were accordingly to be planned. Life skills education, nutrition and health education, awareness about socio-legal issues, etc. were also to be imparted.

The identified group leader-girls (*Sakhi* and *Saheli*) were to be imparted training as per the prescribed module at the project/sector level to serve as peer-monitors for *Kishori-Shakti*. The group leaders were to participate in regular activities of AWC, like providing pre-school education, SN, growth monitoring, etc. They were also to accompany the AWWs for home visits, as training ground for the future.

A training kit was to be provided in every AWC to assist adolescent girls in understanding various health, nutrition, social and legal issues. The cost of each kit was fixed at ₹1,000. There was a provision for a new kit every year. Scrutiny of records revealed that –

- Of the nine districts, the scheme was not implemented in Ahmedabad, Narmada and Kachchh districts during 2010-11;
- Of the 5.06 lakh adolescent girls enrolled (2011-12) under *Sabla*, 0.72 lakh girls (14 *per cent*) were found malnourished. SN was provided for only 220 days leaving a shortfall of 80 days (27 *per cent*). Iron Folic Acid tablets were provided to 2.19 lakh girls (shortfall 2.87 lakh – 57 *per cent*); and health check-up was carried out for 2.60 lakh girls (shortfall 2.46 lakh: 49 *per cent*).
- As against 5.06 lakh adolescent girls enrolled (2011-12), vocational training was imparted to 4,404 girls leaving shortfall of 5.01 lakh (99 *per cent*).

- As against 20,696 AWCs implementing *Sabla* (2011-12) training kits were provided to 1,728 AWCs, leaving a shortfall of 18,968 (92 per cent) depriving girls of learning.

In response, the Government furnished (September 2012) reply stating that as against the enrolment of 5.06 lakh adolescent girls, Iron Folic Acid tablets were given to 5.47 lakh girls (108 per cent). The reply is not correct, since the records made available to audit clearly showed that the tablets were provided to 2.19 lakh girls only.

### **Information, Education and Communication**

#### **2.3.29 Non-implementation of Information, Education and Communication component**

**Implementation of awareness programme was unsatisfactory**

The objectives of the Information, Education and Communication (IEC) were to –

- (i) Create awareness and build up image of the ICDS programme;
- (ii) Stimulate demand for ICDS;
- (iii) Effect and sustain behavioral and attitudinal changes in child caring, nutrition and health; and
- (iv) Muster and sustain community participation.

To achieve these objectives, various activities were to be taken up. GOI prescribed a financial limit of ₹25,000 per project per annum (up to 2008-09) and ₹1,000 per annum per AWC (2009-10 onwards) for implementation of the programme.

Scrutiny of records revealed that against budget estimates of ₹16.03 crore (2007-12), only ₹7.67 lakh was spent on IEC at the departmental level. This meager expenditure had little impact since even the documentary film prepared (2010-11) at a cost of ₹7.67 lakh was not shown at the district/project/AWC level due to non availability of film projectors.

During Exit Conference (January 2012) Government stated that film was in the form of CD which was distributed to Anganwadi Training Centres for display during training and the film was also shown during *Mahila Sammelans*.

Scrutiny of records of selected CDPOs revealed that while 16 projects had incurred expenditure of ₹19.96 lakh on wall paintings and pamphlets as against eligible expenditure of ₹167.56 lakh (2007-12), no activities were carried out by remaining 16 projects. Thus, the awareness programme was not given due importance.

The Government stated (September 2012) that a large number of activities were being carried out in a decentralised manner at the district, block and AWC level. The reply of the Government is not correct as the information furnished at decentralised level did not show implementation of any such activity.

### **Manpower Management**

Efficiency and quality of ICDS services largely depend on the availability of adequate number of trained supervisory cadre like CDPOs and Supervisors as well as grass-root level functionaries.

#### **2.3.30 Shortage in key posts**

Audit scrutiny revealed that as of March 2012, against the sanctioned strength of 54 CDPOs/ACDPOs and 220 Supervisors in selected projects, 34 CDPOs and 201 Supervisors were in position leaving a shortage of 20 CDPOs/ACDPOs (37 per cent) and 19 Supervisors (nine per cent). In 5,118 AWCs of selected projects, 116 posts of AWWs and 160 posts of AWHs were vacant (March 2012).

The Director stated (January 2012) that action to promote 25 AWWs as Supervisors was under process in concerned District Panchayats.

The Government stated (September 2012) that out of 52 vacant posts of CDPOs, 25 posts would be filled up through Public Service Commission and the rest by promotion from amongst the supervisors, for which the procedure would be completed shortly.

#### **2.3.31 Training to ICDS functionaries**

The ICDS Guidelines provide for imparting regular training to ICDS functionaries viz. induction training on initial appointment, job orientation training and refresher training. As of March 2012, there were 18 Agan Wadi Training Centres (AWTC) and one Middle Level Training Centre (MLTC) at Gandhinagar. It was observed that out of ₹18.67 crore earmarked (2008-12) for imparting training to ICDS functionaries, ₹14.58 crore was spent by the Department. The shortfall in training (2007-12) ranged from nine per cent to 27 per cent (functionaries) and 63 per cent to 89 per cent (refresher). The Director had no information regarding number of CDPOs deputed to National Institute of Public Co-operation and Child Development (NIPCCD) for refresher training courses.

The Government attributed (September 2012) shortfall to (i) non-attendance of the trainees due to personal reasons, (ii) non-relief of personnel by DDOs, (iii) non-allocation of batches due to vacancies in the AWTCs and (iv) suspension of training programme at one of the training centres due to administrative reasons and stated that efforts were being made to complete the training schedule.

**There were shortfalls in trainings to functional officers and staff**

## **Redressal of grievances**

### **2.3.32 Non formation of grievance redressal Committee**

**District level grievance redressal committees have not been formed**

As provided in ICDS guidelines, State Government directed (June 2001) that district level grievance redressal committees having representatives of AWWs/ AWHs to solve the grievances and day-to-day problems of AWWs/ AWHs be constituted. The committee was to hold meetings every quarter and a reasonable time frame was to be set up for disposal of complaints. However, no such committee was constituted till April 2011.

During Exit Conference (January 2012) Government stated that such committees were constituted at the district level and two meetings were held (May, November 2011) by DPO, Surat. However, minutes of the meetings were not available with the nodal department.

### **2.3.33 Follow-up action on complaints**

The Director had received 353 complaints (2006-12) from AWWs/AWHs/ MLAs on various subjects. However, the Director had not maintained any control register to monitor follow up action. As such, audit could not ascertain the status of the complaints.

Test check of 116 complaint files revealed that out of the 55 complaints on mental torture, only six were disposed of and rest of the 49 cases were pending with the respective District Development Officers (DDOs). Similarly, 42 out of 51 and six out of 10 complaints regarding corruption and quality of food respectively were pending with DDOs (March 2012). This indicated that action taken was inadequate for addressing reported irregularities.

The Director stated (January 2012) that no such control registers were required to be maintained in his office. The reply of the Director was not acceptable in view of the large number of unattended complaint cases.

The Government stated (September 2012) that complaint register had since been maintained in their office.

### **2.3.34 Monitoring and Evaluation**

- The Co-ordination Committees (involving several departments like Health and Family Welfare, Social Welfare, etc.) under the scheme were required to meet monthly at the project and the district level and quarterly at the State level. However, in 32 ICDS projects and eight districts test checked, project/district coordination committees were not formed.
- The GOI guidelines (October 2010) stipulated field visits by CDPO and Supervisor at the rate of 20 *per cent* and 50 *per cent* AWCs respectively under their jurisdiction. Shortfalls up to 52 *per cent* (Panchmahals) and 50 *per cent* (Jamnagar) in visits of CDPOs and Supervisors respectively were noticed during 2007-12.

- For effective supervision of SNP, officers of the State Nodal Department were required to make surprise visit to AWCs. As against the target of 380 AWCs to be visited, officers of the State Nodal Department conducted 83 visits between August 2010 and March 2012.
- For health related services, State Level Coordination Committee (SLCC) meetings were required to be held. Audit observed that SLCC meetings were not held by the State Nodal Department. However, ICDS officers participated in the meetings held by the Director of NRHM. The Government stated (September 2012) that the Gujarat State Nutrition Mission has been launched as an umbrella programme and that many meetings were held in which representatives from both the departments participated.
- To ensure that all the children of AWCs enrolled in formal education, coordination between AWCs and the local primary school was necessary. Though State level details of the number of PSE children, who actually enrolled in formal education were available for the State as a whole, no data on the number of children eligible to enroll in formal education and the number of children joining schools, was maintained at district level.
- Audit observed improper maintenance of stock registers with unattested corrections, blank columns, pencil entries and unattested overwriting. Summary of beneficiaries registered, actually benefited and closing stock of medicines was not prepared. Due to blank columns in the stock registers, stock consumed could not be verified with respect to the number of beneficiaries.
- Half Yearly and Annual Progress Reports were not prepared by ICDS functionaries. In the absence of reports, performance of the department could not be assessed.

### 2.3.35 Best practices

Despite constraints, State Government took certain good initiatives

Although coverage of ICDS increased in the last five years due to universalisation, the department could not provide adequate and trained manpower. However, the State Government could achieve following despite manpower constraints –

- Provision of seasonal fruits twice in a week to children of AWCs;
- Provision of a pair of uniform (sari, blouse) to AWWs and AWHs;
- Over and above the honorarium of ₹2,200 and ₹1,200 for AWWs and AWHs respectively provided by GOI, State Government sanctioned increment of ₹500/₹250 (October 2007) and ₹1,000/₹500 (May 2010) to AWWs/AWHs;

- Introduced (2007-08) Mata Yashoda Award consisting of various citations and State Level Cash Awards of ₹51,000/₹31,000 for best AWWs/AWHs for exemplary work;
- Sanction of ₹200 per month per Anganwadi (2009-10) towards electricity bills;
- Provision of two LPG cylinders, stoves, idli maker to 49,926 AWCs at a cost of ₹33.40 crore for a pollution free environment in the AWCs; and
- Continuation of Balika Samrudhi Yojana for the benefit of girls, which was discontinued by GOI in 2006-07.

### **2.3.36 Conclusion**

Efforts made to plan and open the required number of AWCs were found to be deficient which deprived of large portion of population from the benefits of ICDS. The proposal for additional projects based on revised population criteria was not forwarded to GOI by the State Government. Basic facilities of building, safe drinking water and toilets were inadequate in existing AWCs. Construction of new AWCs was slow. All the enrolled beneficiaries were not covered under the Supplementary Nutrition Programme. Availability of essential medical kits in AWCs and proper implementation of immunization programme was not ensured. Pre-school education of the children of AWCs was not ensured. Shortage in CDPO/ ACDPO and supervisor cadres and shortfall in field visits by CDPOs and Supervisors was also noticed.

### **2.3.37 Recommendations**

- Planning process of new AWCs, such as timely submission of proposals, etc. may be ensured;
- Basic facilities in the AWCs may be provided and construction of new AWCs expedited;
- Supplementary nutrition to all enrolled beneficiaries may be ensured to tackle the issue of malnourishment and underweight among children;
- Essential Medical Kits may be supplied in accordance with periodicity; and
- Vacancies in CDPO/ ACDPO and supervisor cadres may be filled in and monitoring mechanism strengthened.