

Chapter 4

Input management

The SAP 2008 laid emphasis on management of various inputs like seed, fertiliser which were vital for development of agriculture in the State

4.1 Seed development, storage and distribution facilities

Seed is one of the most important inputs that play a key role in enhancing agricultural productivity. SAP 2008 envisaged enhancing seed replacement rate, making available quality seeds, promoting hybrid seeds, seed treatment, processing and storage to boost agricultural production. Scrutiny of records revealed following deficiencies.

4.1.1 Low Seed Replacement Rate

Seed replacement rate (SRR) is the percentage of area of crop in which certified/ improved quality seeds was used in a given crop season. As low seed replacement rate was one of the identified factors for low productivity and production in the State, the SAP 2008 as well as Annual Action Plans gave much emphasis on enhancing the SRR. The SRR of paddy which was 6.4 *per cent* in 2006-07 was targeted to be enhanced to 25 *per cent* by the end of Eleventh Plan. As per record of Department (Odisha Agriculture Statistics 2010-11), SRR of paddy increased to 20.64 *per cent* by 2010-11 which indicated a positive trend, though it still remained below the targeted 25 *per cent*. We further noticed that SRR of non-paddy crops like *Arhar*, *Urd*, *Moong*, *Niger* and *Ragi* in the State remained below five *per cent* during 2009-10 in the absence of any target set for SRR under SAP 2008 or by the CCO.

Some of the reasons for non-achievement of the targeted SRR were found to be non-supply of adequate quantity of seeds in time, sale of substandard seeds to farmers and shortage of extension staff as discussed by us in subsequent paragraphs/chapters.

The Principal Secretary during discussion in the exit conference stated (November 2011) that SRR of non-paddy crop was less and was around five *per cent* due to short supply of seeds during 2006-11 which was also admitted by the Managing Director, Odisha State Seed Corporation (OSSC). The Principal Secretary added that the OSSC failed to procure seeds from either within or outside the State. However, specific strategy to address this issue of enhancing SRR taking care of the bottlenecks mentioned above was not spelt out clearly. All this was indicative of faulty planning as this problem should have been identified much earlier when strategies were being firmed up for operationalising the SAP 2008.

4.1.2 Seed multiplication in water logged, flood prone and saline areas

The State Level Sanctioning Committee (21 May 2010) under RKVY decided (21 May 2010) to formulate a project for multiplication of seeds which can be grown in flood prone area, water logged and saline areas of the State covering ten lakh hectares in *Kharif* 2011. However, we noticed that no follow up action was taken even after a lapse of more than a year.

The Director confirmed (January 2012) the fact and could not assign any reason for the same. Thus, the objective of SAP 2008 for special interventions in water logged and saline areas was not given priority.

4.1.3 Implementation of Seed Village Scheme

The seed village scheme of GoI launched in 2005-06 envisaged a model of participative production of certified seeds through interested group of farmers each possessing 0.20 hectares of land for cultivation of specified seed crop. The identified farmers were to be supplied certified⁹/foundation seeds¹⁰ at 50 per cent of the cost and imparted training on seed production and seed technology. Subsidy was also given for procurement of storage bins. The project area should receive the above assistance for a maximum period of two years so that the identified farmers get conversant. SAP 2008 also emphasised on intensifying the Seed Village Scheme for participative production of certified seeds. The scheme was executed by the Director of Agriculture through Odisha State Seeds Corporation (OSSC). The quality seeds produced in the scheme were to be procured by the OSSC and supplied to farmers.

Scrutiny of records of the Director and the OSSC revealed that during 2006-11, ₹ 13.45 crore received from Government of India for implementation of the scheme was fully utilised during the period. Against the target of covering 62760 acres under the scheme involving 3.14 lakh farmers, 67316 acres (107 per cent) were covered involving 3.37 lakh farmers; the achievement being higher than the target. During 2007-11, 99655.94 quintals of certified seeds and 817 quintals of foundation seeds were produced. The scheme was left to be monitored by the OSSC. The Director did not fix any norm or target for production of certified seeds in these areas. Thus, Director/CCO did not have an effective monitoring mechanism for deriving optimum benefit out of the implementation of the scheme.

In two (Dhenkanal and Sundargarh) out of seven DDAs, test checked in audit, we noticed that during 2007-11 the OSSC did not facilitate certification and procurement of the 12756 quintal of paddy, 1285 quintal of groundnut seeds and 1435 quintal of *Biri* seeds despite deposit of registration fee of ₹ 1.63 lakh by the farmers on the plea of staff shortage. As a result, the farmers were deprived of the facility of certification as well as purchase of certified seeds produced by them by the OSSC as envisaged under the programme which would have significantly contributed to building ownership and partnership for this scheme by the farmers.

The CCO-cum-Principal Secretary admitted (November 2011) that while OSSC failed to procure seeds timely from outside the State, it also failed to procure these within the State even though the same was available with farmers and assured to look into the matter. This indicated lack of focussed attention of the CCO on implementation of the scheme by the OSSC.

⁹ Certified seeds are those seeds whose qualities like purity, germination capacity etc. are certified by the certifying agencies in the state and the centre.

¹⁰ Foundation seeds are those which are made out of breeder seeds produced by the research institutions at the state and centre.

4.1.4 Seed certification and testing facility not operationalised in all districts

SAP 2008 and Annual Action Plans provided for the setting up more Seed Testing Laboratories in the State in addition to eight Seed Certification Offices functioning in the State. In the SAP 2008, it was planned to set up five more Seed Certification Offices with seed testing laboratories to cater to the needs of all districts of the State.

We noticed that during 2009-10, as sanctioned by the SLSC, the CCO-cum-Principal Secretary released RKVY funds of ₹ 4.15 crore in favour of Odisha State Seed and Organic Products Certification Agency for construction of buildings for three seed testing laboratories (Balasore, Badachana and Bhawanipatna) and four seed certification offices (Baripada, Bolangir, Rangeilunda and Jeypore). While only one seed certification office at Baripada started functioning in December 2010; another building at Balasore was completed in August 2011 but was not operational due to non-installation of electrical connection. Buildings in the remaining cases were at various stages of construction (October 2011). The intended objective of seed testing in these districts remained unachieved.

4.1.5 Availability of seed processing facility

The SAP 2008 envisaged establishing seed processing plants along with godowns of adequate capacity in each district and adequate numbers of mobile seed processing plants were to be procured to provide processing facility to seed villages. There were altogether 106 registered seed processing plants under the Government and private sector in the State before launching of SAP 2008 and 52 such plants were registered thereafter. However, no such plants were registered in two districts of Boudh and Phulbani as of 2010-11.

During 2007-08, the SLSC sanctioned RKVY funds of ₹ 1.80 crore for establishment of three seed processing plants (Bolangir, Boudh and Nawarangpur). Although the construction of plants were completed (July 2011), these were not commissioned (January 2012) due to non-installation of electricity connection. However, Phulbani district continued to remain ignored (March 2011).

In the exit conference, we pointed out that when the farmers were being encouraged to produce seeds, OSSC should have evolved some system for timely processing and purchase of seeds from farmers. The Managing Director (MD), OSSC stated (November 2011) that seed processing facility in the State was grossly inadequate. The CCO-cum-Principal Secretary stated that when seed village scheme was promoted and there was surplus seed production under the scheme, these seeds could have been purchased from farmers and sold to other States. He agreed that some fine-tuning was necessary in this regard. This indicated that the CCO did not effectively monitor activities of OSSC.

4.1.6 Inadequate seed preservation facility / storage

Availability of proper storage for seed is crucial to maintain the quality of seed. The SAP 2008 required production of six lakh MT of certified seeds to achieve the SRR of 25 per cent for paddy by 31 March 2012. Against this requirement, storage facility available with the OSSC was only 0.90 lakh MT (15 per cent) as of November 2011. During exit conference (November 2011) the Managing Director, OSSC stated that additional storage facility for another three lakh MT

seeds were being taken up under RKVY and added that even after its completion, there would be a net shortage of storage capacity of 2.1 lakh MT (33.3 *per cent*). No plan existed to meet the gap in requirement of storage capacity vis-à-vis targeted production of certified seeds.

During 2006-11, 37 seed storage godowns of 1000 MT capacity each were targeted for construction for which the Director placed (2006-11) ₹ 13.91 crore¹¹ with the OSSC. Out of the above, ₹ 8.33 crore had already been utilised but only 17 godowns were completed and put to use as of January 2012. While construction of three godowns¹² with estimated cost of ₹ 99.81 lakh was not started due to non-availability of land in one case and non-finalisation of contract in other two cases, remaining 17¹³ were under construction for over one to five years. The Managing Director, OSSC attributed (September 2011) the slow progress to low pace of construction by contractors (15 projects), cancellation of contract in one case and non-availability of land in four cases.

We are of the view that these factors, being under the control of the Department, were indicative of poor planning and monitoring of these works by the Director and the CCO-cum-Principal Secretary. Even if the farmers were to produce more quantities of certified seeds under the seed village scheme, they would not be able to store it because the OSSC would not be able to provide them adequate storage space. It is then ironical that the same OSSC was promoting the Seed Village Scheme by giving subsidy when it knew that it did not have storage capacity to purchase and store what is produced by these farmers.

4.1.7 Seed sales centres not opened in every Gram Panchayat

Availability of seed throughout the State was an important strategy in the SAP 2008 which targeted opening up of seed sale centres in each of the 6234 Gram Panchayats (GPs) of the State through a network of private seed dealers. However, it was noticed from the records OSSC that as of May 2011, sale centres were opened only in 1625 GPs (26 *per cent*) through 830 private dealers. In 12 out of 32 test checked agricultural districts, only 315 sale centres were available for 1503 GPs, the shortfall being 79 *per cent*. The remaining DDOs could not provide information on the issue, though asked for in Audit (April-July 2011).

The Managing Director (MD), OSSC attributed (May 2011) the shortfall to non-lucrative dealers margin, cumbersome documentation process and lack of godown facility at dealers' sale points. On the steps taken to tide over the situation, the MD stated (January 2012) that the seed sale centers had increased to 2254 in the State and the dealers' margin was approved by the Government on recommendation of State Pricing Committee. But, no records could be

¹¹ 2006-07: ₹ 50 lakh; 2007-08: ₹ 6.41 crore; 2008-09: ₹ 3.83 crore; 2009-10: ₹ 1.24 crore and 2010-11: ₹ 1.93 crore

¹² Parlakhemundi (two) and Sakhigopal

¹³ Anugul, Baripada, Berhampur, Bhadrak, Bhawanipatna, Jagatsinghpur, Jeypore, Jharsuguda I & II, Keonjhar, Khurdha, Nayagarh, Phulbani, Sundargarh, Kendrapada I & II and, Nuapada

shown to audit indicating that these bottlenecks had been brought to the notice of CCO-cum-Principal Secretary by the MD, OSSC.

It was brought to the notice of the CCO by audit in November 2011. Reply was awaited (July 2012).

4.2 Non-availability of quality seeds

As per the SAP 2008, quality (certified) seeds were to be supplied to the farmers at subsidised rates through the sale centres across the State as a strategy towards enhancing agricultural production. Based on the requirements projected by the range DDAs, the Director placed indent on OSSC, who after procuring the same mainly from outside sources, supplied them to the range DDAs at the rate approved by the Government. As per the standing instructions of the Director, the DDAs were to take the samples of seeds on day of receipt and send for testing in the State Seeds Testing Laboratory (SSTL), which in turn was to furnish the results of purity and germination viability within 15 days. The seeds found sub-standard were to be returned to the OSSC. It was emphasised that in no case should substandard seeds be sold to farmers. During 2006-11, the Director spent ₹ 65.35 crore towards seed-subsidy to the farmers.

We noticed that during the period, quality seeds were not supplied to farmers in time due to failure of OSSC in procuring certified seeds from outside suppliers even though certified seeds produced by farmers under Seed Village Scheme remained un-procured as discussed earlier. However, audit scrutiny revealed following irregularities and deficiencies.

4.2.1 Short supply of quality seeds

During 2006-11, the OSSC supplied only 153013 MT (87 per cent) of paddy seeds though the Director placed indent for supply of 176003 MT resulting in short supply by 22990 MT (13 per cent). Similarly, 3338 MT of pulse seeds (42 per cent) and 20153 MT of oil seeds (37 per cent) could not also be supplied by the Corporation during the 2006-11 as indicated in the Table 4 below:

Table 4: Indent and supply of seeds during 2006-11 (in MT)

Year	Paddy seeds			Pulse seeds			Oilseed		
	Indent	Supply	Shortfall	Indent	Supply	Shortfall	Indent	Supply	Shortfall
2006-07	16608	14943 (90)	1665	789	699 (89)	90	8153	1641 (20)	6512
2007-08	19535	20005 (102)	(-) 470	621	489 (79)	132	9895	2585 (26)	7310
2008-09	37403	30458 (81)	6945	1613	937 (58)	676	12485	8816 (71)	3669
2009-10	51722	43636 (84)	8086	2757	1004 (36)	1753	13020	11038 (85)	1982
2010-11	50735	43971 (87)	6764	2082	1395 (67)	687	11467	10787 (94)	680
Total	176003	153013 (87)	22990	7862	4524 (58)	3338	55020	34867 (63)	20153

(Figures in parentheses represent percentage achievement against indented quantity)

As may be seen from the table, supply of pulses seeds declined from 89 per cent of indent in 2006-07 to 36 per cent in 2009-10 and then increased to 67 per cent in 2010-11. However, supply of oilseeds considerably increased from 20 per cent in 2006-07 to 94 per cent in 2010-11.

The MD, OSSC stated (November 2011) that this was due to non-supply of seeds in time by suppliers of other States. He added that the gap between the

indent and supply was due to return of unsold stock to the OSSC. However, documentary evidence in support of lifting of any unsold stock by the OSSC from field DDAs and the reasons thereof could not be shown to Audit. Even if reply of MD, OSSC is considered, it indicated that the demand for seeds was not being assessed realistically by the Director at the State level and the DAOs at the district/ block level. In fact, non-lifting of seeds from OSSC by DDAs after these were procured by the OSSC resulted in wasteful expenditure and loss to OSSC and the Government.

The short supply of seeds contributed to shortfall in production of rice by 67.19 lakh MT, pulses by 3.15 lakh MT and oil seeds by 10.51 lakh MT against the targeted production of 420.68 lakh MT, 50.57 lakh MT and 42.15 lakh MT respectively during 2006-11.

4.2.2 Sale of sub-standard seeds

We noticed that in four (Puri, Sambalpur, Dhenkanal and Sundargarh) out of seven test checked DDAs, seeds of paddy, groundnut, mustard, *Biri(Urd)*, *Mung* and wheat weighing 6345.81 quintal supplied by OSSC during 2009-11 valued at ₹ 1.40 crore were sold by these DDAs to farmers before receipt of the test results. The seed samples were subsequently found to be of sub-standard quality by the State Seed Testing Laboratory (SSTL) with germination percentage varying between zero to 75 per cent against the prescribed norm of germination¹⁴

It was noticed that while despatch of samples for testing by the DDAs to SSTL took up to 99 days from the date of receipt, thereafter receipt of test results took up to 42 days. The above sale included sale of 110.70 quintal of paddy seeds to farmers during *Kharif* 2009¹⁵ by DDA, Sambalpur, which were received by the DDA on 23/24 May 2009. However, the samples were sent by him to SSTL on 17 September 2009 by which time the entire lot had already been sold to the farmers and sowing of the seeds was over. Besides, following instances of procurement and distribution of substandard seeds also came to our notice during audit:

- In Puri district 780 farmers were paid (March 2011) compensation of ₹ 25.16 lakh when sale of such sub-standard seeds came to notice of Department through farmers' complaint and media reports.
- Instructions (August 2010) of the Agriculture Minister to blacklist a central Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) for supply of substandard seeds was over looked. Contrary to the above instruction, OSSC procured different kinds of seeds worth ₹25.75 crore during *Kharif* 2011 from the same PSU indicating blatant disregard of instruction of the Agriculture Minister.

¹⁴ Rice: 80 per cent, Wheat : 85 per cent, Mustard : 85 per cent, Groundnut : 70 per cent, Biri (Urd) : 65 per cent, Mung : 75 per cent

¹⁵ *Kharif* season begins from the onset of the south-west monsoon and ends in September.

- In Balasore District, groundnut seeds of TAG 24 variety weighing 30.65 quintals costing ₹ 1.39 lakh which were supplied by OSSC to the farmers during 2009-10 (*Rabi* season) were found to be substandard as reported by SSTL. However, the farmers were not compensated (May 2011) even after a committee of Joint Directors recommended (June 2010) the same.

The Director stated (May 2011) that in the case of compensation to be paid to farmers in Balasore district the farmers' claim would be sent to the OSSC for making payment. The fact remained that despite deductions made by the Director from the bills of the OSSC on account of supply of substandard seeds over the years, the OSSC did not take any initiative in the matter. This indicated that the action of the CCO was grossly inadequate, as the larger issue of need of supply of quality seeds to farmers was not adequately addressed affecting the farmers adversely.

4.2.3 Sale of subsidised seeds without permits

To ensure the benefit of subsidised seeds reach the intended farmer, the Director instructed (June 2009) the Range DDAs to make arrangements for issuing permits to such farmers by the Village Agriculture Workers / Agriculture Overseer of the Blocks against which the sale centres were to sell seeds to the farmers.

Scrutiny of records of seven DDAs revealed that in three DDAs (Puri, Sambalpur and Sundargarh) sale of subsidised paddy, groundnut, maize seeds weighing 5703.56 MT¹⁶ valued ₹ 8.55 crore were effected during 2010-11 (*Kharif* and *Rabi*) through the sale centres without ensuring sales to the farmers who had been issued with the required permits. In reply, the DDAs promised to follow the instructions in future.

The Director stated (November 2011) that though instructions were issued for sale of subsidised seeds by issue of permits only, the seeds were sold to the bonafide farmers by way of personal identification through Departmental staff/Panchayati Raj Institution members maintaining sale registers at sale centre level due to otherwise shortage of extension staff and limited time period for sale of these seeds.

The reply was not tenable as in such cases identification of bonafide farmers were left to the discretion of the officials manning the sale points/centres. Besides, shortage of extension staff and seasonal sale was known to the CCO/Director much before the adoption of the strategy of issuing permits. Thus, the CCO/Director followed an incoherent, unplanned and ad-hoc strategy while operationalising the SAP. Reply of CCO-cum-Principal Secretary was awaited (July 2012).

¹⁶ Puri : ₹ 2.19 crore (paddy and Ground 732.38 MT), Sundargarh : ₹ 99 lakh (794.40 MT variety of seeds), Sambalpur : ₹5.37 crore (4176.78 MT of variety seeds).

4.3 Integrated nutrient management

As per the SAP 2008, chemical fertilisers as well as organic manures are to be used adequately and in a balanced manner to increase agricultural production in the State. As the fertiliser consumption was very low at 53 kilogram per hectare on an average in the State against the national average of more than 100 kilogram per hectare, the SAP 2008 envisaged promotion of ‘Integrated Nutrient Management’ through suitable programmes and incentives. Our review of this programme revealed the following.

4.3.1 Non-operationalisation of soil testing laboratories

As enhancement of soil health regime is crucial for raising productivity, the Department decided to set up more Soil Testing Laboratories (STLs) in the State and to make soil-testing facility available in all the blocks. The Department sanctioned setting up of 16 STLs and released ₹ 6.45 crore under RKVY (10: ₹ four crore during 2010-11) and State Plan (6: ₹ 2.45 crore during 2006-11). Out of this, ₹ 3.58 crore (RKVY: ₹ 1.13 crore and State Plan: ₹ 2.45 crore) (55 per cent) had been utilised as of August 2011 and four STL buildings were completed while remaining 12 were at various stages of completion. Though four laboratory buildings (Anugul, Keonjhar, Nuapada and Sonepur) were completed and instruments procured, none of these was made operational as of October 2011 due to lack of manpower.


In reply, the Director stated (September 2011) that proposal for engagement of Agriculture Officers submitted (March 2011) to the CCO-cum-Principal Secretary was under consideration of the Government. The shortage of manpower, though a constraint, was a pre-existing condition which was not properly assessed and factored in while formulating the SAP 2008 and even while operationalising the same later. In the absence of a long-term perspective plan, this crucial aspect also remained unflagged and unattended. The AAPs also failed to take this issue into account.

The non-achievement of targets in most of the areas/interventions was attributed by the Director to shortage of staff. The CCO-cum-Principal Secretary failed to address the issue of staff shortage successfully although this problem was endemic in the Department.

4.3.2 Low fertiliser consumption

We noticed that during 2006-11, despite annual upward trend in the average consumption of fertiliser per hectare during *Kharif* in the State from 45.92 kilogram/hectare to 63.58 kilogram/hectare, it remained far below the national average of 112 to 135 kilogram / hectare during the period as depicted in the chart.

It was seen that though fertilisers like Urea, Muriate of Potash (MOP), Di Ammonium Phosphate (DAP) and complex fertilisers were being indented by the State from GoI, there was short lifting against the allocation by GoI of these fertilisers by 2.83 lakh MT (16.17 per cent) during *Kharif* 2009 and 2010¹⁷ against total allocation of 17.52 lakh MT by the GoI. Director stated (February 2012) that the supply was affected due to transport problem, inadequate storage space/railway rake points, labour problem and international market situations.



We noticed that the problems of short supply of fertilisers, shortage of rakes, less supply of MOP, non-provisioning for a buffer stock of fertilisers were repeatedly discussed in various fora like monthly review meetings of fertiliser manufacturers (16 and 20 May 2009), Crop Weather Group meetings (August 2010/2011) & fertiliser review meeting (21 June 2011). Despite the above, there was short supply against demand and allocation leading to lower consumption of fertiliser in the State. This indicated that effective steps were not taken to address the perennial problem of low consumption of fertilisers due to short supply which resulted in adverse impact on the production level as well as productivity of rice, pulses and oilseeds in the State.

The Principal Secretary stated (November 2011) that farmers were mainly using NPK fertiliser thereby depleting the soil regime though some of them also adopted traditional agriculture practices. We, therefore, view that a lot remained to be done by the Department in motivating the farmers to adopt a balanced micro nutrient and heavy integrated nutrient management approach to their agriculture by significantly augmenting the extension activity which, currently, was woefully deficient with very limited penetration of Agro Service Centres (ASCs) and huge shortages in Village Agriculture Workers as discussed in subsequent chapters.

4.3.3 Inefficient organic farming led to loss of central assistance

With a view to restoring soil health and fertility and preventing depletion of natural resource base, the GoI sanctioned (February 2008) ₹ 1.50 crore under the National Programme on Organic Farming (NPOF) and released (March 2008) in the first phase ₹ 37.57 lakh for establishment of 15 vermi-hatcheries, development of data base, market information centre, field demonstration of organic input, exposure visit of farmers and officials etc. Subsequent release of funds by GoI under the scheme was dependent on the submission of utilisation certificate and progress report in implementation of the projects. The State Bio-Chemist was the nodal officer for implementation of the scheme in the State.

¹⁷ The information on quantity of allocation made by GoI for *Kharif* (2007 and 2008)) and *Rabi* (2008) was not available with the Director of Agriculture.

Scrutiny of the records of State Bio-Chemist revealed that the Director allotted funds to the Bio Chemist in March 2008 but did not stipulate any period for implementation of the project. The Bio Chemist utilised only ₹ 32.63 lakh in 2008-09 for establishment of the 15 vermi-hatcheries and the Director submitted the utilisation certificate to the State Government in November 2010. No physical verification report was sent to the GoI (May 2011). In the meanwhile, the scheme was discontinued from 2009-10 due to which the Department had refunded (November 2010) unutilised amount of ₹ 4.94 lakh to GoI. Thus, due to the Director's failure to stipulate implementation period and subsequent failure to monitor the implementation and submission of UC/physical verification report, the Department lost opportunity of getting further central assistance of ₹ 1.12 crore.

The State Biochemist attributed (May 2011) the reason to delayed collection of information from the field executing agencies on implementation of the programme indicating failure of operational control system in the Department. However, no action was taken against the concerned executing agencies.

4.3.4 Failure to conduct evaluation study

The State Level Sanctioning Committee (SLSC) during 2007-11 sanctioned ₹ 5.14 crore under RKVY, for promotion of organic farming through establishment of 343 vermi-hatcheries at block level and 10350 vermi-compost units at block and village levels to be implemented by the State Bio-Chemist through the field Project Directors of Agriculture Technology Management Agencies (ATMA), DAOs and AAOs in the farmers' fields. The farmers were to be paid subsidy.

Scrutiny of records of the State Bio-Chemist revealed that the projects were executed utilising the full amount and subsidy was paid to the beneficiary farmers as per approved cost norms; utilisation certificates were also submitted to the Department. However, information on the number of units actually established, status of their functioning and production reports were not available with him. In the SLSC meetings held on May 2010, decision was taken for undertaking a quick evaluation study on functioning and utilisation of the vermi-compost units. Accordingly, the Department requested (November 2010) Odisha University of Agriculture and Technology (OUAT) to take up a study. However, the intended evaluation study report was awaited from OUAT as of March 2012 as complete list of beneficiaries was not made available by the Director to OUAT. Thus, the Director failed to monitor the establishment of the vermin-hatchery and compost units indicating slack supervisory controls over his field formations. Besides, the expected outcome of enhancing soil fertility, crop growth and yield as envisaged in the approved project proposals by implementing vermi-hatchery and vermi-compost units still remained unassessed (March 2012).