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# Executive summary

## 1 Context

Starting 13 May 2008 with Jaipur, the Country witnessed a spate of terrorist attacks every alternate month: 26 July, Ahmedabad; 13 September, Delhi; and 26 November, Mumbai. The immediate fallout of these attacks has been the phenomenal economic and social costs. While the country is set to recover from these attacks, it points to the vulnerability of police forces in dealing with these emerging challenges and the crying need to

In early recognition of these vulnerabilities, in February 2001 itself, Government of India had circulated a modified scheme captioned “Modernisation of Police Force” to all the States and suggested a graded reform path to match the individual policing needs as guided by their risk exposure levels. Five years after the launching of the Modernisation of Police Force Scheme, Comptroller & Auditor General considered it an opportune time to evaluate the working of the scheme and selectively commissioned ‘performance audit’ reviews covering 11 general category States and 5 special category States (including Nagaland on manpower management). As per the established procedure, results of

audit were presented to the respective States’ Legislature. Except for Kerala and Manipur, none of the States had discussed these reports in their Public Accounts Committees. Reports on Assam, Tripura and Uttarakhand covering a five-year period ending March 2008 are under submission to their Legislatures and therefore not yet ready for placing in the public domain. State-wise audit coverage is at **Annex A**.

## 2 The report

This report synthesises the 16 Performance Audit reviews published as part of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s reports\* on the evaluation of the Government of India sponsored Non-plan scheme of “Modernisation of the State Police Force.” Under the scheme, Ministry of Home Affairs pledges a pre-determined Central share to fund State Governments’ police upgradation and Modernisation programme through the following components:

- **Enhancing Mobility** –purchase of new vehicles (including bullet proof vehicles and mine proof vehicles) and replacement of old vehicles

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\*these reports are also available on the CAG’s website, [www.cag.gov.in](http://www.cag.gov.in)



- **Weaponry** – to meet the gap between authorized scale and existing holding of arms
- Improvement in the **communication system**
- **Training** – including expansion of buildings and enhancement of other infrastructure facilities for training
- **Forensic Science Laboratory/ Finger Print Bureau** - facilities
- Investigation aids and **equipments** (including intelligence gathering)
- **Computer** - and other office equipments
- Construction and repair of **buildings** - police stations/chowkies/ lines, police control room and erection of perimeter security and houses for the police personnel

The report consists of three main parts: an introduction, summary of audit findings and conclusions and recommendations emerging from the detailed audit findings. It addresses the component-wise performance of the scheme. For better appreciation of all the 16 Performance Audit reviews are published as a set and shown as **Annex D**.

### **3 Constraints and achievements**

Bureau of Police Research and Development is an established Research and Development organisation and is well positioned to guide a policy of Modernisation of the police force in India. It sets norms and standards for each aspect of the policing. The role of Ministry of Home Affairs is to drive the police reform programme and maintain these standards uniformly across the country. As a major funding agency and guardian of

internal security, Ministry of Home Affairs is the principal stake holder in

In practice, however, there has been a perceptible gap in the standards and expectations between the Centre and the States. The functioning of apex body- the State Level Empowered Committee is a case in point. There is hardly any policy direction emanating from the business transacted by the State Level Empowered Committees. The State Level Empowered Committees had in fact, by and large, reduced themselves to discharging the role of a purchase committee. Other constraints in Modernisation of police force included: lack of coordination between revenue and police departments in making the land available for police housing and infrastructure creation, sub-optimal levels of manpower position, lack of training in handling sophisticated technology, inadequate preparation to absorb the new technology and large scale diversion of newly acquired vehicles meant for basic policing to VIP escorts and failure to transfer the sophisticated weaponry to police stations. Although there is no success story to share in any of the States studied, almost all States had benefited from the Ministry of Home Affairs' enhanced funding programme.

### **4 Funding**

Compared with the social and economic costs involved in the recovery phase, particularly in the aftermath of terror strikes, Government of India's non-plan scheme with an annual outlay of Rs. 2000 crore (including States' contribution) for all the States was modest but a good beginning. The funding pattern of the scheme defines cost sharing between

Government of India and the States in the ratio of 50:50 up to 2002-03. This arrangement was not found sustainable as most State Governments could not contribute their matching 50 per cent share. This made Government of India revise their funding arrangement in October 2003. Consequently, the States were then divided into three categories viz. A, B 1 and B 2 with 100 per cent, 75 per cent and 60 per cent respectively as Central share. In September 2005, these States were re-grouped into two categories: Category A- including seven North-Eastern States and Jammu and Kashmir, and Category B with 19 general category States and Sikkim. Central support to the Category A States is 100 per cent as against 75 per cent support to category B States. Category- wise list of States covered in audit is at **Annex B**.

Experience of 16 States in utilisation of funds is not very promising as there were significant shortfalls in relative cost- sharing and wide gaps in actual expenditure against plan outlays (**Annex C**). The States were caught up in a vicious circle of delay in finalisation of Annual Action Plans causing delayed release of funds and ultimately leading to failure in utilising them. Some States had adopted a short cut method of locking them up in Personal Deposit account to show these amounts as expenditure which did not benefit the concerned State in general or the programme in particular.

## 5 Planning

Modernisation of Police Force scheme requires every State to draw up a long-term Perspective Plan and align it with the annual spending programme through their Annual

Action Plans. There could not have been a better mechanism to monitor the fund flow or to measure the effectiveness of the scheme without this. Far from having it in place, States have adopted an adhoc approach and defaulted in timely submission of the plans to Ministry affecting the releases. Some States have even gone to the extent of showing their non-plan expenditure on salaries, etc. as States' share of Modernisation of Police Force Scheme. Such an approach may have helped release of Government of India share in the short run but in effect reduced the total outlay and hindered their own Modernisation programme.

## 6 Mobility

Modernisation of Police Force scheme places great emphasis on mobility of police forces as it recognises the principle that the increased mobility in field policing reduces the response time and enhances efficiency and effectiveness. A major share of expenditure was thus allocated to procurement of vehicles primarily for field policing. However, the practice as revealed in audit presented a different scenario. A large number of vehicles meant for mobility were seen to have replaced old ones while some other vehicles were diverted to VIP escorts and a few remained in the parking lots for want of drivers.

## 7 Weaponry

Scale of weapons to be procured by each State is guided by the Bureau of Police Research and Development norms. Weapons procurement data on each State studied in audit revealed that sophisticated weapons

like AK 47, 7.62mm SLR, 5.56mm, INSAS rifle, etc. were far below the States' requirements. As a result, police stations continued to depend on outdated weapons. Instances of issue of expired ammunition also figured in the reports. In some cases these weapons were supplied to body guards of Superintendents of Police, etc. in violation of the Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines. Retention of sophisticated weapons in the armoury of police reserve is another regular feature. Delay in training was often cited as main reason for the stockpiling. In one State, women police stations were not supplied any weapons at all.

## 8 Communication System

Installation of Police Telecommunication Network equipment is considered vital to the police communication. Government of India directly procured and delivered the equipment to the States but installation and the selection of sites was left to the States. A large number of equipment in the select cases was found to be either incompatible due to hardware - software mismatch, or was inoperable due to wrong selection of clear sites. In a number of cases even the earmarked communication equipment supplied to district police headquarters was lying idle in stores. Some States like Andhra Pradesh felt that the Police Telecommunication Network equipment supplied to them is inferior to their own AP State Wide Area Network which has better connectivity and robustness.

## 9 Recommendations

Four main recommendations emerge from the performance evaluation of the 16 States reviewed in audit.

Chapter 3 of the report presents further details for the enabling agencies to act upon:

- i) The institutional mechanism to aid and direct Modernisation of Police Force policy and practice in the States should be made more effective. The State Level Empowered Committee should reorient itself from playing the role of purchase committee and actively involve in designing Perspective Plans, Annual Action Plans and in monitoring of the scheme.
- ii) Ministry of Home Affairs should establish a system to monitor the timely and appropriate use of funds sanctioned and released.
- iii) All States must ensure that procurement of Police Telecommunication Network and Forensic Science Laboratory/nt is immediately installed. Weapons procured should be immediately distributed amongst the targeted police stations.
- iv) All vacant posts in States must be filled up in a time bound manner so that the benefit of Modernisation of Police Force Scheme is derived optimally.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The Modernisation of Police Force scheme was launched by Government of India in 1969 for modernising the police force in the country to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. In February 2001, the scheme was modified with enhanced Central assistance for increasing the operational efficiency of the State police force. The major components covered in the scheme are: Mobility, Communication, Weaponry, Training, Police housing & building, Forensic Science and other infrastructure and Computerisation. Five years after the commencement of the scheme, Comptroller & Auditor General commissioned a series of Performance Audit reviews (Annex D) to measure the whole gamut of the functioning that the Modernisation of Police Force Scheme seeks to achieve. The Performance Audit review methodology is an internationally recognised auditing technique employed to independently assess any Government programme/scheme to measure its economy, efficiency and effectiveness. These Performance Audit reviews were published in various States' audit reports and were presented to the respective Legislatures. The audit was commissioned with the following broad objectives as to whether:

- The Perspective Plans and Annual Action Plans were designed and aligned in accordance with the Bureau of Police Research and Development norms.
- The fund flow was timely and adequate.
- The individual components of the scheme met the tests of economy and efficiency.
- The envisaged infrastructure upgrade was achieved to augment the operational efficiency of police forces.
- The communication equipment procured and installed aided better intelligence and investigation, and
- The forces were adequately trained and facilities for trainings created.



# Chapter 2

## Summary of audit findings

### 1 Planning

The Modernisation of Police Force Scheme requires every State to propose a Perspective Plan in 2000-01 and an Annual Action Plan to Ministry of Home Affairs by 15 May each year. The Annual Action Plans are to be first cleared by the State Level Empowered Committee before forwarding it to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Audit noticed that there was considerable delay in approval of the Annual Action Plans due to delayed submission to Ministry of Home Affairs as well as time taken by the Ministry of Home Affairs to clear the same. As a result, there was little time left to utilise the approved outlay in the same year. As the Perspective Plans were tentative, deviations from the Perspective Plans were rampant.

In **Andhra Pradesh**, due to delays in approval of Annual Action Plans, implementation of the scheme was delayed and only 13 to 82 per cent of funds were utilised in the same year. Government spent Rs. 31.37 crore on works not covered under Annual Action Plan and not approved by State Level Empowered Committee. [p30†](#)

In **Bihar**, there were persistent delays (2-9 months) in preparation of Annual Action Plan by police Headquarters. Due to delayed submission (by 17 months), Ministry of Home Affairs did not approve their Annual Action Plan for 2003-04. [p48](#)

In **Kerala**, submission of Annual Action Plans to the Ministry of Home Affairs was delayed up to seven months. Approval of the Annual Action Plans by the Ministry of Home Affairs was also delayed by up to five months. This resulted in insufficient time to spend scheme funds in the same year. [p84](#)

In **Maharashtra**, the Annual Action Plans did not flow from the perspective plan. The State submitted supplementary plans to Government of India in the month of March every year. This resulted in delays from 5 to 12 months in approval of plans by Ministry of Home Affairs. [p110](#)

In **Rajasthan**, Government did not adhere to the Perspective Plan in construction of buildings as their Annual Action Plans projected far

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† denotes page number

below the actual requirements. Even there was deviation from the approved Annual Action Plan. [p136](#)

In **West Bengal**, the Perspective Plan drawn up by the State Government included items not covered under the Scheme. Annual Action Plan for 2002-03 was not approved and no funds were released during the year. [p165](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh**, the perspective plan was submitted thrice during January to July 2001 which was incomplete. The approval of the revised Perspective Plan sent in September 2001 was not received from Government of India. There were deviations from the approved Annual Action Plans in procurement of security items and in construction works. [p174](#)

In **Manipur**, the Department did not make any efforts to obtain Government of India approval of the Perspective Plan for 2001-05. The Annual Plans deviated from the Perspective Plan due to changed priorities. [p192](#)

In **Meghalaya**, Government delayed submission of Annual Action Plan to Ministry of Home Affairs. The delays ranged upto three months. Ministry of Home Affairs also delayed approval. As the Plan was approved in the third quarter of the year, there was insufficient time to spend the scheme funds in the same year. [p212](#)

In **Mizoram**, the perspective plan was deficient as only 44 per cent of total expenditure was incurred on the priority areas viz. staff quarters, police stations and outposts, Forensic Science Laboratory, vehicles and upgradation of training college. [p233](#)

## **2 Financial Management**

Under utilisation of allocated funds had been a common feature that plagued almost all States covered in audit. This had obvious impact on the scheme's success and prolonged the gestation period. Percentage utilisation of total funds released for Modernisation of Police Force during the period covered in audit was between 69 and 100 in the general category States and 46 to 100 per cent in the Special Category States. However these figures dropped significantly in terms of percentage of total expenditure to the total approved outlay for Modernisation of Police Force Scheme. In general category States, the percentage varied between 28 and 86 while in the Special Category States, it fluctuated from 28 to 76. States attributed the shortfalls in utilisation to delays in release of funds by Ministry of Home Affairs. Delays were also noticed at Ministry of Home Affairs level as they took longer time to approve the Annual Action Plans submitted by the States. Some States had resorted to parking the scheme funds in various deposit accounts. Most States showed the funds advanced to construction

agencies as utilized to claim the subsequent installments from Ministry of Home Affairs.

In **Andhra Pradesh** (2002-07), the Government was deprived of Central assistance of Rs. 136.49 crore due to under-utilisation of funds released earlier. Scheme funds of Rs. 79.55 crore were parked in banks by the Police Housing Corporation and the interest earned (Rs. 2.56 crore) on the amounts was appropriated for other purposes. The Corporation submitted the Utilisation Certificates even for the unspent amounts. [p31](#)

In **Bihar** (2001-06), Government spent only Rs. 251 crore against total approved plan of Rs. 435 crore. Due to slow pace of spending, the State was deprived of Central share of Rs. 121 crore. [p47](#)

In **Jharkhand** (2000-04), Modernisation of Police Force funds advanced (Rs 61.76 crore) to the construction agencies and retained in Civil Deposit (Rs. 8.65 crore) were reported to Government of India as utilised. [p63](#)

In **Karnataka** (2002-07), there was under-utilisation of scheme funds during the same year due to late release of funds and the procedural delays. Scheme funds were spent on items not approved by Government of India. [p72](#)

In **Kerala** (2000-06), not more than 50 per cent of the approved outlay of a year was spent during the same year and the balances were carried over to the subsequent years. As a result, the items approved for 2000-01 were implemented upto 2005-06. A large part of the scheme funds advanced to the Kerala Police Housing Construction remained unspent (Rs 141 crore) and the interest earned on this amount was appropriated for other purpose. During 2002-06, reduced Central assistance put additional financial burden (Rs. 27.51 crore) on the State. [p85](#)

In **Madhya Pradesh** (2000-06), the State was deprived of Central assistance of Rs. 77.93 crore due to slow progress in scheme implementation. An inflated expenditure report by Rs. 159.42 crore helped the construction agency pocket the interest earned on the amount. The agency did not refund the unspent balance to the State. [p98](#)

In **Maharashtra** (2000-05), due to slow progress of the programme, State Government could not avail Government of India grant of Rs. 97.51 crore. Scheme funds of Rs. 183.90 crore deposited with PWD and Police Housing Corporation were treated as expenditure, of which Rs. 62 crore remained unspent as of October 2005. [p111](#)

In **Orissa** (2000-04), amount advanced (Rs 38.28 crore) to the construction agency was treated as expenditure and the Utilisation Certificates furnished to Government of India was inflated to that extent. During 2000-04, there was significant under-utilisation of funds under the major components viz. arms (70 per cent), computer (100 per cent), traffic control equipment (85 per cent) and upgradation of finger print bureau (100 per cent). [p126](#)



In **Rajasthan** (2002-07), under-utilisation of scheme funds ranged from 24 and 40 per cent. Due to slow spending, the State was deprived of Central grant of Rs. 154.22 crore. State Government did not release its share during 2002-07. [p137](#)

In **Uttar Pradesh** (2000-05), out of total expenditure of Rs. 810 crore, 39 per cent (Rs.315 crore) remained unutilised as they were parked in Personal Ledger account (Rs. 52 crore) and with construction agencies (Rs. 263 crore). Rs. 35.30 crore was spent on items not approved by Ministry of Home Affairs. [p155](#)

In **West Bengal** (2000-05), total approved outlay for 2000-05 was Rs 392.20 crore. During 2003-05, only Rs. 1.21 crore was released by Government of India against the approved outlay of Rs. 181.72 crore due to under utilisation of funds released earlier; expenditure was Rs. 7.05 crore. State Government did not release its share during 2000-05. Shortfall in expenditure against approved outlay under 'Intelligence equipment' and 'building' was 91 per cent and 89 per cent respectively. [p165](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh** (2002-07), funds were released by Government of India in the last quarter of the year. The unspent balances carried forward to the subsequent year(s) ranged between Rs. 1.62 crore and Rs. 5.50 crore. The Department furnished the utilisation certificate with inflated expenditure to the extent of Rs. 2.90 crore. Shortfall in utilisation of funds under the components 'Training', 'Computerisation' and 'Forensic Science Laboratory' was 45 per cent, 58 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. [p175](#)

In **Manipur** (2002-07), unutilised balance of Rs 11.95 crore placed with the construction agency was reported to Ministry of Home Affairs as spent. [p193](#)

In **Meghalaya** (2002-07), during the years 2003-07, percentage of unspent balance ranged between 37 and 87. Government of India did not release its share of Rs. 14.57 crore. The State Government also delayed in release of Central funds to the Department by 4 to 11 months. [p213](#)

In **Mizoram** (2002-07), 42 per cent of GOI share was released in the last quarter resulting in retention of unspent balance every year. Amounts retained in Civil Deposit (Rs. 5.70 crore) and transferred to PWD (Rs. 6.87 crore) were shown as expenditure. [p231](#)

### **3 Mobility**

Mobility is vital to the efficient performance of the police force. Increased mobility reduces the response time and enhances operational efficiency of the forces. Bureau of Police Research and Development scales for operational vehicles are the guiding factor in procurement of vehicles. Audit observed that there were shortages of vehicles. Most of the vehicles procured replaced the old ones and there was shortage of drivers for the available

vehicles. The police response time was too long in some States while in some other cases, there was no record to show any improvement.

In **Andhra Pradesh**, 58 per cent of the vehicles procured were utilised for replacing the old vehicles. Sixty-three per cent of the police stations were not provided with four-wheelers. There was no system of recording the police response time; as such improvement or deterioration in this aspect could not be assessed in audit. [p34](#)

In **Bihar**, shortage of vehicles was 43 per cent as of March 2006. There was also shortage of drivers (47 per cent) in the test-checked districts. [p53](#)

In **Jharkhand**, 114 vehicles were purchased for two Armed battalions of the State which had only 120 personnel. Twenty-three vehicles were distributed to these battalions and the rest were distributed to other units. [p65](#)

In **Kerala**, 893 jeeps purchased during 2000-06 were mostly used for replacement of old jeeps. Government purchased passenger cars instead of light vehicles, in violation of the approved Annual Action Plan. [p91](#)

In **Madhya Pradesh**, though all the police stations were provided with vehicles during 2000-05, there were shortages of vehicles. During 2005, in 253 cases (out of 517 cases) response time taken was between 1 hour and 2 hours. [p101](#)

In **Maharashtra**, only 14 per cent of additional vehicles and 31 per cent of replacement vehicles were allotted to the police stations. Average response time in 118 police stations was 156 minutes. [p113](#)

In **Orissa**, against the requirement (as of March 2001) of 1495 vehicles, 1067 vehicles were procured during 2000-04. Of these, 425 replaced the condemned ones. In the test-checked districts only 155 drivers were available against available fleet of 263 vehicles. [p131](#)

In **Rajasthan**, there was shortage of 3704 vehicles. Thirty-eight per cent of the new vehicles replaced the old ones. Only 45 per cent of the vehicles were supplied to the police stations, despite availability of additional vehicles. In 153 test checked cases, response time was between half-an-hour and 218 hours. [p140](#)

In **Uttar Pradesh**, against the shortfall of 9780 vehicles, 2383 vehicles were purchased during 2000-05. But there was no addition to the existing fleet as the new vehicles replaced the old ones. Two hundred and three Ambassador cars were purchased for replacement against 55 approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Sixty-seven were attached to various offices not related to police mobility. [p157](#)

In **West Bengal**, against the requirement of 4788 vehicles (including motor cycles) 2170 were procured during 2000-05. [p166](#)

In **Manipur**, against the total requirement of 1750 vehicles the Department had 1190 vehicles as of March 2007. Shortages in the districts and battalions ranged between 30 and 51 per cent. [p194](#)

In **Meghalaya**, there was shortage of 53 heavy and medium vehicles and excess of 87 light vehicles. Against 260 vehicles, there were 208 drivers. [p217](#)

In **Mizoram**, against the total requirement of 800 vehicles, 571 were available. Department had no Bullet Proof vehicles but it procured TATA Quails, Bolero, TATA Indica, etc. disregarding the Bureau of Police Research and Development norms. [p239](#)

#### **4 Buildings - residential and non-residential**

Construction of well secured police station buildings and houses for police personnel closer to the police stations is one of the thrust areas of the scheme. A significant part of the scheme funds was allocated for this purpose. Audit observed that there were considerable delays in construction of residential and non-residential buildings in most of the States. Consequently, police force's own security was in jeopardy. Satisfaction levels of housing were also very low.

In **Andhra Pradesh** (2002-07), 53 per cent of staff quarters and 43 per cent of non-residential buildings were not completed because of non-availability of site. [p33](#)

In **Bihar** (2001-06), against the total requirement of 59,614 houses, only 3421 (six per cent) were included in the Plan, of which 1045 units were completed. [p49](#)

In **Jharkhand** (2000-04), District Composite Control rooms remained non-functional after spending Rs 2.09 crore on building, vehicles etc, for want of manpower. [p65](#)

In **Karnataka** (2002-07), there was undue delay (2 to 4 years) in completion of five non-residential buildings despite deposit of funds with construction agency. Out of 5,000 quarters required, 3134 (63 per cent) were completed (April 2007). [p74](#)

In **Kerala** (2000-06), out of total requirement of 35,795 residential houses for the police personnel (as per Bureau of Police Research and Development) there were 973 (3 per cent) completed houses and 3794 houses were not completed/commenced as of March 2006. Of the 331 completed houses physically verified, 124 (37 per cent) remained vacant for want of electricity and water connection. [p90](#)

In **Madhya Pradesh** (2006), out of 6080 buildings works taken up during 2000-06, only 1739 were completed; 78 completed buildings were not handed over. Despite availability of funds, 2658 buildings works were not started for want of land, administrative approval, finalisation of drawing, designs, etc. [p99](#)

In **Maharashtra** (2000-05), out of 54 construction works of quarters and buildings, 47 remained incomplete; delays in completion ranged up to three years. Fifty per cent of police personnel in the test-checked police stations were not provided with quarters. They were put up at an average distance of 13 Km from the Police Station. In two districts, 488 quarters (50 per cent) remained vacant for want of water and electricity connection. [p112](#)

In **Orissa** (2000-04), out of 1823 buildings (residential and non-residential) sanctioned during 2000-04, 678 were completed, 1146 were incomplete and 99 were not started. Government attributed the delay to limited capacity of the construction corporation. [p128](#)

In **Rajasthan** (2002-07), works of 343 administrative and residential buildings were not completed/ commenced, while 99 completed buildings were not taken over for long periods. There was 62 per cent shortage of requirements in test checked districts. In one Police Station, police personnel were staying 50 Kms away from Police Station. [p138](#)

In **Uttar Pradesh** (2000-05), only 25 per cent (3105 units) of the targeted residential units were constructed during 2000-05. [p155](#)

In **West Bengal** (2000-05), against the targets of 324 residential buildings and 800 non-residential buildings, 96 residential and 52 non-residential buildings were constructed. [p167](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh** (2002-07), out of 143 non-residential buildings sanctioned 105 were completed, 31 were incomplete and 7 were not taken up. Against the requirement of 7176 quarters, only 410 quarters (6 per cent) were targeted upto 2006-07, of which only 108 quarters were completed. [p177](#)

In **Manipur** (2002-07), out of 85 non-residential buildings (police station, out post, etc.) taken up during 2002-07, only 32 were completed of which 16 were not handed over by the construction agency to the Department. Fifty-three were not completed/ started. Only 1652 (11 per cent) police personnel were provided with quarters out of 15494 required. [p197](#)

In **Mizoram** (2000-07), out of 15 quarters taken up for construction were completed as of March 2007. Construction of only 46 quarters was taken up of which 10 remained incomplete. Satisfaction level in respect of housing was very low. [p216](#)

In **Mizoram** (2002-07), against the targets of 53 buildings for Police Stations and Outposts, only 26 were constructed. Due to shortage of quarters, the level of satisfaction of housing was 16 per cent for upper subordinates and 18 per cent for lower subordinates. [p235](#)



## 5 Weaponry

The Modernisation of Police Force Scheme offers to replace outdated and unserviceable weapons with sophisticated weapons. It was observed that the police force in the States continued to depend on the outdated weapons. There were shortages as acquisition of weapons from ordinance factories was slow. Weapons procured were mostly kept in district headquarters. Even where the sophisticated weapons were provided, the police personnel were not adequately trained in their use.

**Andhra Pradesh**, the Police Stations in the test-checked districts continued to depend on outdated weapons, as procurement of modern weapons was inadequate. Majority of the weapons were kept in district headquarters. [p35](#)

In **Bihar**, AK-47 rifles were placed at the disposal of bodyguards of VIPs in violation of Ministry of Home Affairs instructions. [p54](#)

In **Jharkhand**, 1470 SLRs were purchased for two battalions having 135 combat personnel. [p66](#)

In **Karnataka**, as against 2236 weapons required, 1406 weapons were received in test checked police units. Of these, only 242 were distributed for want of trained Police Personnel. [p78](#)

In **Kerala**, Rs. 25 lakh were allocated for purchase of a hundred 7.62 mm SLRs. Instead, they purchased 1000 second hand rifles at a cost of Rs. 50 lakh from Assam Rifles who were replacing them. [p93](#)

In **Rajasthan**, there was shortage of 9540 weapons in the State including AK 47 rifles and SLRs as of March 2007. Women Police Stations in Alwar and Jaipur city were not provided with any weapon. Weapons ordered for Rs. 1.78 crore were not received from Ordinance Factory. [p141](#)

In **Uttar Pradesh**, outdated point-303 bore rifles and point-410 muskets were in use by the police force. [p158](#)

In **West Bengal**, adequate weapons were not supplied to the extremist prone police stations. Bomb detection equipment for three districts could not be procured as the supplier, a Government of India Corporation which was paid an advance of Rs. 71 lakh, had gone into liquidation. [p166](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh**, distribution of weapons to the extremist prone districts and non-extremist prone districts was not in accordance with the Bureau of Police Research and Development prescription. Shortfall in availability of weapons in test checked police stations was 8 to 100 per cent. In the test checked battalions, shortfall ranged between 13 and 100 per cent. Arms and ammunitions worth Rs. 1.80 crore were yet to be received from the Ordinance Factory, Kolkata. [p181](#)

In **Manipur**, shortfall of arms of various kinds was between 17 and 100 per cent and shortfall in ammunition was between 36 and 95 per cent. The test-checked police stations and battalion were holding unserviceable weapons. [p201](#)

In **Meghalaya**, there was shortage of sophisticated weapons in the test checked districts. Bullet Proof jackets (1829) were supplied in two districts without requirement or in excess of requirement. [p219](#)

In **Mizoram**, 10 categories of arms (50 per cent ) were reported to be not reliable, not useful, very old and outdated. Further, as of March 2007, 3089 SLRs were held by the department which were reported to be too long and did not match the short stature of Mizos. The Bullet Proof jackets and helmets were also too heavy and unsuited to the average physical stature of Mizo police personnel. [p237](#)

## **6 Communication**

A cohesive network for the benefit of investigation of crime and transmission of crime related data, finger prints, images, photographs, etc was envisaged in the Police Telecommunication Network of Modernisation of Police Force Scheme. However, the Police Telecommunication Network was not set up successfully in some States. In some other States, the Police Telecommunication Network was functional only up to district level. There were shortages of various communication equipments. Even the persons using the Police Telecommunication Network were not adequately trained.

In **Andhra Pradesh**, Ministry of Home Affairs supplied Police Telecommunication Network equipment/Multi Access Radio Telephones worth Rs. 2.13 crore in November 2004. The equipment was not installed mainly because the State already had a better network connectivity up to police station. [p37](#)

In **Bihar**, the Police Telecommunication Network system (costing Rs. 4.96 crore) remained non-functional due to non-construction of tower. There was shortage of wireless sets. Even the batteries

This

affected the communication system. [p51](#)

In **Karnataka**, the Police Telecommunication Network project was not operational even after two years of the scheduled date of installation, due to technical snags in the system and the staff not being trained. [p75](#)

In **Kerala**, Police Telecommunication Network had not been fully operational for want of aerial Multi Access Radio Telephones. [p95](#)

In **Maharashtra**, the objective of transmission of criminal data was not achieved as the Police Telecommunication Network equipment was not utilised. While 452 Remote Station Units, out of 850 purchased, were lying in stores, the required 60 additional Base Station units were not provided by GOI. Pendency in crime

detection cases increased by 68 per cent during 2000-04. [p116](#)

In **Rajasthan**, 348 Multi Access Radio Telephones were lying idle or out of order. The Police Department was deprived of the benefit of voice communication among the Police Stations through Police Telecommunication Network system. [p144](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh**, the Police Telecommunication Network system was not fully implemented and the objective of extending link to all police station was not achieved after spending Rs. 4.62 crore. [p183](#)

In **Manipur**, the Police Telecommunication Network system was not functional as 26 Remote Station Units out of 38 installed were found to be defective. Communication equipment procured was found to be unsuitable for use of Special Branch personnel. [p198](#)

In **Madhalava**, eight Police Telecommunication Network terminals, eight base station Basic Station Units and 34 Remote Station Units were installed during 2003-07. [p223](#)

In **Mizoram**, the Police Telecommunication Network project could not be implemented as only 9 out of 31 Remote Station Units were installed and VSATs were installed only in four (out of eight) districts, of which three were defective. [p242](#)

## **7 Computerisation**

Sharing and transmission of crime related data amongst the police stations within the State and across the country is a core component of Modernisation of Police Force scheme. This calls for creation of a robust IT infrastructure and supporting software for networking of computers. Common Integrated Police Application was identified to be meeting this requirement and National Informatics Centre was given the task of implementing it. The experience as gathered in audit suggests that the programme was implemented half heartedly by the States in developing and disseminating these software packages.

In **Andhra Pradesh**, 'e-Cops' an online e-governance policing project was not implemented effectively even after six years of the project launch at a cost of Rs. 30.47 crore. Expenditure on Common Integrated Police Application worth Rs.1.92 crore remained unfruitful. [p40](#)

In **Karnataka**, Common Integrated Police Application system was not commissioned as of October 2007 as the software was not developed. Police IT Software Project was not completed after spending Rs. 13.28 crore due to enhancement of the scope of the project. [p76](#)

In **Madhya Pradesh**, Common Integrated Police Application project was not implemented as the software was not found useful. Computers were installed only in 3 out of 94 targeted police stations. [p101](#)



In **Rajasthan**, Computer Aided Dispatch System was not installed as of June 2007. [p146](#)

In **Uttar Pradesh**, 96 per cent police stations were not computerized and the office automation remained neglected. [p160](#)

In **West Bengal**, the computer network installed at Headquarters Control room, detective department and five Divisional Commissioner's offices had been functioning without online connectivity. [p168](#)

In **Mizoram**, Common Integrated Police Application project was a complete failure as National Informatics Centre, the implementing agency, did not impart training to the Police personnel. [p243](#)

## **8 Forensic Science Laboratory / Finger Print Bureau**

The Modernisation of Police Force scheme envisages development of infrastructure for improving quality of crime investigation and strengthening the dimension of forensic science. In most States however, the Forensic Science Laboratorys lacked adequate infrastructure (viz. equipment, building and trained personnel), while mobile forensic units were not made operational. As a result, there was large pendency in analysis of samples. As the automatic finger print identification systems were not installed, the investigation was being done manually in some States.

In **Andhra Pradesh**, forensic equipments were lying unutilised for want of sites. The laboratories were under utilised and submission of analytical reports was delayed up to 12 months. Despite availability of funds, equipment of surveillance mobiles was not procured. [p36](#)

in  
analysis of samples increased sharply. A laboratory at Muzafarabad did not have the required equipment. [p55](#)

In **Karnataka**, Modernisation of the Forensic Science Laboratory and the Finger Print Bureau was not effective due to inadequate trained personnel and delay in software development. [p77](#)

In **Kerala**, due to delay in construction of building and posting of staff, equipment purchased for Forensic Science Laboratory was lying idle. The programme for modernising the finger print bureau was not implemented as the equipments purchased were for conventional methods of investigation. [p93](#)

In **Madhya Pradesh**, the DNA analysis in the laboratory was not started as of November 2006. Government did not sanction any post of scientist, technician and assistant for the laboratory. There was huge pendency in analysis of samples by Forensic laboratory. As many as 2394 cases were pending for more than 10 years. [p103](#)

In **Maharashtra**, there were delays in receipt and installation of the forensic equipment which ranged up to 39 months. Even after installation, equipments (19 items) remained idle for 19 months. There was also shortage (284 vacant posts) of technical

manpower. As a result, pending cases for analysis increased by 67 per cent during 2000-05. [p115](#)

In **Orissa**, the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory at Balasore was not functional as the construction of building was not started due to land problem and equipment worth Rs 1.23 crore remained unutilised. The targeted 19 mobile Forensic Science Laboratory units were not functional for want of vehicles. The equipments procured (valued Rs 89.13 lakh) were lying idle. [p129](#)

In **Rajasthan**, 43 forensic equipments worth Rs. 8.52 crore were not installed even after 5 to 49 months of procurement for want of space. 8430 cases were pending for analysis as of March 2007. DNA sample testing could not be started in the absence of transfer of technology and trained staff. The Automatic Finger print identification systems were not installed in the test checked districts. The investigation was being done manually. [p142](#)

In **West Bengal**, performance of the Forensic Science Laboratory was poor as the issue of the investigation reports were delayed by two to 45 months. [p169](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh**, the Forensic Science Laboratory lacked proper infrastructure and manpower. Almost all samples collected are sent outside the State for analysis. [p184](#)

In **Manipur**, forensic laboratory was not functioning properly due to 82 per cent vacancies in technical posts resulting in 73 to 82 per cent cases remaining pending for analysis during 2002-07. [p200](#)

In **Meghalaya**, the only Forensic Science Laboratory of the State was under staffed and had no Director since January 2005. There were delays in analysis and reporting on the samples which ranged up to 894 days. [p223](#)

## **9 Training (including manpower)**

Training is an integral part of any police force and keeps the police forces 'fit' and 'ready' to meet any challenges. In recognition of this, Modernisation of Police Force scheme makes liberal allocations to support and equip the forces by creating training infrastructure. Audit scrutiny revealed that percentage of police personnel trained was very low. There were deficiencies in providing hands-on experience in modern weaponry. Training infrastructure was inadequate. In one State (Nagaland) a large number of police constables was without the stipulated work for want of basic training.

In **Andhra Pradesh**, funds for upgradation of training facilities were diverted to construction works. [p39](#)

In **Bihar**, only 10 per cent of total force were trained in one training centre. Training infrastructure was inadequate in the training schools. [p55](#)

In **Karnataka**, 1414 posts of inspectors and constables were lying vacant as of October 2007. The training infrastructure was inadequate to make the programmes effective due to delay in completion of works. [p80](#)

In **Kerala**, there were delays in construction of buildings for the police training institutes. Utilisation of funds was less than 40 per cent of the outlay. Canine schools established in March 2006 did not have dogs and trainees. [p94](#)

In **Madhya Pradesh**, requisite infrastructure for training was not created and large number of trainings slots were not utilised. [p104](#)

In **Maharashtra**, only 69 per cent of the Police personnel were trained during 2000-04. [p117](#)

In **Orissa**, auditorium-cum-library building at Police Training College could not be utilised due to defects in construction. [p130](#)

In three Training Centres in **Rajasthan**, no training was imparted for 16 to 21 months for lack of approved programmes; the training equipment remained idle. [p145](#)

In **Uttar Pradesh**, no new training infrastructure was created and the existing capacity of the training centres was not fully utilised. [p159](#)

In **West Bengal**, live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons resulting in crippling of the performance of the police force. [p169](#)

In **Arunachal Pradesh**, out of 7589 police personnel in the State as of March 2007, only 2000 were trained during 2000-07. There was shortfall (between 20 and 100 per cent) in practice of various weapons. [p182](#)

In **Manipur**, there was shortfall of 2742 police personnel (18 per cent of sanctioned strength) as of March 2007. The training imparted to the police personnel was basic training and refreshers' course and no training was imparted on modern weapon system. [p203](#)

In **Meghalaya**, only 7 to 23 per cent of police personnel were imparted professional training. Shortfall in practice of weaponry was as high as 80 per cent. Only 13 Inspector and Sub-Inspectors (out of 104) involved in VIP security were imparted VIP security training. There were significant shortages (11 per cent of sanctioned strength in 2006-07) of police personnel. Women Police constitute 3 per cent of total police force. [p220](#)

In **Mizoram**, total shortage of police personnel was 1712 (17 per cent). Out of the total 8265 police personnel, 1944 were imparted training during 2002-07. Though Ministry of Home Affairs suggested giving priority to filling the vacant posts over procurement of equipment, the Department procured equipment valued Rs. 2.44 crore, while there was 78 per cent shortage of staff. [p240](#)

In **Nagaland**, as against 84 training courses planned, 23 were conducted as per the plan and 30 more unscheduled courses were conducted. As a result, large number of police personnel remained untrained. Due to lack of Basic Training, 777 Recruit Constables remained without stipulated work during 2006-07. In three districts, deployment of police personnel in rural areas was 4 to 47 per cent against 60 to 86 per cent of rural population. Deployment of police as security guard to the VIPs was in excess of the entitlement. [p256](#)

## **Chapter 3**

# **Conclusions and recommendations**

### **Conclusions**

- There were inordinate delays in submission of Annual Action Plans by the States and approval of the same by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Thus, there was little time left to implement the Scheme as per the plan and utilise the funds during the same year. The Annual Action Plans deviated from the Perspective Plans in some States.
- Due to delays in approval of the Annual Action Plans, utilisation of scheme funds during the same year was very low. Percentage of total expenditure to the total approved outlay for Modernisation of Police Force Scheme ranged between 28 and 86 in general category States, while in the Special Category States (Category A), it was between 28 and 76. Similarly, percentage of utilisation of total funds released during the five/six year period covered in audit was between 69 and 100 in the general category States. In the Category A States, it ranged from 46 to 100 per cent. Scheme funds were parked in various deposit accounts in some States and funds advanced to the construction agencies were shown as utilized. States share was not at all released by two States.
- There were shortages of vehicles in all States. Most of the vehicles procured replaced the old ones and the net addition for increasing the mobility was little. Even there was shortage of drivers for the available vehicles. The police response time was too long in some States while in other, there was no record to show any improvement.
- The police force in the States continued to depend on the outdated and unserviceable weapons. There were shortages of weapons as acquisition of weapons from Ordnance Factories was slow. Weapons procured were mostly kept in district headquarters. There were shortages of trained police personnel to handle the sophisticated weapons.
- In most States, there were shortages of residential and non-residential buildings compared with the requirement as per Bureau of Police Research and Development norms, due to delays in construction. Thus, security of police force was not ensured and the level of satisfaction of housing was very low.



- The Police Telecommunication Network, in the use of crime investigation and transmission of crime related data, was not successfully set up in some States. In some other States, the Police Telecommunication Network was functional only up to district level. There were shortages of various communication equipments. Police Telecommunication Network was handled by untrained personnel.
- Though training is an essential requisite for effective functioning of the police force, the percentage of police personnel trained was very low in most of the States. There were deficiencies in practical training in modern weaponry. Training infrastructure was inadequate. Even police constables were not utilised for the stipulated works for want of basic training to them.

## **Recommendations for:**

### **All States**

- Utilisation of the allocated funds as per the approved annual plan should be ensured through proper monitoring by the State Level Empowered Committee.
- In order to improve the mobility of the police force and the response time to reach crime site/ terrorist incidences, the police stations should be provided with adequate number of vehicles as per Bureau of Police Research and Development norms.
- The pace of construction of the buildings for police stations and police quarters should be speeded up. Availability of sites should be ensured before transfer of funds to the construction agencies.
- The forensic science laboratories and the finger print bureau should be strengthened with necessary equipment and trained personnel. Optimum utilisation of the Forensic Science Laboratory and Finger Print Bureau should be ensured to avoid delays in analysis of samples/crime investigation cases.
- In order to derive full benefit of the scheme, vacant posts of police personnel should be filled up in a time frame as per the Bureau of Police Research and Development norms.

### **Ministry of Home Affairs**

- State police force should be provided with modern sophisticated weapons and given proper training to handle those so as to enable them to deal with challenges posed by terrorist and other extremist elements.

## **All States and Ministry of Home Affairs**

- Annual Action Plans should be prepared after thorough study of the deficits in the infrastructure requirement of the State Police force so as to avoid any deviation from the approved Annual Action Plan. Timeliness in submission and approval of the Annual Action Plans should be ensured for effective and efficient implementation of the scheme. State Level Empowered Committee should monitor the implementation at a regular interval preferably every month.
- Police telecommunication network should be strengthened to facilitate better communication for police intelligence and crime investigation.
- Training needs should be properly assessed and regular training should be imparted for upgradation of professional skills of the police force. Training institutions should be strengthened with necessary infrastructure.



## Annex A

### State-wise audit coverage

S.No	Name of the States	Period covered in audit
1.	Andhra Pradesh	2002-07
2.	Bihar	2001-06
3.	Jharkhand (control mechanism in Police Department)	2000-04
4.	Karnataka	2002-07
5.	Kerala	2000-06
6.	Madhya Pradesh	2000-06
7.	Maharashtra	2000-05
8.	Orissa	2000-04
9.	Rajasthan	2002-07
10.	Uttar Pradesh	2000-05
11.	West Bengal	2000-05
12.	Arunachal Pradesh	2002-07
13.	Manipur	2002-07
14.	Meghalaya	2002-07
15.	Mizoram	2002-07
16.	Nagaland (manpower management of Police Department)	2002-07

## **Annex B**

### **List of States covered in audit (Category-wise)**

#### **Category 'B' (cost partly shared by Government of India)**

1. Andhra Pradesh
2. Bihar
3. Jharkhand (control mechanism in Police Department)
4. Karnataka
5. Kerala
6. Madhya Pradesh
7. Maharashtra
8. Orissa
9. Rajasthan
10. Uttar Pradesh
11. West Bengal

#### **Category 'A' (cost fully borne by Government of India)**

12. Arunachal Pradesh
13. Manipur
14. Meghalaya
15. Mizoram
16. Nagaland (manpower management of Police Department)

# Annex C

## Utilisation of funds

(Rs in crore)												
Sl. No	Name of State	Period covered in audit	Total Plan outlay	Gol share due	Releases by Gol^	State's share due	Releases by States	Total release	Total Exp	%age of exp. to total release	Shortfall in Gol release	Shortfall (-)/ Excess (+) of State's release
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	Andhra Pradesh	2002-07	699.92	484.25	347.76	215.67	21.95	369.71	296.13	80.09	136.49	(-) 193.72
2	Bihar	2001-06	435.02	272.31	151.29	162.71	210.44	361.73	251.30	69.47	121.02	(+) 47.73
3	Jharkhand	2001-04	242.85	125.03	081.82	117.82	113.25	195.07	147.19	75.45	43.21	(-) 4.57
4	Karnataka	2002-07	667.35	417.33	315.49	250.02	249.06	630.85	542.45	85.98	101.84	(-) 0.96
5	Kerala	2000-06	369.96	212.82	154.03	157.14	166.14	320.17	320.17	100	58.79	(+) 9.00
6	Madhya Pradesh	2000-06	623.02	357.35	279.42	265.67	240.91	520.33	490.38	94.24	77.93	(-) 24.76
7	Maharashtra	2000-05	877.45	473.95	376.44	403.50	331.83	708.27	654.11	92.35	97.51	(-) 71.67
8	Orissa	2000-04	244.17	115.98	NA	128.19	NA	NA	169.89	NA	NA	NA
9	Rajasthan	2002-07	530.94	332.48	252.55*	198.46	Nil	252.55	226.32	89.61	154.22	(-) 198.46
10	Uttar Pradesh	2000-05	1167.25	630.12	479.85	537.13	346.34	826.19	810.00	98.04	150.27	(-) 190.79
11	West Bengal	2000-05	392.20	214.27	118.18	177.93	Nil	118.18	110.16	93.21	96.09	(-) 177.93
12	Arunachal Pradesh	2002-07	55.00	39.11	39.45	15.89	17.51	56.95	45.82	80.45	Nil	(+) 1.62
13	Manipur	2002-07	104.15	93.65	33.73	10.50	0.02	33.75	33.72	99.91	59.92	(-) 10.48
14	Meghalaya	2002-07	54.17	40.05	25.73	14.12	7.17	32.90	15.05	45.74	14.32	(-) 6.95
15	Mizoram	2002-07	54.00	37.50	41.69	16.50	0.25	41.84	41.28	98.66	Nil	(-) 16.25

NA-Not Available

^Government of India

\*including Rs.74.29 crore pertaining to 2000-01

## General Category States

*1. Andhra Pradesh, Audit Report ( Civil) for the year ended 31 March 2007*

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### HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

#### 3.4 Modernisation of Police Force

##### Highlights

*The scheme of Modernisation of Police Force was launched to augment the operational efficiency of the State police to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. Implementation of the scheme in the State suffered mainly due to deficient planning and poor monitoring both at department and Government levels. Annual action plans were not need based and their delayed approval necessitated several deviations from the approved plans. Construction of non-residential and residential buildings was not given due priority and huge funds were locked up with the AP State Police Housing Corporation. Sixty three per cent of the police stations were not provided with four wheelers adversely affecting the field policing. Procurement of sophisticated weaponry was inadequate and the police stations continued to depend on outdated weapons. The Forensic Science Laboratories were underutilised. Computerisation of police stations was ineffective to augment the operational efficiency.*

**Annual action plans were not need based and their delayed approval resulted in delaying the implementation of the scheme and caused several deviations from approved plans. Separate sub-plan for Home Guards was not provided.**

*[Paragraphs 3.4.6 and 3.4.6.1]*

**State Government did not release its matching share (Rs 98.69 crore) in the years 2002-03 to 2005-06. The percentage of utilisation of funds in the year of sanction was very low at 13 to 38 per cent.**

*[Paragraph 3.4.7]*

**Despite availability of sufficient funds, 53 per cent of staff quarters and 43 per cent of Non-residential buildings were not completed. This also resulted in locking up of huge funds (Rs 80 crore) in Fixed Deposits with the AP State Police Housing Corporation. Adequate priority was also not given to construction of police station buildings though focused in the perspective plan/annual plans.**

*[Paragraphs 3.4.8.1 and 3.4.8.2]*

**There was no significant increase in mobility as 58 per cent of the vehicles purchased were mainly used for replacement of old vehicles. 1003 police stations (63 per cent) were not provided with four wheelers, though envisaged in the guidelines.**

*[Paragraph 3.4.9.1]*

**Modernisation of weapons was not achieved due to inadequate procurement of sophisticated weapons and police stations depended on outdated weapons only. Forensic Science Laboratories were underutilised.**

*[Paragraphs 3.4.10 and 3.4.11.2]*

**Computerisation of police stations was ineffective and expenditure of Rs 32.39 crore on eCops (Rs 30.47 crore) and Common Integrated Police Application (Rs 1.92 crore) largely remained unfruitful.**

*[Paragraphs 3.4.14.1 and 3.4.14.2]*

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**An efficient monitoring mechanism was absent both at Department and Government level including the State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC).**

*[Paragraph 3.4.15]*

#### **3.4.1 Introduction**

Government of India introduced (1969) the scheme of Modernisation of Police Force (MOPF) to augment the operational efficiency of the State police so as to face the emerging challenges to internal security effectively. The Scheme was revised during 2000-01 and extended for a period of ten years, to make good the deficiencies in basic police infrastructure as identified by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D). Under this revised scheme, the State Governments were required to submit a five-year Perspective Plan (PP) on the requirement of police forces starting from 2000-01 indicating the specific projects, which the governments want to implement in each year. The components covered under the scheme were (a) Construction (residential as well as non-residential buildings) (b) Mobility (c) Weaponry (d) Equipment and (e) Communication system including Computerisation.

#### **3.4.2 Organisational set-up**

At Government level, Principal Secretary, Home Department is responsible for implementation of the scheme. At the departmental level, Director General (DG), DGP- Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB), assisted by five Additional DGPs, Provisions & Logistics (P&L), Police Transport Organisation (PTO), Intelligence, APSP Battalions and AP Police Academy (APPA), six IGPs- Communication, Police Computer Services, training, Grey Hounds, Home Guards, Security Wing and Director, AP Forensic Science Laboratory (APFSL), Commissioners of Hyderabad and Cyberabad are responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the scheme. At the district level, Superintendents of Police (SP) are responsible for the implementation of the scheme. Construction work was executed by AP State Police Housing Corporation (APSPHC - Corporation). There is a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) set up (May 2001) under the chairmanship of the State Chief Secretary to monitor the implementation of the scheme.

#### **3.4.3 Audit objectives**

Audit Objectives were to assess whether:

- Annual Action Plans (AAP) were in accordance with the perspective plans (PP) and were based on requirements;
- Funds provided for the scheme were utilised for the intended purpose;
- Various components of the scheme were implemented economically and efficiently and the targets fixed for each component were achieved;
- Equipment purchased/assets created have been utilised and maintained properly and the intended benefits achieved; and
- Implementation/progress of the Scheme was monitored effectively.

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#### 3.4.4 Audit criteria

The following criteria were adopted for the performance audit review:

- BPR&D and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) (GOI) guidelines on the scheme, Perspective Plans and Annual Action Plans;
- Annual Action Plans approved by MHA, release orders of GOI/State Government;
- Purchase rules of the State Government, Codal provisions for execution of works, etc and targets fixed by MHA in Annual Action Plans for various components;
- History sheets/log books in respect of equipment, allotment registers in respect of quarters, records of eCops and Common Integrated Police Application Software (CIPA); and
- Minutes/records of State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC), instructions issued from time to time by GOI/State Government and Internal Audit Plans.

#### 3.4.5 Scope and methodology of audit

The implementation of the scheme was reviewed (December 2006 – June 2007) for the period of five years from 2002-07. Records were test checked in the Home Department of the State Secretariat, DGP, AP State Police Housing Corporation, Directorates of FSL, Finger Print Bureau (FPB), Anti Corruption Bureau, and eight District Police Offices<sup>36</sup> (DPOs) selected in audit. Besides, records of three police stations under each DPO and Regional Forensic Science Laboratories (RFSLS), Battalions, Police Training Colleges (PTCs) existing in those districts were also test checked.

An entry conference was conducted in February 2007 with the DGP and his officers in which the Audit methodology was explained. Exit conference was also held (July 2007) with the MD, APSPHC (Corporation), Additional DGP(P&L), Addl. DGP (APPA), Addl. DGP (PTO), IG (Communications), IG (PCS) and Director (APFSL, Hyderabad). The results of the review are presented in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### Audit findings

##### 3.4.6 Plan formulation

**Annual Action Plans varied from Perspective Plan. Separate sub plan for Homeguards was not provided**

As per the GOI guidelines, the State Government was to submit to MHA, a five-year perspective plan for modernisation starting from 2000-01. The State Government submitted (November 2000) a perspective plan covering only four-year period from 2001-05. Although the Annual Action Plans (AAP) were to flow from the perspective plan, the action plans varied from perspective plan every year. Separate Sub Plan for Home Guards was not

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<sup>36</sup> Hyderabad city, Cyberabad, Guntur, Mahaboobnagar, Kurnool, Nizamabad, Sangareddy and Vizianagaram

provided in the annual plans though stipulated by MHA. The allocation/actual release was also meager; less than one *per cent* of the total outlay during the years 2003-04 to 2006-07 as against five *per cent* of total annual outlay of the State, stipulated (October 2003) by the MHA. No funds were released during the year 2004-05.

#### 3.4.6.1 Submission of Annual action plans

Scheme funds were not spent in the same year

Except for 2004-05, there were delays in submission of AAPs by the State Government, as shown in *Appendix 3.12*. Further delays in the approval by MHA, release of funds to State Government and overall delay of one year adversely affected the implementation of the scheme. As a result, the funds could not be utilised in the same financial years by the department. GOI had to revalidate the sanction of Rs 20.92 crore of 2003-04 for utilisation during 2004-05.

#### 3.4.6.2 Deviations from approved annual plans

Expenditure of Rs 31.37 crore was spent for works not covered by AAPs and without the prior approval of SLEC. Rs 2.48 crore had no Government approval

It was seen that during the years 2002-03 to 2005-06, an amount of Rs 31.37 crore<sup>37</sup> was diverted to other purposes like purchase of Very High Frequency (VHF) sets (instead of Automatic Vehicle Location System), construction of police constable quarters (instead of SI quarters), etc. under the same head without the prior approval of SLEC against the provisions of MHA. SLEC ratified the diversion only after periods ranging between one and three years. Further, an amount of Rs 2.48 crore released during 2004-05 (Rs 2.44 crore) and 2005-06 (Rs 0.04 crore) under 'Material & Equipment' was utilised for procurement of more number of communication equipment than approved in the Annual Action Plan. This deviation has not yet been ratified by the SLEC (July 2007).

#### 3.4.7. Financial management

Under the scheme, 50 *per cent* of outlay (75 *per cent* from 2003-04 onwards) approved in the AAP would be funded by GOI and the balance was to be borne by the State Government. The funds intended for construction activity were released to the Corporation in 2002-03 through the DGP by adjustment to its Personal Deposit (PD) account. From 2003-04 onwards the funds were being released by GOI direct to the Corporation.

The details of approved plan, funds made available vis-à-vis the expenditure during the years 2002-03 to 2006-07 were as under:

<sup>37</sup> 2002-03 (Rs 10.47 crore), 2003-04 (Rs 8.65 crore), 2004-05 (Rs 10.68 crore), 2005-06 (Rs 1.57 crore)



(Rupees in crore)

Plan year	Approved Plan	Amount due from GOI	Central releases (% with reference to Col.2)	State's releases	Total fund available (Column4+5)	Total Expenditure <sup>s</sup>	Utilization of funds in the year of sanction (% of utilisation)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2002-03	162.68	81.34	80.74 (50)	--	80.74	80.74	31.05 (38)
2003-04	153.18	114.88	71.42 (47)	--	71.42	71.42	58.97 (82)
2004-05	153.66	115.24	79.50 (52)	--	79.50	79.50	29.52 (37)
2005-06	150.41	112.80	82.36 (55)	--	82.36	64.47	10.81 (13)
2006-07	79.99	59.99	33.74 (42)	21.95	55.69	--	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>699.92</b>	<b>484.25</b>	<b>347.76</b>	<b>21.95</b>	<b>369.71</b>	<b>296.13*</b>	<b>-</b>

<sup>s</sup>The expenditure figures shown in column 7 denote the expenditure of that particular year against column 6 as of March 2007

\*Rs 79.55 crore lying in the shape of Fixed Deposit Receipts with the APSPHC was also incorrectly shown as expenditure by the department

The Component-wise expenditure during 2002-03 to 2006-07 was as follows:

(Rupees in crore)

Component	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	Total
Construction	28.81	27.09	27.61	17.35	Nil	100.86
Mobility	25.28	24.37	16.08	15.53	Nil	81.26
Weaponry	6.30	1.82	13.24	24.35	Nil	45.71
Equipment	18.59	7.44	14.68	7.24	Nil	47.95
CIPA & POLNET	1.76	10.70	7.89	Nil	Nil	20.35
<b>Total</b>	<b>80.74</b>	<b>71.42</b>	<b>79.50</b>	<b>64.47</b>	<b>Nil</b>	<b>296.13</b>

**Central assistance was short received to the extent of Rs 136.49 crore. State Government had not released its share (Rs 98.69 crore) for the years 2002-03 to 2005-06**

It was observed that:

There was a short release of Rs 136.49 crore by GOI during 2002-07. The State government did not release its matching share (Rs 98.69 crore) under the plan head for years 2002-03 to 2005-06. It was however, seen that Rs 161.43 crore<sup>38</sup> released under a different head of account (Non-Plan) was shown as State share in the utilisation certificates, which was not accepted by GOI.

**Percentage of utilization in the year of sanction of funds was precariously low**

The percentage of utilisation of funds with reference to the actual releases was precariously low in 2005-06 (13 *per cent*), 2004-05 (37 *per cent*) and 2002-03 (38 *per cent*). Thus, State Government could not utilise the annual allocation within the respective financial years, resulting in non-implementation of the scheme in full. As a result of low utilisation the items in approved plans sanctioned in 2002-03 were implemented in 2006-07. Due to belated release of funds by GOI, the expenditure could not be incurred during 2006-07.

All the above shortcomings indicated lack of effective financial, administrative and supervisory controls that adversely affected the implementation of various components of the scheme.

<sup>38</sup> 2002-03 (Rs 78.74 crore); 2003-04 (Rs 23.80 crore); 2004-05 (Rs 26.58 crore); 2005-06 (Rs 32.31 crore)

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### 3.4.8. Construction

As per the guidelines issued by GOI, high priority should be given to the construction sector. The buildings proposed for construction are mostly connected with providing well-secured police station buildings and housing to staff, besides barrack facilities for Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in the district. The other thrust areas identified for providing infrastructure facilities are Greyhounds, AP Police Academy, Police Training College, AP Special Police Battalions and Home Guards Organisation.

#### 3.4.8.1 Inordinate delays in constructions of buildings

**Fifty three and 43 per cent of the Staff quarters and non-residential buildings were not completed. Expenditure of Rs 19.72 crore on incomplete buildings was unfruitful**

Out of 460 non-residential buildings proposed to be constructed during 2002-07, only 263 buildings (57 *per cent*) were completed and 88 buildings were under progress (expenditure: Rs 11.10 crore) and 109 buildings were not even taken up (July 2007). Delayed completion of buildings was attributed to non-identification of site, change of site, non-feasibility of site and poor response to tenders. The year-wise details are given in *Appendix 3.13*. Adequate priority was not given to police station (PS) buildings. As per BPR&D guidelines 421 PS buildings were required to be constructed. However, only 39 PS buildings (out of 102 sanctioned) were completed while construction of 54 buildings was under progress and nine buildings had not started as of July 2007.

As against target of 832 residential buildings in the annual plans 2002-03 to 2004-05 only 388 (47 *per cent*) were constructed; 389 are under progress (expenditure: Rs 8.62 crore) and construction of 55 quarters had not started. The year-wise details are given in *Appendix 3.13*. Thus, achievement was far behind the target fixed.

The non-commencement of both residential (55) and non-residential buildings (109) involving an amount of Rs 26.81 crore was attributed by the Corporation to non-availability of site, delay in finalisation of tenders. The contention is not tenable as the funds should have been sanctioned/released only after identification of suitable sites. Thus, due to inordinate delay in completion of construction of non-residential as well as staff quarters, the targets fixed by MHA were not achieved despite availability of sufficient funds. This also rendered the total expenditure of Rs 19.72 crore on incomplete quarters/non-residential buildings unfruitful.

#### 3.4.8.2 Parking of huge funds in fixed deposits/submission of inflated UCS by Corporation

**Corporation parked Rs 79.55 crore in the shape of fixed deposits in banks**

Out of Rs 138.90 crore released to the Corporation during 2002-07 towards construction of residential and non-residential buildings, an amount of Rs 79.55 crore<sup>39</sup>, being the unspent amount was deposited in the banks in short term FDRs. In addition to this, advances amounting to Rs 94.81 lakh given

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<sup>39</sup> up to 2002-03 (Rs 11.61 crore), 2003-04 (Rs 8.38 crore), 2004-05 (Rs 14.17 crore), 2005-06 (Rs 11.80 crore), 2006-07 (Rs 33.59 crore)

to unit offices viz., Addl. DGP/AP State Battalions (Rs 56.73 lakh), IGP Greyhounds (Rs 26.40 lakh), District Police Offices (Rs 11.68 lakh) were also to be adjusted. Although huge unspent amounts were available with the Corporation, it has submitted inflated UCs even for the amounts parked in PD accounts and on this basis, MHA (GOI) continued to release funds every year in a routine manner. The following were also noticed:

**Interest amount of Rs 2.56 crore was appropriated by the corporation without the concurrence of GOI**

- While the ceiling on tender premium was five *per cent* as per the Government instructions (July 2003), the Corporation was accepting tenders with a premium up to 10 *per cent*. This resulted in extra expenditure of Rs 4.52 lakh in six cases during 2005-06 and 2006-07.
- The interest which accrued on the deposits as at the end of March 2006 amounting to Rs 2.56 crore was adjusted by the Corporation to administrative charges without the concurrence of GOI.
- In respect of the works transferred to unit offices along with the funds for execution by them, the Corporation irregularly withheld Rs 5.22 lakh towards administrative charges.

Submission of incorrect UCs, deviations from approved annual plans and defective planning leading to delays in construction of buildings, showed the lack of proper internal controls in the department and the Corporation.

### 3.4.9 Mobility

Mobility is vital to the efficient and effective performance of the police force. BPR&D has prescribed scales for various types of operational vehicles such as heavy/medium/light vehicles and motor cycles required for police stations, District Armed Reserve and Armed Police battalions.

Scrutiny of the records of DGP, PTO and District Police Offices (DPOs) disclosed the following points:

#### 3.4.9.1 Non-supply of vehicles to police stations

**1003 police stations (63 *per cent*) were not provided with four wheelers, while 1250 vehicles were used for other purposes**

As per the guidelines issued by MHA, the MOPF scheme would concentrate on providing field vehicles required for basic policing in the first instance as per BPR&D norms. In the perspective plan covering 2001-05, the department had proposed to procure 1309 jeeps and 1309 motorcycles for 1309 out of 1585 police stations, which were not having any vehicles. Though 1832 light motor vehicles were procured during 2002-07, 582 police stations only were provided with jeeps as of July 2007 leaving 1003 police stations (63 *per cent*) uncovered. The remaining 1250 vehicles were being utilised for other purposes like VIP escorts, movement of special parties in connection with extremist activities etc. neglecting basic policing. It was also observed that no separate registers were maintained in the DPOs/police stations regarding the allotment of vehicles under the MOPF scheme.

**58 per cent of vehicles procured were utilised for replacement of old condemned vehicles**

As the MOPF scheme is meant to increase the existing fleet of vehicles, expenditure on account of replacement of vehicles would be normal item of expenditure provided for by the State Government. It was however, observed

that out of 3962 vehicles procured in the years 2002-03 to 2006-07, 2285 vehicles (58 *per cent*) were utilised for replacement of old condemned vehicles contrary to guidelines. As such, addition to existing fleet was only 1,670 (42 *per cent*). In the six test checked districts also, 289 out of 393 police stations (74 *per cent*) were not having four wheelers. The district-wise details are given in *Appendix 3.14*.

Thus, the objective of increasing the mobility for field policing so essential for the performance of the police force had not been achieved.

### **3.4.9.2 Geographical Information System (GIS) not provided to highway patrolling vehicles**

**GIS facility was not provided to Highway patrolling vehicles**

In the perspective plan 2001-05, it was proposed to have a minimum of 60 patrolling parties with 'Tata Sumo' vehicles with the equipment of GIS system @ Rs 10 lakh each at a total estimated cost of Rs 6 crore. Sixty Toyota vehicles (Rs 2.46 crore) at Rs 4.09 lakh each were procured and supplied to the needy police stations, without however, providing GIS facility. Thus, the objective of equipping the vehicles with GIS facility for patrolling was defeated.

### **3.4.9.3 Response time<sup>40</sup>**

**No norms were fixed for Response time**

Increase in mobility for field policing should result in reduction of response time. It was however, seen that the State Government had not fixed any norms for the response time nor did it give any instructions for recording the time of visit of site of offence in the crime diary. During test-check of the 24 police stations in the eight selected districts, except in Vizianagaram-I town, Mangalagiri Rural (Guntur District) and Dhone (Kurnool District) police stations, the time relating to visit of scene of offence by the police personnel was not noted in crime diary. As such there is no way to assess whether response time was reduced consequent on increase in mobility.

### **3.4.10 Weaponry**

**Modernisation of weapons was not achieved due to inadequate procurement of sophisticated equipment. Police stations depended on outdated weapons only**

The perspective plan 2001-05 envisages replacement of outdated and unserviceable weapons, with more sophisticated weaponry. Given the magnitude of the extremist's activity, the requirement of AK47, 7.62 mm Self Loaded Rifle (SLR), nine mm carbines, 5.56 mm Insas, etc. for the police stations were projected in the perspective plan to improve the striking capability of police force. Accordingly purchase of sophisticated weapons costing Rs 45.71 crore were sanctioned during 2002-07. It was however, seen that most of the weapons were procured only during 2005-06. In all the police stations of test checked districts, it was observed that they continued to depend on out-dated weapons like 0.410 muskets and 0.303 rifles with the majority of the weapons being kept in the district headquarters.

<sup>40</sup> Total time taken from the time of receiving message/making First Information Report to the time of the police person actually reaching the crime scene

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Thus, one of the objectives of modernisation to improve the preparedness and striking capability of police force was not achieved as a majority of them continued to use outdated and obsolete weaponry.

### **3.4.11 Equipment**

#### **3.4.11.1 Scientific aids to investigation**

The Scheme envisaged provision of modern scientific aids to investigation and development of infrastructure for improving the quality of crime investigation. BPR&D suggested that, in order to strengthen the dimension of forensic science, all districts be provided with Mobile Forensic Science laboratory (FSL). In Perspective Plan, it was proposed to establish 40 mobile FSLs. However, as of July 2007, only 26 mobile FSLs and seven RFSLs were established. The equipment required by FSLs was being procured by APFSL, Hyderabad and also supplied by Central FSL, New Delhi.

#### **3.4.11.2 Non/Underutilisation of forensic equipment**

**FSLs were underutilised forensic equipment worth Rs 1.09 crore was lying idle**

Equipment valued Rs 97.42 lakh<sup>41</sup> was lying idle at the Directorate/RFSL, Kamareddy and two items of equipment valued Rs 11.65 lakh procured in February 2005 for establishing mobile Toxicology unit at Gandhi Medical College, Hyderabad were also lying unpacked in the Directorate, APFSL (July 2007) due to non-preparation of sites. In the meantime, the warranty period also expired. The Director, APFSL, Hyderabad attributed non-completion of buildings/ preparation of sites to administrative problems. Thus, due to non-synchronising of purchases of equipment with the pace of construction of the buildings and preparation of sites, equipment worth Rs 1.09 crore has been lying unused for about two years, rendering the expenditure so far, unfruitful.

**Forensic equipment worth Rs 37.31 lakh were underutilized**

There was underutilisation of forensic equipment worth Rs 37.31 lakh in the test checked laboratories as under:

- In the Directorate of APFSL, Projective Velocity Machine instrument valued Rs 11.19 lakh procured in May 2004 was utilised only four times during 2004 and four times during 2005. It has not been utilised for the last two years.
- In RFSL, Kurnool, Gas Chromatograph and FTIR (total cost: Rs 14.62 lakh) supplied during 2004 were utilised only 24 times during 2004-07 and in another case, HP Thin layer Chromatograph (cost: Rs 11.50 lakh) received by RFSL, Kurnool in January 2004 was installed in August 2004. It was not put to use as of July 2007 for the envisaged purpose, as the scanner along with the software was not supplied with the Chromatograph rendering the expenditure unfruitful.

The above points indicated lack of proper assessment of requirement of equipment and lack of adequate follow-up at the district level.

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<sup>41</sup> Supplied to RFSLs, Cyberabad (Rs 55.10 lakh), Kamareddy (Rs 42.32 lakh) (including the equipment value: Rs78.54 lakh supplied by Directorate of Forensic Science, New Delhi in July 2005)



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#### 3.4.11.3 Delay in submission of analytical reports by FSL

**Submission of analytical reports by FSL was delayed**

Many sophisticated equipment were procured during 2002-03 to 2006-07 in order to facilitate accurate, fast, dependable results and to improve the quality of the investigation and to widen the role of forensic science in criminal justice system. Analysis reports were required to be submitted within a month, as there is every likelihood of material change in the item referred to for analysis, if there was delay. However, on a review of the records relating to departments of Chemistry, Documents, Physics in the FSL Directorate, it was noticed that there was no improvement in the reduction of time for submission of analysis reports. The percentage of cases analysed within a month ranged between 19 and 71 *per cent*. The delay stretched up to 12 months in some cases. Director, APFSL, Hyderabad replied (April 2007) that instrumental methods' analysis, though vital, in itself was not complete and other factors like interpretations by scientists would also form part of overall analysis and added that the one month time was only self imposed criterion and there were no Government/statutory orders to this effect. The reply is not acceptable as the criterion was fixed by the Directorate duly taking into account all the factors including the time taken for each test.

#### 3.4.11.4 Non-procurement of equipment for surveillance mobiles

**Surveillance Mobiles envisaged in annual plan 2004-05 were not procured**

For procurement of Surveillance equipment viz., a vehicle mounted integrated mobile video surveillance system to help in remote video monitoring of processions, crime scenes, polling stations, VIP convoys etc., an amount of Rs 31 lakh was released (August 2005) to Hyderabad Commissionerate which lapsed and was revalidated in November 2006. This time, to avoid lapse of funds the amount was deposited in the PD account of AP Technological Services (APTS) where it was still lying as of July 2007. Thus the procurement of surveillance equipment envisaged in the annual plan of 2004-05 is already delayed by two years and thereby the surveillance system was not modernised.

#### 3.4.11.5 Non- procurement of mounted horses

**Mounted horses as envisaged were not procured. Rs 19.21 lakh were locked up with the Hyderabad Commissionerate**

During January 2006, Rs 20.94 lakh was released to Hyderabad Commissionerate for procurement of 25 mounted horses. The amount was drawn by the Commissioner in March 2006 and kept in the savings bank account contrary to financial rules. Six horses worth of Rs 1.73 lakh were purchased by March 2006. The remaining 19 horses were not procured as of July 2007 despite the fact that the funds initially sanctioned by GOI during 2004-05 had to be revalidated (by GOI) in December 2005 before release to the Commissionerate in January 2006. The balance Rs 19.21 lakh have been locked up with the Commissionerate for over a year.

#### 3.4.12 Communication

In the Perspective Plan 2001-05, it was considered essential to strengthen the police communication system in the State by providing latest technology communication equipment.

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#### 3.4.12.1 Idling of equipment

State Government opposed to POLNET connectivity. Expenditure of Rs 4.35 crore on Communication system under POLNET is redundant

A Police Communication Project using Satellite communication for transfer of data, voice and fax viz., POLNET was implemented in the State. For this, the State Government was required to prepare sites (towers) for installation of POLNET equipment to connect police headquarters with district police offices and from there to police stations. Equipment valued Rs 4.35 crore was supplied by MHA for implementation of POLNET. As of July 2007, the POLNET is functional only up to the district police office level and was not extended to police stations due to non-preparation of sites and non-installation of equipment. In fact the State Government opposed (December 2003) the POLNET MART connectivity from district headquarters to police stations on the grounds that the AP State had a powerful and superior 2MB network known as APSWAN which connected all mandal headquarters and police stations. Despite this, MHA supplied (November 2004) Multi Access Radio Telephony (MART) equipment worth Rs 2.13 crore. This equipment was however, not installed due to non-erection of 66 towers (120 ft each) at the district police offices and 565 aerial masts of 60 ft each at the police stations for which Rs 3.50 crore were estimated to be additionally required.

Thus, providing communication system under POLNET was redundant and the expenditure of Rs 4.35 crore (including MART equipment) incurred on this project remained unfruitful.

#### 3.4.12.2 Non-establishment of VHF repeater stations

VHF repeater stations valuing Rs 90 lakh planned in 2004-05 did not come up

For better connectivity, coverage and reliability, GOI approved (annual plan 2004-05) for establishment of second VHF repeater stations in 14 extremists affected districts at an outlay of Rs 2.80 crore<sup>42</sup>. The State Government released (January 2006), Rs one crore for establishment of five repeater stations in five districts. Of this, Rs 90 lakh was drawn (March 2006) and adjusted to PD Account of the Corporation and balance Rs 10 lakh was spent on procurement of repeater equipment. Although the equipment was installed in the five DPOs connected with the sites initially identified it was later decided to change these locations due to unfavourable communication conditions. It was however, seen that the new locations/districts had not been identified (July 2007). Thus, the objective of providing effective communication system through repeater stations in the extremists affected districts, has not been achieved despite availability of funds. This also resulted in the amount of Rs 90 lakh being locked up with the Corporation for over a year and unfruitful expenditure of Rs 10 lakh.

#### 3.4.12.3 Non-establishment of Automatic Vehicle Location system (AVLS)

The objective of faster and quicker response in attending to scene of offence has not been fulfilled

The State Government released Rs 1.70 crore in May 2003 for implementation of the AVLS and Global Positioning System (GPS) in Hyderabad (Rs 70 lakh) and Cyberabad (not in the approved plan) and for establishment of computerised

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<sup>42</sup> @Rs 20 lakh per station consisting of Rs 12 lakh for 150 ft. self supported aerial towers, Rs 6 lakh for building and Rs 2 lakh for equipment for each district

**IG (Communications)  
diverted Rs 1.20 crore  
intended for AVLS**

call centers system with caller liner identification system (dial 100) for police control room in Cyberabad Commissionerate (outlay: Rs one crore). However, establishment of dial 100 system for police control room in Cyberabad could be completed with an expenditure of Rs 50 lakh against the sanction of Rs one crore. Further, the geographical maps required were not procured leaving the project of AVLS and GPS unimplemented in Hyderabad and Cyberabad as of July 2007 i.e. even after lapse of four years of approval (2002-03) by GOI. In the meantime, the IG (Communications) diverted (February 2004) the balance Rs 1.20 crore for providing communication equipment (High Frequency sets) to the District Superintendents of Police and Commissionerates for strengthening communication network in view of spurt in Maoist/ISI and other terrorist group activities. The Department should however, have met this expenditure from State budget in view of its dire necessity. Thus, due to the diversion of MOPF funds, the envisaged AVLS based on GIS and GPS remains unimplemented in Hyderabad and Cyberabad defeating the main objective of faster and quicker response time to a complaint.

### **3.4.13 Training**

#### **3.4.13.1 Diversion of funds meant for training**

As training is an essential requisite for the effective functioning of the police force, infrastructural facilities and equipment for police training institutes were to be provided under the scheme.

**Funds intended for  
upgradation of  
training facilities  
were diverted**

As per BPR&D guidelines, training infrastructure and facilities are to be created and upgraded from time to time. Accordingly, an amount of Rs 3.39 crore was drawn and placed with the Corporation in 2004-05 (Rs 1.10 crore) and 2005-06 (Rs 2.29 crore) for construction of Motor Transport (MT) Block, swimming pool, seminar hall and firing range at APPA premises. In March 2006 however, DGP instructed the MD of the Corporation to utilise the amount for other construction works. This diversion was stated to have been done as the proposed land to the extent of 21 acres was being given for the 'Outer Ring Road Project' and there was a proposal even to shift the APPA to another site by creating world-class facility. In August 2006, DGP instructed the Corporation to stop all construction works in APPA as directed (August 2006) by the Government. In December 2006, the State Government informed that it had been decided to continue APPA in the remaining area. However, the funds amounting to Rs 3.39 crore diverted were not reallocated to APPA (July 2007). Further, another amount of Rs 70 lakh released during 2003-04 for construction of swimming pool was also locked up with the Corporation for over three years now. Thus, three years after the release of funds, the objective of up-gradation of Academy remains unfulfilled.

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### 3.4.14 Computerisation

#### 3.4.14.1 Ineffective usage of eCops application under phase-I and non-implementation of phase-II

**Ineffective implementation of Phase I and Non-implementation of Phase II of eCops rendered the expenditure of Rs 30.47 crore largely unrealised**

Under the scheme of MOPF, funds were released for implementation of eCops, an online policing e-Governance project in phases. Phase-I covered the six pilot locations<sup>43</sup> with an expenditure of Rs 13.57 crore.

Mention was made in Para 3.5 of the Audit Report for the year ended 31 March 2004 about phase-I of the project falling significantly short of the objectives envisaged and of various deficiencies in the application. Problems associated with inadequacy of access control, user account and password management still continued to exist. Test-check of two of the six pilot locations i.e. Hyderabad and Cyberabad and three police stations under each, showed that there were no specific instructions by the IG (Computers) and DPOs regarding complete and timely usage of eCops application by all the investigating officers at police station level. Most of the important benefits expected to accrue from eCops were not realised even after a lapse of over six years of launching of the project, as mentioned below:

- Instantaneous information accessibility, electronically throughout the organisation could not be realised.
- Except First Information Report (FIR) registration form, no other form is effectively being used and only the manual system was being followed in respect of the other forms.
- The available database was incomplete and inaccurate and most of the features of the package could not be put to use even after spending Rs 63 lakh towards back log data entry activity. Also, most of the crime related registers were not being used as data relating to all the forms and registers had not been entered.
- Even the daily status report is prepared using word processing programs, and not through eCops.
- eCops application was not used by Investigating Officers.
- No effective strategy was developed to enhance user acceptance and usage of eCops.
- Effective and continuous risk management clubbed with review and monitoring mechanism was lacking at various mile stones of project implementation and this resulted in inordinate delay in implementation of projects apart from ineffective usage and acceptance and lack of accountability at police station level.
- Interfacing and integration of eCops with other departments like hospitals, judiciary and jails was also not done.

Thus, the entire expenditure of Rs 13.57 crore remains largely unproductive.

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<sup>43</sup> Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam, Cyberabad, Vikarabad and Srikakulam

**Expenditure of Rs 1.36 crore (out of Rs 16.90 crore) was rendered wasteful due to change of architecture**

For Phase-II implementation in nine other districts<sup>44</sup>, GOI released Rs 16.90 crore (Rs 10.70 crore in 2004-05 and Rs 6.20 crore in 2005-06) and the entire amount was spent. Test-check of records at IG (PCS) and in Kurnool, Mahboobnagar, Medak and Vizianagaram, disclosed that eCops application had not yet been implemented due to non-installation of system and application software. The IG (PCS) admitted (June 2007) that due to staggered release of funds the implementation had been delayed. It was further observed that an expenditure of Rs 1.36 crore incurred (January 2006) (out of Rs 16.90 crore) on procurement of 9-Oracle enterprise database server editions and 871 Personal Oracle licenses for usage under client-server architecture became wasteful as the department contemplated (April 2006) change of architecture to web-based application and consequently the software procured could not be put to use for any purpose. The hardware and software procured for client server model was never used for the intended purpose. Thus, the amount of Rs 16.90 crore spent in the nine districts also remains largely unrealised.

Thus, while implementation of Phase-I of eCops remains ineffective, it was yet to take off in the Phase-II districts, rendering the entire expenditure of Rs 30.47 crore largely unrealised.

#### **3.4.14.2 Common Integrated Police Application Software (CIPA) did not take off**

**CIPA did not take off. Entire expenditure of Rs 1.92 crore on computers and related equipment remained unfruitful**

Under the scheme, Guntur and Prakasam Districts were identified for implementation of CIPA project in Phase-I. National Informatics Centre, GOI, supplied (September 2006) computers and related equipment worth of Rs 1.92 crore (@ Rs 1.84 lakh to each police station) to 42 and 62 police stations in Guntur and Prakasam Districts respectively. Although computers were installed in the police stations in both the districts, CIPA package was not put to use as of July 2007. The recruitment process of technical assistants, trained operational staff and supervisory officers at police stations was also in the initial stages. The proposals for integration of eCops project and CIPA package has not been materialised so far as CIPA has yet to be stabilised. Thus equipment worth Rs 1.92 crore has remained idle since September 2006.

#### **3.4.15 Monitoring and evaluation**

**Monitoring was poor both at Department and Government level including the SLEC**

State Level Empowered Committee was required to meet every month to monitor the preparation of Annual Action Plans for submission to MHA and implementation of the approved AAPs. As against 60 meetings required to be held during the five year period 2002-07, SLEC met only three times during the period, that too exclusively for the ratification of deviations. The deviations were not intimated to GOI though stipulated. The Committee was not convened even for the approval of annual action plans.

As per the guidelines of GOI issued during 2001, a mid term review was to be conducted after two years. However, this was not done. Further, the physical

<sup>44</sup> Chittoor, East Godavari, Karimnagar, Khammam, Kurnool, Mahaboobnagar, Medak, Vizianagaram and West Godavari



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targets and the status of achievements were also not being reported/submitted to GOI. Neither the State Government nor the DGP had formulated any system to monitor the implementation of the programme at their level periodically. Thus, monitoring was poor both at department and Government level.

#### **3.4.16 Conclusions**

The implementation of Modernisation of Police Force in the State suffered. Annual action plans were not based on requirements necessitating a number of deviations from the approved plans. There was short release of Central share. The State Government did not release its matching share for the years 2002-03 to 2005-06. The percentage of utilisation of funds in the year of sanction was precariously low. The various components of the scheme were not implemented economically and efficiently and the targets fixed for each component were not achieved. Despite availability of sufficient funds, significant number of staff quarters and non-residential buildings were not completed, resulting in locking up of huge funds transferred to the AP State Police Housing Corporation. Adequate priority was also not given for the construction of police station buildings. A large number of the police stations were not provided with four wheelers adversely affecting the field policing activities. Procurement of sophisticated weapons was inadequate and police stations and Battalions continued to depend on outdated weaponry. Funds intended for upgradation of facilities for training were diverted for other purposes. Forensic Science Laboratories were underutilised. The expenditure incurred on POLNET was redundant. Computerisation of police stations was also ineffective. An efficient monitoring mechanism was absent both at department and Government level including the SLEC. Overall, the objectives of the scheme were not fully achieved.

#### **3.4.17 Recommendations**

- Annual Action Plans should be drawn up based on assessment of actual need and subjected to scrutiny by SLEC. It should be ensured that prior approval of SLEC as stipulated should be obtained, for any deviations.
- The pace of construction should be accelerated to ensure completion of the buildings in a time bound manner.
- Mobility of the police force for field policing should be improved.
- Implementation of eCops and CIPA to the desired level should be ensured at once to ensure instantaneous information access electronically at all levels including the police stations.
- There is an urgent need to put in place a stringent monitoring mechanism both at the department and Government level as well as SLEC.

The above points were reported to Government in July 2007; their reply had not been received (August 2007). Recommendations were accepted in the exit conference held in July 2007.

**Appendix 3.12**  
(Reference to paragraphs 3.4.6.1 page 89)

**Delays in submission of Annual Action Plans (MOPF) to Ministry of Home Affairs**

Year of the scheme	Due date of submission of the AAP to MHA	Date of submission of the AAP	Date of approval of the AAP by the MHA
2002-03	15.05.2002	21.10.2002	13.11.2002
2003-04	15.05.2003	02.07.2003	30.09.2003
2004-05	15.06.2004	05.07.2004	04.08.2004
2005-06	15.05.2005	14.06.2005	29.06.2005
2006-07	15.05.2006	01.07.2006	26.07.2006

**Appendix 3.13**  
(Reference to paragraphs 3.4. 8.1 page 91)

**A. Status of Non - residential buildings under Modernisation of Police Force**

Year of allotment	Total units taken up	No. of units		
		Completed	In progress	Not commenced
2002-03	136	136 (100%)	--	--
2003-04	83	53 (64%)	30	--
2004-05	85	61 (72%)	19	05
2005-06	65	13 (20%)	39	13
2006-07	91	--	--	91
<b>Total</b>	<b>460</b>	<b>263 (57%)</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>109</b>

**B. Status of Residential buildings under MOPF**

Year of allotment	Total units taken up	No. of units		
		Completed	In progress	Not commenced
2002-03	318	306 (96%)	12	--
2003-04	278	78 (28%)	189	11
2004-05	236	04 (2%)	188	44
2005-06	--	--	--	--
2006-07	--	--	--	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>832</b>	<b>388 (47%)</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>55</b>

**Appendix 3.14**  
**(Reference to paragraph 3.4.9.1 page 93)**

**Non-providing of vehicles (four wheelers) to police stations**

District	No. of police stations	Vehicles received during 2002-03 to 2006-07	No. of vehicles supplied prior to 2002-03	No. of vehicles supplied to police stations during 2002-03 to 2006-07	No. of police stations still having no vehicles
Sangareddy	60	28	05	05	50
Kurnool	84	52	07	Nil	77
Nizamabad	47	45	23	07	17
Mahaboobnagar	76	45	01	20	55
Vizianagaram	42	39	01	09	32
Guntur	84	52	06	20	58
<b>Total</b>	<b>393</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>289</b>

## HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

### 3.1 Modernisation of State Police Force

#### *Highlights*

*The scheme for Modernisation of police force was revamped with enhanced allocation from 2000-01 for increasing the efficiency and striking capability of the State police forces. The scheme envisaged increase in operational efficiency of the State police forces to enable them to meet the challenges of internal security environment, extremists activities and law and order situation in the State. Due to inadequate planning and delayed issue of sanctions, the scheme was unable to bridge the gap in infrastructure relating to mobility, arms, communication and training. Salient points are mentioned below:*

**The State Government was deprived of Rs 121.02 crore of GOI share during 2001-06 due to low spending of funds caused by delay in issue of sanctions by Home Department.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.6)*

**Rupees 77.23 crore for the year 2003-04 was not approved by MHA due to delayed submission of annual plans.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.7)*

**Only 1045 housing units were completed against the total requirement of 59614 units for the State police force.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.8)*

**Wireless sets costing Rs 4.61 crore were purchased without required accessories hence they remained unutilized.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.9.1)*

**The infructuous expenditure of Rs 4.96 crore on POLNET was mainly attributable to the failure of State Government to abide by its contractual obligation.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.9.2)*

**Extra expenditure of Rs 3.10 crore was incurred during 2002-06 on purchase of vehicles and arms at higher rates due to delay in finalization of purchase procedure.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.11.1)*

**The State Level Empowered Committee met only for approval of purchase proposals and did not monitor the implementation of scheme.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.15)*

#### **3.1.1 Introduction**

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India (GOI) introduced the scheme of “Modernisation of State Police Force (MPF)” (1969) with the objective to improve the functional efficiency of the State Police Force in controlling the crime, terrorism and naxal activities. After periodical reviews,

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the GOI extended it for a further period of ten years w.e.f. 2000-01. The central assistance was enhanced from fifty to seventy five per cent in 2003-04 to strengthen the existing infrastructure viz. buildings, mobility, weapons, communication systems, training, Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), office automation and equipment.

### **3.1.2      *Organisational set up***

At the Government level, Secretary, Home (Police) Department was responsible for implementation of the scheme. Director General of Police (DGP) with the assistance of the ADG (Training and Modernisation), the IG (Provision), the DIG (Administration), the DIG (Technical Services and Communication), the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) were responsible for execution and implementation of the scheme. Construction of Police buildings was executed by Bihar Police Building Construction Corporation (BPBCC). At the district level Senior Superintendents of Police/ Superintendents of Police (Sr.S.Ps/S.Ps) were responsible for implementation of the scheme in 840 police stations in the state.

At the apex level the State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) was constituted with the Chief Secretary as Chairman and the Home Secretary, Development Commissioner, Finance Commissioner and DGP as members among others to approve the annual action plan and to evaluate the monitoring of implementation of the scheme.

### **3.1.3      *Audit objectives***

Audit objectives were to examine whether:

- the annual plans formulated reflected the needs of the State Police Force;
- the funds provided for the scheme were optimally utilised;
- the deficiencies in existing infrastructure assessed during 2000-01 were removed and upgraded infrastructure was created and provided to the police force to improve its operational efficiency;
- the modernisation scheme was effective in promoting quick response and reducing investigation time;
- the implementation of scheme was monitored closely and effectively.

### **3.1.4      *Audit criteria***

The audit criteria used to evaluate the scheme were:

- GOI norms for incurring expenditure on different components of the scheme;
- Purchase procedure of Bihar Financial Rules;
- Norms prescribed by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D), New Delhi and GOI instructions;
- Monitoring system provided in the scheme.



### 3.1.5 Audit coverage and methodology

Performance review of Modernisation of State Police Force was conducted during February to May 2006 covering the period 2001-06. Entry conference was held (April 2006) with IG (Provision) and DIG (Provision). The records of Secretary, Home Department, DGP, ADG (Modernisation), IG (Provision), IG (Homeguard), IG (Technical Services and Communication), Director (FSL), Central Store (Weaponry), Central Store (Vehicles & Equipment) and Chairman-cum-Managing Director (BPBCC) along with its four Divisions<sup>1</sup>, Constable Training School (CTS) Nathnagar, Bhagalpur and nine<sup>2</sup> out of 40 police districts which includes five<sup>3</sup> naxal affected were test checked in course of review. Records relating to preparation and implementation of Annual plans, purchase of arms, equipment, vehicles, construction of police buildings and their utilisation were reviewed. Audit findings were discussed in an exit conference (October 2006) with IG (Provision) and Additional Secretary of Home Department. Their views have been taken into account in this review.

### 3.1.6 Financial management

During 2000-03 the scheme was financed by GOI and the State Government in the ratio of 50:50. The funding pattern was modified from 2003-04 and the ratio was changed to 75:25 between the Centre and State. A condition was imposed to release the funds for subsequent years only after receipt of utilisation certificate of previous years failing which the sum equivalent to unutilised amount would be deducted from the central share of next year. In order to expedite the modernisation process, GOI decided (November 2003) to provide funds directly to suppliers agencies except buildings from 2003-04.

The details of plan approved, funds released by the GOI, State share and expenditure incurred under the scheme during 2001-06 were as under:

<i>(Rupees in crore)</i>							
Year	Approved plan	Budget Provision	Central share	Funds released by		Total available funds	Expenditure during the year
				Centre	State		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2001-02	118.99	108.00	59.49	54.00	54.00	108.00	23.24
2002-03	101.17	108.00	50.59	10.93	76.83 <sup>#</sup>	87.76	23.59
2003-04	Nil	108.00	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	35.19
2004-05	108.31	108.00	81.23	46.49	43.61	90.10	101.32 <sup>*</sup>
2005-06	106.55	108.00	81.00	39.87	36.00	75.87	67.96 <sup>^</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>435.02</b>	<b>540.00</b>	<b>272.31</b>	<b>151.29</b>	<b>210.44</b>	<b>361.73</b>	<b>251.30</b>

<sup>#</sup> It includes Rs 65.90 crore kept in P/L Account for buildings construction work of plan year 2000-01.

<sup>\*</sup> It includes Rs 45.01 crore, value of materials supplied by GOI during 2004-05;

<sup>^</sup> It includes Rs 30.87 crore, value of materials supplied by GOI during 2005-06.

<sup>1</sup> Patna, Bhagalpur, Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur.

<sup>2</sup> Aurangabad, Bhagalpur, Darbhanga, East Champaran, Gaya, Jamui, Muzaffarpur, Patna and Saharsa.

<sup>3</sup> Aurangabad, East Champaran, Gaya, Jamui and Patna.

State Government  
deprived of GOI  
share of  
Rs 121.02 crore

The following was observed:

- GOI provided only Rs 151.29 crore out of its share of Rs 272.31 crore depriving State Government of Rs 121.02 crore. Delay ranging from five to 13 months in issue of sanction orders by the Home Department was responsible for slow utilization of funds.
- Considering the inability of State Government in utilising funds of central grant, GOI itself purchased materials\* costing Rs 75.88 crore and supplied to State Government during 2004-06.
- Rupees 88.11 crore was spent during 2001-05 on purchase of items proposed in the previous year plan (2000-03) out of the allocation of current year budget though renewed budget provision in the current year for incurring expenditure out of approved plan of previous year was not made.

The component-wise breakup of the Annual Plan funds which includes central and state share both and expenditure thereagainst were as under:

<i>(Rupees in crore)</i>				
Sl. No.	Components	Approved plan 2000-06	Expenditure during 2001-06	Shortfall
1.	Buildings	227.57	59.62	167.95
2.	Communication	38.96	15.17	23.79
3.	Office automation and equipment	59.71	27.23	32.48
4.	Mobility	165.49	94.95	70.54
5.	Weapons	52.21	51.44	0.77
6.	Forensic Science Laboratory	1.13	0.22	0.91
7.	Training	5.12	2.67	2.45
	<b>Total</b>	<b>550.19<sup>#</sup></b>	<b>251.30</b>	<b>298.89</b>

# It includes Rs 115.17 crore of Annual plan approved by GOI in 2000-01 from which expenditure was incurred during 2001-06.

The above table shows substantial shortfall in expenditure vis-à-vis approved plan which has been commented in subsequent paras.

### 3.1.7 Planning

Requirement not  
assessed on the basis  
of BPR&D norm

The annual plans were to be prepared on the basis of BPR&D norms in order to provide adequate sophisticated arms, buildings, training and communication network to enhance the striking capacity of Police force. The norms of the BPR&D were not considered and inputs from field offices were not obtained while preparing the plans.

The following shortcomings were noticed in plans:

- requirement of High Frequency (HF) wireless sets as per BPR&D norms alongwith battery; cable, antenna, etc were neither assessed nor included in plan.

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\* Vehicles, Arms and POLNET

- only 3421 (six *per cent*) housing units were included in the plan (2000-06) against requirement of 59614 units;
- only 4892 vehicles (58 *per cent*) were included in the plan (2000-06) against requirement of 8383;
- requirement of arms was not assessed;

Perspective plan (2000-05) was not submitted to GOI. In respect of annual plan the GOI (MHA) directed (April 2001) the State Government to submit annual plan in the month of April every year. It was noticed that the annual plans were not being submitted timely to MHA. GOI. The details of annual plans from preparation to sanctioning stage were given in *Appendix-XXVI*.

**Delayed issue of sanctions by the Home Department**

The analysis of *Appendix-XXVI* shows that there was persistent delay ranging from two to nine months in preparation of annual plans at Police headquarters level. The Home Department delayed issue of sanction by five to thirteen months even after receiving approval from MHA. The annual plan of Rs 77.23 crore pertaining to the year 2003-04 was not approved by the MHA as it was submitted after delay of 17 months out of which eight months were taken by the Home Department to process the proposal. Similarly, proposals (Rs 8.97 crore) for purchase of explosive detector, VHF hand sets, bullet proof jacket, passive night vision devices and providing water supply and electric supply at CTS Nathnagar were pending with the Home Department in 2005-06 leading to surrender of Rs 8.31 crore despite submission of the proposals by IG (Provision) well in time.

### **3.1.8. Shortage of buildings**

**Only six per cent buildings included in plan against requirement**

The National Police Commission had recommended (1977) hundred *per cent* accommodation for police personnel. Against the requirement of 59614 housing units<sup>4</sup> for the entire police force at the beginning of 2001-02, the units included in the plan of 2000-06 was 3421<sup>5</sup> (six *per cent*). The actual requirement based on BPR&D norms was not calculated by the BPBCC.

Out of 3421 units included in the plan, only 1608 units were taken up for construction. The physical and financial target, achievement, expenditure both on completed and incomplete work of buildings construction during 2001-06 were detailed in *Appendix-XXVII*. It was observed that out of 1608 works of construction of housing units taken up during 2001-06 at a cost of Rs 78.52 crore, only 1045 units (65 *per cent*) could be completed at a cost of Rs 34.38 crore. The construction work of four police stations was not started as of June 2006 as the land was not made available by the Government.

<sup>4</sup> Requirement: PS 523, P/Line-17, DCR-40, SP Office-23, RDG-9, Zonal IG-4, SDPO Office-56, Rest room/ Women barrack 893, LSQrs 50142, USQrs 7907.  
(Source: BPR&D book and DGP's Report submitted to MHA).

<sup>5</sup> Approved Plan: PS-146, P/Line-8, DCR-40, SDPO Office-2, Rest room/Women barrack-24, LSQrs-2137, USQrs-1064.

**BPBCC failed to enforce the clause of agreement with contractor**

- The construction of 559 housing units were awarded to contractors during 2001-03 with stipulated completion period of ten months to one year. The constructions were incomplete even after lapse of three years, reportedly due to dispute on construction site, delay in retendering for the incomplete left over works, and non supply of materials (iron & cement) by BPBCC to the contractors. Moreover, as per clause of agreement, the Corporation did not impose any penalty on the defaulting contractors. However, Rs 18.97 crore was paid to the contractors as of August 2006. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, BPBCC, Patna, stated that delay in release of sanction orders for schemes of 2001-02 and notification for liquidation (July 2003) of the Corporation by the Government affected the execution of the scheme. The reply was not tenable as the works awarded to the contractors in the year 2001 and 2002 (Scheme of 2000-01) were lying incomplete (June 2006).
- 67 housing units were stated to be completed in three test-checked divisions<sup>6</sup> at a cost of Rs 3.36 crore between August 2004 and December 2005 but remained unallotted as they were not handed over by BPBCC as of June 2006;

**Buildings of PS remained unused due to lack of US and LS quarters**

- Four police stations without any quarter, one with ten lower subordinate quarters and one police line were constructed at a cost of Rs 1.61 crore during January 2001 to March 2005 were transferred to the concerned SPs<sup>7</sup>, but the buildings remained unused due to lack of lower subordinate and upper sub-ordinate quarters and boundary wall for proper security. Out of five police stations (PS), four PS buildings at Simra (Aurangabad)-1, Tilouthu (Rohtas)-1, Chhabilapur (Nalanda)-1 and Aanti (Gaya)-1 constructed at a cost of Rs 27.01 lakh were destroyed (2004-05) by extremists. The lower sub-ordinate quarters constructed for Delha Thana (Gaya) and police line of Rohtas district remained unused till date as the SPs of both districts did not take action to shift in the new buildings despite handing over the buildings in November 2002 and April 2005 respectively by BPBCC. The reasons for non-shifting of police line into the new building was mainly attributable to the non-provision of boundary wall, water supply, drainage system and naxal problem.

### **3.1.9 Communication**

To improve the response time, a plan for modernisation of communication system for linking headquarters with police station level was approved for Rs 38.96 crore against which only Rs 15.17 crore (39 *per cent*) was spent during 2001-06.

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<sup>6</sup> Patna, Muzaffarpur and Bhagalpur.

<sup>7</sup> Rohtas (PS-2, LS-10, P/Line-1), Aurangabad (PS-1), Nalanda (PS-1), Gaya (PS-1)

### 3.1.9.1 Wireless sets remained non-functional

The requirement of VHF, HF, HH sets along with battery as per BPR&D norms and availability thereagainst as of June 2006 were as shown in the table:

	Requirement as per BPR&D norms (in number)						Available					Shortage (in number)				
	Total	Static	HH	HF	Battery		VHF	HH	HF	Battery		VHF	HH	HF	Battery	
	VHF Sets	VHF Sets	Sets	Sets	13 Plate	25 Plate	Sets	Sets	Sets	13 Plate	25 Plate	Sets	Sets	Sets	13 Plate	25 Plate
Test checked districts	1418	526	949	NA	1052	NA	964	636	50	397	9	454	313	NA	655	91
Bihar	4561	1558	4699	191	3116	382	3542	3330	102	1127	40	1019	1369	NA	1989	164

(As per BPR&D norms two batteries are required for each static VHF sets and all HF sets)

Against the availability of VHF sets (68 per cent) and HF sets (53 per cent) with respect to requirement the availability of batteries was only 38 per cent and nine per cent respectively. 3542 Very High Frequency (VHF) sets (Rs 4.59 crore), 3330 Hand Held (HH) sets (Rs 3.77 crore), 102 High Frequency (HF) sets (Rs 48.34 lakh) and 677 (12 volt 13 plate) batteries (Rs 14.58 lakh) for VHF sets were procured during 2003-06 for police stations of 40 police districts.

**VHF sets worth Rs 3.60 crore remained non-functional**

Out of 3542 VHF sets, 2896 VHF sets (Rs 3.60 crore) were procured and supplied without required accessories<sup>8</sup> as they were not included in the plan. Further, 280 VHF sets (Rs 52.87 lakh) supplied (2004-05) with eliminator by Motorola were returned (February 2005) to the company with the request to replace the eliminator with batteries but they were not supplied as of June 2006. 102 HF sets (Rs 48.35 lakh) supplied without batteries or eliminator and distributed to field offices were lying idle. The DGP replied that all the VHF and HF sets were functional in the State, but the fact remains that the department did not make provision of accessories and adequate number of batteries.

1127 batteries were available against requirement of 3116 batteries. The operational life of 667 batteries were expired (April 2006). Shortage of batteries affected adversely the operation of VHF-HF sets.

Thus, wireless sets purchased at a cost of Rs 4.61 crore remained unutilized and failed to augment the communication network of Police Force. Further, against the sanctioned strength of 997 Literate Constables (Operators), 225 personnel were available in Bihar (March 2006) which adversely affected the functioning of communication system. The proposal for procurement of batteries (April 2006) was sent by wireless wing of IG (Modernisation) as stated by the DGP. The DGP replied that procurement of batteries and the proposal for recruitment of literate constables has been sent.

<sup>8</sup> Two adapters, Cockcell cable, Grout plain antenna, Bracket, Battery charger and Tower Mast.



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### 3.1.9.2 POLNET

Satellite based integrated police communication network (POLNET) sanctioned under 10<sup>th</sup> plan (2002-07) was included in the Annual Plan of the year 2002-03 under police modernisation scheme to provide voice, data and message communication from the Headquarters office to Police Station level with the help of 36 Very Small Aperture Terminal (V-SAT) and 840 Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART).

The work for execution of POLNET project was awarded (2002) to Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) Gaziabad by GOI for completion upto March 2005.

As per terms and condition the installation of V-SAT, Computer, Fax Machine, Antenna, Base Subscriber Unit (BSU) of MART, at district level and Remote Subscriber Unit (RSU) of MART, Antenna and Telephone set at PS level were to be provided by BEL. 120 feet tower for V-SAT (36), generators, voltage stabilisers, air conditioning machines, 60 feet triangular lattice MAST for each MART units (840), furniture and batteries with charger were to be provided by the State Government.

It was observed that:

- Though BEL completed installation and commissioning of V-SATs during 2005-06, State Government did not provide air conditioners despite being informed by BEL (November 2005) that probability of break down increases due to high temperature. As on March 2006 out of 36 V-SATs, 11 V-SATs were completely non-functional and 14 were partially functional.
- Multi Access Radio Telephony equipment supplied by BEL (December 2004) was lying unutilized in district stores as State Government failed to construct towers in 840 PS though Rs 1.60 crore and Rs 11.43 crore was provided in the budget for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 respectively as funds were not released by the department.

**Non-construction of tower led to infructuous expenditure of Rs 4.96 crore on POLNET**

Thus, POLNET remained non-functional and amount of Rs 4.96 crore paid to BEL proved infructuous. The DGP accepted (October 2006) the audit findings.

### 3.1.10 Office automation and equipment

Twelve Fire Arms Training Simulators (FATS) were purchased at a cost of Rs 1.73 crore during 2001-02 for imparting training to police personnel out of which five were supplied to test checked districts. Two FATS at CTS, Nathnagar, one at Bihar Military Police (BMP)-18, Gaya were defective and remaining two at BMP-6, Muzaffarpur and BMP-1, Patna could not be utilised due to absence of trained personnel to handle the equipment. The DGP stated (October 2006) that the commandants were instructed to get it repaired.

Generator sets purchased at a cost of Rs 72.56 lakh were lying unutilized

In view of erratic electric supply position in Bihar 145 Gen Sets (2005-06) were purchased at a cost of Rs 72.56 lakh and distributed to the PS of test checked districts but they remained unutilized due to non-provision of kerosene oil for its operation. The DGP stated that Secretary, Food and Civil Supply had been requested (July 06) to allot the district wise kerosene oil quota.

### 3.1.11 Mobility

The expenditure incurred under Mobility during 2001-06 was Rs 94.95 crore. The requirement of different categories of vehicles as per norms of BPR&D and availability there against as on March 2006 were as under:

Types of Vehicles	Requirement as per BPR&D norms	Included in the plan 2000-06	Purchased during 2001-06	Total available as on March 2006	Shortfall in	
					Number	Percent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Heavy	805	296	137	223	582	72
Medium	817	337	192	577	240	29
Light	3404	1433	703	2809	595	17
Motor Cycle	3357	2826	829	1197	2160	64
<b>Total</b>	<b>8383</b>	<b>4892</b>	<b>1861</b>	<b>4806</b>	<b>3577</b>	<b>43</b>

The analysis of aforesaid table indicated that against the requirement of 8383 vehicles, only 4806 (57 per cent) vehicles were available as of March 2006. The shortage of 43 per cent with respect to requirement was mainly due to short utilisation of funds as well as delay in finalisation of purchase. Shortage of different kind of vehicles was accepted (October 2006) by the DGP and stated that proposal for procurement of vehicles is under process.

It was observed that :

Availability of drivers was very low compared to vehicles.

- The sanctioned strength of drivers in Bihar was 2342 against which only 1037 drivers were available for operation of 4806 vehicles in the State as of March 2006.
- In nine test-checked districts 329 (53 per cent) drivers were available (June 2006).
- 60 Commander Jeeps and 16 Tata Spacio vehicles procured during 2004-05 and 2005-06 for Left Wing Extremists (LWE) districts<sup>9</sup> were provided to non-LWE districts<sup>10</sup>. The DGP's reply that vehicles were provided to non-LWE districts in the interest of law and order is not tenable as these vehicles were meant for LWE districts.

<sup>9</sup> Arwal, Aurangabad, Bhojpur, East Champaran, Gaya, Jamui, Jahanabad, Kaimur, Nawada, Nalanda, Patna, Rohtas, Sitamarhi and West Champaran.

<sup>10</sup> Hqr:12+0, Naugachhia:6+0, Buxar:6+2, Bhagalpur:8+1, Banka:7+0, Muzaffarpur:3+3, Begusarai:2+0, Vaishali:2+0, Sheohar:1+0, Siwan:3+0, Darbhanga:3+4, Madhepura:1+0, Shekhpura:1+2, Khagaria:1+0, Purnea:1+1, Gopalganj:1+0, Samastipur:1+0, Saharsa:1+1, Saran:0+1 and Munger:0+1.

- Out of 386 motorcycles purchased for outposts and town outposts 273 were deployed at other places like SP residence (13), Police Line (260) etc in test checked districts.

#### **3.1.11.1 Extra expenditure on purchases**

**Extra expenditure of Rs 3.10 crore due to delay in purchase**

The proposal for purchase of six types of vehicles and three types of arms (*Appendix-XXVIII*) were approved in annual plans of 2000-03. The total cost of purchase was Rs 19.35 crore. These items could not be purchased during the respective plan years due to delay in issue of sanction by the Home Department and consequent delay in placement of supply orders by IG (Provision). These items were purchased during 2002-06 at a cost of Rs 22.45 crore leading to extra expenditure of Rs 3.10 crore. The DGP accepted (October 2006) the audit findings.

#### **3.1.11.2 Wasteful expenditure due to non-execution of after sale service contract**

**Motorboats remained defective**

Twenty-one boats valued Rs 1.05 crore were purchased during 2001-02 for 19 districts from an Okhla based company. The option of signing after sales service contract was not exercised by the provisioning branch. It was observed that SPs of 13 districts informed the IG (Provision) between November 2002 and July 2005 that 15 boats were non-functional due to mechanical defects with simultaneous request to the company also. One boat in Bagha districts became defective during guarantee period but was not repaired by the company. Neither penal action was initiated against the company nor was its bank guarantee of Rs 5.34 lakh withheld. Though 15 Motor Boats costing Rs 74.91 lakh were lying defective, no action was taken by the department for repair. In absence of after sale service contract the motor boats could not be repaired which became defective between November 2002 and May 2005. The DGP informed that SP's have been directed to get the motorboats repaired.

#### **3.1.11.3 Avoidable payment**

**Avoidable payment due to delay in release of purchase order**

Empowered Committee approved the proposal for purchase of 12 Vehicle Mounted Water Cannons (VMWC) and 41 Riot Control Vehicles (RCV) during the year 2001-03. Proforma invoice was obtained from Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) (July 2003) in which the quoted rates for VMWC (Rs 25.90 lakh) and RCV (Rs 8.40 lakh) were valid till December 2003, later extended upto March 2004. However, Home Department delayed the release of sanction order and placement of purchase order was issued in April 2004 by the IG (Provision) for 11 VMWC and 41 RCV but by that time DRDO increased the rate of VMWC to Rs 28 lakh and RCV to Rs 8.90 lakh leading to avoidable extra payment of Rs 43.60 lakh.

#### **3.1.12 Weaponry**

**AK-47 deployed for personal security**

Rupees 51.44 crore was spent on procurement of weapons (AK-47: 1500; INSAS: 9660; LMG: 100; Carbine: 50 and 9 mm Pistol: 972) during 2001-06 against approved plan size of Rs 52.21 crore. The deployment of AK-47 rifles in test-checked districts disclosed that, 39 rifles (out of 363) were provided to

bodyguards by the concerned SPs in violation of instructions of Ministry of Home Affairs which strictly prohibited use of AK-47 rifles for personal security. Intensive training required for handling of AK-47 and INSAS was also not imparted.

The DGP informed that direction have been issued to SPs for imparting training. Further, SPs have been asked to explain the circumstances under which AK-47 were deployed with bodyguards.

### **3.1.13 Forensic Science Laboratory**

Forensic Science Laboratory was providing technical and scientific assistance to the Police Department by analyzing samples received/collected from the crime site. MHA approved (2000-01) plan of Rs 1.13 crore for purchase of equipment but only Rs 22 lakh could be spent till date (June 2006). 32 persons were posted against sanctioned strength of 65 technical staff<sup>11</sup>.

**Pending cases increased from 824 to 3007**

The number of pending cases of samples received during modernization period (2001-06) increased from 824 (2001) to 3007 (2005). The samples received in 2001 were not analysed till June 2006. The Director, FSL, stated that shortage of manpower was adversely affecting the routine work resulting in low disposal of cases.

#### **3.1.13.1 Non-utilisation of forensic equipment**

**Equipment non-functional due to voltage fluctuation**

Three machines<sup>12</sup> valuing Rs 21.99 lakh provided to FSL Patna during 2002-03 were commissioned between February 2003 and January 2006 in order to provide speedy scientific aid to investigation. All the three machines were remained non-functional during 2003-06 due to software problem and voltage fluctuation. Director, FSL, stated that the software problem could not be solved due to non allotment of funds. Further, scrutiny revealed that DNA isolation machine (Rs 53 lakh) remained packed since June 2002 due to lack of building to be provided by State Government as of June 2006.

#### **3.1.13.2 Non-functional Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (RFSL)**

The RFSL at Muzaffarpur, located in a rented building was without equipment required for sample testing. It was working only as a collection centre of samples. The samples collected were being sent to FSL Patna for analysis. Non-working of RFSL was adversely affecting the police investigation process.

### **3.1.14 Training**

**Police Academy not yet constructed**

Training is necessary to address the changing needs of Police Force in order to introduce the modern technological applications and to develop skills. Six

<sup>11</sup>

<i>Position of staff</i>	<i>Sr. Scientific Officer</i>	<i>Sr. Scientific Assistant</i>	<i>Technician/Lab Assistant</i>
<i>Sanctioned strength</i>	24	13	28
<i>Men-in-position</i>	3	4	25

<sup>12</sup>

*Distillation Analyser, Viscosity Analyser, Polygraph*

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training institutions<sup>13</sup> of undivided Bihar except Constable Training School (CTS) Nathnagar, Bhagalpur institutions are now in Jharkhand. State Government was yet to acquire land for construction of Police Academy despite approval of proposal in 2002-03.

Test check of records of ADG (Training) and CTS, Nathnagar disclosed that neither training requirement was assessed nor annual targets fixed during 2001-06. The Department simply issued order (May 2005) for relieving of police personnel for training on the basis of date of appointment.

**Even basic training not imparted**

Only 4076 (10 per cent) were trained against total strength of 36995 Police personnel in the CTS Nathnagar. Basic training was imparted to 936 personnel in 2000-01 which was further declined to 233 in 2005-06. Reasons for decline was stated to be reluctance of SPs to relieve the personnel for training. Improper training was imparted to six fresher DSPs as no Police Academy was available. BPR&D norms for refresher training on every five year were not followed. The existing infrastructure in the training school was inadequate and requirement was not fulfilled despite provision in Modernisation plan of 2002-03. Only 37 arms were available against the required 558 arms for training.

### **3.1.15 Monitoring**

**Monitoring was not done by State Level Empowered Committee**

State Level Empowered Committee was responsible for approval of annual plans for onward submission to MHA. The progress of implementation of approved annual plans was to be monitored by the SLEC by holding one meeting every month and by deputing teams of officers who will visit fields and make periodic assessment regarding implementation of the scheme. It was, however, noticed that SLEC met 17 times only during 2001-06 though 60 meetings should have been held. This affected adversely in submission of annual plans to MHA for approval and implementation of the plan. Scrutiny of minutes of these 17 meetings disclosed that the implementation of the scheme was never reviewed and met only for approval of purchase proposals of vehicles, arms and communications equipment etc.

### **3.1.16 Conclusion**

State Government was deprived of central assistance due to low spending caused by delay in issue of sanctions by the Home Department. Planning was inadequate as input from field offices was not available and BPR&D norms were not considered while assessing the requirement. Consequently targets fixed in the plan were low when compared to the actual requirement. Incomplete housing units due to deficient contract management by BPBCC led to denial of housing facilities to police personnel. Striking capability of the force was not augmented as motorcycles meant for outposts and vehicles procured for LWE districts were deployed elsewhere. Scientific investigation of crime did not improve as the forensic science laboratory suffered from shortage of manpower

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<sup>13</sup> Police Training College, Hazaribagh; Military Police Training College, Hazaribagh; Traffic Training School, Jamshedpur; Automatic Indoor Firing Range, Bokaro; Granade Firing Range, Deoghar and Wireless Repeater Station at Parasnath Hills.



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and non-utilisation of equipment. Skill enhancement of personnel could not be achieved as there was no officer training academy and infrastructure at constable training school was inadequate. Schemes were never reviewed by SLEC indicating a weak monitoring mechanism.

Thus, scheme of Police modernisation had a marginal impact in bridging the gap in infrastructure and upgradation of skills of Police personnel.

### *Recommendations*

- Proposals should be processed by the Home Department within a fixed time limit.
- Plans should correctly assess the requirement as per BPR&D norms as well as inputs from the field offices ;
- Efforts should be made to bridge gaps in infrastructure especially buildings and mobility;
- FSL should be strengthened in terms of equipment and technical manpower to aid scientific investigation of crime;
- The Government should upgrade the training infrastructure including setting up new training academy for officers and also ensure it's optimum utilisation;
- Monitoring of implementation of scheme should be made effective both at the level of Departmental and State Level Empowered Committee.

The above points were reported to Government (July 2006); their reply has not been received (October 2006).

## APPENDIX-XXVI

*(Refer Paragraph: 3.1.7 Page-39)*

*Details of presentation of annual plans from preparation to sanctioning stage*

Plan year	Date of receipt in Home department from Police headquarters	Date of approval of empowered committee	Date of sending plan to MHA	Date of approval by MHA	Date of issue of sanction by the Department
2001-02	10.11.2001	15.01.2002	22.01.2002	02.02.2002	05.03.2003
2002-03	09.11.2002	17.12.2002	14.02.2003	20.03.2003	04.03.2004
2003-04	07.01.2004	12.02.2004	20.09.2004	Not approved	--
2004-05	08.09.2004	20.09.2004	20.09.2004	22.09.2004	31.03.2005
2005-06	10.06.2005	11.06.2005	25.06.2005	14.09.2005	16.02.2006

## APPENDIX-XXVII

*(Refer Paragraph: 3.1.8 Page-39)*

*Statement of physical and financial target, achievement, expenditure both on complete and incomplete work of buildings construction during 2001-06*

*(Rupees in crore)*

Type of Construction	Units taken up for construction (Plan Year 2000-02)		Achievement				
	Physical	Financial	Physical		Financial		
			Completed	In Progress	Completed	In Progress	Total expenditure
Lower Sub-ordinate Quarter	1072	26.80	694	378	15.71	5.11	20.82
Upper Sub-ordinate Quarter	370	17.54	252	118	10.02	3.32	13.34
Police Station	23	2.76	7	12	0.82	0.47	1.29
Distt.Control Room	36	4.09	22	14	1.67	0.50	2.17
Boundary Wall	80	3.20	51	29	1.79	0.19	1.98
Female Barrack	22	0.56	18	4	0.92	0.16	1.08
Police Line	5	23.57	1	4	3.45	9.22	12.67
<b>Total</b>	<b>1608</b>	<b>78.52</b>	<b>1045</b>	<b>559</b>	<b>34.38</b>	<b>18.97</b>	<b>53.35</b>

**APPENDIX-XXVIII***(Refer Paragraph: 3.1.11.1 Page-44)***Statement of excess expenditure above approved rate***(Rs in lakh)*

Name of vehicle/ arms	Plan Year	Purchase during the year	Rate approved (per unit)	Total Amount approved	Rate Purchased	Total Amount of Purchase	Difference in rate	Total Number Purchased	Total Excess Expenditure
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
BP Gypsy	2000-01	2002-03	10.00	110.00	12.02	132.22	2.02	11	22.22
Crane with Fabrication	2000-01	2002-03	9.00	117.00	11.52	149.76	2.52	13	32.76
Mine Protected Vehicle	2000-01	2002-03	55.00	220.00	60.32	241.28	5.32	4	21.28
Prisoner Van	2000-01	2002-03	9.75	204.75	10.82	227.22	1.07	21	22.47
AK-47	2001-02	2003-04	0.05	20.00	0.07	28.00	0.02	400	8.00
BP Car	2001-02	2003-04	14.00	14.00	19.65	19.65	5.65	1	5.65
INSAS Rifle	2001-02	2003-04	0.22	64.50	0.26	78.60	0.05	300	14.10
Mine Protected Vehicle	2001-02	2003-04	55.00	550.00	60.32	603.20	5.32	10	53.20
Vehicle Mounted Water Canon	2001-02	2003-04	24.00	264.00	28.00	308.00	4.00	11	44.00
BP Gypsy	2001-02	2004-05	10.00	40.00	12.05	48.20	2.05	4	8.20
MMV	2002-03	2004-05	55.00	330.00	60.32	361.92	5.32	6	31.92
81mm mortar	2002-03	2005-06	0.20	1.00	9.40	47.00	9.20	5	46.00
<b>Total</b>				<b>1935.25 or Rs.19.35 crore</b>		<b>2245.05 or Rs 22.45 crore</b>			<b>309.80 or Rs 3.10 crore</b>

**HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT**

**5.1 Internal Control Mechanism of Home (Police) Department**

***Highlights***

Internal control system is an integral part of the functioning of an organisation to govern its activities effectively to achieve its objectives. Various internal control measures in financial and operational activities are built into the departmental rules, codes and manuals and strict adherence to these minimises the risk of errors and irregularities. An evaluation of the internal control mechanism in Home Department- Police revealed that the internal control measures prescribed under the rules were generally neglected, expenditure control was non-existent, and implementation of schemes for modernization of police force was deficient.

**Budget was prepared without taking any inputs from the field offices and without considering the expenditure of previous years. As a result the budget estimates were tentative and not need based**

***(Paragraph 5.1.5)***

**Out of total plan funds of Rs 209.42 crore released by the State Government during 2001-04, Rs 84.72 crore only were spent and Rs 124.65 crore (60 per cent) were surrendered without any recorded reasons. Evidently there was excess provision of fund.**

***(Paragraph 5.1.7)***

**Utilisation certificate submitted to Government of India for Rs 147.16 crore spent during 2000-04 on Modernisation of Police Forces(MPF) included advances of Rs 70.41 crore given to Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation (Rs 38.63 crore), Executive Engineers, BCD (Rs 15.16 crore), 22 Deputy Commissioners (Rs 7.97 crore) for composite control rooms and amount retained in civil deposit (Rs 8.65 crore).**

***(Paragraph 5.1.10)***

**In seven test checked districts, District Composite Control Rooms could not become operational despite expenditure of Rs 2.09 crore as man power required for the control room was not sanctioned by the Government.**

***(Paragraph 5.1.16)***

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**Car diaries in respect of 113 vehicles out of 182 vehicles under SSP Ranchi were not submitted by users during 2003-04 even though bills for fuel amounting to Rs 39.78 lakh were already disbursed. Misappropriation of amount cannot be ruled out.**

*(Paragraph 5.1.22)*

**Department did not have any internal audit wing. Internal audit by finance department was also not conducted.**

*(Paragraph 5.1.25)*

### **5.1.1 Introduction**

Internal control system is an integral part of the functioning of an organisation to govern its activities effectively to achieve its objectives. Various internal control measures in financial and operational activities are built into the departmental rules, codes and manuals and strict adherence to these provide reasonable assurance to the department about compliance with applicable rules thus assuring reliability of financial reporting and achieving effectiveness and efficiency in departmental operations.

### **5.1.2 Organisational set up**

Home Department was headed by the Secretary, Home, assisted by one Special Secretary, one Additional Secretary, five Deputy Secretaries and three Under Secretaries. Director General and Inspector General of Police (DG and IG) headed the Police Directorate was entrusted with the issue of allotment of funds against sanction orders of the department and actual execution of schemes and police operations.

### **5.1.3 Audit objective**

The evaluation of internal control system in the Home Department (Police) covered check of adherence to various control measures envisaged in the codes, manuals, guidelines and instructions of the Government.

### **5.1.4 Scope of audit and audit coverage**

At the State level the records of Home Department and the Police Directorate relating to the years 2000-04 were test checked. At district level, records relating to seven<sup>1</sup> Superintendents of Police and two<sup>2</sup> Commandants (JAP eight and JAP nine) were test checked. In addition, records of seven Deputy Commissioners to whom funds were allotted for construction of composite control room were also test checked during April to August 2004 to see the appropriateness of expenditure and effectiveness of internal control mechanism both at the State and the district levels.

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<sup>1</sup> S.P. and D.C. Offices- Dhanbad, Hazaribagh, Jamshedpur, Lohardaga, Palamu, Ranchi and Sahebganj.

<sup>2</sup> Commandant Offices- Palamu (JAP-8) and Sahebganj (JAP-9).



### Budgetary Control in Home Department

Secretary, Home Department was the head of the department and acted as the Controlling Officer for administration of grants. Budget Estimates were prepared by the Police Directorate and submitted to the department where after proper scrutiny the estimates were compiled for the department as a whole and then submitted to the Finance Department. Process of budget preparation and its submission to Finance department was analysed in audit to ascertain whether these were carried out as per rules and prescribed procedure. The following deficiencies were noticed:

#### 5.1.5 Actual expenditure of preceding years not considered for preparation of budget estimates

The Budget Estimates were to be prepared taking into consideration the amounts spent in previous years. However, it was seen that the department had no information of actual expenditure of the previous year as the Drawing and Disbursing Officers did not furnish monthly expenditure statements to the Directorate as required under the Jharkhand Financial Rules. Further as per the budget calendar, the controlling officer was to submit the BE to the Finance Department on first October but the BE for 2004-05 was sent to Finance in February 2004 after a delay of over four months.

Thus, the budget estimates, prepared without any inputs from the field offices, were not need based and were unrealistic as would be evidenced from the statement of expenditure for the period 2001-2004 given below:

Year	Budget provision			Expenditure			(Rupees in crore) Excess (+)/ Saving (-)		
	Plan	Non-plan	Total	Plan	Non-plan	Total	Plan	Non-plan	Total
2001-02	45.54	328.95	374.49	26.68	306.58	333.26	(-) 18.96 (41)	(-) 22.37 (8)	(-) 41.23 (11)
2002-03	40.83	391.75	432.58	7.90	306.78	314.68	(-) 32.93 (81)	(-) 84.97 (22)	(-) 117.90 (27)
2003-04	123.05	395.50	518.55	50.19	357.56	407.75	(-) 72.86 (59)	(-) 37.94 (10)	(-) 110.80 (21)
<b>Total</b>	<b>209.42</b>	<b>1116.20</b>	<b>1325.62</b>	<b>84.77</b>	<b>970.92</b>	<b>1055.69</b>	<b>(-) 124.65 (60)</b>	<b>(-) 145.28 (13)</b>	<b>(-) 269.93 (20)</b>

Source: Appropriation Accounts (Percentages in bracket)

Thus there were savings of 41 to 81 *per cent* under plan heads and 8 to 22 *per cent* under non-plan heads during the period 2001-04, which was indicative of the fact that budget was not realistic and need based.

#### 5.1.6 Expenditure control

Rule 471 of JFR lays down that the authority administering a grant (administrative head of the department in Government) is ultimately responsible for watching the expenditure under its control for keeping the expenditure within the grant.

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The controlling officer was to receive from different DDOs, minor/sub head-wise return of expenditure for every month. In order to keep a watch on receipt of such returns a broadsheet was also to be maintained. The controlling officer was to examine these returns of expenditure and prepare a statement (FR 25 and FR 26) showing expenditure under the grant up to the preceding month.

No such return of expenditure was submitted by the DDOs to the Directorate nor did the Directorate submit any return to the department. The department also did not monitor the submission of expenditure statements by the Directorate. Monitoring of expenditure in the department was thus totally absent.

Broadsheet of monthly expenditure statement (Financial Rules Form 24, 25 and 26) was not maintained by the Head of the Administrative department in the Home department.

#### ***5.1.7 Surrender of funds under plan head***

Out of Rs 209.42 crore budgeted under plan heads during 2001-04, Rs 124.65 crore (60 per cent) were surrendered. There was nothing on record to show the reasons for non-utilisation of the budgeted funds nor did the department stated any reason for such huge surrenders.

#### ***5.1.8 Sanction order not acted upon by Directorate***

During 2002-03 the department sanctioned a sum of Rs 56.62 lakh for purchase of security equipment. The Directorate, however, did not act upon the sanction order nor intimated the department about the non-drawal of the amount sanctioned. Thus the Department and the Directorate both failed in their responsibilities indicating lack of coordination between them, leading to non-utilisation of sanctioned funds for purchase of security equipment.

#### ***5.1.9 Diversion of scheme funds***

An amount of Rs 1.96 crore received for the scheme “Modernisation of Police Force (MPF)” during 2000-01 was diverted to purchase of vehicles for Chief Minister carcade (Rs 1.16 crore) and to anti-Naxalite Operation (Rs 80 lakh) outside the scope of the MPF.

#### ***5.1.10 Incorrect utilisation certificate submitted to Government of India***

The utilisation certificate for expenditure (Rs 147.16 crore) incurred during 2000-04 under MPF (both Central and State shares) was submitted to Government of India in May 2004. This utilisation certificate included payment of Rs 70.41 crore (49 per cent) as advance to Jharkhand Police

Housing Corporation (Rs 38.63 crore), Executive Engineers Building Division Ranchi and Garhwa (Rs 15.16 crore), allotment of funds to 22 Deputy Commissioners for composite control rooms (Rs 7.97 crore) and money kept in civil deposit (Rs 8.65 crore). None of these agencies had furnished expenditure or utilisation report to the department. Thus, the utilisation certificates submitted to Government of India did not reflect actual expenditure.

### **Implementation of Modernisation of Police Force**

Funds released by Government of India and the State Government under the Modernisation of Police Forces and expenditure incurred there against during 2000-2004 were as below:

Year	Funds released by GOI	State Funds	Total	Expenditure
2000-01	40.15	29.93	70.08	46.52
2001-02	28.94	47.34	76.28	53.18
2002-03	12.73	5.24	17.97	3.92
2003-04		30.74	30.74	43.57
Total	81.82	113.25	195.07	147.19

The following deficiencies were noticed in the implementation of various components of Modernisation of Police Force

#### ***5.1.11 Physical and financial progress report not obtained from executing agency***

During 2001-04, 18 schemes of construction of Police Buildings and lower subordinate quarters were sanctioned from MPF fund for Rs 53.79 crore. The entire amount was paid as follows:

- To the Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation- Rs 38.63 crore (Rs 34.86 crore- 2001-02 and Rs 3.77 crore- 2002-03),
- To Executive Engineer, Building Division-I, Ranchi -Rs 31.76 lakh (2002-03). Division- II - Rs 7.42 crore (2002-03),
- To Executive Engineer, Building Division Garhwa - Rs 7.42 crore (2002-03).

Although huge funds were involved, the department/ directorate did not monitor the progress of work nor insisted upon submission of physical and financial progress reports. None of these buildings were handed over to the department as of March 2004.

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#### ***5.1.12 Payment made for construction to JPHC without availability of land***

It was seen in audit that for implementation of 55 sub-schemes (12 Police stations, six out posts, 24 temporary out posts, one barrack and two complexes) no land was available with JPHC. However, without considering this aspect, Rs 9.21 crore were advanced to JPHC during 2001-04 by the department, which remained unused as of October 2004.

#### ***5.1.13 Entrusting the purchase to JPHC beyond its jurisdiction***

JPHC was paid Rs 3.56 crore in March 2002 for purchase of security and office equipment for central stores and wireless building although the JPHC was created to undertake only construction and maintenance work of police buildings. The department overlooked this aspect indicating failure of internal control at various levels.

#### ***5.1.14 Faulty selection of scheme***

During 2001-02, two sub-schemes for construction of Kamalpur and Burma Mines Police station buildings were entrusted for execution to JPHC and Rs 24 lakh paid in March 2002. But the buildings of these Police stations already existed in good condition. Such faulty selection of schemes indicated failure of checks and controls in the department. The money advanced was lying with JPHC (March 2004).

#### ***5.1.15 Purchase of vehicles without actual requirement***

During 2000-01, 114 vehicles of different types were purchased for Jharkhand Armed Police Battalion No. 8 and 9 (57 vehicles for each Battalion) at a total cost of Rs 5.64 crore. None of these Battalions was fully operational. The requisite personnel for these Battalions under all cadres were 2662 (1331 for each battalion) Against this; there were only 120 personnel in all cadres (JAP8-76 personnel + JAP 9-44). Purchase of 114 vehicles for such number of personnel was not called for and therefore only 12 and 11 vehicles were provided to JAP 8 and 9 respectively by the Directorate. Of these only six were in actual possession (JAP 8-3 and JAP 9-3). The rest of the vehicles were distributed to other units. The entire purchase and distribution were thus not properly planned. Internal control was totally absent at all levels which led to purchase of vehicles without actual requirement.

#### ***5.1.16 Non-functional composite District Control rooms***

District control rooms were to be established in all district headquarters for maintaining law and order round the clock. In addition to this it was also to function for disaster management, riot control etc. For this purpose district control rooms were divided into two wings viz. Composite Control room for maintenance of law and order under the control of the District Magistrate and Police Control room (PCR). During 2001-02, the department sanctioned Rs

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7.97 crore for composite control rooms (Rs 3.19 crore for purchase of vehicles, Rs 3.62 crore for construction of buildings in 22 districts and Rs 1.16 crore for purchase of office equipment and furniture) and Rs 1.86 crore for PCR. Purchase for PCR was made centrally by the department and Rs 7.97 crore sanctioned for composite control rooms was allotted to all 22 Deputy Commissioners. Records of seven Deputy Commissioners were test checked and it was found that out of the total fund of Rs 2.61 crore allotted to them for construction of buildings, purchase of vehicles and equipment etc. Rs 2.09 crore was spent but the control rooms could not become operational as manpower required for the control room was not sanctioned by the Government. This shows lack of proper planning on the part of the department.

#### ***5.1.17 Injudicious expenditure on computerisation***

Ninety four computers with laser printers and UPS were purchased at a total cost of Rs 84.27 lakh in 2003-04 although the scheme for computerisation for networking in order to facilitate gathering and transmission of information from district level to police headquarters level was approved by MHA during 2000-01. Networking was not done at all till August 2004. Besides, records of training of manpower to run the system were not furnished to audit. The computerisation project could not be made operational even after the lapse of more than three years. The different components of computerisation schemes were not synchronized by the department indicating absence of internal control.

#### **Inventory Control**

There were instances of condemned vehicles not written off, purchases without actual requirement and weapons remaining out of service for want of repairs as discussed below:

#### ***5.1.18 Condemned/off road vehicles included in District Strength of vehicles***

In seven test checked units (SP Offices), out of the available 730 vehicles, 78 vehicles were condemned or proposed for condemnation or off road. But these were not replaced by the Directorate and stood included in the unit strength of vehicles. No review on this point was conducted by Directorate.

#### ***5.1.19 Purchase of SLR without assessment of actual requirement***

During 2000-01, 1470 self loading rifles (SLR) costing Rs 73.50 lakh were purchased from the Ordnance Factory, Tekanpur (MP) for Jharkhand Armed Police 8 and 9 having contingent of 135 combat personnel and 135 SLR were issued to both the battalions. 680 SLRs were issued to different existing units and 655 SLRs costing Rs 32.75 lakh remained idle in central stores. The Department/Directorate did not plan the purchase according to actual requirement resulting in excess purchase.



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#### **5.1.20 SLR lying out of service**

Out of seven test checked units (SP offices), 350 SLRs were issued during 2001-02 to six units only. Of these 24 SLRs were lying out of service (seven per cent) in 4 units for want of minor repairs. The Directorate did not provide the repairing tool kits to any unit. All these units were in naxal affected areas.

### **Operational Control**

Specialised training was a vital component of the modernisation of police forces. It was, however, seen that despite availability of funds, the training was far below the actual requirement. Further, submission of car diaries by the users meant for keeping control over fuel consumption was not monitored as discussed below:

#### **5.1.21 Inadequate training to Police personnel**

Training was a vital aspect for maintaining high degree of operational readiness of a police force. Scrutiny of training imparted to police personnel under different specialized training courses as required as per the Bureau of Police Research and Development revealed that there was a huge gap between the requirement and the actual training imparted. For example, out of 15939 police personnel to be trained under weapon and tactics course, only 446 were trained. Similarly, under counter-insurgency and commando course, anti terrorism and VIP security course, bomb disposal course and interrogation technique course, only 68, 124, 64 and nil personnel were trained against the training requirement of 15939, 15939, 2194 and 388 police personnel respectively. Thus, the operational readiness of police force was not ensured by imparting specialized training.

#### **5.1.22 Non-submission of car diaries**

Petrol statement based on car diary was an important tool of internal control for running of vehicles and consumption of fuel. This statement was being compiled at district level and sent to range DIG, Zonal IG and DG&IGP for monitoring the running of vehicles. Scrutiny of records of SSP, Ranchi revealed that out of 182 vehicles under his command, car diaries in respect of 113 vehicles were not submitted by the respective users during the year 2003-04 although bills for fuel were paid. Range DIG, Zonal IG and even Police headquarters did not take any action on the defaulters. Total amount of consumption of fuel without submitting car diaries worked out to Rs 39.78 lakh.

#### **5.1.23 Mismatch between drivers and cars**

The Directorate had a fleet of 1269 vehicles of all types. It was seen in audit that to man these vehicles, there were only 576 drivers in position against the

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sanctioned strength of 1062. Thus, the sanctioned and the actual strength of drivers both were less than the available number of vehicles. The planning for purchase of vehicles was out of sync with sanctioned strength as well as drivers in position; proper utilisation of the vehicles was doubtful under the circumstances.

### **Monitoring, evaluation and Reporting**

For effective implementation of modernisation schemes, monitoring and evaluation of all schemes at all levels was essential. Scrutiny revealed deficiencies at all levels of monitoring, evaluation and reporting as described below:

#### ***5.1.24 Inspection of Directorate not carried out by department***

Rule 306 A of the Jharkhand Treasury Code enjoins upon the Controlling Officer to inspect the accounts records of DDOs under his control at least once a year. No such inspection was carried out by the department. This control instrument was to ensure that expenditure remained within available grants and the accounts records were maintained in the prescribed manner. Failure on this count facilitated non drawal of funds although sanctioned by the department and repeated surrender of MPF funds.

#### ***5.1.25 No internal audit***

Internal audit wing of the Finance department, Government of Jharkhand did not conduct any internal audit of the department since 2000-01 i.e. creation of Jharkhand State.

#### ***5.1.26 Response to audit***

Accountant General (Audit) conducts the audit of the Offices of the Department and major irregularities are reported through Inspection Reports (IRs). The initial replies to IRs are to be sent within a month from the date of their receipt by the auditee unit. 95 IRs and 459 paras pertaining to the period from 2000-01 to 2003-04 were outstanding for which even the initial replies were not furnished by the any of the auditee unit. No steps were taken by the department for speedy clearance of these outstanding paras.

#### ***5.1.27 Conclusions***

Budget was not prepared in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the budget manual. Various inputs like actuals of previous years and compilation and analysis of expenditure of the field office were not considered for preparing the budget. Huge amounts of expenditure advanced to various agencies were included in the utilisation certificates submitted to Government of India which did not reflect correct position. Huge funds were released to

JPHC for construction of buildings etc. without checking whether the works were actually being carried out. Indiscriminate purchase of vehicles was made without synchronising it with available number of drivers. There was deficiency in monitoring at the level of the Head of the Administrative Department.

**5.1.28 Recommendations**

- Provisions of the relevant manuals should be enforced to ensure proper control over budget and expenditure.
- The policy of dependence on JPHC for civil construction works needs review.
- Purchase of equipment should be properly planned and tune with availability of personnel .to utilise and operate the equipment.

The matter was reported to the Government (September 2004 and February 2005); reply had not been received (May 2005).

## HOME DEPARTMENT

### 3.1 Modernisation of State Police Force

#### Highlights

*Modernisation of State Police Force Scheme approved by Government of India as a Centrally assisted scheme aimed at providing additional infrastructure to improve the efficiency of the State police forces. The implementation was not effective due to lack of planning, coordination and monitoring. The basic infrastructure could not improve to the expected level despite spending substantial sums of money.*

There were savings of Rs.104.49 crore from the State share of funds during 2002-07 (except 2005-06) due to delay in tendering process and obtaining permission for import of weapons. There was an unspent balance of Rs.22.10 crore (2006-07) from the Central share due to their release at the fag end of the year.

(Paragraph 3.1.6)

The operationalisation of communication and computerisation projects could not be ensured due to lack of coordination with the executing agencies and inadequate monitoring despite spending Rs.26.18 crore on this component.

(Paragraph 3.1.9)

Modernisation of Forensic Science Laboratories and Fingerprint Bureaux in the State was not effective despite procuring sophisticated equipment for want of adequate trained personnel.

(Paragraph 3.1.10)

Only 17.21 *per cent* of 1,406 modern weapons procured in the test-checked districts of Mysore and Tumkur were distributed to the police stations.

(Paragraph 3.1.11)

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**Equipment viz. mini crime scopes, mass spectrometers, auto analysers, uninterrupted power supply systems, fax machines, etc., costing Rs.2.96 crore were lying idle either in the absence of trained staff/consumables or were not required for immediate use.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.12)**

**The training infrastructure did not improve substantially due to delay/non-completion of the infrastructural works taken up by the Department.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.13)**

**Monitoring of the implementation of the scheme was not effective.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.14)**

### **3.1.1 Introduction**

Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India (GOI) introduced (1969) the scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces (Scheme) to provide additional infrastructure to the State police to improve its efficiency. The scheme was extended (February 2001) for a further period of 10 years from 2000-01. The major portion of the funds was to be spent on construction of safe police stations, outposts and in improving housing of the upper and lower subordinate officials. The scheme also aimed at providing modern weaponry, improving mobility, communication, security, forensic science equipment and training facilities in the Police Department.

### **3.1.2 Organisational set-up**

Principal Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Home Department is the administrative head and the Director General and Inspector General of Police (DG&IGP) was in charge of the implementation of the scheme. The DG&IGP was assisted for this purpose by two Additional Directors General (ADGP), an Inspector General (IGP), two Deputy Inspectors General (DIG), the Director of Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and a Superintendent of Police (SP), Finger Print Bureau (FPB) at Head Quarters besides Commissioners of Police (CoP) and SPs in field formations. A State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) was functioning to oversee the implementation of the Scheme.

### **3.1.3 Audit objectives**

The audit objectives were to assess whether:

- the funds provided for the scheme were utilised effectively and efficiently;
- the planning for implementation of various components of modernisation was need based and efficient;
- all the components such as construction of residential and non-residential buildings, supply of modern weaponry, improvement in



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mobility communication and computerisation were implemented efficiently; and

- the scheme was monitored effectively.

### **3.1.4 Audit criteria**

The audit criteria were:

- the scheme guidelines issued by GOI;
- Annual Action Plans approved by GOI including minutes of High Powered Committee meetings; and
- Government Circulars issued for scheme implementation.

### **3.1.5 Scope and methodology of audit**

The implementation of the scheme during the period 2002-07 was reviewed in audit (February-May 2007) by test-checking the records in the offices of the Principal Secretary, DG&IGP, the ADGP (Transport, Telecommunication and Modernisation-TTM), ADGP (Police Computer Wing), ADGP (Karnataka State Reserve Police-KSRP), DIG (Wireless), IGP (Training), Director (FSL) and SP (FPB). Besides, the records of the SPs in nine<sup>1</sup> districts, 131 out of 851 police stations, three CoP (Bangalore, Hubli-Dharwad and Mysore) and six Training Centres were also test-checked by simple random sampling method. The audit objectives were discussed during an entry conference with the ADGP (TTM) on 29 January 2007. The audit findings were discussed with the Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department and the DG&IGP during the exit conference held on 3 October 2007. The Principal Secretary agreed to examine the audit observations and take follow-up action.

### **Audit findings**

### **3.1.6 Financial management**

As per the approved funding pattern of the scheme, the Central and State Governments were to share the expenditure in the ratio of 50:50 up to the end of 2002-03, 60:40 from 2003-04 to 2004-05 and at 75:25 with effect from 2005-06. The State's share of funds was specifically earmarked for construction of residential and non-residential buildings and to modernise the police computer wing. The total receipts and the expenditure on the scheme during the period 2002-07 were as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Bangalore, Belgaum, Bijapur, Dakshina Kannada, Dharwad, Gulbarga, Hassan, Mysore and Tumkur

**Table 1: Receipt and Expenditure**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Cost of the project as per approved Action Plan			GOI Share; Receipts and expenditure			Budget allotment by the State Government and expenditure		
	GOI share	State share	Total	Receipts*	Expenditure	Unspent balance	Allotment	Expenditure	Excess (+)/ Savings (-)
2002-03	80.01	80.01	160.02	75.00	75.00	-	5.50	-	(-) 5.50
2003-04	86.32	57.55	143.87	70.00	70.00	-	82.44	69.85	(-) 12.59
2004-05	86.37	57.58	143.95	58.86	58.86	-	66.77	57.06	(-) 9.71
2005-06	108.59	36.20	144.79	47.49	47.49	-	47.54	85.73	(+) 38.19
2006-07	56.04	18.68	74.72	64.14	42.04	22.10	113.11	36.42	(-) 76.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>417.33</b>	<b>250.02</b>	<b>667.35</b>	<b>315.49</b>	<b>293.39</b>	<b>22.10</b>	<b>315.36</b>	<b>249.06</b>	<b>(-) 66.30</b>

\* The receipts include funds released by GOI directly to KSPHC, KLAC and Ordnance Factory, Kolkata

**Savings in GOI funds (2006-07) were due to release of funds at the fag end of the year and those out of State share of funds were due to procedural delays involved**

While the savings out of the Central share of funds during the year 2006-07 were attributed by the Government to the release of funds at the fag end of the financial year, the savings out of State's share were stated to be due to delay in completion of tendering process, procedural delays in obtaining permission for importing weapons, *etc.* during the years 2002-05 and 2006-07.

Of the State share of Rs.315.36 crore, Rs.169 crore was raised as loan by the Karnataka State Police Housing Corporation (KSPHC), from the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) and the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) for construction of the residential (Rs.45 crore) and non-residential buildings (Rs.124 crore) respectively. The State Government stood guarantee to these loans.

### **3.1.6.1 Diversion of funds**

**Rs.3.23 crore was irregularly diverted out of scheme funds for items not approved under the scheme**

As per the guidelines of GOI, approval of SLEC was necessary for incurring expenditure on unapproved items of work falling within the same component (*viz.* buildings, mobility, *etc.*). However, approval of GOI (High Powered Committee) was required to divert funds from one component to incur expenditure on approved items falling under another component. It was observed that Rs.3.23 crore meant for construction of a Commando Training School at Devanahalli and Regional FSL at Belgaum, setting up an encrypted mail (enmail) communication system and procurement of a vehicle explosive detector was diverted for construction of buildings and providing indoor firing range at Kudlu (Rs.1.80 crore), setting up a DNA centre (Rs.43 lakh), procurement of generators (Rs.30 lakh) and other equipment (Rs.70 lakh) without obtaining the approval of the High Powered Committee of GOI as it involved different project components.

### **3.1.7 Planning**

**Perspective plans were not approved by GOI**

The GOI while approving the scheme stipulated (February 2001) that the State Government would submit a five-year perspective plan of modernisation of their police force starting from 2000-01. An Annual Action Plan (AAP) was also required to be formulated and got scrutinised by the SLEC. The release of Central assistance was subject to approval of the AAP by the GOI. The SLEC was constituted (June 2001) by the Government with the Chief

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Secretary as the Chairperson and the Principal Secretaries, Home Department and Finance Department as well as the DG&IGP as its members. The ADGP (TTM) was the nodal officer for coordinating the implementation of the various components of the scheme.

Records disclosed that perspective plan, as prescribed by GOI, was not got approved by the Ministry of Home, GOI before implementing the scheme. AAPs were, however, got approved each year.

### **Execution of scheme works**

The Department executed works relating to construction of residential and non-residential buildings, communication and computerisation besides procuring arms and equipment for modernisation of the State Police Force. These works could not be completed in time due to lack of coordination and monitoring as detailed below:

### **3.1.8 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings**

Construction of residential and non-residential buildings was funded by both Central and State Governments.

#### **3.1.8.1 Buildings constructed out of State funds**

The scheme provided for construction of 469 non-residential and 5,000 residential buildings at an estimated cost of Rs.124 crore and Rs.180 crore respectively. The construction was sanctioned in November 2000 and March 2003 for completion by March 2005 and March 2006 respectively. The KSPHC entrusted with the job, raised a loan of Rs.45 crore for residential buildings and Rs.124 crore for non-residential buildings from the HDFC and the HUDCO respectively on the guarantee given by the State Government. Of the 5,000 quarters, the KSPHC had completed 3,134 quarters and construction of 1,777 quarters was in progress while the work on the remaining 89 quarters had not been taken up (April 2007). The total expenditure incurred on residential buildings was Rs.140.90 crore. Of the 3,134 quarters completed, the Department had taken possession of 3,080 quarters and allotted 3,053 quarters to its personnel. Out of 469 non-residential buildings, 458 buildings had been completed and of the remaining 11 buildings eight were awaiting completion and three works were yet to be taken up for execution. These included the proposed new office building of CoP, Bangalore and State Intelligence Bureau. The total expenditure incurred on non-residential buildings was Rs.101.83 crore (April 2007).

**Delay in furnishing guarantee to the loans by the State Government delayed the completion of residential/non-residential buildings**

Records disclosed that although the State Government sanctioned the non-residential buildings in November 2000, the guarantee to raise HUDCO loans by KSHPC was given by them only during 2003-04 and in respect of residential buildings only during 2004-05. Consequently, the mobilisation of funds was delayed. The delay in completion of buildings was attributed by the Government (October 2007) to the belated release of funds and non-availability of sites for some of the residential buildings. Government also stated (October 2007) that there would not be any cost overrun due to delay in

completion of these works. It, however, did not spell out the measures taken for containing the cost overrun.

### 3.1.8.2 Buildings/civil works out of GOI funds

There was undue delay in commencement/completion of the following non-residential buildings entrusted to the Karnataka Land Army Corporation (KLAC) during the period 2001-07 as detailed in the table below:

**Table 2: Delay in completion of civil works**

(Rupees in lakh)

Five civil works in respect of which Rs.4.14 crore were advanced to Karnataka Land Army Corporation during March 2001-November 2004 were yet to be completed

Sl. No.	Name of the work	Original/Revised estimated cost	Date of entrustment/ expected completion	Amount deposited with KLAC and date	Status of work as on March 2007
1.	Construction of Regional Forensic Laboratory at Belgaum	50.00/ 68.75	July 2002/ September 2003	50.00 (March 2001)	Work not completed due to non-release of balance amount of Rs.18.75 lakh to KLAC.
2.	Construction of Training Complex at Police Training Centre, Gulbarga	175.00/ 186.29	March 2004/ October 2005	175.00 (March 2004)	Work still incomplete due to non-release of Rs.11.29 lakh to KLAC.
3.	Construction of Magazine Building at five Training Institutes	20.00	2004-05/ Due date not fixed	20.00 (April 2004)	Two institutes yet to be completed.
4.	Laying driving track at Police Driving & Maintenance School, Yelahanka	135.00	March 2003/ July 2004	135.00 (June 2003)	Work not completed due to diversion of funds to other works as ordered by the Department.
5.	Construction of barracks at KSRP III Battalion, Bangalore	34.00	April 2004/ September 2005	34.00 (April 2004)	Work was reported to be nearing completion.
<b>Total</b>		<b>444.04</b>		<b>414.00</b>	

The works were thus lingering for the last two to four years despite depositing Rs.4.14 crore with the KLAC.

### 3.1.9 Communication and computerisation

The Department took up (2002-07) various communication and computerisation works such as providing an integrated satellite based Police Telecommunication Network (POLNET), encrypted mail communication system to ensure faster and secured communication of data/message by sending encrypted messages between major cities, etc. besides setting up a multi purpose control room with infrastructural facilities for all purposes

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including disaster management. The computerisation projects involved, *inter alia*, developing a Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA) software to computerise the working of all the police stations in the State and another software called 'Police IT Software' to comprehensively cover all the activities of the Department. The total expenditure incurred on communication and computerisation was Rs.90.24 crore (March 2007).

#### **3.1.9.1 POLNET project**

**The Modern Police Communication Network (POLNET) on which Rs.2.22 crore had been spent was not operational even two years after its scheduled date due to technical snags**

This project aiming at integrating all police stations through better voice, fax and data transmission capabilities was approved (August 2002) by GOI and Rs.4.02 crore was released during the period August 2002 to March 2006. The project was entrusted (June 2004) to Bharat Electronics Limited, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh for implementation within two years which was later extended by another year. The project covered only 21 districts and an expenditure of Rs.2.22 crore had been incurred up to the end of March 2007. Records revealed that the project was not yet operational due to technical snags in the system and the staff not being fully trained in voice/data/fax transmission techniques.

#### **3.1.9.2 "Dial-100" scheme**

**The Police helpline set up and maintained at a cost of Rs.1.16 crore for emergency purposes was not used effectively**

This scheme aimed at enabling the general public to contact the police control room in case of emergency and also to identify the caller was approved (2002-03) by GOI at a cost of Rs.60 lakh. The scheme was commissioned in June 2006 at a cost of Rs.1.16 crore and the system was maintained round the clock. It was, however, noticed that 96 *per cent* of the calls (27.25 lakh) by the general public during 2006-07 were of general nature and the genuine emergency calls were only 1.26 lakh. Action to create general awareness among the public to prevent misuse of the system was not taken by the Department.

#### **3.1.9.3 Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA) System**

**An integrated police application software project was yet to be commissioned despite spending Rs.8.38 crore**

The CIPA System was approved by the GOI during 2004-05 and Rs.15.23 crore was released during 2005-07 to implement the scheme in two phases. While the National Informatics Centre (NIC) was to provide the necessary software and coordinate the implementation of the CIPA, the KSPHC was entrusted the job of procuring hardware. Infrastructure such as providing electrification, computer tables and chairs and other furniture was to be procured by the Department at Rs.28,000 per police station under Phase-I and at Rs.30,000 per police station under Phase-II.

NIC had neither developed the required software nor the KSPHC supplied the computers. The KSPHC had already been paid Rs.6.69 crore for the work (March 2006). A further sum of Rs.1.69 crore was spent on providing the infrastructure. The system had not been commissioned as testing of hardware and development of software was stated to be under progress (October 2007). No date for supply of software and hardware by the NIC and KSPHC had been stipulated by the Department. Consequently, the project was lying incomplete even after three years of its sanction.



Enhancement of the scope of IT software after its entrustment delayed completion of the project on which an expenditure of Rs.13.28 crore had been incurred

#### **3.1.9.4 Police IT Software Project**

A comprehensive software project covering all the activities of the Department was approved (November 1999) by Government of Karnataka (GOK) at a cost of Rs.16.35 crore. The project was to be commissioned within three years (2002-03). The Department procured the required hardware for the project (2000-03) at a cost of Rs.11.95 crore and the development of the software was entrusted (December 2003) to WIPRO Limited at a cost of Rs.1.90 crore with a stipulation to complete the work by April 2005. A core group was constituted (January 2004) to closely monitor the software development and ensure the project implementation as scheduled.

WIPRO was yet to develop the software required for the project despite receiving the payment of Rs.1.33 crore in advance. The delay was stated by the Government (October 2007) to be due to enhancing the scope of IT software to cover all aspects of police functioning right from police station to police headquarters. Belated enhancement of the scope of the project delayed completion of the project. The obsolescence of the hardware procured during 2002-03 (Rs.11.95 crore) by the time project is commissioned could not be ruled out.

#### **3.1.9.5 Electronic Beat System**

The GOI sanctioned (March 2003) implementation of electronic beat system to replace the existing manual beat system in civic areas to protect the life and property of the public. The system was got installed in 123 police stations at a cost of Rs.1.14 crore through an IT firm. The system could not be utilised effectively due to its frequent breakdowns/repairs. The company, which supplied the system wound up operations during 2005-06. Consequently, the Department was utilising the existing manual beat system rendering the expenditure of Rs.1.14 crore on the electronic system unfruitful. Government replied (October 2007) that the maintenance of the system would be entrusted to any other company shortly to realise the objective of e-beat System.

### **3.1.10 Modernisation of Forensic Science Laboratories (FSL) and Finger Print Bureaux (FPB)**

Modernisation of Forensic Science Laboratories and the Fingerprint Bureaux was not effective due to inadequate trained personnel

The State FSL at Bangalore and five<sup>2</sup> Regional FSLs were set up in the State to help in generating scientific evidence for criminal justice delivery system. There were 29 FPBs in the State. The scheme envisaged to modernise both the FSLs and FPBs by inducting sophisticated equipment and the trained personnel. The Department purchased equipment, eight mobile forensic vans and five accident recovery cranes besides setting up a DNA centre at Bangalore.

Records, however, disclosed the following:

- The FSL at Bangalore and the five Regional FSLs had a working strength of only 63 scientific personnel against the sanctioned strength of 146 posts. Due to severe shortage of scientific personnel, the percentage of cases

<sup>2</sup> Belgaum, Davanagere, Gulbarga, Mangalore and Mysore

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disposed of during the period 2002-07 was in the range of 45 to 74 *per cent* only. The Department had also not fixed any time limit for disposal of a case by the FSL.

- The post of a finger print expert was vacant for the last five years in seven<sup>3</sup> FPBs despite providing sophisticated equipment such as mini crime scopes, dust mark lift kit, *etc.*, thereby defeating the objective of modernisation of these FPBs.
- Eight<sup>4</sup> mobile forensic vans and five<sup>5</sup> accident recovery cranes in the test-checked districts procured at a cost of Rs.1.65 crore under the scheme were idle as seen from their log books. These vans could not be put to use for want of personnel trained in forensic evidence gathering and the cranes were not required as stated by the SPs in these test-checked districts.
- The Audio Video Laboratory approved by the GOI (2005-06) at a cost of Rs.51 lakh<sup>6</sup> for examining audio video tapes involved in crimes for their authentication was not set up despite availability of funds due to delay in developing the professional software.
- The DNA Centre approved (2001-02) for the FSL at Bangalore at a cost of Rs.three crore was not made operational even at the end of March 2007 due to non-supply/installation of equipment by the Centre for Human Genetics to whom Rs.2.60 crore were paid (June 2004) for the purpose.

Modernisation of the FSL and the FPB was not effective due to inadequate trained personnel, delay in development of professional software, *etc.*

### 3.1.11 Weaponry

**Only 17.21 *per cent* of the modern weapons procured under the scheme had been distributed to the police stations**

As per the norms laid down by Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D), the total requirement of different types of weapons (considering those already existing with the State Police) for the State was 23,830, to be procured over a period of five to seven years commencing from 2000-01. Out of this, the Department had received 13,487 numbers of different types of weapons and distributed 10,776 weapons to various police units and police training centres as of March 2007.

Bulk of the weapons supplied (10,651) to the police units were retained in the armoury of District Armed Reserve and City Armed Reserve without distributing these to the police stations as per the BPR&D norms. In the test-checked police units of CoP-Mysore, SP-Mysore and SP-Tumkur, the total number of different types of arms to be procured for 81 police stations was 2,236 (as per norms) against which 1,406 weapons were received by the three police units and only 242 weapons (17.21 *per cent*) had been distributed

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<sup>3</sup> Bagalkot, Belgaum, Chitradurga, Kodagu, Koppal, Haveri and Uttara Kannada

<sup>4</sup> SPs of the Districts of Belgaum, Bijapur, Dakshina Kannada, Dharwad, Gulbarga, Hassan, Mysore and Tumkur

<sup>5</sup> SPs of the Districts of CAR-Bangalore, Dharwad, Gulbarga, Hassan and Mysore

<sup>6</sup> Rs.11 lakh for supply of speech laboratory and Rs.40 lakh for development of professional software

to the police stations. The heads of the police units attributed (March/April 2007) non-supply of weapons to non-receipt of ammunition and non-imparting of training to the police personnel. The Department, thus, did not ensure supply of weapons to the police stations as per the prescribed norms.

### 3.1.12 Idle Equipment

**Equipments worth Rs.2.96 crore remained idle for one to seven years for various reasons**

Equipment procured (2000-06) at a cost of Rs.2.96 crore were lying idle for want of consumables and trained personnel or were not required for immediate use as detailed in the table below:

Sl. No.	Particulars of items	year of purchase	Quantity purchased	Cost (Rs.in lakh)	Reasons for non-utilisation
1.	Fax machines	2002-06	234	33.41	Out of 234 machines, only 171 were supplied to police stations and the remaining were lying in stores. None of the machines supplied was used for want of consumables likes cartridges, toners.
2.	Power Generators	2004-05	101	12.96	Out of 101 generators, only 29 were supplied to police stations.
3.	Web cameras	2005-06	109	1.33	Not forthcoming
4.	Video conferencing	2005-06	4	20.00	Not forthcoming
5.	Laundry equipment	2003-04	1	10.63 (including the cost of installation)	Equipment supplied to Karnataka Police Academy, Mysore was transferred to KSRP IV Battalion which was not put to use as it was not required by KSRP.
6.	Emission testing machines	2003-04 to 2006-07	4	6.86	Equipment were not put to use for want of licence from Regional Transport Office (RTO).
7.	Uninterrupted Power Supply machines	2005-06	424	21.00	Solar power packs were already available in police stations
8.	Mini-crime scopes and cameras	2000-06	Not available	98.82	Non-availability of trained personnel.
9.	Mass spectrometer, gas chromatograph, auto analyser, automatic solvents, LCD projectors, etc.	2002-06	Not available	91.41	Equipment not required for immediate use.
<b>Total</b>				<b>296.42</b>	

The expenditure of Rs.2.96 crore on these items was, therefore, rendered unfruitful.

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### 3.1.13 Human Resource Management

There were 1,414 vacancies of police inspectors and police constables

The scheme emphasised the need to fill all vacancies in the State Police Force on priority so that the assistance made available is optimally utilised.

The combined working strength in various cadres of the Department such as Police Inspector (FPB), Police Inspector (Civil), Police Sub-Inspector (Civil) Police Sub-Inspector (FPB), Head Constable (Wireless), Police Constable (Wireless), *etc.*, was 3,076 as against the combined sanctioned strength of 4,490 and the vacancies varied from 25 *per cent* to 100 *per cent*. Government replied (October 2007) that recruitment plan had been chalked out to fill up the vacancies.

The training infrastructure was inadequate to make the training programmes effective

According priority to training infrastructure was one of the principal areas of focus under the scheme. There were six<sup>7</sup> regular training institutes and 27 temporary training schools in the State for imparting basic training to recruits and also in-service personnel. Test-check of records disclosed that various works taken up for augmentation of training infrastructure were not completed.

Construction of a training complex at Police Training Centre, Gulbarga, construction of magazine buildings at five training centres, laying driving track for training at Police Driving & Maintenance School (PDMS), Yelahanka, construction of a cyber crime laboratory at Karnataka Police Academy (KPA), Mysore and Gulbarga at a cost of Rs.4.14 crore were yet to be completed. Construction of accommodation for 400 trainees at Karnataka State Police Training School (KSPTS), Channapatna (estimated cost: Rs.1.89 crore) and providing fencing and firing range works at Armed Police Training School (APTS), Yelahanka at an estimated cost of Rs.2.50 crore (November 2004) were yet to be taken up although GOI had approved the same during 2004-06. Construction of 10 quarters, compound wall, fencing, renovation of old parade ground and providing overhead tanks to trainee quarters at KSPTS, Channapatna was also not completed over a period of two to five years. Test-check also revealed that calendar of training programme was not drawn up in advance and the training programmes were scheduled at short notices.

### 3.1.14 Monitoring

Monitoring of the scheme implementation was not effective

The SLEC constituted for monitoring the implementation of the scheme met once a year only for finalising the draft AAP for submission to GOI. The timely completion of buildings, installation of communication and computerisation systems such as POLNET, CIPA, Police IT software, *etc.*, were not monitored by the SLEC.

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<sup>7</sup> PDMS-Bangalore, APTS-Bangalore, KSPTS-Channapatna, Khanapur, Gulbarga, KPA-Mysore

### **3.1.15 Conclusion**

The utilisation of funds provided for the modernisation of state police force was not efficient due to release of funds by GOI at the fag end of the year and procedural delays. The construction of residential and non-residential buildings was delayed. The communication and computerisation on projects taken up under the scheme could not be completed due to lack of coordination with the executing agencies and inadequate monitoring by the Department. Equipment costing Rs.2.96 crore was lying idle for want of consumables, trained manpower, *etc.* The vacancies in various cadres ranged between 25 to 100 *per cent.* Procurement of modern weapons without training the police personnel in their usage left the department under-prepared for eventualities. Lack of trained manpower in FSL and FPB impeded the pace of gathering foolproof evidence.

### **3.1.16 Recommendations**

- Expeditious action should be taken to get the lingering communication and computerisation projects such as POLNET, CIPA and Police IT software commissioned so as to avail of their benefits.
- The incomplete training infrastructure should be got completed expeditiously and a calendar of training programmes should be prescribed to make training effective.
- Expeditious action should be taken to fill all the technical posts in the Forensic Science Laboratories and Fingerprint Bureaux. The Electronic Beat System should also be made functional.
- Expeditious action should be taken to put the idle equipment to optimal use by providing the required manpower, consumables and transferring them to needy places wherever necessary.
- The implementation of the scheme should be monitored closely and effectively.

The replies furnished (October 2007) by the Government are incorporated at appropriate places.



## HOME DEPARTMENT

### 3.5 Modernisation of Police Forces

#### Highlights

*The Scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces was launched by the Government of India (GOI) for modernising the police forces in the country to enable them to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. Annual plans prepared without proper assessment of needs and their delayed approval resulted in delay in implementation of the scheme and caused deviations from approved plans. Huge amounts transferred to Kerala Police Housing Construction Corporation Limited for construction of non-residential/residential buildings were lying unutilised mainly due to failure of the department in handing over sites. Even the completed residential buildings remained unoccupied due to lack of electricity/water connection. There was no appreciable increase in mobility as Jeeps purchased were mainly used for replacement of old vehicles. Equipment purchased for Regional Forensic Science Laboratory were idling due to failure in providing infrastructure and necessary technical staff in time.*

- **Shortfall in Central assistance to the scheme resulted in additional burden of Rs 27.51 crore on the State exchequer.**

*(Paragraph 3.5.8.1)*

- **In Letter of Credit transactions there were omissions/delays in opening and closing of accounts and remitting the balance into Treasury.**

*(Paragraph 3.5.8.3)*

- **Intention of increasing the mobility of police force was defeated as passenger vehicles worth Rs 3.79 crore were purchased instead of light vehicles.**

*(Paragraph 3.5.9.8)*

- **Non-synchronising of the purchase of equipment with the construction of buildings and posting of staff resulted in idling of equipment worth Rs 3.42 crore at Regional Forensic Science Laboratories.**

*(Paragraph 3.5.11)*

- **Speed Check Radar Guns were purchased against the directions of Government and ignoring the lowest quotation, resulting in excess expenditure of Rs 33.22 lakh.**

*(Paragraph 3.5.13)*

#### 3.5.1 Introduction

The Scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces (MOPF) was launched by the Government of India (GOI) for modernising the police forces in the country to enable them to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. The Scheme was in vogue from 1969-70. A revised Scheme involving substantial outlay of Central assistance was launched by the GOI in February 2001 for a ten year period starting from 2000-01. The basic objective of the whole Scheme was to meet the deficiencies in the State Police Forces and to

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achieve planned development and modernisation of the State Police Forces. The main components of the Scheme were Building, Housing, Mobility, Weapons, Traffic, Scientific Aids to Investigation, Equipment, Training, Communication and Computerisation.

### **3.5.2 Organisations set up**

Police Department functions under the Home Department of the State Government. Director General of Police (DGP) is the head of the Police Department. Additional DGP (Modernisation) under the DGP is in direct charge of Modernisation Programme. There is a State Level Empowering Committee (SLEC) set up under the Chairmanship of the State Chief Secretary for speedy sanction of schemes under the MOPF and for proper monitoring of implementation. Construction of buildings for residential and non-residential purposes was done through the Kerala Police Housing Construction Corporation Limited (KPHCC).

### **3.5.3 Audit coverage**

Records in the Home Department, the Police Headquarters, the State Forensic Laboratory, the State Finger Print Bureau, the KPHCC, and other offices like the District Police Offices\*, the Police Stations involved in the implementation of the Scheme were examined. The audit was conducted during February 2006 to May 2006 covering the period 2000-2001 to 2005-06. Out of 17 Police Districts, five\* were selected for audit. In the selected districts, offices of District Armed Reserve, Armed Police Battalions and 25 *per cent* of Police Stations were test checked.

### **3.5.4 Audit objectives**

The performance audit was conducted with the objective to assess/see whether :

- Annual Action Plan (AAP) was drawn up based on the GOI guidelines and these were based on requirements;
- adequate funds were provided by the Central/State Governments and the funds were utilised for the intended purpose;
- the efficiency and economy in implementing various components of the Scheme;
- equipment purchased/assets created have been utilised and maintained properly and the intended benefits achieved; and
- implementation/progress of the Scheme was effectively monitored and adequate internal control mechanism existed in the Police Department for the proper control of receipt, expenditure and management of assets created.

### **3.5.5 Audit criteria**

The following audit criteria were adopted.

- GOI guidelines on the Scheme and further instructions issued from time to time

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\* Thiruvananthapuram City (7 Police stations), Thiruvananthapuram Rural (8 Police Stations), Thrissur (10 Police stations), Kannur (8 Police Stations) and Ernakulam Rural (7 Police Stations)

- Requirements of the State Police as arrived at by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR &D)
- Annual Action Plans approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA-GOI)
- Store Purchase Rules regarding purchase of items
- Stock Register, log books in respect of equipment and allotment register in respect of quarters
- Minutes/records of State Level Empowering Committee

### 3.5.6 Audit methodology

An entry conference was conducted in February 2006 with the Additional DGP (Modernisation) and his team during which the audit objectives and criteria were explained to them. Additional DGP made a presentation of the salient features of the Scheme and the various constraints faced by the State Government. The audit team collected data from the PHQ and the field offices, issued audit enquiries to elicit information, scrutinised files/records, conducted discussions with the officers and visited selected offices to assess the utilisation of buildings and equipment. Findings and recommendations of the review were discussed with the Principal Secretary (Home) during exit conference held (July 2006) with the Government. Their views had been taken into account while finalising the review.

### Audit findings

#### 3.5.7 Plan formulation

The existing Scheme of MOPF was extended by the GOI in February 2001 for a further period of 10 years with enhanced Central assistance. The maximum annual plan size of the State was fixed at Rs 63 crore to be allocated among the 10 components. As per the GOI guidelines, the State Governments were to submit to the MHA-GOI, a five year modernisation plan for their police forces starting from 2000-01. The annual plans were to flow from the five year plan. The Annual Action Plan (AAP) formulated by the State Police Force had to be scrutinised by the SLEC before sending it for approval of the High Power Committee (HPC) of the MHA for allocation of funds to the State Government.

#### 3.5.7.1 Delay in submission/approval of Annual Plan

The due date fixed by the MHA for submission of AAP by the State Government was 15 May of the respective year except in the case of 2000-01 and 2004-05. The details of due date, date of submission of AAP by the State Government, date of approval by the MHA were as follows.

Scheme Year	Due date of submission of the AAP to the MHA	Date of submission of the AAP	Date of approval of the AAP by the MHA
2000-01	30 September 2000	4 March 2001	29 March 2001
2001-02	15 May 2001	19 December 2001	6 January 2002
2002-03	15 May 2002	26 August 2002	1 November 2002
2003-04	15 May 2003	June 2003	12 September 2003
2004-05	15 June 2004	17 July 2004	23 December 2004
2005-06	15 May 2005	July 2005	14 September 2005

Delay upto seven months in submitting the AAP to the MHA resulted in insufficient time to spend Scheme funds in the same year

In none of the years, the State Government submitted the AAP to the MHA within the due dates. The delays ranged upto seven months. Consequently the approval of the AAP by the MHA was also delayed and in most of the years the MHA approved the AAP in the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of the financial year leaving insufficient time to spend the Scheme funds in the same year.

### 3.5.7.2 *Short utilisation of funds*

The State Government did not utilize the annual allocation within the financial year. The percentage of utilisation ranged from one *per cent* to 50 *per cent* as per data given below:-

Scheme year	Approved outlay	Amount utilised in the year of sanction	Percentage of utilisation
	(Rupees in crore)		
2000-01	58.57	0.34	1
2001-02	62.23	26.02	42
2002-03	63.00	25.97	41
2003-04	63.00	31.57	50
2004-05	61.65	30.22	49
2005-06	61.51	26.84	44
Total	369.96	140.96	38

Audit scrutiny also revealed that

- owing to low utilisation in the Scheme year, the items in approved plans of earlier years were carried over and implemented in subsequent years – the items in approved plans sanctioned as early as in 2000-01 were implemented in 2005-06. The intention behind annual plan was defeated by such delays,
- several deviations from approved AAP were made during the course of implementation. These deviations included purchase of equipment/vehicles/weapons not included in approved AAP, non-purchase of items as per approved AAP, change of site of construction, delay in handing over site, non-availability of site, etc. This indicated that proper assessment of requirements was not made while preparing the AAPs and
- defects in preparation of the AAPs and delayed approval had the effect of delaying the Scheme and causing deviation from the approved plans as brought out in the succeeding paragraphs.

### 3.5.8 **Financial Management**

The maximum Annual Plan size for the State was fixed at Rs 63 crore. Of this, Central share was 50 *per cent* during 2000-01 to 2002-03; 60 *per cent* during 2003-04 and 2004-05 and 75 *per cent* from 2005-06 onwards. The Central share was in the form of 50 *per cent* grant and 50 *per cent* loan during 2000-01 and 2001-02.

#### 3.5.8.1 *Shortfall in Central assistance*

From 2002-03 onwards, the Central share was not fully released to the State Government. The details of Central assistance due and that received were as under:

**Reduced Central assistance resulted in additional financial burden of Rs 27.51 crore on state exchequer**

*(Rupees in crore)*

Scheme year	Outlay approved by the MHA	Central assistance <sup>#</sup>		Shortfall
		Amount due	Amount received	
2000-01	58.57	29.29	29.29	NIL
2001-02	62.23	31.11	31.16	(-)0.05
2002-03	63.00	31.50	25.13	6.37
2003-04	63.00	37.80	22.00	15.80
2004-05	61.65	36.99	26.45	10.54
2005-06	61.51	46.13	20.00	26.13
Total	369.96	212.82	154.03*	58.79

<sup>#</sup> Percentage of Central assistance : 2000-01 : 50, 2001-02 : 50, 2002-03 : 50, 2003-04 : 60, 2004-05 : 60, 2005-06 : 75

\* Includes amounts given to implementing agencies directly by the GOI

Though the GOI was committed to give Rs 212.82 crore during 2000-01 to 2005-06, the amount released to the State Government was only Rs 154.03 crore resulting in shortfall in Central assistance by Rs 58.79 crore. Reduced allocation for the Scheme by the Finance Ministry (GOI) was stated to be the reason for curtailment of Central assistance. The reduced Central assistance during 2002-03 to 2005-06 resulted in greater financial burden to the State Government as it took up the entire Scheme for execution. The additional burden on State exchequer on this account amounted to Rs 27.51 crore up to 31 March 2006.

Government stated (September 2006) that earnest efforts were being taken to get the funds due from the Central Government.

### 3.5.8.2 Shortfall in expenditure

State Government released its own share as well as the GOI share released to the State Government through the State budget. The expenditure on the Scheme included funds released through the State budget as well as funds spent out of amounts directly received by the implementing agencies from the GOI. The details of approved annual outlay and the amount spent are given below.

*(Rupees in crore)*

Scheme year	Approved outlay <sup>*</sup>	Progressive utilisation upto 31 March 2006	Balance
2000-01	58.57	55.43	3.14
2001-02	62.23	59.15	3.08
2002-03	63.00	63.00	Nil
2003-04	63.00	61.80	1.20
2004-05	61.65	53.95	7.70
2005-06	61.51	26.84	34.67
<b>Total</b>	<b>369.96</b>	<b>320.17</b>	<b>49.79</b>

<sup>\*</sup> Component wise details are given in Appendix XXV

The amount spent on the Scheme was Rs 320.17 crore during the period 2000-06 against the total outlay of Rs 369.96 crore. The amount shown as utilised included amounts advanced (Rs 199.03 crore<sup>∞</sup>) to the KPHCC by the State/Central Governments for construction works out of which Rs 141.27 crore remained unspent as on 31 March 2006. Consequently the actual expenditure on the Scheme up to 31 March 2006 was Rs 178.90 crore only against Rs 320.17 crore reported as utilised. Thus the expenditure on the Scheme was overstated to the extent of Rs 141.27 crore.

<sup>∞</sup> 2001-02 : Rs 9.85 crore; 2002-03 : Rs 60.94 crore; 2003-04 : Rs 47.32 crore; 2004-05 : Rs 36.80 crore; and 2005-06 : Rs 44.12 crore



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Government stated (September 2006) that all funds transferred to KPHCC were regarded as deemed utilised.

### **3.5.8.3 Omission/delay in Letter of Credit transaction**

Letter of Credit (LC) accounts were opened in the State Bank of Travancore (SBT), Thiruvananthapuram for making payments in foreign currency for equipment imported for the Forensic Science Laboratory. The following omission/delays were noticed in LC transactions.

- Amount credited to the SBT for the purpose was shown as utilised in the progress reports. But the refunds received on closure of accounts, though credited to the Government accounts as Refund of Payments (RoP) were not deducted from amount shown as utilised. Consequently expenditure was overstated by Rs 43.21 lakh (Rs 20.89 lakh for 2000-01 and Rs 22.32 lakh for 2003-04) in 10 cases.
- In four cases, involving Rs 2.66 crore there were delays ranging from two to three months in opening LC accounts after drawal of money from treasury. This indicated unnecessary early drawal of the Government money.
- In five cases, involving Rs 16.23 lakh, there were delays ranging from two to four months in closing LC accounts after the transaction and refunding the balance. This resulted in unnecessary retention of the Government money in the SBT.

### **3.5.9 Implementation**

The Scheme was to be implemented as per the guidelines issued by the MHA and subject to the financial rules of the State Government and orders issued by it. Audit scrutiny of the implementation of the Scheme with reference to applicable rules and canons of financial propriety revealed omissions/irregularities/diversions/deviations in implementing various components as described in succeeding paragraphs. It was also seen that the Department did not obtain approval of the MHA for deviations from approved AAP or variation of prescribed norms as required in the guidelines.

#### **3.5.9.1 Long delays in utilisation of funds released**

Construction of Buildings including houses for police personnel is an important component of the Scheme. The bulk of the funding of the Scheme was for this component. Out of outlay of Rs 369.96 crore for the Scheme during 2000-01 to 2005-06, Rs 190.50 crore was earmarked for this purpose.

KPHCC was the sole agency for carrying out all the construction works of the Police Department. During 2000-06, Rs 199.03 crore were released to the KPHCC under the Scheme. This amount included funds transferred by the State Government to Treasury Public Account of the KPHCC at Vellayambalam Treasury and also the amounts (Rs 22.80 crore in 2004-05 and 2005-06) given to it directly by the MHA through Demand Draft and credited to its account in the SBT, Thiruvananthapuram. Out of Rs 199.03 crore received, only Rs 57.76 crore were spent on the works and the unutilised balance with the KPHCC kept in Bank/Treasury deposits amounted to Rs 141.27 crore as on 31 March 2006. Test check revealed that in respect of works for which Rs 106.20 crore were released during 2001-2006, the

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constructions\* had not even been started (March 2006)<sup>9</sup>.

The reasons for non-commencement of works were - sites not handed over, design and drawings not ready, works yet to be tendered, agreement yet to be executed, etc. It was the responsibility of the Police Department to handover the sites. These cases indicated that works were allotted and funds transferred to the KPHCC without proper planning and assessment of need. The Department stated (July 2006) that delay in handing over site was mainly due to procedural delays in assessing the valuation of existing old buildings by the Public Works Department (PWD).

### **3.5.9.2      *Appropriation of interest earned on Scheme funds for other purposes***

As of 31 March 2006, the unutilised funds with the KPHCC amounted to Rs 141.27 crore. KPHCC was earning interest on the funds kept in the SBT as short term deposits. The KPHCC admitted that interest earned in such short term deposits were set off against the payment of interest due to the Financial Institutions (HUDCO/LIC) for loans taken by the KPHCC. This interest earned should have been part of the Scheme funds, but was utilised for other purposes. The total interest earned on Scheme funds was not furnished to Audit. No specific direction was issued on this by the State Government or the Department to the KPHCC.

Government replied (September 2006) that this was done with a view to reduce the financial burden of State Government since otherwise it was to be met from budgetary allotment. Reply of Government is not acceptable as the interest earned on the Scheme funds should have been utilised for the Scheme itself.

### **3.5.9.3      *Excess transfer of funds***

Rupees 2.50 crore were released to the KPHCC (October 2003) for construction of 160 Rest Rooms for Women Police Constables (WPCs) at various Police Stations. The approved cost as per the MHA norm was Rs 90,000 per rest room. As such the amount required was only Rs 1.44 crore, 75 rest rooms had been constructed (March 2006) the average cost being Rs 87,000. The amount transferred in excess amounting to Rs 1.06 crore was retained by the KPHCC and had not been refunded (March 2006). At the exit conference (July 2006) the Department agreed to construct more number of rest rooms for WPCs to set off the excess amount.

### **3.5.9.4      *Unauthorised deviation from approved plan***

Funds released as per the annual plans approved by the MHA were to be used for the works specified in the plans. Based on the Government Order (January 2003) the Department accorded sanction for construction of 118 Upper Subordinate Quarters (USQs) at the Kerala Police Academy (KEPA) under Scheme 2002-03 at a unit cost of Rs 4.75 lakh. PHQ directed (March 2003) the KPHCC to utilize the funds for 118 USQs (Rs 5.60 crore) on building works which were already arranged for construction at the KEPA. The funds were transferred to the KPHCC in August 2003. The buildings

**Expenditure of  
Rs 5.60 crore for  
works not covered by  
the AAP and without  
sanction of State  
Government**

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\* Important items of work included 16 District Police Lines (Rs 12.40 crore), 8 District Police Offices (Rs 1.20 crore), 11 Police Control Rooms (Rs 2.20 crore), Training Infrastructure (Rs 4.23 crore), 2239 LSQs (Rs 55.47 crore), 448 USQs (Rs 21.18 crore), etc.

<sup>9</sup> More than 3 years: Rs 16 crore, more than 2 years: Rs 9 crore, more than 1 year: Rs 37 crore

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constructed using the diverted funds included Senior Officers quarters, Senior Officers Mess, Ladies Hostel, Visiting Officers quarters, etc. The works had since been completed. The expenditure of Rs 5.60 crore was for works not covered by the approved annual plans and without sanction of the State Government.

These constructions were reckoned by the Department as construction of 118 USQs and wrongly shown against the physical achievements. Unauthorised diversion of Rs 5.60 crore by the Department resulted in denial of family accommodation to 118 Police personnel.

Government admitted (September 2006) the fact and stated that the issue would be examined in consultation with the Head of Department

#### **3.5.9.5 Deviation from norms**

GOI guidelines prescribed norms for fixing area of housing units for Lower Subordinates and Upper Subordinates. Audit scrutiny revealed that these norms were violated without approval of the MHA and the number of dwelling units constructed under the Scheme were inflated in progress reports, thus concealing the shortfall in the targeted number. Details are given below:

- As per the norms laid down by the MHA, Lower Subordinate Quarters (LSQs) meant for family accommodation for Police Constables (PCs) and Head Constables (HCs) should have a unit area of 500 sq.ft. @ Rs 500 per sq.ft. (unit cost Rs 2.50 lakh). During 2000-06, Rs 96.72 crore were released to the KPHCC for construction of 3949 LSQs. But the State Government adopted unit area of 750 sq.ft. for LSQs resulting in reduction of dwelling units by about 1300 numbers.
- The Department decided to construct residential accommodation for Senior Officers/Guest houses/Hostels having area ranging between 1000 and 5000 sq.ft out of Rs 96.72 crore, released to the KPHCC for construction of LSQs. The buildings are at various stages of construction as of March 2006. The total amount thus diverted amounted to Rs 3.83 crore<sup>Ψ</sup> (approximately) in 65 cases resulting in denial of family accommodation to 153 Lower Subordinates.
- Upper Subordinate Quarters (USQs) are meant for family accommodation of Assistant Sub Inspectors, Sub Inspectors and Inspectors. As per the norms fixed by the MHA, the unit area for USQ was 950 sq.ft. @ Rs 500 per sq.ft (unit cost : Rs 4.75 lakh). During 2000-06, Rs 38.85 crore were released to the KPHCC for construction of 818 USQs. It was observed in audit that out of the funds released for USQs, sanctions were also issued by the Department for construction of 40 dwelling units of area ranging between 1425 sq.ft. and 2850 sq.ft for being allotted to Deputy Superintendent of Police and other Senior Officers which was not provided in the Scheme resulting in reduction of USQs. In the years 2000-01 and 2001-02, 12 Inspectors were allotted quarters above their entitlements. Inspectors being Upper Subordinates were eligible for dwelling unit of 950 sq.ft only. The amount thus diverted would come to Rs 3.49 crore<sup>ⓧ</sup> (approximately) in 52 cases. The approval of the MHA was not obtained

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<sup>Ψ</sup> Rs 3.83 crore approximately for 76500 sq.ft.@ Rs 500/sq.ft. in 65 cases corresponding to 153 LSQs @ 500 sq.ft./ LSQ

<sup>ⓧ</sup> Rs 3.49 crore approximately for 69825 sq.ft.@ Rs 500/sq.ft. in 52 cases corresponding to 73 USQs @ 950 sq.ft./USQ

for such diversion. This resulted in denial of family accommodation to 73 Upper Subordinates.

At the exit conference (July 2006) the Department agreed to modify the progress report on construction of quarters on the basis of actual number of dwelling units constructed and get the deviation ratified by GOI.

### 3.5.9.6 Physical progress

As per the BPR&D data, the State required 32,669 LS quarters and 3,126 US quarters for 100 *per cent* satisfaction. The details of work sanctioned and completed/in progress thereagainst during 2000-06 were as under:

#### Quarters

Year of allotment of funds	Total units		Number of units <sup>a</sup>					
			Completed		In progress		Not commenced	
	LSQ	USQ	LSQ	USQ	LSQ	USQ	LSQ	USQ
2001-02		128		64		38		26
2002-03	1804	144	689	76	697	30	418	38
2003-04		160		144		14		2
2004-05	1175	166	NIL	NIL	199	4	976	162
2005-06	970	220	NIL	NIL	125	-	845	220
<b>Total</b>	<b>3949<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>818<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>689</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>1021</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>2239<sup>#</sup></b>	<b>448<sup>\$</sup></b>

\* In unit area as per the GOI norm i.e. 500 sq.ft. for LSQ and 950 sq.ft. for USQ

Φ These do not include deductions on account of diversions as discussed in para 3.5.9.5

# Sites have not been handed over in 568 units

\$ Sites not handed over in 309 cases

#### Buildings

Year of allotment of funds	Total no. of buildings <sup>a</sup>	Number of buildings		
		Completed	In progress	Not commenced
2001-02	5	5	-	-
2002-03	12	2	2	8
2003-04	36	1	7	28
2004-05	29	NIL	2	27
2005-06	23	NIL	NIL	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>86<sup>*</sup></b>

# Major buildings such as Police Lines, Police Control Rooms, District Police Offices, etc.

\* Sites not handed over in 44 cases

It would be seen from the details given above that the progress in construction was very slow despite availability of funds. Out of 2687 units (Quarters) not commenced, 877 were attributed to non-handing over of sites, the balance 1810 cases were not commenced for various reasons such as works not tendered, not awarded, etc. Out of 86 buildings not commenced, 44 cases were attributed to non-handing over of site and the balance 42 were not commenced for various reasons such as works not tendered, not awarded, etc.

#### Non-utilisation of quarters constructed

Site visits conducted by Audit revealed that several quarters had not been occupied as the buildings had no electricity/water connection as instanced below:

- Out of 233 completed (between December 2004 and January 2006) LSQs visited by Audit (May/June 2006), 91 LSQs remained unoccupied (39 *per cent*)<sup>\*</sup>.

Quarters completed during September 2004 to March 2006 remained unoccupied for want of electricity/water connection

\* 91 LSQs viz., Thiruvananthapuram city (16), Thiruvananthapuram Rural (8), Ernakulam Rural (36), Thrissur (8) and Kannur (23).

- Out of 98 completed (between September 2004 and March 2006) USQs visited by Audit (May/June 2006), 33 USQs remained unoccupied (34 per cent)<sup>#</sup>.

#### **3.5.9.7 *Diversion of funds meant for construction work for unapproved works and poor quality of construction***

- As per record of the KPHCC, 36 LSQs @ 750 sq.ft. per quarter were constructed at the Police Station Compound, Wadakkekkara, Ernakulam (Rural). Site visit revealed that only 32 @ 750 sq.ft were constructed and the balance area of 4 quarters had been utilised for common areas like staircase. Government stated (September 2006) that in flat type construction, portion for common areas like fire escape, stair case, etc., had to be made as per Building Rules and had to be counted as total built up area. This is not tenable because as per the progress report the total number of LSQs constructed was shown as 36.
- During site visit (June 2006) to completed 32 LSQs at Wadakkekkara it was observed in audit that the brickwork just over the basement had started corroding, apparently due to poor quality of bricks or location of building in water-logged area. This was likely to affect the life of the building constructed at a cost of Rs 1.35 crore (36 x 750 x 500). The building completed in July 2005 was yet to be occupied for want of water/electricity connection.
- As per the records of the KPHCC, the District Crime Records Bureau (DCRB) blocks were constructed in the DPOs, Thrissur and Kannur. But it was revealed on site visits (June 2006) that no such buildings were constructed and the amount for the same had been utilised for construction of Passport Cell and Zonal Office of DIG respectively though not included in the Approved Action Plan.
- Site visit (May 2006) revealed that extension to the Police Station, Kazhakuttam and construction of Rest Rooms for WPCs were not made, as reported in the KPHCC progress report. It was found that another floor had been constructed over Circle Inspectors' Office, Kazhakuttam for accommodating Vanitha (Women) Cell.

#### **3.5.9.8 *Mobility***

Mobility is vital to the efficient and effective performance of police force. Mobility deficiency is nil when a well equipped police force has the ability to move the entire force at once. Based on this concept, the BPR&D has prescribed scales for various types of operational vehicles such as Heavy/Medium/Light Vehicles and Motor cycles required for Police Stations (PS), District Armed Reserve (DAR) and Armed Police Battalion (APB). Against outlay of Rs 84.94 crore provided for Mobility during 2000-06, Rs 67.75 crore were spent upto 31 March 2006.

Details of vehicles in the Police Department as at the beginning and at the end of 2000-06 were as follows.

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<sup>#</sup> 33 USQs viz., Thiruvananthapuram city (2), Thiruvananthapuram Rural (8), Ernakulam Rural (7) and Thrissur (16)



Date	Number of vehicles			
	Jeeps	Motor Cycles	Others	Total
1 April 2000	1318	197	527	2042
31 March 2006	1334	1831	810	3975

Despite purchase of 893 Jeeps during the period, the net addition was negligible. It would appear that the purchased jeeps were mostly utilised for replacement of old jeeps and did not enhance the mobility of the Police force on this account.

#### ***Diversion of funds - Purchase of Passenger Cars instead of Light vehicles***

As per BPR &D report (January 1998), there was no deficiency of Light Vehicles (LV) in the State. For operational purposes LV like Jeep can move 8 police personnel at a time. As the State Government felt that Medium Vehicles (MV) were not found to be much useful for policing, it was decided (February 2001) to phase out MVs with LVs. In order to make up for the deficiency of 608 MVs as on 01 January 1998 as reported by the BPR&D, a total of 1824 LVs were needed (@ 3 LVs per 1 MV). Considering the financial constraints, 608 LVs were proposed to be purchased during the years 2000-05 (five-year Action Plan for Modernisation). Against this, 1076 LVs were purchased as against 1002 LVs approved by the MHA. A test check of purchases of LVs during the period 2000-01 to 2004-05 revealed that 104 vehicles<sup>6</sup> not categorised as operational vehicles were purchased at a cost of Rs 3.79 crore. These vehicles except Maruti Omni were issued for use of Senior Officers. Thus, Rs 3.79 crore diverted for these vehicles in violation of the AAP was not approved by MHA and did not help to improve the mobility of the Police Force as intended.

**Intention of increasing the mobility of Police Force was defeated by purchase of passenger vehicles worth Rs 3.79 crore instead of light vehicles**

#### ***3.5.9.9 Excess expenditure over outlay***

Against the GOI approval for purchase of vehicles for Rs 16.92 crore in the AAP for 2001-02, the Department purchased vehicles of various types at a cost of Rs 18.30 crore. The Department, however, did not obtain the sanction of the GOI, for the excess expenditure over outlay, as required.

#### ***3.5.9.10 Excess payment of Entry Tax and irregular debit to Scheme funds***

During 2003-04, the Department paid Rs 2.35 crore towards Entry Tax\* (ET), (12 per cent of value) on vehicles purchased during 2000-01 to 2002-03 by debiting the expenditure under Scheme. Entry Tax paid included Rs 8.76 lakh wrongly levied towards Entry Tax on 20 Ambassador Cars purchased within the State during 2002-03 and Rs 1.10 crore relating to purchase of vehicles during 2000-01 for purposes not included in modernisation of Police force. Hence a total of Rs 1.19 crore was irregularly debited to Scheme funds.

**An amount of Rs 1.19 crore was irregularly debited to Scheme funds**

#### ***3.5.10 Deviation from Approved Action Plan in purchase of weapons***

Against outlay of Rs 6.08 crore on weapons during 2000-06, Rs 6.15 crore were spent up to 31 March 2006. Deviations from the approved action plan were observed in the following cases. No approval of the MHA was obtained for the deviation.

<sup>6</sup> These included Ambassador Cars (50), TATA Indica (11), Maruti Omni (19), Mahindra Bolero (23) and Scorpio (1).

\* Tax payable Under Section (3) of the Tax on entry of Goods into Local Area Act, 1994.



**Deviating from approved action plan, weapons were purchased without approval of the MHA. Purchase of ammunition to the tune of Rs 89.25 lakh was irregular**

- Against sanction for purchase of weapons (200 9-mm pistols and 2 LMG) for Rs 44.60 lakh in the AAP for 2000-01, the Department purchased weapons (200 9-mm pistols and 10 rifles) and ammunition, for Rs 130.39 lakh during 2001-02 which included Rs 89.25 lakh on ammunition which was irregular. Government stated (September 2006) that the ammunitions were purchased as there was no sufficient funds in the State budget for 2000-01. The reply is not acceptable as the allotment of Scheme funds was for purchase of weapons only.
- Under Scheme 2001-02, Rs 25 lakh were allocated for purchase of 100 7.62-mm SLR Rifles. Instead the Department purchased (March 2003) 1000 old (1964 to 1970 vintage) but serviceable Rifles costing Rs 50 lakh from the Assam Rifles who were replacing them.

### **3.5.11 Scientific Aids to Investigation**

The Scheme envisages provision of modern scientific aids to investigation and development of infrastructure for improving the quality of crime investigation. Against outlay of Rs 22.06 crore during 2000-2006, for Scientific Aids to Investigation, the utilisation was Rs 12.14 crore upto 31 March 2006.

It was observed that approved outlay of Rs 4.62 crore for 2000-01 was for purchase of scientific equipment (Rs 62 lakh) and DNA finger print development (Rs 4.00 crore), the Department made purchases for Rs 4.12 crore which included approved items costing Rs 65.92 lakh only. The purchase of remaining items such as Atomic Absorption Spectrometer, Forensic Fibre Analyser, etc., costing Rs 3.46 crore did not have the approval of the MHA. The department also did not inform the MHA about the deviation from approved Action Plan. This indicated that the Action Plan for 2000-01 submitted to the GOI for approval was not need based.

**Non-synchronising of the purchase of equipment with the construction of buildings and posting of staff resulted in idling of equipment worth Rs 3.42 crore**

Equipment costing Rs 3.42 crore were purchased during August 2005 and September 2005 for the Regional Forensic Science Laboratories (RFSL) at Kannur and Thrissur. Though the building for RFSL at Kannur had been completed in November 2004 at a cost of Rs 75 lakh and equipment were installed, the Laboratory had not been functional as the technical staff required were not posted (June 2006). The required notification fixing the area of jurisdiction had also not been issued (June 2006). The building for the RFSL at Thrissur had not been completed (May 2006). The equipment purchased for the Lab were still lying in the packages at the State FSL, Thiruvananthapuram (May 2006). As a result of non-synchronising of the purchase of equipment with the construction of buildings and posting of staff, equipment worth Rs 3.42 crore were lying unused.

**Accepting the highest tender for purchase of Atomic Absorption Spectrometer resulted in excess expenditure of Rs 18.64 lakh**

The State Government issued (September 2001) administrative sanction for purchase of Atomic Absorption Spectrometer for FSL at an approximate cost of Rs 40 lakh under the Scheme 2000-01 even though the item was not included in Action Plan for the year approved by the GOI. Three firms were short listed as their products conformed to technical specialisation in the tender. The lowest tender (M/s Niu. Lab) was for Rs 19.47 lakh and the highest (M/s Lab India) was for Rs 38.70 lakh. But the Department purchased the equipment from M/s Lab India at their reduced cost of Rs 38.11 lakh on the ground of technical superiority. Disregarding the product which met the minimum requirement and purchasing the costlier one was irregular. It was

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also seen that M/s Niu Lab had supplied this equipment to several reputed Medical/Forensic Science Institutions. If the Department was very particular about procuring equipment with superior features the right course could have been retendering. The irregular purchase resulted in excess expenditure of Rs 18.64 lakh

### **3.5.12 Finger Print Bureau (FPB)**

In the detailed five year plan 2000-05, for the Scheme, the Department proposed to modernize the FPB by updating technologies for lifting, storing and comparing finger prints at an estimated cost of Rs 5 crore. Despite approval of the MHA during the years, modern equipment like Poly ray, Video Spectral Comparator, Crime light equipment, etc. were not purchased with the result that conventional methods of comparison of impressions were still being employed. Out of outlay of Rs 3.6 crore for 6 years, the utilisation was only Rs 1.26 crore. Instead of modern equipment, the items supplied to the FPB under the Scheme were various types of finger print/foot print investigation kits, accessories, chemicals, etc. The employment of conventional methods caused difficulties to investigating officers affecting the quality of results.

### **3.5.13 Irregularity in purchase of Speed Check Radar Guns**

The Scheme provided funds for acquisition of equipment for traffic enforcement and regulation with a view to improve public safety and prevent accidents. The approved outlay during 2000-2006 was Rs 3.45 crore of which Rs 1.58 crore only were utilised upto 31 March 2006. Despite yearly increase in number of road accidents, the Department utilised only 46 *per cent* of the funds earmarked for road safety. Government replied (September 2006) that earnest efforts were being made to utilise the unspent balance.

Extra expenditure of Rs 33.22 lakh on purchase of 11 Speed Check Radar Guns at Rs 5.60 lakh per piece disregarding the lowest offer of Rs 2.58 lakh per piece

The Department sought (November 2004) sanction of the Government for purchase of 11 Speed Check Radar Gun @ Rs 5.60 lakh per piece from M/s Turbo Consulting Company, New Delhi ignoring the lowest quotation of Rs 2.58 lakh per piece offered by another firm on the plea that the model proposed to be purchased had superior features. In reply, the Government stated (February 2005) that the model selected had higher features than the specification laid down in tender specification and hence the rejection of the lowest offer of Rs 2.58 lakh per piece was not in order. Though the Government directed (February 2005) the DGP to retender, the Department did not comply with the directions of the Government and went ahead with the purchase (January 2005) resulting in extra expenditure of Rs 33.22 lakh. In reply, the Department stated (July 2006) that the direction of the Government was received (February 2005) after the supply order was placed (January 2005). The Department should have waited for the sanction of the Government before placing supply order. It was revealed during visit of Traffic Police Station, Kannur in June 2006 that the Radar Gun supplied to the Police Station in May 2005 had not been put to use for want of essential accessories.

### **3.5.14 Training**

Training was an essential requisite for the effective functioning of police force. The Scheme provided for infrastructure facilities and equipment for police training institutes in the State. A total outlay of Rs 10.75 crore was

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approved during 2000-01 to 2005-06 by the MHA for purchase of equipment, furniture, cooking utensils, cooking range, etc. and to improve the infrastructure facilities at the KEPA, Thrissur and Police Training College (PTC), Thiruvananthapuram. Against this Rs 7.87 crore were reported as utilised. Audit scrutiny revealed that out of the Rs 7.87 crore, Rs 4.23 crore were advanced to the KPHCC during 2004-05 and 2005-06 for construction of Aquatic Training Centre (Rs 100 lakh), Indoor Training Centre (Rs 100 lakh), Modernisation of Library at PTC (Rs 67 lakh), Traffic Training School (Rs 40 lakh), Passing out Parade Pavilion (Rs 50 lakh) etc., the work on these had not even been started. Obviously, actual utilisation of funds was less than 40 *per cent* of the outlay. A Canine School constructed at a cost of Rs 50 lakh in March 2006 at the KEPA, Thrissur had not been functional as dogs were not purchased and Trainers not posted.

### **3.5.15 Communication**

A police communication project using satellite communication for transfer of data, voice and fax *viz.*, POLNET was proposed to be implemented in the State by the MHA under the Scheme. For this, the State Government was required to prepare sites for installation of POLNET equipment. The project was to be fully commissioned by 31 March 2005. Due to non-preparation of sites, the installation could not be completed. POLNET had been functional only up to the District Police Office level. The voice communication had not been extended to the Police Stations as Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART) equipment received from the MHA could not be installed for want of towers at the District Police Offices and aerial masts at the Police Stations. Rupee 1.03 crore given to the KPHCC in November 2005 for installation of masts in the Police Stations was not utilised for want of design. Rupees ten crore were additionally needed for aerial masts for entire coverage. Despite spending Rs 4 crore on equipment, the POLNET had not been fully operational for want of aerial masts even though the target date was already over.

**POLNET was not fully operational even after spending Rs 4 crore, for want of aerial masts**

### **3.5.16 Monitoring and Internal Control**

Audit scrutiny revealed the following deficiencies

- Though periodic financial progress reports were sent to the MHA, the physical progress of components were not reported to the MHA (March 2006).
- As per the GOI directions, a State Level Empowering Committee was set up under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary in June 2001 for speedy sanction of schemes and proper monitoring of implementation. It was directed therein that the committee would meet every month and ensure proper implementation of the scheme. During the six years ending March 2006, the Committee met annually to finalise and submit annual plan to the GOI. Except on some occasions in the initial years, no monitoring was conducted by the committee.
- The expenditure on the Scheme was not subjected to internal audit.
- Only evaluation of the Scheme in physical terms was conducted and no assessment of the impact of the Scheme on crime detection, traffic

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safety, reduction of pending cases in FSL etc., was conducted by the Department.

Government replied (September 2006) that the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram had been entrusted with the work of impact assessment and the field work would start shortly.

#### **3.5.17 Conclusion**

Annual Plans prepared without proper assessment of needs and their delayed approval had resulted in delaying the implementation of the scheme of Modernisation of Police Force and caused deviations from approved plans. Huge amounts transferred to the KPHCC for construction of non-residential/residential buildings, were lying unutilised mainly due to failure of the Department in handing over sites. Diversion of funds for unintended constructions, slow progress in construction, deviation from approved norms and non-occupation of completed quarters were observed. Projects for improving training facilities were not completed. There was no appreciable increase in mobility as Jeeps purchased were mainly used for replacement of old vehicles and purchase of other non-operational vehicles. Equipment purchased for Regional FSL were idling due to failure in providing infrastructure and necessary technical staff in time. Proper monitoring mechanism was absent at the level of Government and the Department.

#### **3.5.18 Recommendations**

- Annual Plans should be prepared based on needs and got approved early.
- The pace of construction should be speeded up by making available the sites while transferring the funds to the KPHCC.
- Replacement/procurement of vehicles should be done with the aim of improving the mobility of Police. The Government should consider separate allocation of funds from State budget for replacement of vehicles.
- Equipment for the Regional Forensic Science Laboratories should be put to use immediately by providing the required infrastructure and adequate technical manpower.
- Projects for improving training facilities should be completed immediately for enjoying the benefits early.
- Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms both at the level of Government/ Department should be made effective.

Government, during discussion (July 2006) generally agreed with the conclusion and accepted the recommendations of audit.

**Appendix XXV**  
**Component wise Outlay and Expenditure - 2000-2006**  
**(Reference : Paragraph 3.5.8.2 ; page 95)**

(Rupees in crore)

Components	Scheme Year												TOTAL	
	2000-01		2001-02		2002-03		2003-04		2004-05		2005-06			
	Outlay	Expenditure (per cent)	Outlay	Expenditure (per cent)	Outlay	Expenditure (per cent)	Outlay	Expenditure (per cent)	Outlay	Expenditure (per cent)	Outlay	Expenditure (per cent)	Outlay	Expenditure <sup>o</sup> (per cent)*
Building	7.23	7.23 (100)	11.92	12.29 (100)	16.73	17.17 (100)	5.13	5.13 (100)	4.77	4.78 (100)	8.34	8.35 (100)	54.12	54.94 (100)
Housing	21.64	21.64 (100)	18.88	18.88 (100)	23.00	23.10 (100)	37.16	37.26 (100)	21.20	21.20 (100)	13.50	13.49 (100)	135.88	135.57 (100)
Mobility	12.89	12.20 (95)	16.92	18.30 (108)	16.15	15.10 (93)	10.26	10.75 (100)	11.52	11.40 (100)	17.20	NIL (0)	84.94	67.75 (80)
Weapons	0.45	1.30 (288)	0.25	0.50 (200)	0.42	0.38 (90)	0.75	0.55 (73)	2.11	2.97 (140)	2.10	0.45 (21)	6.08	6.15 (100)
Traffic	0.17	--	0.06	0.10 (167)	0.87	0.48 (55)	0.50	0.13 (26)	0.64	0.69 (100)	1.21	0.18 (15)	3.45	1.58 (46)
Scientific aids to Investigation	5.37	5.39 (100)	2.00	0.87 (44)	NIL	NIL	4.81	3.88 (81)	3.05	1.22 (40)	6.83	0.77 (11)	22.06	12.14 (55)
Equipment	4.29	2.87 (67)	2.92	2.00 (69)	3.43	3.72 (100)	1.83	0.75 (41)	3.42	2.09 (61)	3.76	1.63 (43)	19.05	13.07 (69)
Training	NIL	0.24	0.50	0.52 (100)	0.75	0.42 (56)	1.98	1.25 (63)	5.45	4.49 (82)	2.07	0.95 (46)	10.75	7.87 (73)
Communication	6.53	4.21 (64)	4.03	2.77 (69)	1.65	2.62 (158)	0.58	2.10 (362)	3.19	4.16 (130)	2.50	0.62 (25)	18.48	16.48 (89)
Computerisation	NIL	0.35	4.75	2.92 (61)	NIL	NIL			6.30	0.95 (15)	4.00	0.40 (10)	15.15	4.62 (30)
TOTAL	58.57	55.43 (95)	62.23	59.15 (95)	63.00	63.00 (100)	63.00	61.80 (93)	61.65	53.95 (88)	61.51	26.84 (44)	369.96	320.17 (87)

<sup>°</sup> Progressive expenditure upto 31 March 2006

<sup>♦</sup> With respect to Total Outlay

## Home Department

### 3.5 Modernisation of Police Force

#### 3.5.1 Introduction

Modernisation of Police Force (Scheme) was introduced (1969) by Government of India (GOI), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to improve the efficiency of Police force, and remove the deficiencies in infrastructure viz., buildings, mobility, communication, weapons, training, Forensic Science laboratory (FSL), Finger Print Bureau (FPB), security equipment, computerisation and office automation to enable the state police to deal with the growing crime, terrorist and naxalite activities and meet the internal security threat effectively on cost sharing basis. At Government level, Principal Secretary, Home Department was responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the scheme. The State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) constituted under the chairmanship of Chief Secretary was responsible at apex level, to finalise the Annual Action Plans (AAPs) and monitor the implementation of the scheme. At the department level Director General of Police (DGP) Additional Director General (ADG) (Communication), Director FSL and MD Police housing corporation (MPPHC) and at district level Superintendent of Police (SP) were responsible for implementation of the scheme.

#### 3.5.2 Financial management

The funding under the Modernisation scheme was to be shared in the ratio of 50:50 percent by the Central and State Governments upto 2002-03. The Central share comprised 50 percent as grant and 50 percent as loan. For 2003-04 and 2004-05 the funding pattern was revised to 60:40. From the year 2005-06 the Central assistance was increased to 75 per cent as grant.

The details of plan approved, funds released by the GOI and State Government and expenditure incurred thereagainst during 2000-06 were as under:

(Rupees in crore)										
Year	Approved Plan	Central Share		State Share		Central release	State release	Total (Co.7+8)	Total Expenditure	Balance
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
2000-01	108.97	50	54.49	50	54.48	54.49	58.04	112.53	10.00	102.53
2001-02	106.00	50	53.00	50	53.00	53.00	53.07	106.07	81.56	24.51
2002-03	106.00	50	53.00	50	53.00	51.33	51.33	102.66	57.19	45.47
2003-04	98.07	60	58.84	40	39.23	48.24	40.32	88.56	80.95	7.61
2004-05	99.74	60	59.84	40	39.90	42.07	28.05	70.12	189.23	(-)119.11
2005-06	104.24	75	78.18	25	26.06	30.29	10.10	40.39	71.45	(-)31.06
	623.02		357.35		265.67	279.42	240.91	520.33	490.38	29.95

Balances at the year end were transferred to civil deposit after approval of the Finance Department (FD).



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### 3.5.2.1 Shortfall of Central share and short utilization of funds

The GOI share of Rs. 77.93 crore could not be availed by the State Government due to slow progress of programme implementation

Against sanctions of Rs. 623.02 crore for 6 annual plans, GOI share was Rs. 357.35 crore, but due to slow progress of the programme implementation, GOI released only Rs. 279.42 crore. Thus the GOI share of Rs. 77.93 crore could not be availed by the State Government for implementation of scheme.

Out of total assistance of Rs. 520.33 crore released during 2000-06 department could not utilize Rs. 29.95 crore as of March 2006. Further out of Rs. 490.38 crore shown as expenditure, Rs. 159.42 crore was lying with the construction agencies\* as of March 2006.

Inflated reporting of expenditure by Rs. 159.42 crore which was lying with construction agencies.

The State Government, however, reported the entire amount as expenditure and utilization certificates were issued to the GOI. This resulted in inflated reporting of expenditure by Rs. 159.42 crore which was lying with construction agencies.

### 3.5.2.2 Non-refund of unspent balance

The unspent balance of Rs. 0.76 crore, out of Rs. 4.72 crore provided for 103 buildings, was not refunded by the agencies.

Construction of 103 residential and non-residential buildings was completed and handed over during May 2003 to September 2005 by MPPHC by incurring an expenditure of Rs. 3.96 crore. However, the unspent balance of Rs. 0.76 crore, out of Rs. 4.72 crore provided for these buildings, was not refunded to the Department by MPPHC.

The Department instructed (July 2006) the construction agencies to refund the balance amount. However, the same had not been refunded as of August 2006.

### 3.5.3 Housing

MPPHC earned an interest of Rs. 11.45 crore during 2000-06 on funds provided to them for construction works and utilised the same to meet out their own expenses.

The scheme laid special emphasis on construction of residential, administrative and other buildings with a view to providing a better working environment to the police personnel and an amount of Rs. 243.74 crore was released to construction agencies during 2000-06 for construction of buildings against which an expenditure of Rs. 84.32 crore was incurred as of June 2006. The balance amount (Rs. 159.42 crore) was lying with the construction agencies.

MPPHC parked the fund with the Banks and earned interest of Rs. 11.45\*\* crore during 2000-06 on the funds provided to them for construction work and it was utilized by them to meet out their own expenses. The position of construction of buildings is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

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\* M.P. Police Housing Corporation (Rs.155.17 crore), M.P. Housing Board (Rs. 2.21 crore), PWD (Rs. 0.49 crore), RES (Rs. 1.55 crore).

\*\* (Rs. 0.46 crore in 2000-2001, Rs. 1.77 crore in 2001-2002, Rs. 2.21 crore in 2002-2003, Rs. 0.89 crore in 2003-2004, Rs. 2.68 crore in 2004-05 and Rs. 3.44 crore in 2005-06).

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### **3.5.3.1 Completed buildings not handed over to the Departments**

**Seventy eight completed buildings costing to Rs. 15.76 crore were not handed over to Department**

Construction of 6080 buildings were taken up during 2000-2006 at a cost of Rs. 243.74 crore of which 1739 buildings pertaining to the year 2000-03 were completed by incurring an expenditure of Rs. 62.44 crore of which 78 buildings costing Rs. 15.76 crore (MPPHC-6 buildings Rs. 0.94 crore, MPHB-34 buildings Rs. 10.49 crore and PWD-38 buildings Rs. 4.33 crore) completed during February 2004 to August 2005 were not handed over to the Department by the construction agencies as of August 2006. The buildings included 44 thana bhawans in 23 districts, 18 administrative buildings in 12 districts and 293 residential buildings in 10 districts as per details given in **Appendix 3.9.**

### **3.5.3.2 Delay in construction of buildings**

**Construction of 868 works remained incomplete even after incurring expenditure of Rs. 12.82 crore.**

The construction of 868 buildings costing Rs. 37.56 crore sanctioned during 2000-03 and taken up during 2001-05 was however incomplete as of August 2006 after incurring an expenditure of Rs. 12.82 crore. The scrutiny of records revealed that the work of these buildings was started very late due to the fact that funds for the years 2000-01, 2001-02 and 2002-03 were released to the agencies in August 2001, October 2002 and March 2005 respectively. Though these works were started in October 2001 to March 2005, these could not be completed even after lapse of more than three years.

These works mainly included 218 residential quarters pertaining to the year 2000-2001 and 2001-02 at Dhar, Satna, Katni, Sheopur, Morena and Mandsaur districts on which expenditure of Rs. 4.06 crore was incurred. Similarly five administrative buildings, 22 thana bhawan and 14 other buildings remained incomplete in Bhopal, Indore, Sheopur, Bhind, Shivpuri and Umariya on which expenditure of Rs. 2.12 crore was incurred. At Dhar, work for 54 residential quarters was sanctioned at the cost of Rs. 1.48 crore and after incurring an expenditure of Rs. 0.90 crore upto October 2005 the contract of work was cancelled in October 2005 and process for re-tendering was in progress as of August 2006.

On the above being pointed out the Department stated (July 2006) that no time limit was prescribed to complete these works. However, the agencies were being regularly directed to complete the work at the earliest in the monthly meetings. The reply was not tenable as the monitoring with construction agencies was not effective and works sanctioned more than five years back had also remained incomplete.

### **3.5.3.3 Non-commencement of construction works**

**The work of 2658 buildings was not started inspite of timely release of funds to the agencies.**

Construction of 2658 buildings costing Rs.109.75 crore sanctioned during 2000-06 (01 building in 2000-01, 03 in 2001-02, 752 in 2002-03, 333 in 2003-04, 1053 in 2004-05 and 516 in 2005-06) could not be started as of June 2006 for want of administrative approval (444), finalisation of drawing, designs and estimates (162), finalisation of tender (451), non-availability of land (1557) and other reasons (44). This was despite the fact that Rs.109.75 crore were

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already released to the construction agencies\*. The main works where the construction had not commenced include one thana bhawan each at Bhopal, Jhabua, Barwani, and Satna, quarters at Shivpuri (80), Gwalior (53) and Morena (13) and administrative buildings at Dhar (02) and Dabri Chowki (01).

### **3.5.4 Procurement of vehicles**

#### **3.5.4.1 Insufficient number of drivers**

There are 932 Police Stations (PSs) in the State. At the beginning of the year 2000 only 16 percent PSs were equipped with vehicles. During the period of 2000-2005 total 3737 vehicles were purchased by the Department by incurring an expenditure of Rs.110.90 crore and all the PSs were provided with vehicles.

In the eight\*\* test checked districts there were 287 vehicles in the year 2000 and after implementation of scheme 401 additional vehicles were provided to these districts during 2000 -2005 and hence 688 vehicles were available as of January 2006 in these districts. Against the availability of 688 vehicles only 412 drivers were in position in these districts which had an adverse impact on utilization of the vehicles and thus the procurement of vehicles without ensuring services of requisite drivers was injudicious.

#### **3.5.4.2 Delayed response time**

The Saraf Committee opined that fixing of maximum response time is necessary to induct sense of purpose and direction and recommended a maximum response delay time of five minutes in reaching to the crime site. The State Government did not fix the maximum response time. The 311 vehicles were provided during 2000-2006 to the seven§ districts

The test check of records of 32 PSs in seven districts revealed that in 356 out of 575 cases during 2003 and 253 cases out of 517 during 2005 police reached the crime site between 1 hour to 2 hours and in 103 cases of 2003 and 122 cases of 2005 the police reached the crime site even after more than two hours. Response time taken was thus far from satisfactory and no significant improvement was witnessed in reduction of response time even after providing additional vehicles to these districts.

### **3.5.5 Computerisation**

#### **3.5.5.1 Non-achievement of object of computerisation**

Under Modernisation of Police Force Scheme computerisation of 914 police stations, SDOP Offices, SP Offices and range IG Offices in the state with on line connectivity with the State Police Headquarters was envisaged with a view to enhance efficiency and effective supervision and monitoring. Keeping above in view Rs. 29.10 crore were sanctioned by GOI during the period 2000-06 for computerisation, finger print bureau, questioned document work, etc. of which the expenditure worth Rs. 18.56 crore (Rs. 15.62 crore by State Crime Record Bureau (SCRB) and Rs. 2.94 crore by SP offices) was incurred

**The objectives of computerization were not achieved even after incurring an expenditure of Rs. 18.56 crore.**

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\* MPPHC Rs. 108.21 crore (Rs. 0.10 crore August 2001, Rs. 26.62 crore in March 2005, Rs. 11.55 crore in May 2005, Rs. 37.34 crore March 2005, Rs. 32.60 crore in March 2006) MPHB Rs. 1.54 crore (Rs. 0.36 crore in October 2002, Rs. 1.04 crore in March 2005 and Rs. 0.14 crore in March 2005)

\*\* Badwani, Bhopal, Gwalior, Jabalpur, Jhabua, Katni, Mandsaur and Sagar

§ Badwani, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Jhabua, Katni, Mandsaur and Sagar

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leaving unutilized balance of Rs. 10.54 crore (Rs. 6.90 crore with SCRB and Rs. 3.64 crore with SP offices) as of August 06.

Scrutiny of records revealed that computer hardware and peripherals were provided to district offices, Headquarter office and 114 PSs. Though the Local Area Network (LAN) was provided at Headquarters office and district office, but online connectivity of PSs, district offices and Headquarter office was not provided. Scrutiny further revealed that the scheme was not included in the AAP from 2004-05 onwards. This resulted in non-achievement of object of the computerisation scheme of having on line connectivity.

The Department stated (August 2006) that scheme could not be completed because funds for interconnectivity were not provided by the Government. The reply was not acceptable as the unutilized balance of Rs. 10.54 crore was already available with the Department.

#### ***3.5.5.2 Deficiency in Implementation of Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA) project***

CIPA was introduced by GOI (2003-04) with a view to record data regarding crime and criminals by computerizing Head Office, range offices, SP offices, SDOP offices and all PSs in the state with online connectivity with each other together with access/transfer of data of crime and criminals to / from each other.

GOI approved Rs. 5.40 crore and Rs. 13.86 crore in AAPs of 2004-05 and 2005-06 respectively for the project. In the first year 94 PSs and in second year 274 PSs were to be covered under the project. The work of site preparation was to be done by SCRB and the supply of hardware, as per configuration fixed by GOI, development of software and installation thereof was to be done by NIC. GOI did not release the funds approved for 2005-06.

The hardware in 93 PSs was supplied by vendor but installation thereof was completed only in 3 PSs as of August 2006. The supply of hardware in 275 PSs and installation thereof was not started so far due to non-release of funds by GOI. The ACs required were not provided in any of the 94 PSs for which sites were prepared by SCRB.

The delivery and implementation schedule was not known to SCRB and configuration of hardware and peripherals was also not checked by them, to ensure that all the items required were received. Thus due to lack of coordination between implementation agency and SCRB, and lack of monitoring the hardware received in 90 PSs was lying idle.

The Department admitted that hardware and software were not installed in PSs (October 2006) and the difficulty was being faced due to lack of co-ordination between SCRB and implementing agency. It was also stated that the CIPA software was not found to be useful due to deficiencies found during demonstration.

### **3.5.6 Telecommunication**

#### ***3.5.6.1 Deficiency in Implementation of Police Network (POLNET) project***

POLNET is a satellite based network that provides voice, data and message communication between police station, district offices, Range office, State

**The computers were installed only in three PSs against targeted 94 PSs. The CIPA software was also not found to be useful.**

**The material worth Rs. 1.39 crore supplied for POLNET project could not be used.**

Head office, National Capital. The project network consists of hybrid station at Bhopal, 37 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) in 37 districts with connectivity to 825 PSs using Multi Access Radio Telephony (MART) via Base Station Unit (BSU) located at VSAT sites. GOI sanctioned Rs. 4.75 crore in AAP for the year 2002-03 to 2005-06 and MHA placed the sanction at the disposal of Directorate of Coordination Police Wireless (DCPW) for implementation of the project. The project was targeted to be completed by May 2005, which was extended upto November 2006.

Scrutiny revealed that the instruments/equipment for VSAT and MART were received in the districts and PSs during January 2003 to April 2004 and Hybrid Station at Bhopal and VSATs of 37 districts were installed upto May 2005. Scrutiny further revealed that out of 825 PSs the use of the material was made in 470 PSs as these were feasible being within range of BSU. Therefore the material of MART worth Rs. 1.39 crore, supplied to the remaining 355 PSs which were out of range of BSU proved infructuous.

Department stated (October 2006) that the proposal for utilisation of the material was being prepared by incorporating the PSs which are within the range but not covered in the original plan.

### **3.5.7 Functioning of Forensic Science Laboratory**

#### **3.5.7.1 Delay in Establishment of DNA Laboratory**

The Perspective Plan 2000-05 envisaged the establishment of DNA laboratory at Sagar. The Department purchased (February 2004 to April 2005) equipment worth Rs. 3.35 crore for DNA laboratory. The commissioning of the equipment was not started as of November 2006 and benefit of the DNA analysis could not be extended to the criminal cases.

**The DNA analysis in laboratory was not started up to November 2006 even after incurring an expenditure of Rs. 3.35 crore.**

The analytical procedure of a forensic physical evidence in the laboratories invariably involves high degree of knowledge, competence and expertise. A technical manager or leader of a laboratory must have a minimum of three years of forensic DNA laboratory experience and who are actually engaged in DNA analysis shall undergo at regular intervals of not less than 180 days external proficiency testing in accordance with the standards. He must have completed a qualifying test before beginning independent case work. The technicians and laboratory support personnel must have training, education and experience commensurate with their responsibility as outlined in their job description. But no such person having the qualification mentioned was posted. The scrutiny further revealed that the Government did not sanction any post of scientist, technician and assistant for DNA laboratory. But four scientists working in other discipline were posted in the laboratory, who did not fulfill the required qualifications as envisaged in the manual for independent functioning of the DNA testing. Post supply training was also not imparted by the vendor to these scientists of the Department.

The Director FSL stated (November 2006) that the laboratory has begun on trial run basis. The standardization of work was in progress and Genotyping of isolated DNA is to be taken up as next step in DNA profiling. So far as the qualification of scientists are concerned it was stated that they have had the requisite training under the MOU signed between the Government of MP and the CDFD Hyderabad.



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The reply was not acceptable as the DNA analysis in the laboratory was not started upto November 2006 and the scientists had not completed minimum 180 days external proficiency testing as per DNA standard

#### **3.5.7.2 Delay in receipt of samples for scientific analysis**

In accordance with the instructions issued by the Police Headquarters the samples collected by the police from the crime site should be sent to FSL within two weeks of memo issued from SP offices.

Test-check of the records (August 2006) of Director FSL Sagar revealed that samples collected by the police in criminal cases were sent by Police with delay ranging from one year to seven years to the laboratory. As the PSs did not have any preservation facilities as per requirement of laboratory, the Director FSL admitted (August 2006) that the quality of the samples deteriorates due to bacteria/fungus/rusting with passage of time which may adversely affect the test results.

#### **3.5.7.3 Huge pendency in analysis of samples**

The samples received in the laboratory were required to be analysed as soon as possible. Year wise details of test analysis of samples conducted by FSL were as under:

Year	Opening Balance	Cases received during the year	Total	Cases examined during the year	Pending at the end of the year
2000	22796	14443	37239	32792	4447
2001	4447	14818	19265	12308	6957
2002	6957	13848	20805	12169	8636
2003	8636	12987	21623	15144	6479
2004	6479	11292	17771	13015	4756
2005	4756	9081	13837	9171	4666
2006 upto 6/06	4666	4224	8890	4870	4020

The review of the progress report of analysis of cases revealed that number of cases analysed during a year reduced from 32792 in 2000 to 9171 in 2005. Out of 4020 cases shown pending at the end of June 2006, 2814 cases pertained to the year 1992 to 2005 (2394 cases 10 to 14 years old, 399 cases five to ten years old and 21 case one to five years old). In reply it was stated that the files were kept in the toxicology wing and analysis result would be intimated as and when required by concerned unit.

#### **3.5.8 Non-creation of infrastructure and shortfall in numbers of training courses**

Out of 49 housing units and administrative buildings including classrooms approved during 2000-05 at the cost of Rs. 9.37 crore of which the construction of 33 buildings was taken up and completed after incurring expenditure of Rs. 4.02 crore and the work of remaining 16 units was not started as of August 2006 for want of estimates, approval of design drawing and site selection. ADG (Training) was responsible to chalk out and monitor the implementation of training calendar and to assess the impact of various trainings in the field. Scrutiny of information and records revealed that out of 204 courses targeted in PTS Indore, Pachmarhi, Rewa, Tigara and Umaria meant for 11750 police personnel during 2002, 2003 and 2005 only 5758 personnel were trained in 138 courses conducted during these years and the shortfall in number of courses was 66 (32 per cent) and shortfall in number



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of trainees was 5992 (51 per cent). The number of courses planned and slots allotted for police personnel for the year 2000, 2001 and 2004 was not available with the office of the ADG (Training).

### **3.5.9 Conclusion**

Due to slow pace of utilization, GOI share amounting to Rs. 77.93 crore could not be availed by State Government for implementation of scheme. The financial management of the scheme was deficient as unspent balance lying with construction agencies after completion of work had not been recovered. There were large sums of money lying with construction agencies which were shown to be expended in the returns sent to GOI. Despite their completion, buildings were not handed over to the Department. Therefore, the objectives for which these were constructed were not fulfilled. There was delay of construction of thana bhawans, residential quarters and many of the works which were sanctioned could not be commenced for want of approval, finalisation of drawing, design and non-availability of land etc. Though the vehicles have been purchased and supplied, commensurate number of drivers were not available and the response time was also found to be poor. On line connectivity was not ensured and hardware and software purchased for CIPA project was not put to use. There was delay in establishment of DNA laboratory and there were huge pendency of cases in FSL. Requisite infrastructure for training was not created and there were large number of training slots which were not utilized.

### **3.5.10 Recommendations**

- Amount lying with construction agencies should not be reported to GOI as expended and unspent balance lying with agency after completion of work should be immediately recovered.
- Expeditionary efforts should be made for getting the possession of buildings that have been constructed so that they are put to use for the purpose for which these have been constructed.
- In light of large number of construction works being delayed and also not having commenced; a review of these constructions work should be carried out and coordinated steps be initiated with other agencies and a system of periodical and regular monitoring should be introduced so as to ensure early commencement and completion of these works.
- On line connectivity should be ensured at various levels so as to derive optimum benefit of computerisation.

The matter was reported to Government in September 2006; reply had not been received (December 2006).

**Appendix 3.9**  
(Reference: Paragraph 3.5.3.1, page 100)

Statement showing completed buildings not handed over to the department

(Rupees in lakh)

Sl. No.	Name of District	Thana Bhavans			Admn. Buildings			Residential Buildings		
		No. 3.	Amount 4.	Date of Comp. 5.	No. 6.	Amount 7.	Date of Comp. 8.	No. 9.	Amount 10.	Date of Comp. 11.
1	Indore	1	12.96	8/05	2	32.00	8/04	--		
2	Jhabua	1	10.84	8/05				--		
3	Bhopal	1	9.80	8/05	2	60.00	8/04	54	148.00	8/04 to 2/05
4	Hoshangabad	1	11.72	8/05				--		
5	Balaghat	3	33.08	8/05				--		
6	Dindori	3	34.78	8/05	1	8.63	8/05	--		
7	Seoni	1	12.00	8/05				--		
8	Narsinghpur	2	24.11	8/05				--		
9	Mandla	3	29.81	8/05	--			18	37.55	8/05
10	Katni	1	9.33	8/05				--		
11	Jabalpur	1	11.75	8/05	1	12.00	2/04	54	150.80	2/04 to 12/04
12	Chhindwara	3	35.44	8/05				--		
13	Dewas	1	11.31	8/05				--		
14	Shajapur	3	35.80	8/05				--		
15	Mandsaur	2	24.09	8/05	1	12.00	4/04	--		
16	Ujjain	7	79.79	8/05	1	12.00	5/05	54	148.20	11/04
17	Rewa	2	21.18	3/05, 8/05	3	52.00	3/05, 8/05	--		
18	Gwalior	2	21.75	4/05, 8/05	2	24.35	4/05, 8/05	--		
19	Bhind	2	22.72	8/05				--		
20	Chhatarpur	1	12.02	8/05				26	77.01	9/04
21	Sagar	1	12.50	8/05	1	36.00	10/04	--		

## HOME DEPARTMENT

### 3.2 Modernisation of Police Force

#### HIGHLIGHTS

For increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the State police forces, the scheme of Modernisation of Police Force, already in vogue, was revamped with increased allocation from 2000-01. It was proposed to increase the operational efficiency of the State police forces to enable them to meet the challenges of the fast changing internal security environment and law and order situation of the country. The scheme with increased outlays from 2000-01 onwards was unable to improve operational efficiency in meeting the changing law and order situation, crime detection, reduction in response time, early settlement of crime cases and augmenting training facilities. Some of the important points are highlighted below:

Due to slow progress of the programme, total programme fund for 2000-05 was reduced from Rs 877.45 crore to Rs 708.27 crore by the Government of India. Consequently, the State Government could not avail Rs 97.51 crore.

(Paragraph 3.2.8)

Instances of delay in receipt, delay in installation and idling of equipment ranging between three and 39 months resulting in blocking of funds of Rs 11.31 crore were noticed. Pending cases for analysis in Forensic Science Laboratories increased by 67 per cent in the last five years.

(Paragraphs 3.2.14 and 3.2.15)

Forty seven out of 54 works of staff quarters, administrative buildings and other works remained incomplete for a period ranging between one and three years after incurring an expenditure of Rs 41.46 crore.

(Paragraph 3.2.10)

Due to lack of approach road, proper land and change in site, 164 quarters and 15 works remained incomplete after incurring an expenditure of Rs 8.23 crore. Besides, 488 completed quarters (out of 983) remained vacant as they were away from work place and for want of electricity and water.

(Paragraph 3.2.10)

There was no reduction in crime detection cases and also the average response time had not improved.

(Paragraph 3.2.19)

No evaluation study was conducted by the State Government to assess the impact of the scheme.

(Paragraph 3.2.20)

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### **3.2.1 Introduction**

Duties of police force are wide ranging and cover nearly every facet of social and economic misdemeanour. To accomplish this difficult and daunting task, the technical and technological resources that could augment their efforts were mostly rudimentary and obsolete<sup>1</sup>. The scheme of Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) as introduced by the Government of India (GOI) to improve the efficiency of State police force was implemented (1969) on a continual basis. The scheme was revived from April 2000 for a period of five years upto March 2005 with enhanced allocation of Rs 921 crore to be continued for a further period of five years upto March 2010. The scheme comprised eight components namely mobility, equipment, communication, training, weaponry, housing, buildings and computerisation.

### **3.2.2 Scheme objectives**

The main objectives of the scheme were to:

- improve operational efficiency of the police force to enable them to meet the challenges of the fast changing internal security environment and law and order situation;
- improve the efficiency of crime detection;
- upgrade police stations to achieve reduction in response time to crime;
- construct quarters for police personnel and administrative buildings;
- achieve reduction in delays in submission of analytical reports to enable settling of crime cases early by strengthening forensic laboratories;
- equip the intelligence wing in the Police Department with advanced equipment and revamp their working and
- augment training facilities.

### **3.2.3 Organisational set-up**

Principal Secretary, Home Department is responsible for implementation and monitoring of the scheme. The scheme is implemented in the State through the Director General of Police (DGP), the Commissioner of Police (CP), Mumbai, the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Managing Director, Maharashtra State Police Housing and Welfare Corporation (MSPHWC) and the Commandant General, Home Guards (HG).

### **3.2.4 Audit objectives**

As the revived scheme was initially for a five-year period ending March 2005, audit scrutiny was conducted with a view to express an opinion on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of the scheme. The objectives of audit were to assess whether:

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<sup>1</sup> Saraf Committee Report

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- planning was adequate and comprehensive indicating various components to be implemented and priorities set with target dates for completion and budget allocations were made;
  - modernisation of the critical policing processes of investigation and forensic analysis led to improvement in crime detection rate;
  - upgradation of police stations had resulted in reducing response time to crime;
  - equipment procured were installed and put to optimal use;
  - infrastructure such as administrative buildings and quarters were completed and utilised;
  - communication had improved; and
  - training facilities provided were sufficient.

#### **3.2.5 Audit criteria**

The scheme was taken up for performance audit in the backdrop of the Report of the Committee on Police Reforms, 2000 (Padmanabhaiah Committee), the Maharashtra Administrative Reforms Committee (MARC) Report, 2002 and the Saraf Committee Report, 2002. No criteria were adopted by the Department to monitor performance. In August 2004, the Ministry of Home Affairs fixed certain parameters for assessment of the scheme. The following are the important criteria adopted for arriving at audit conclusions.

The perspective plan was assessed with reference to annual plans, annual expenditure and progress reports of physical progress of various components. The functioning of the Forensic Science Laboratories was evaluated with pending cases and time taken for analysis of samples. Response time was analysed with reference to actual time taken by the police personnel to reach the crime site. The crime detection rate was assessed with reference to pending cases.

#### **3.2.6 Audit methodology and scope**

Audit for the period 2000-05 was carried out between March 2005 and July 2005 through test check of the records at the offices of Home Department, DGP, CP (Mumbai), Director, FSL, MSPHWC and Commandant General, HG.

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In addition, the records of four\* Commissionerates out of nine, seven\* Superintendents of Police (SP) out of 35, seven♥ groups of the State Reserve Police Force (SRPF) out of 13, eight♦ Police Training Institutes out of 12, three RFSLs§ out of four² and 30 police stations out of 923 in seven• out of 35 districts were also test checked.

As major procurement for the scheme was made at Mumbai by DGP, CP, FSL and HG and materials were delivered at district places, one district each from six revenue divisions and an additional district out of naxalite affected areas were selected for random test-check.

The audit plan including the audit objectives and criteria was discussed in the entry conference (May 2005) and audit conclusions were discussed in the exit conference (November 2005). Views of the Government expressed during the discussion or otherwise communicated in writing have been incorporated in the review.

## **Audit Findings**

### **3.2.7 Planning**

Considering the approval in principle by the GOI for Rs 921 crore for the plan period of five years, the State Government approved (September 2001) a perspective plan to the tune of Rs 877.09 crore. As the annual plan for 2000-01 was already approved (March 2001) and the financial year was over, a four year perspective plan was sent (October 2001) by the State Government for approval. It was, however, seen that annual plans did not flow from the perspective plan but separate requirements were called for from the implementing agencies in spite of existence of the approved perspective plan by the State Government. It was seen in audit that the perspective plan prepared was not comprehensive enough containing targets indicated in physical and financial terms. During 2001-04, supplementary plans were sent for approval by the GOI during the month of March of the relevant years. All this added to the delay which ranged between five and twelve months in approval of plans by the GOI.

Government in the exit conference (November 2005) agreed that some outcome goals as far as measurable should be worked out.

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\* Nagpur, Nashik, Pune and Thane

♦ Buldhana, Gadchiroli, Latur, Nagpur, Nashik, Pune and Thane

♥ Group I, II, IV, V, VIII, XI and XIII

♦ Marol, Nagpur, Nanveej, SRPF Nanveej, MPA & DTS Nashik, SPU Pune, UOTC Nagpur

§ Nagpur, Nashik and Pune

² RFSL Aurangabad, Nagpur, Nashik and Pune

• Buldhana, Gadchiroli, Latur, Nagpur, Nashik, Pune and Thane



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### 3.2.8 Financial management

During 2000-03, funds provided by the Central and the State Governments for the scheme were in the ratio of 50:50. The funding pattern was modified based on categorisation of the States by the GOI and the ratio was changed to 60:40 between the Central and the State Governments from the year 2003-04. The Central share was to be in the form of stores. A maximum of five *per cent* of the total allocation was to be provided to the Home Guard from the year 2003-04 for incurring expenditure on all components except housing.

The details of plan approved, funds released by the GOI, share of the State and expenditure incurred under the scheme during 2000-05 were as under:

**(Rupees in crore)**

Year	Annual Plan approved by GOI	Central share	Opening Balance	Funds released by GOI	Share of State Government	Total available funds	Expenditure during the year	Closing Balance
2000-01	166.20	83.10	-	83.10	83.10	166.20	90.04	76.16
2001-02	194.10	97.05	76.16	92.10	92.10	260.36	153.63	106.73
2002-03	164.86	82.43	106.73	67.40	67.40	241.53	146.66	94.87
2003-04	173.42	104.05	94.87	62.84	41.89	199.60	102.27	97.33
2004-05	178.87	107.32	97.33	71.00	47.34	215.67	161.51	54.16
<b>Total</b>	<b>877.45</b>	<b>473.95</b>		<b>376.44</b>	<b>331.83</b>		<b>654.11</b>	

**Due to slow progress of programme, the State Government could not avail GOI grant of Rs 97.51 crore**

Against sanction of Rs 877.45 crore for five annual plans, GOI share was Rs 473.95 crore. Due to slow progress of the programme, GOI released only Rs 376.44 crore and the total programme fund was reduced to Rs 708.27 crore during 2000-05. Thus, the State Government could not avail the GOI share of Rs 97.51 crore of the approved plan so far (July 2005). It was noticed that in the years 2000-01, 2003-04 and 2004-05, as against the total Central release of Rs 216.94 crore, proportionate expenditure incurred was Rs 186.49 crore which necessitated revalidation of Rs 30.45 crore in the subsequent years.

The details of component-wise and year-wise expenditure are given in **Appendix XXXIII**.

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## Programme management

### Housing and buildings

The expenditure incurred under housing and buildings during 2000-01 to 2004-05 was Rs 260.50 crore.

The State Government felt that the 81,806 quarters (*57 per cent*) available for a staff strength of 1,44,288 was not adequate. Construction of staff quarters, administrative offices and police station buildings were carried out through MSPHWC and Public Works Department (PWD). The funds for PWD works were released through MSPHWC and the progress was monitored by the user offices. In respect of works executed through MSPHWC, user offices were not involved with the execution of work.

#### 3.2.9 Expenditure on housing inflated

Funds amounting to Rs 159.48 crore and Rs 24.42 crore were placed at the disposal of MSPHWC and PWD respectively for housing/building projects during 2001-05, against which expenditure incurred was Rs 100.42 crore and Rs 21.91 crore respectively. The State Government, however, showed the entire amount of Rs 183.90 crore received by them as expenditure even though the GOI had instructed that the funds remaining unspent with the implementing agencies should not be treated as expenditure.

#### 3.2.10 Lack of buildings and other facilities

Forty seven works taken up during 2001-05 remained incomplete after incurring expenditure of Rs 41.46 crore

Out of 54 works of construction of quarters and buildings taken up during 2001-05, only seven works were completed and 47 works remained incomplete as of June 2005 after incurring an expenditure of Rs 41.46 crore. Delays in respect of 22 works in the jurisdiction of DGP ranged between one and three years and in other cases period of delay was not furnished to audit. Government stated (October 2005) that three works have been completed and the others are under different stages of completion.

Scrutiny of records in MSPHWC, PWD and the user offices revealed the following:

- Construction of 164 staff quarters in Hingoli District and 15 works of construction of police stations, administrative buildings, water works, repeater station in five<sup>◇</sup> districts either did not commence or remained incomplete after incurring an expenditure of Rs 8.23 crore due to lack of approach road, proper land, change in the site, change in estimate and for want of additional funds. Government clarified (October 2005)

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<sup>◇</sup> Latur, Nagpur, Nashik, Navi Mumbai and Pune.

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- that provision for approach road for the quarters in Hingoli District has now been included in the work.
- Fifty *per cent* of personnel working in the 30 test checked police stations were not provided with quarters. They were staying at an average distance of 13 kms from the police stations. Similarly, in 20 out of 30 test checked police stations, no facilities like separate toilets, changing rooms and resting rooms for women constables were provided even though there were 85 lady police constables working in those police stations.
  - In Dhule, Hingoli, Jalgaon and Solapur Districts, 1,130 quarters remained vacant for two to 11 months due to delay in handing over of the constructed quarters to the user department by MSPHWC. Similarly, 488 quarters (out of 983 constructed) in Nashik (306) and Wardha (182) Districts remained vacant as they were either away from work place and/or electricity and water connections were not given.
  - The Department incurred an expenditure of Rs 74.50 lakh on payment of consultancy charges on seven projects. The projects were however subsequently cancelled. Thus, expenditure on consultancy was unfruitful.
  - An expenditure of Rs 42 lakh was incurred on carrying out maintenance and repair works of 704 SRPF quarters at Mumbai even though the work was not covered under MPF scheme. Government accepted that the fund of MPF was temporarily used for repair work and would be reverted.
  - The State Government accorded (February 2004) administrative approval of Rs 1.25 crore to a proposal for developing eight firing ranges out of grants under weaponry for 2003-04 and subsequently revised the original sanction in December 2004. In six districts, sanction for Rs 1.13 crore was accorded for this work and the amount was deposited with PWD. Though this sanction was revised and reduced to Rs 45 lakh, the total amount continued to remain with PWD (July 2005). Improper planning had not only delayed development of firing ranges but also resulted in blocking of funds. Government clarified that three works had been completed and the others are under different stages of completion.

## **Mobility**

The expenditure incurred under mobility during 2000-01 to 2004-05 was Rs 156.79 crore.

During 2000-05, 5,131\* vehicles were purchased to augment mobility. Of these, 1,906 vehicles were additional and 3,225 were for replacement of the old vehicles. In all, a fleet of 7,895 vehicles of different categories were under

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\* Motor cycle-1485, light van-2885, Big Van-179 and others-582,

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the control of various offices of the DGP and CP, Mumbai for various purposes as of March 2005.

### 3.2.11 Deployment of vehicles

Fourteen *per cent* of additional vehicles and 31 *per cent* of replacement vehicles were only allotted to the police stations

A total of 804 vehicles were received (236 additional and 568 for replacement) during 2000-05 in seven<sup>^</sup> districts test checked. Though 164 additional vehicles were provided in seven offices of five districts, no additional drivers were provided without which simultaneous deployment of vehicles would not be possible. Out of 236 vehicles, 66 *per cent* were deployed for *bandobast*, highway security and CID branch, 18 *per cent* were retained with SP/CP offices and only 14 *per cent* vehicles were provided to the police stations. Similarly, out of 568 vehicles received as replacement, 44 *per cent* were deployed for *bandobast*, 25 *per cent* retained with the SP/CP/SDPO offices and only 31 *per cent* vehicles were utilised for replacement in the police stations which shows that police stations were not given priority in allotment of vehicles. As mobility has a direct relation to response time, deployment of more vehicles at the police stations in a planned manner would have resulted in improvement of response time.

### 3.2.12 Response time

Information for the months of December 2000 and 2004 regarding response time<sup>\*</sup> in respect of crimes pertaining to Indian Penal Code was collected by audit from 118 police stations in the jurisdiction of six SP offices and three CP offices and the average response time (ART) was calculated as detailed in the **Appendix XXXIV**. The ART of 118 police stations worked out to 156 minutes which was far from satisfactory. It was also noticed that in 54 police stations (46 *per cent*) of the 118 police stations where additional vehicles were not deployed response time had deteriorated.

The Saraf committee opined that fixing of maximum response delay time is necessary to induct a sense of purpose and direction and recommended a maximum response delay time of five minutes. Audit exercise to assess and compare the police response time from the log books of control rooms and crime registers of police stations was futile as the records therein did not have sufficient data to enable such analysis.

Government stated (October 2005) that there is substantial improvement in response time. The reply is not tenable as this aspect has not been monitored by the Department.

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<sup>^</sup> SP offices of Buldhana, Gadchiroli, Latur & Nagpur and CP offices Nagpur, Nashik, Pune & Thane

<sup>\*</sup> total time taken from the time of receiving message / making First Information Report to the time of the police person actually reaching the crime scene

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## Strengthening of Forensic Laboratories

The expenditure incurred under strengthening of forensic laboratories during 2000-01 to 2004-05 was Rs 48.38 crore.

### 3.2.13 Functioning of Forensic Science Laboratories (FSL)

Forensic Science Laboratories were providing technical assistance to the Police Department by analysing samples received/collected from the crime site. The FSL and RFSLs are yet to obtain accreditation and had started the process of obtaining the same. The following irregularities were noticed.

### 3.2.14 Pending cases

Pending cases for analysis increased by 67 per cent

Analysis report is required to be submitted within a month. It was seen that reduction in pendency as envisaged under the scheme was not achieved as cases pending for analysis increased by 67 per cent from the year 2000-01 to 2004-05. Average time taken for analysis in July 2000 by toxicology division and by biology-serology division was 28 to 100 weeks and seven to 36 weeks respectively. The position did not improve in July 2004, as average time taken by toxicology division and by biology-serology division was 18 to 102 weeks and five to 54 weeks respectively. The Department attributed the increase in pendency to shortage of technical manpower. As no recruitment was made, the number of vacant posts increased from 107 in 2000 to 284 as on January 2005.

The Government clarified (October 2005) that increase in pendency was due to vacant posts which would be filled in within two-three months and the reports could be issued within a month by 2006.

### 3.2.15 Utilisation of forensic equipment

Audit scrutiny revealed that there was delays in receipt of the forensic equipment ranging from three to nine months and their installation by 10 to 39 months. Even after installation, 19 items of equipment valued at Rs 6.70 crore which were procured between May 2002 and November 2004 remained idle for 19 months. Details are shown in **Appendix XXXV**.

It was also noticed that 45 items of equipment procured at a cost of Rs 17.46 crore and installed at four<sup>3</sup> laboratories, as detailed in **Appendix XXXVI** generated on an average less than one report per machine per month from the date of their installation to March 2005.

Government stated (October 2005) that a sample may need repeated analysis and the use of such sophisticated equipment improves quality and quantity of analysis would depend on the number of cases received. The clarification is

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<sup>3</sup> Aurangabad, Mumbai, Nagpur and Pune

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too general in nature and the fact remains that the department had not conducted any evaluation on the efficiency of utilisation of equipment procured. Government in the exit conference informed that YASHADA<sup>♥</sup> was requested to carry out the evaluation.

Six out of above 45 equipment procured at a cost of Rs 2.56 crore and installed in three<sup>•</sup> laboratories between May 2002 and October 2004 did not generate any report. Government replied (October 2005) that though reports were generated no records were maintained. In the exit conference Government agreed to issue instructions for maintaining the log books for major equipment.

Eight<sup>♦</sup> mobile crime units procured (May 2004) at a cost of Rs 94.80 lakh for collection of samples from the crime site were underutilised as these eight units were used only on 11 occasions from their arrival till May 2005. Government clarified (October 2005) that staff for these units have been sanctioned and recruitment is in progress. The reply is not tenable as the procurement of vehicles should have succeeded the recruitment of manpower for its utilisation.

It was seen that CP Mumbai also procured three investigation vans at a cost of Rs 36.63 lakh for collection of fingerprints and photographs from the site. By proper co-ordination, same vehicle could have been fitted with equipment for all types of investigations.

### Equipment

The expenditure incurred under equipment during 2000-01 to 2004-05 was Rs 42.87 crore.

#### 3.2.16 Idling of equipment

Eighty items of equipment like Steering Wheel Clamps, Laser speed check Guns, FACTS-4, Automatic Blood Analyser and Laser speed check Guns were procured at a cost of Rs 4.61 crore as detailed in **Appendix XXXVII** and supplied to the subordinate offices between July 2000 and September 2004. Scrutiny of the records in the respective offices revealed that the equipment remained idle for periods ranging from five to 58 months for want of repairs.

A cohesive network for the benefit of investigation of crime and for transmission of crime and criminal data, finger prints, image, photograph and facsimile throughout the country was envisaged by March 2005 in the Police Network (POLNET) programme by GOI. The primary application of the

Equipment costing Rs 4.61 crore remained idle for periods from five to 58 months

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<sup>♥</sup>A Government Training Institute

<sup>•</sup> Aurangabad, Mumbai and Nagpur

<sup>♦</sup> Aurangabad (1), Mumbai (2), Nagpur (2), Nashik (1) and Pune (2)



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project was to transfer data from the district headquarters to the State headquarters and secondary application was voice communication. Of the 33 Base Station Units (BSU) installed (May 2005), three had gone defective as of October 2005. Only 398 Remote Station Units (RSU) out of 850 purchased were installed and site preparation materials for the remaining 452 RSUs (cost: Rs 49.72 lakh) were lying in the central stores at Pune or in the stores of SP/CP office. Thus, the POLNET equipment were not being utilised and more importantly the primary objective of criminal data transmission is yet to be achieved. In order to have optimum coverage, sixty additional BSUs were required which are still to be provided by GOI.

### **Computerisation**

The expenditure incurred under computerisation during 2000-01 to 2004-05 was Rs 9.59 crore.

Computerisation can play a vital role in detection and investigation of crime and in making police work quicker and more efficient. It was noticed that there was no planned, coordinated and well-directed effort to allow utilisation of computer facilities as could be seen from the succeeding paragraphs.

#### **3.2.17 Computerisation of police stations**

It was noticed in audit that in four<sup>#</sup> SP offices computers were not supplied and no personnel were trained though SP, Buldhana and Latur had submitted proposals for computerisation of police stations. In two<sup>♥</sup> offices of CPs though computers were supplied to all police stations, no software was developed to work on them.

Thus, computers had not been supplied to all the police stations. Even where the computers were there, those were being used for word-processing purposes. There was no proposal yet (October 2005) to introduce relevant software to improve efficiency of report writing, diarising of events, online registration of crime, storing and retrieval of information which made up the chief tasks at the police stations.

### **Training**

The expenditure incurred under training during 2000-01 to 2004-05 was Rs 5.98 crore.

**3.2.18** Scrutiny of the records in five<sup>♦</sup> out of eight training centers revealed that as against a target of 24,546, only 16,961 police personnel (69

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<sup>#</sup> Buldhana, Gadchiroli, Latur and Nagpur

<sup>♥</sup> Nagpur and Nashik

<sup>♦</sup> Daund (2), Marol, Nagpur and Nashik

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*per cent*) were trained during 2000-04. Though intake capacity of the schools was raised from time to time there was no increase in manpower or infrastructure. Thus, no impact of the scheme was felt except procurement of some equipment like simulators, multi-media projectors and televisions.

A portable explosive X-ray machine costing Rs 11 lakh was supplied (August 2004) to the Special Protection Unit, Pune. It was not even demonstrated to the trainees as no training was given to the instructors of the training unit.

In three\* districts test checked, as against the targets of 189 training camps to be conducted by the District Commandants, Home Guards (HGs) to impart training to 15,794 HGs during 2000-2004, only 49 camps were conducted covering 2,852 HGs. Impact of this scheme was not analysed by the Department in the district training centres where the training camps were conducted.

### **3.2.19 Crime detection statistics**

**Pendency in crime cases increased by 68 per cent**

One of the objectives of modernisation was to enhance crime detection. Despite the scheme being in operation for five years, pendency in crime cases registered an increase of 68 *per cent* from the beginning of 2000 (76742) to the end of 2004 (1,12,039), though average number of crimes registered did not vary considerably. It was also noticed that there was decreasing trend in the number of finger prints received for matching. As against 2.62 lakh finger prints received in 2000 for matching, the number of finger prints received in 2004 was 1.75 lakh. This reduction of over 33 *per cent* is an indicative that the investigating officers are not lifting prints and are becoming less dependent on finger prints for investigation in most of the cases. It was also seen that the number of visits to crime sites made by FSL personnel had decreased from 1,642 in 2000 to 1,188 in 2004. FSL attributed this reduction to shortage of manpower.

Government clarified (October 2005) that even though there was increase in the population, industrialisation, terrorism and unemployment, the registered crimes had remained steady or marginally decreased.

### **3.2.20 Monitoring and evaluation**

**Evaluation study to assess the impact of the scheme was not conducted**

The Government had set up a High Power Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary and a review committee under the Chairmanship of the Additional Chief Secretary for monitoring the physical and financial progress of the programme and its periodical evaluation.

During the period of five years ending March 2005, the Committee met five times only to finalise and submit annual plans to the GOI. Thereafter no monitoring was conducted by the Committee. As a result, planning and

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\* Buldhana, Gadchiroli and Pune

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budgeting was not meticulously coordinated with the implementation of the programme. The MPF cell in the office of the CP acted only as a central purchase agency. This affected the efficient implementation of the scheme.

Though the scheme was in operation for the last five years, no evaluation study of the scheme was undertaken to assess the impact of the scheme. The State Government stated (March 2005) that they were still in the process of engaging a Government agency for conducting evaluation.

### **3.2.21 Conclusion**

Though the scheme was revamped with increased outlay, the progress of implementation was slow mainly due to slow pace of spending. There was delay in finalising supplementary annual plans. The forensic laboratories could not utilise the sophisticated equipment purchased for want of trained manpower. Pendency in analysing the samples increased considerably. Vehicles procured were mostly deployed for *bandobast*; as a result police response time to crime did not improve. Most of the proposed housing and building projects could not be completed depriving the police personnel of the benefits envisaged. Computers had not reached all the police stations. Training infrastructure is not adequate to support the increased intake capacity of training schools. There was lack of monitoring of the implementation of the scheme.

### **3.2.22 Recommendations**

Government should consider implementing the following recommendations.

- A citizens' charter committing the police to a specific response time for urgent and non-urgent calls should be promulgated.
- A review of installation, commissioning and utilisation of all the equipment should be taken and action taken accordingly to overcome the deficiencies.
- Steps should be taken to ensure that the vacant residential quarters are occupied.
- Optimum utilisation of forensic laboratories should be ensured by provision of trained manpower.
- Deployment of vehicles and manpower for Law and Order and *bandobast* should be in tune with the objectives of the scheme.

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### Appendix XXXIII

(Reference No.: Paragraph: 3.2.8; Page 57)

#### Statement showing component-wise and year-wise expenditure under Modernisation of Police Force

(Rupees in crore)

Component	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	Total
Housing	32.89	83.07	40.88	-	2.50	159.34
Mobility	55.13	34.60	27.19	31.80	8.07	156.79
Building	12.59	25.68	49.20	10.19	3.45	101.11
Communication	18.31	7.52	2.95	16.25	4.17	49.20
FSL	0.40	22.31	13.13	8.55	3.99	48.38
Equipment	14.62	6.82	0.70	16.34	4.39	42.87
Computerisation	4.64	2.17	0.11	2.40	0.27	9.59
Weaponry	4.82	1.42	0.63	0.75	-	7.62
Homeguards	-	-	-	5.23	1.99	7.22
Training	3.36	0.61	-	2.01	-	5.98
Equipment received from GOI	-	-	-	-	43.96	43.96
Grants to MSPHWC by GOI	-	-	-	-	22.05	22.05
<b>Total</b>	<b>146.76</b>	<b>184.20</b>	<b>134.79</b>	<b>93.52</b>	<b>94.84</b>	<b>654.11</b>

<b>Appendix XXXIV</b> <i>(Reference : Paragraph 3.2.12; Page 60)</i> <b>Statement showing details of Response Time</b>				
Office	Number of police stations	ART of Dec 2000 (in minutes)	ART of Dec 2004 (in minutes)	Name of Police Stations where there is no improvement and number of police stations
SP(Rural), Nagpur	16	417.69	520.00	Bela, Katol, Kondali, Savner, Ramtek, Jakhalkheda and Parshivani (7)
SP, Buldhana	16	171.76	142.63	Jandura, Khamgaon Rural, Shegaon, Buldhana, Khamgaon Urban, Chikali and Sakharkheda (7)
SP(Rural), Nashik	10	160.92	91.82	Abhona, Yewala Urban and Yewala Rural (3)
SP, Latur	11	491.72	239.58	Vadavna and Devni (2)
SP(Rural), Thane	12	134.49	96.51	Kalyan Taluka, Talasari, Boisar and Mira Road (4)
SP(Rural), Pune	24	79.37	87.68	Haveli, Lonikalbhor, Lonavala Urban, Baramati Taluka, Vadgaon Nimbalkar, Indapur, Khed, Chakan, Manchar, Junner, Otur, Shikapur and Sasvad (13)
CP, Pune	17	29.87	27.02	Lashkar, Bandgardan, Faraskhana, Vishrambag, Khadki, Pimpri, Chatursingi, Bhosari, Samarth, Vishramwadi and Yervada (11)
CP, Thane	10	31.22	37.13	Vartaknagar, Kapurbavadi, Khopri, Vishnunagar and Dombivali East (5)
CP, Nagpur	2	14.52	163.06	Tahsil and Ganeshpeth (2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>170.17</b>	<b>156.16</b>	<b>54</b>

### Appendix XXXV

(Reference: Paragraph 3.2.15; Page 61)

#### Details of delay, non-installation and idling of forensic equipment

Sl.No	Name of the equipment	Purpose of equipment	Cost (Rs in lakh)	Dates of receipt at RFSL	Dates of installation	Remarks
<b>Equipment pertaining to RFSL, Pune</b>						
1	Ion Chromatograph System	To test post blast explosive	37.85	9/02	4/03	There was delay of eight months in installation for want of gases and regulators.
2	Ion scan Chromatograph	To test narcotics and explosives	38.39	9/02	5/03	There was delay of nine months in installation for want of gases.
3	Solid Phase Auto Extraction System	To extract poison from visceral material	32.23	6/02	2/03	There was delay of eight months in installation for want of proper gas regulator.
4	Oxford EDXRF	To conduct analysis of non-destructive inorganic physical samples	66.07	9/02	9/04	There was delay of 24 months in installation due to leakage of compressor.
5	ASE 22 DIONEX Accelerator Solvent System	To extract poison from visceral material	39.45	6/02	9/03	There was delay of 14 months in installation for want of stabilizer and gas supply.
6	Kinematic Viscosity Meter	To test petroleum products like lubricants & engine oil	12.89	09/02	04/03	There was delay of six months in installation for want of transport to RFSL.
<b>Equipment pertaining to RFSL, Aurangabad</b>						
7	Oxford EDXRF	To conduct analysis of non-destructive inorganic physical samples	66.07	9/02	10/04	There was delay of 24 months in installation for want of UPS system and 3 phase supply.
8	S-100 UVVIS Spectrophotometer	To analyse drugs	21.58	6/02	9/04	There was delay of 26 months in installation for want of UPS system and 3 phase supply.
9	Thermal Energy Analyser	To detect nitrogen content in explosives	47.57	5/02	12/02	There was delay of 6 months in installation for want of transport to RFSL.
10	Solid Phase Auto Extraction System	To extract poison from visceral material	37.23	6/02	10/05	The equipment has not been installed as of June 05. Government clarified (October 2005) that equipment was now installed. Thus, there was delay of 39 months in installation.
11	Sulphur in oil Analyser	For analysis of sulphur and oil.	21.54	11/04	10/05	The equipment has not been installed as of June 05. Government clarified (October 2005) that equipment was now installed. Thus, there was delay of 10 months in installation.



Appendix XXXV (Concl'd.)						
Equipment pertaining to RFSL, Nagpur						
12	Kinematic Viscosity Meter	To test petroleum products like lubricants & engine oil	12.89	09/02	09/02	There was three months delay from receipt of equipment at Mumbai (June 02). Government justified the delay on account of receipt of equipment in phases and to save transportation cost.
13	Solid Phase Auto Extraction System	To extract poison from visceral material	32.23	02/03	2/03	There was nine months delay from receipt of equipment at Mumbai (May 02). Government justified the delay on account of receipt of equipment in phases and to save transportation cost.
14	Oxford EDXRF	To conduct analysis of non-destructive inorganic physical samples	66.07	9/02	9/02	There was five months delay from receipt of equipment at Mumbai (April 02). Government justified the delay on account of receipt of equipment in phases and to save transportation cost.
15	DMA 5000 Density Meter	For alcohol analysis	11.36	9/02	9/02	There was four months delay from receipt of equipment at Mumbai (May 02). Government justified the delay on account of receipt of equipment in phases and to save transportation cost.
16	Automatic Distillation Analyzer	Distillation purpose	88.81	6/02	6/02	The equipment lying idle for the last 19 months since November 2003.for want of repairs (June 05) as this was not covered under Annual Maintenance Contract
17	NIR Analyzer	Analytical purpose	15.00	11/04	10/05	The equipment has not been installed as of June 05. Government clarified (October 2005) that equipment was now installed. Thus, there was delay of 10 months in installation.
Equipment pertaining to RFSL, Nashik						
18	NIR Analyzer	Analytical purpose	15.00	10/04	10/05	The equipment has not been installed as of June 05. Government clarified (October 2005) that equipment was now installed. Thus, there was delay of 11 months in installation.
19	Portable GC with Data Station	Spot investigation of gas analysis	8.00	7/04	10/05	The equipment has not been installed as of June 05. Government clarified (October 2005) that equipment was now installed. Thus, there was delay of 14 months in installation.
		<b>Total</b>	<b>688.82</b>			

<b>Appendix XXXVI</b> <i>(Reference: Paragraph 3.2.15; Page 61)</i> <b>Statement showing insufficient generation of reports</b>													
Sr. No.	Name of equipment	Qty.	Total cost (Rupees in lakh)	Mumbai		Nagpur		Pune		Auranga bad		Total MM*	Total reports
				MM	R	MM	R	MM	R	MM	R		
1	Ion Chromotograph System	4	151.40	32	448	30	17	23	15	No records maintained		85	480
2	Fannigan AQS Benchtop	3	222.96	32	224	30	10	29	15	-	-	91	249
3	STA 1500 Rheoi Metric Thermal Analyser	2	89.82	34	1544	33	25	-	-	-	-	67	1569
4	AA Hydride	1	49.52	34	270	--	-	-	-	-	-	34	270
5	GCM Spectrophotometer	2	144.20	34	645	33	175	--	-	-	-	67	820
6	Ion scan Chromotograph	4	153.56	32	582	30	10	22	112	No records maintained		84	704
7	Kinematic Viscosity Meter	2	25.78	33	1492	30	10	-	-	-	-	63	1502
8	S 100 UVVIS Spectrophotometer	4	86.32	34	187	33	144	29	426	6	10	102	767
9	Automated DNA Sequencer	1	62.57	34	150	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	150
10	HPLC with Photo Diode	1	41.08	10	128	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	128
11	Automatic Cloud Pour Analyzer	1	21.53	11	92	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	92
12	HPTLC (Density Meter CD 60)	3	45.93	-	-	30	25	29	27	27	10	86	62
13	Kinematic Viscosity Meter	2	25.60	-	-	-	-	23	95	26	30	49	125
14	HPLC	1	31.50	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	2	27	2
15	Thermal Energy Analyser	3	139.71	-	-	33	5	28	12	No records maintained		61	17
16	Solid Phase Auto Extraction System	2	64.46	-	-	25	9	25	14	-	-	50	23
17	Oxford EDXRF	3	198.21	-	-	30	5	6	2	No records maintained		36	7
18	HPCL	1	29.51	-	-	48	2	-	-	-	-	48	2
19	ASE 22 Dionex Accelerated Solvent System	2	78.90	-	-	No records maintained		18	17	-	-	18	17
20	Inductive Complete Plasma	1	26.98	-	-	-	-	24	9	-	-	24	9
21	Desaga TLC MAT Reproducible	1	28.77	-	-	-	-	24	27	-	-	24	27
22	GEL Documentation Apparatus	1	26.91	No records maintained		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		<b>45</b>	<b>1745.81</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>5762</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>1071</b>	<b>7022</b>

MM = Machine Month, R = Report

**Appendix XXXVII**

(Reference : Paragraph 3.2.16 ; Page 62)

**Details of idle equipment purchased under Modernisation of Police force**

Sr. No.	Equipment	Purpose of equipment	Qty	Total cost (Rs in lakh)	Receipt Month	Remarks	Supplied to whom
<b>Equipment purchased by Commissioner of Police, Mumbai</b>							
1	16 Channel passive GSM & intercepting system	For intercepting the calls from GSM mobile phones	1	302.00	3/04	Found fault with the equipment and the supplier did not attend to the repairs. Lying idle for the last 15 months since its purchase (July 2005).	Anti Terrorist Squad, Mumbai
2	FACTS-4	For finger prints matching	1	75.00	7/01	Not working since 2004 and the work is done manually. Lying idle for the last 20 months (July 2005).	Jt.CP (Crime), Mumbai
3	Laser speed check Guns	To check the speed of the vehicles	3	11.98	1/04	Remained idle for 18 months from its purchase (July 2005) as company did not give demonstration and when they came, the battery was not working. No adequate training was imparted.	Traffic branch, Mumbai
4	Steering Wheel Clamps	For holding vehicle by locking steering wheel	65	0.98	11/03	When the door of the vehicle is locked, the instrument cannot be fixed on steering wheel. Remained idle for 18 months from November 2003 to June 2005.	- do -
<b>Equipment purchased by Director General of Police</b>							
5	Crime Site Scope Kit	For gathering of evidences at crime scenes	2	42.00	7/2000	Was not working since its receipt. As the supplier did not attend inspite of repeated request, FIR had been filed against the supplier. The matter is subjudice. Lying idle for 59 months since its purchase (July 2005).	Finger Print Bureau, Pune
9	Automatic Blood Analyser	For analysis of blood	1	18.68	5/03	Not working and lying idle for the last four months (March 2005). Since the printer is also not working, the reports prepared manually.	Police Hospital, Mumbai
6	Laser speed check Guns	To check the speed of the vehicles	2	8.00	9/04	The equipment was idle from 12/04 to 6/05 for 5 months.	CP, Nashik
8	Multi Media Projector	For presentations	1	2.30	6/03	Government confirmed that the equipment remained idle from March 2005 to September 2005.	CP, Nagpur
7	Decimeter	To measure sound	4	0.96	9/02	Not working from November 2004. Lying idle for the last six months since its purchase (June 2005).	CP, Nashik
<b>Total</b>			<b>80</b>	<b>461.90</b>			

## HOME DEPARTMENT

### 3.6 Upgradation of standards of administration and modernisation of Police Forces

#### 3.6.1 Introduction

In terms of the recommendations of successive Finance Commissions, Government of India (GOI) had been releasing grants to the State Government for upgradation of the standards of Police administration. Besides, the Central Government allocated funds for implementation of the non-plan scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces to enable the State Police forces to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. The modernisation scheme was under implementation in the State since 1969-70 and was extended up to 2004-05. The scheme included four major components viz. acquisition of arms, computerisation of police stations, upgradation of Finger Print Bureau and Traffic Control equipment. Records of 13 unit<sup>37</sup> offices out of 42, besides the Home and the Finance Departments were test checked during November 2003 to April 2004 covering the period from April 1999 to March 2004.

#### 3.6.2 Financial management

The funding under the Modernisation scheme was to be shared equally by the Central and the State Governments up to 2002-03. The Central share comprised 50 *per cent* as grant and 50 *per cent* as loan. Since 2003-04, the funding pattern was revised to 60:40; out of the Central share, 60 *per cent* was given as grant. For the upgradation scheme, the funding was made by Central grants as recommended by the Tenth and the Eleventh Finance Commissions (TFC/EFC).

During 1999-2004, the State Government provided for Rs.190.27 crore (Modernisation: Rs.171.91 crore and Upgradation: Rs.18.36 crore) in the budget against which Rs.148.01 crore (Modernisation:Rs.132.72 crore and Upgradation: Rs.15.29 crore) were spent. While according sanction, the State Government mentioned that the amounts should be drawn and deposited into Civil Deposits. However, the amounts transferred to the Civil Deposit were classified under functional heads and that resulted in overstatement of expenditure in the Appropriation Accounts of the Government. The unutilised balance in the Civil Deposits as of March 2004 amounted to Rs.42.26 crore (Modernisation: Rs.39.19 crore and Upgradation: Rs.3.07 crore) and had accumulated mainly due to delay in completion of civil works and delay in procurement of arms, equipment, vehicle etc. Delay in getting Government approval to the action plans was also a contributing factor.

Utilisation  
certificate  
submitted to  
GOI included  
payment of  
advance to the  
extent of  
Rs.38.28 crore

\* The abbreviations used in this review have been listed in the Glossary in Appendix-XXXVI ( page 222)

<sup>37</sup> (1) Director General and Inspector General of Police, Cuttack; (2) Additional DGP, Training, Cuttack; (3) Principal, PTC, Angul; (4) DIG, PMT, Cuttack, (5) DIG, CID, Cuttack, (6) SP, Signal, Cuttack; (7) SP, Rayagada; (8) SP, Special Branch, Cuttack; (9) SP, Koraput; (10) SP Balasore; (11) SP, Keonjhar; (12) SP, Rourkela; (13) Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, BBSR.

Further, it was seen that the utilisation certificates submitted to Government of India included Rs.38.28 crore advanced to the Orissa State Police Housing Welfare Corporation, Bhubaneswar (Rs.30.17 crore) and to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Rs.8.11 crore) treating the same as final expenditure. Thus, the utilisation certificates furnished to GOI was not based on actual expenditure incurred.

### 3.6.3 Programme implementation

The implementation of the scheme of Modernisation of Police Force found to be deficient during 2000-04 as the spending vis-a-vis the budget provision ranged from nil to 30 per cent on four major components of the programme as detailed below:

**(Rupees in crore)**

Sl. No.	Component	Budget Provision	Actual Expenditure	Percentage of shortfall
1.	Arms	27.11	8.12	70
2.	Computer (Information Technology)	4.03	Nil	100
3.	Traffic control equipment	0.55	0.08	85
4.	Upgradation of FPB	2.91	Nil	100

The Government attributed the poor utilisation of funds to difficulties in the Police headquarters in handling increased volume of procurement as also the delay in getting GOI's approval to the annual action plans due to which the scheme funds were kept under Civil Deposit. However, the State Police Headquarters stated (September 2003) that they depended on the Government for taking decisions on various aspects of the implementation of the scheme including the procedure for purchase of arms and other equipment which was time consuming. There was also delay in getting approval of the State Level Purchase Committee (SLPC) as well as delay in release of funds by the Government. It was, however, noticed that the annual action plans were sent to GOI very late by the State Government; the action plan for 2000-01 was sent to GOI in April 2001 and that for 2003-04 in October 2003 (Part) and January 2004 (Final).

Although funds were not a constraint, due to lack of co-ordination between State police headquarters and the department, there was delay in upgradation of the State Finger Print Bureau (SFPB) and implementation of the Information Technology (IT) Plan of the State Police. Besides, overdependence on the Orissa State Police Housing and Welfare Corporation (OPHWC) for construction of building contributed to the delay in the implementation of the projects.

### 3.6.4 Upgradation of State Finger Print Bureau

Provision of funds of Rs.2.90 crore was made for the upgradation of the State Finger Print Bureau under modernisation scheme. Projections were made for replacement of manual system of matching and identification of finger prints by Automated Finger Print Identification System (AFIS) employing computerised method in 2001-02 and procurement of inkless finger print device with other items for the system in the subsequent years. During

**Despite availability of funds, the State Finger Print Bureau could not be modernised for over three years**

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2001-02, Rs.1.56 crore were drawn for procurement of AFIS and Rs.0.63 crore was drawn in March 2003 for procurement of inkless finger print devices. During the process of finalising the tender by the Director, SFPB, the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) instructed not to procure the existing benchmarked system since they had decided to benchmark a system with advanced technology. The benchmark report of AFIS with advanced technology was received from NCRB in April 2003. A modified Project Report was sent to NCRB for approval in August 2003 the approval to which was received in September 2003. However, the tender papers could only be finalised in March 2004 and quotations for supply of the items were called for from the benchmarked firms in April 2004 stipulating the response time up to 30 June 2004. Thus, despite availability of funds, due to procedural delays in benchmarking of the system and finalisation of tender formalities, the State Police failed to derive the benefits of AFIS for over three years.

### ***3.6.5 Police Stations not computerised***

The Information Technology (IT) Plan of the State Police envisaged providing a computer to each of the 449 police stations in the State and establishing on line connectivity with the State Police Headquarters and other allied offices. In the first phase, 129 police stations were to be computerised followed by other police stations in the subsequent years. The plan, which was intended for implementation through the National Informatics Centre also envisaged the provision for video conferencing facilities, direct voice communication, exchange of data etc. However, for establishing connectivity, the State Police depended on the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) for supply of the required application software.

**The IT plan could not take off for want of application software**

Keeping the above in view, the State Government sent the action plan for the years 2000-01 and 2001-02 to the Government of India (GOI) between April and May 2001, the approval of which was received in May 2001 and February 2002 respectively. Thereupon, the State Government sanctioned (March 2002) Rs.2.72 crore for the purpose which was drawn and kept in the Civil Deposit as the application software system was yet to be received from the NCRB. However, in February 2003, the NCRB intimated that the required software was still under consideration due to technological changes. No further progress on the issue could be made thereafter and the IT plan remained unimplemented (June 2004).

The Director, State Crime Records Bureau stated (June 2004) that the IT plan would be implemented as per the Action Plan 2004-05 which had been sent to GOI for approval.

### ***3.6.6 Construction of buildings***

During 2000-04, the Government sanctioned construction of 1923 building projects comprising police stations and staff quarters funded from the Modernisation scheme (1683) and the EFC grants (240) the execution of which were entrusted to OPHWC, Bhubaneswar. Of the 1923 projects, only 678 were completed while 1146 projects were incomplete and 99 projects had not even started as of May 2004. The OPHWC attributed (July 2004) the slow progress to late receipt of funds, delay in according administrative approval.



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There was also delay owing to change of proposals and sites. Further, 128 building projects, although completed, were not taken over by the State Police. However, the Government in an agenda note cited (May 2003) the limited capacity of OPHWC for construction of civil works as a reason for delay in execution of the building projects. Despite this, the policy of exclusive dependence on OPHWC for execution of building projects continued and an amount of Rs.36.35 crore remained unspent with the OPHWC as of May 2004 which ultimately affected the completion of 1146 building projects.

Thus, due to delay in completion of 1146 projects and not taking possession of 128 completed projects, the police stations and outposts continued to function in old, unsafe and rented buildings and the police personnel were deprived of residential accommodations (August 2004).

### ***3.6.7 Wasteful expenditure due to idle infrastructure/equipment***

Due to lack of co-ordination between different wings of the State Police Headquarters and the Department and general deficiencies in implementation of different programmes, equipments procured were lying idle and infrastructure created remained unutilised and there were avoidable extra expenditure on purchase of equipment the details of which are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

### ***3.6.8 Non-functioning of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory***

The Upgradation Scheme, as recommended by EFC, provided for construction of one Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (RFSL) at Balasore at a cost of Rs.1.80 crore (Building: Rs.20 lakh and equipment: Rs.1.60 crore). The State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) meeting held on 8 June 2001 decided on the construction of the building first and purchase of equipment thereafter. Contrary to the above decision, before construction of the building, equipment worth Rs.1.23 crore were procured between August 2001 and April 2004 as envisaged in the Action Plan. While equipment worth Rs.52.06 lakh were kept in stock, the others were installed in the State Forensic Science Laboratory at Bhubaneswar and other Regional Laboratories to avoid damage. The warranty period for most of the equipment (normally one year from the date of purchase) was over. The construction of the RFSL building at Balasore scheduled to be completed during 2001-02 was not started as of June 2004 due to land dispute. Thus, due to lack of co-ordination among the State Police headquarters, the Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory and other executing agencies of the department, the equipment worth Rs.1.23 crore remained unutilised/underutilised and the establishment of a Regional Forensic Science Laboratory could not materialise for over three years.

Idle investment of Rs.1.23 crore on equipment due to lack of synchronisation of purchase with construction of building

### ***3.6.9 Mobile Forensic Science Laboratory units not established***

The EFC recommended establishment of 19 Mobile Forensic Science Units (MFSUs) in the State at a cost of Rs.12 lakh each (Rs.6 lakh for purchase of mobile vans; Rs.6 lakh for equipment). The SLEC meeting held in June 2001 decided to purchase vehicles and equipment for the MFSUs at one go. Purchases of equipment were done by the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Bhubaneswar while the purchase of mobile vans was done by the DIG, Police Motor Transport, Cuttack. Scrutiny of records of SFSL revealed

Equipment worth Rs.89.13 lakh lying idle as the targetted 19 MFSUs not established

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(June 2004) that equipment worth Rs.89.13 lakh were purchased by Director, SFSL during August 2001 to January 2004. However, provision for procurement of 11 vehicles was made in 2003-04 of which supply order for only four vehicles was placed on 15 March 2004 as Rs.42.68 lakh was surrendered due to imposition of restriction on plan expenditure. Thus, due to non-procurement of vehicles, the MFSUs in the newly created districts could not be made functional. As a result, the equipment procured for MFSUs were issued to the existing district forensic science units as the mobile units in the newly created districts were not functional.

Despite availability of funds, due to lack of co-ordination between the two wings of the State Police, the MFSUs could not come up and the objective of providing forensic test services on the spot remained unachieved.

### ***3.6.10 Non-utilisation of training infrastructure created***

Auditorium at the Police Training College, Angul constructed at a cost of Rs.29.85 lakh could not be made functional due to defects in construction

With a view to upgrading the training facilities for police personnel, construction of Auditorium-cum-Library at the Police Training College, Angul at a cost of Rs.27 lakh was approved as per TFC recommendation. The work was executed by the PWD and an amount of Rs.29.85 lakh was spent. The building was handed over to the Police Training College in September 2000. The building remained unutilised due to defective echo proof system, inadequate fan fittings, defective motor for water supply, insufficient accommodation for library and want of approach road. In the meantime, a hailstorm in April 2002 and a cyclone in May 2003 caused extensive damage to the structure. Non-provision of echo proof system etc. during construction of the building rendered the expenditure of Rs.29.85 lakh unfruitful and defeated the aim of upgrading the training facilities of the State Police .

The IGP, PTC, Angul stated (February 2004) that the Executive Engineer, Angul R&B Division was requested (December 2003) to take up the repair work of the building. Neither the inherent defects of the building were rectified nor the damage caused by the hailstorm and cyclonic wind were repaired as of February 2004.

### ***3.6.11 Avoidable delay in purchases of vehicles/equipment***

Extra expenditure of Rs.28.22 lakh due to delay in placing supply orders

Under the modernisation scheme, the SLPC finalised the rate, the quantity and the firm for procurement of different vehicles during February 2001 and December 2001 for the years 2000-01 and 2001-02 respectively. The DGSD rates basing on which the approval of the SLPC was obtained were valid up to 2 February and 21 February 2002 for purchase of vehicles of M/s Mahindra and M/s Tata respectively. Although sufficient time was available and funds were not a constraint, the DIG, PMT placed orders on 28 February 2002 with both the above firms by which time the firms had increased their prices. This resulted in extra expenditure of Rs.19.16 lakh on procurement of 181 vehicles.

DIG (Admn) Orissa, Cuttack, obtained rates from Ordnance Factory, Dehradun in April 2002 for 30 Passive Night Vision binoculars and 28 Night Vision goggles. Basing on the rates in the proforma invoice, the DIG paid Rs.84.33 lakh to the Ordnance Factory in September 2003 after one year and four months from the date of obtaining the rates, by which time the validity period of the rates had expired and prices had increased with effect from

**Blockage of Rs.16.19 lakh due to purchase of defective equipment without accessories for use in SFSL, Bhubaneswar**

1 April 2003. Thereupon, the purchase order was revised for reduced supply of 30 binoculars and 21 goggles at the revised cost of Rs.83.28 lakh. This resulted in extra expenditure of Rs.9.06 lakh. However, it was noticed that the Ordnance Factory had neither supplied the items nor refunded the balance of Rs.1.05 lakh as of July 2004. The DIG stated (July 2004) that the delay in placement of the purchase order was due to late release of funds by the Government (June 2003).

The SFSL, Bhubaneswar purchased an equipment "Fourior Transmission Infrared Photometer" at a cost of Rs.9.05 lakh in 1998 out of the Modernisation funds, from a company in Kolkata. Due to defects and want of accessories, the machine remained unutilised since the date of its purchase and its warranty period expired on 19 November 2003. An amount of Rs.7.14 lakh drawn in August 2002 for payment of the cost of accessories to the firm as the firm failed to supply these accessories.

The purchase of the defective equipment without accessories led to blocking of funds to the extent of Rs.16.19 lakh besides not getting any service from the equipment.

### **3.6.12 Mobility support under Modernisation scheme**

#### **Acquisition and deployment of vehicles**

**The utilisation of newly purchased vehicles was doubtful as 155 drivers were in position against the deployment of 263 vehicles**

As per norms of the Bureau of Police Research and Development, Government of India, Police Motor Transport, Orissa made an assessment in 2000-01 that 1495 vehicles should be purchased for the State Police. As against that, only 1067 vehicles were procured during 2000-04. Since 425 vehicles were also condemned during the same period, the net addition to the police fleet during the period was only 642 vehicles. However, as against the sanctioned posts of 1315 drivers against which 1241 men were in position in the State, there were 2212 operational vehicles as of March 2004. Thus, there was a shortfall of 971 drivers which indicated that the utilisation of new vehicles was doubtful. Test check of the position in the four districts<sup>38</sup> showed that against 263 vehicles available in these districts both at the district headquarters and at the police stations as of March 2004, the number of sanctioned posts of drivers was 170 and the number of drivers actually available was only 155.

#### **Bulletproof jeeps worth Rs.36.30 lakh lying idle**

**Bulletproof jeeps purchased at a cost of Rs.36.30 lakh remained idle due to non-provision of bulletproof tyres and air-conditioning**

During the year 2000-01, the SLPC in its meeting held in February 2001 approved purchase of two Mahindra "Rakshak" bulletproof jeeps at the DGS&D rate at a cost of Rs.29.81 lakh under the Modernisation scheme. While approving the purchase, the SLPC did not specify bulletproof tyres and air conditioning for the bulletproof jeeps. The purchase order was placed with M/s Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., Bhubaneswar in February 2002 and the jeeps were supplied during June 2003 at a cost of Rs.36.30 lakh. However,

<sup>38</sup> District	No. of operational vehicles	Drivers in position
Rourkela	57	48
Rayagada	73	18
Balasore	71	42
Koraput	62	47

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due to non-provision of bulletproof tyres and air conditioning, the bulletproof jeeps were not considered roadworthy. Such contingencies were not visualised either by the technical committee or the SLPC while approving the purchase of bulletproof jeeps during 2000-01.

The DIG (PMT) stated (February 2004) that the vehicles would be used after purchase of necessary bulletproof tyres, AC machines etc. Failure to provide for the necessary accessories for the bulletproof jeeps *ab initio* defeated the very objective of providing mobility support to the police force in tackling the law and order situation in the naxalite affected areas.

### **3.6.13 Monitoring and evaluation**

The Modernisation scheme, which has been under implementation since 1969-70 was extended up to 2004-05. The revised guidelines (2000-01) of the scheme envisaged review of the scheme after two years of its implementation and the State Government was required to constitute a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) to meet as frequently as possible but not less than once in three months to review the implementation of the scheme for ensuring inter-departmental co-ordination and removing constraints, if any. The SLEC, which was constituted in May 2001 under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary met only twice in August 2001 and February 2004. Lack of monitoring by the SLEC led to tardy implementation of the modernisation programme as interdepartmental co-ordination could not be ensured to remove constraints arising out of procedural delays.

Similarly, the guidelines issued by the Government of India on implementation of the Eleventh Finance Commission recommendations envisaged evaluation of the scheme through professional agencies so as to bring out the strength and weaknesses of the programme. Such evaluation has not so far been made.

### **3.6.14 Conclusion**

Funds remained unspent and targets were not achieved on account of delay in finalisation of tenders and other procedural formalities in respect of major components like arms, computer, traffic control and Finger Print Bureau. Despite its limited capacity, exclusive dependence on OPHWC for construction of buildings had the effect of large number of projects remaining incomplete. Undue delay in placement of purchase orders with supplier firms resulted in extra expenditure owing to price enhancement after the expiry of the validity period of offers. The implementation of the programmes was not effectively monitored by the SLEC. Thus, even though funds were not a limiting constraint, the State Police failed to derive the intended benefits and the main objectives of the grants viz. upgrading the standards of administration and modernizing the police forces were not adequately met.

### **Recommendations**

- Close monitoring of the State Level Empowered Committee by frequent meetings for timely implementation of the scheme should be ensured.
- The policy of exclusive dependence on Orissa State Police Housing and Welfare Corporation, Bhubaneswar which was adopted for the Eleventh

Finance Commission grant and the Modernisation scheme for Civil Construction Projects should be reviewed.

- Purchase procedure should be streamlined to avoid extra expenditure on account of delay in placement of orders.
- Inter-departmental co-ordination should be ensured for optimum utilisation of equipment procured and infrastructure created.
- Utilisation certificates of scheme funds should be based on actual expenditure and parking of funds under Civil Deposit beyond the financial year in which the same was credited should be avoided.
- The Principal Secretary to the Government stated (September 2004) that the observation pointed in the paragraph are under examination and reply would be furnished in due course.

## HOME DEPARTMENT

### 3.2 Modernisation of Police Force

#### *Highlights*

*The Government of India launched the scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces in the States to enable the police to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. Construction of residential/ non-residential buildings was delayed. Despite purchase of additional vehicles, there was no significant increase in mobility as new vehicles were adjusted against condemned vehicles. Equipments procured for Forensic Science Laboratories were idle for want of installation and technical manpower.*

State Government did not contribute its matching share during 2002-07. Under-utilisation of funds by the State Government ranged between 24 and 40 per cent. State was deprived of Central grant of Rs 154.22 crore due to slow utilisation of funds.

(Paragraph 3.2.7)

Out of Rs 131.86 crore transferred to the Rajasthan State Road Development and Construction Corporation Limited for construction works, only Rs 99.25 crore (75 per cent) were utilised. Ninety nine buildings completed at a cost of Rs 10.18 crore were not taken over even after one to 41 months of their completion. Ninety one works were incomplete after incurring expenditure of Rs 12.48 crore.

(Paragraphs 3.2.8 and 3.2.8.1)

Forty three Forensic equipment worth Rs 8.52 crore remained unutilised for five to 49 months. Automated Finger Print Identification System procured at a cost of Rs 1.82 crore for modernisation of Finger Print Bureau was not functioning. Out of 680 Multi Access Radio Terminals, only 204 (30 per cent) were being used.

(Paragraphs 3.2.11.1, 3.2.12 and 3.2.13.1)

Information and Technology equipments worth Rs 72.15 lakh remained idle for 16 to 21 months in three training institutes. Three Simulators worth Rs 41.70 lakh were idle/out of order for 16 to 36 months for want of maintenance and non-availability of personnel.

(Paragraph 3.2.14)



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**The Department has not fixed any standards for response time to be taken for reaching the crime site. No monthly monitoring was done by the State Level Empowered Committee.**

*(Paragraphs 3.2.9.2 and 3.2.16)*

### **3.2.1 Introduction**

The scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF) was introduced (1969) by Government of India (GOI) to improve the efficiency of State police force to meet the challenges of the fast changing internal security situation. The scheme was revised during 2000-01 and extended for a period of 10 years. Under the scheme, the State Government was to submit a five-year perspective plan starting from 2000-01 indicating the specific projects. The annual plans were to flow from five-year plan. The components covered under the scheme were housing and building; mobility; communication and computerisation; weaponry; training; traffic equipments/aids to investigation; Forensic Science Laboratories (FSL) and Finger Print Bureau (FPB) facilities; Night vision devices and necessary protective equipments and Home-guards.

### **3.2.2 Organisational set up**

Principal Secretary, Home Department is responsible for implementation of the scheme in the State. Director General of Police (DGP) is the Head of the Police establishment. Additional Director General of Police (Planning and Welfare) is in charge of implementing the modernisation programmes. There is a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary with Principal Secretary, Home and DGP as members to monitor implementation of the scheme. The Annual Action Plan (AAP) formulated by DGP for requirement of funds is scrutinised by the SLEC before approval by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), New Delhi. Construction work was entrusted to the Rajasthan State Road Development and Construction Corporation Limited (RSRDCC) and Public Works Department (PWD).

### **3.2.3 Audit objectives**

The audit objectives were to assess whether:

- the planning was adequate and comprehensive and the annual plans were in accordance with the perspective plan;
- the assessment of requirement of funds was done properly and the same were utilised for the intended purpose;
- an appropriate implementation strategy was there and was effective;
- the provision of accommodation, procurement and deployment of vehicles, weapons, forensic and training equipments was as per rules and approved AAP; and
- the scheme was monitored properly.

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### 3.2.4 Audit criteria

The audit criteria adopted were:

- GOI guidelines on the scheme and instructions issued from time to time,
- Annual plans approved by the MHA, New Delhi,
- Response time with reference to actual time taken to reach the crime site,
- Minutes of meetings of the SLEC.

### 3.2.5 Scope and methodology of audit

The performance audit was conducted (April-May 2007) covering the period 2002-07 by test check of records of the Home Department, DGP office, FSLs<sup>34</sup>, FPB, Jaipur, Rajasthan Police Academy (RPA), Jaipur, Security Training School (STS), Jaipur, Rajasthan Police Training Centre (RPTC) and Police Training School (PTS), Jodhpur and Kherwara (Udaipur), Mewar Bhil Core (MBC), Kherwara, Director, Communication at Jaipur and four Superintendents of Police (SPs)<sup>35</sup> alongwith 33 Police Stations (PSs) in these districts. Audit examined the records of RSRDCC to assess the progress of construction works. An entry conference with the Principal Secretary, Home Department was held on 9 May 2007 wherein the audit objectives and criteria were explained. The audit findings were discussed in the exit conference held on 1 August 2007 with the Principal Secretary, Home Department. The review was finalised considering their views.

## Audit findings

### 3.2.6 Planning

The existing scheme of MPF was extended by the GOI for a period of 10 years starting from 2000-01 with enhanced Central assistance. According to the GOI guidelines, State Government was to prepare a five years perspective plan with effect from 2000-01 for submission to the GOI. The annual plans were to flow from the five-year perspective plan. It was seen that although no five-year perspective plan was submitted after 2004-05, the GOI continued to extend the assistance on the basis of AAPs. The following was observed:

**Government did not adhere to five-year plan while projecting requirement for buildings in the annual plans.**

- The five-year plan (2000-05) envisaged requirement of Rs 2,405.95 crore to meet shortage of residential, administrative and PS buildings. The State Government submitted the requirement of Rs 386.62 crore only for buildings under AAPs (2000-01 to 2006-07) and GOI approved Rs 381.93 crore. Further, an expenditure of Rs 76.59 crore<sup>36</sup> only was incurred up to March 2007 on completed buildings. Thus, Government failed to include proposals for construction of buildings in the AAPs as per the five-year perspective plan and utilise whatever the allotment made.

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34. Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur.

35. Alwar, Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur.

36. Rs 76.59 crore = Rs 99.25 crore (Total expenditure) minus {Rs 10.18 crore (Works completed but not handed over) plus Rs 12.48 crore (Expenditure incurred on incomplete works)}.

**GSM interception system proposed in AAP was not purchased.**

- The AAP for 2003-04 included proposal for purchase of a GSM Interception System for border areas to intercept the mobile communication across the border. Government issued (August 2004) sanction of Rs 5 crore for it, but the sanction was subsequently cancelled (November 2004) on the ground that use of the system needed close supervision and delicate handling. This indicated lack of proper planning in preparation of proposals by the Department, which resulted in non-utilisation of funds and consequent delays in the implementation of the scheme.
- The funds released as per annual plans approved by the MHA were to be used for the items specified in the plan. The State Government however, accorded (August 2005) sanction of Rs 48 lakh and spent Rs 40.64 lakh<sup>37</sup> for items not considered by the MHA in the AAP. The DGP accepted the facts (July 2007).

### 3.2.7 Financial management

During 2000-03, Central and State Government funded the scheme in the ratio of 50:50. Half of the GOI share was in the form of grant-in-aid and half in the form of loan. The funding pattern was modified to 60:40 from November 2003 and again to 75:25 in September 2005 due to change of categorisation of Rajasthan on the basis of level of threat from insurgency/ militancy/cross border terrorism etc. During 2003-07 GOI assistance was in the form of grant. The details of AAP, funds released by the GOI and the expenditure incurred during 2002-07 were as under:

(Rupees in crore)									
Year	Approved annual plan	Amount released by GOI		State share	Amount revalidated by GOI during the year	Total amount available for the year	Expenditure incurred during the year	Balance amount (7 – 8)	Percentage of balance amount to total amount available (9 to 7)
		Grant-in-aid	Loan						
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
2002-03	120.83	8.09	8.09	NIL	74.29 <sup>38</sup>	90.47	60.76	29.71 <sup>39</sup>	33
2003-04	119.80	43.02	NIL	NIL	39.76	82.78	49.39	33.39	40
2004-05	116.98	42.67	NIL	NIL	23.33	66.00	50.10	15.90	24
2005-06	121.33	46.41	NIL	NIL	15.90	62.31	37.96	24.35	39
2006-07	52.00	29.98	NIL	NIL	7.49 <sup>40</sup>	37.47	28.11 <sup>41</sup>	9.36	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>530.94</b>	<b>170.17</b>	<b>8.09</b>	<b>NIL</b>			<b>226.32</b>		

37. Creation of driving track at Police Motor Driving School, Bikaner: Rs 10 lakh; Preparation/ upgradation of grounds and other infrastructure like power/water etc. for seven training centres: Rs 1.12 lakh; Copy printers, Lamination and binding machines (one each for the training centres-8): Rs 19.56 lakh; and Procurement and installation of Mock Crime Scene for training to inspecting officers at RPA, Jaipur: Rs 9.96 lakh.

38. Closing balance of previous year 2001-02.

39. The GOI revalidated (December 2003) Rs 39.76 crore as against Rs 29.71 crore unutilised as of March 2003 for 2003-04. Similarly, against Rs 33.39 crore lying unspent as of March 2004, revalidation for Rs 23.33 crore was issued for 2004-05.

40. Rs 24.35 crore unspent balance of 2005-06 is due to Rs 46.41 crore intimated as released by GOI and adopted by Audit instead of Rs 29.55 crore intimated as received by the State Government from GOI. Hence, revalidation was for only Rs 7.49 crore in 2006-07.

41. This includes expenditure out of revalidated amount also.

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The following significant points were observed:

- State Government did not contribute its matching share during 2002-07. The DGP stated (June 2007) that due to limited financial resources Government was not in a position to contribute its matching share.

**Under-utilisation of funds by State Government ranged from 24 to 40 per cent.**

- During 2002-07, State Government could not utilise 24 to 40 per cent of funds released by the GOI. DGP attributed (June 2007) this to large size of scheme and adherence of prescribed procedure for purchase of items. The reply was not tenable as the State Government was aware of the procedures to be followed and also knew that further allotment would be received only after funds already received from GOI were fully utilised.

**State was deprived of Central grant of Rs 154.22 crore due to slow utilisation of funds.**

- Out of the total outlay of Rs 530.94 crore, GOI share due was Rs 332.48 crore. Due to slow utilisation of funds, the GOI assistance was reduced to Rs 178.26 crore<sup>42</sup>, thus, depriving the State of Rs 154.22 crore (46 per cent). DGP stated (June 2007) that utilisation was slow as funds were released at the fag end of the years in 2000-01 and 2001-02. The reply was not tenable as State Government failed to utilise the revalidated amount of Rs 2.26 crore<sup>43</sup> sanctioned during 2000-02 even upto March 2006.
- As per GOI instructions (February 2001) modernisation funds should be used in the same financial year. However, funds<sup>44</sup> remained unutilised for periods ranging 12 to 75 months upto March 2007.

### **3.2.8 Housing and buildings**

According to the guidelines issued by GOI, high priority should be given to construction sector. According to AAPs, construction works of Rs 381.93 crore were approved by the GOI. The Police Department transferred (February 2002 to January 2007) Rs 131.86 crore<sup>45</sup> to the Personal Deposit (PD) account of the RSRDCC for construction of PSs and police outposts (610), residential buildings (123) and administrative buildings (332). Out of this, Rs 99.25 crore were utilised as of March 2007.

#### **3.2.8.1 Inordinate delay in construction of buildings**

Out of 1,065 works, 131 works costing Rs 57.12 crore and 934 works costing Rs 74.06 crore were allotted to RSRDCC and PWD respectively as

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42. Grant-in-aid: Rs 170.17 crore and loan: Rs 8.09 crore.

43. 2000-01: Rs 1.50 crore and 2001-02: Rs 0.76 crore.

44. Rs 1.42 crore (2000-01), Rs 0.55 crore (2003-04), Rs 0.10 crore (2004-05), Rs 17.39 crore (2005-06) and Rs 6.77 crore (2006-07)

45. Includes Rs 0.80 crore in respect of Home guard

detailed below:

(Amount: Rupees in crore)

(Amount: Rupees in crore)															
Type of buildings	Number of works allotted	Sanctioned amount	Works completed and handed over		Works completed but not handed over				Works remaining incomplete				Works not started		
			N	S	N	S	E	P	N	S	E	P	N	S	P
A. RSRDCC															
Police Stations/ outposts	43	7.74	35	6.26	4	0.76	0.76	NA	3	0.66	0.64	24	1	0.06	2
Residential	10	2.44	2	0.25	2	1.12	1.12	NA	6	1.07	0.27	12	-	-	-
Administrative	78	46.94	51	36.31	3	0.13	0.13	5-12	20	10.07	7.03	2-36	4	0.43	2-24
Total 'A'	131	57.12	88	42.82	9	2.01	2.01	-	29	11.80	7.94	-	5	0.49	
B. PWD															
Police Stations/ outposts	567	35.12	312	19.30	46	3.79	3.25	1-41	26	2.77	1.51	12-60	183	9.26	2-24
Residential	113	16.60	68	10.32	21	3.20	2.73	1-19	21	2.81	1.28	12-24	3	0.27	12
Administrative	254	22.34	155	11.48	23	2.51	2.19	1-35	15	3.09	1.75	2-60	61	5.26	2-60
Total 'B'	934	74.06	535	41.10	90	9.50	8.17	-	62	8.67	4.54	-	247	14.79	-
Grand Total	1065	131.18*	623	83.92	99	11.51	10.18	-	91	20.47	12.48	-	252	15.28	

N = number of works, S = sanctioned amount, E =expenditure and P =period of delay in months

NA = Not available

\* Sanctioned works of Rs 131.18 crore against Rs 131.06 crore transferred to RSRDCC for Police Department.

**Ninety one building construction works remained incomplete after spending Rs 12.48 crore.**

It could be seen from the above table that 99 buildings (RSRDCC: 9 and PWD: 90) completed at a cost of Rs 10.18 crore were not taken over by the Department (March 2007) even after one to 41 months of completion. Further, 91 works (RSRDCC: 29 and PWD: 62) on which expenditure of Rs 12.48 crore was incurred remained incomplete and 252 works (RSRDCC: 5 and PWD: 247) estimating Rs 15.28 crore were not started due to delay in finalising drawings, selection of sites, stay orders by the courts, etc.

### 3.2.8.2 Shortage of staff quarters

In the five-year perspective plan Government projected (April 2000) requirement of 54,587 staff quarters considering the existing 15,111 quarters (22 per cent) available for 69,698 police personnel. Information regarding net requirement of staff quarters as of 31 March 2007 was not furnished (July 2007) by the DGP. Position in four test checked districts as of March 2007 was as under:

S. No.	District	Total strength	Number of quarters required	Number of quarters available	Shortage of quarters
1.	Jodhpur (City)	1,961	1,279	450	829
2.	Jodhpur (Rural)	687	440	89	351
3.	Udaipur	2,264	1,449	742	707
4.	Alwar	1,954	1,291	443	848
5.	Jaipur (City)	3,856	2,400	907	1,493
6.	Jaipur (Rural)	1,500	997	326	671
	<b>Total</b>	<b>12,222</b>	<b>7,856</b>	<b>2,957</b>	<b>4,899</b>

**Shortage of quarters forced the staff to stay 50 km from duty station.**

There was net shortage of 4,899 quarters (62 per cent) in four test checked districts. As a result, the police staff had to stay at a distance from their working places. It was noticed that 14 staff members of Thanagazi PS (Alwar District) had to stay as far as 50 Kms from the PSs, which meant that they were not available for deployment in the event of emergency call.

Thus, inordinate delays in completion/taking over of buildings negated the plans approved for constructions under AAP.

### 3.2.9 Mobility

Out of Rs 45.90 crore allotted for purchase of new vehicles by the GOI during 2002-07, expenditure of Rs 43.35 crore was incurred.

#### 3.2.9.1 Shortage of vehicles

Taking into account the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) study conducted in 1998, the position of assessment of vehicles required (April 2000), availability of vehicles, purchases during 2002-07 and shortage of vehicles in the Department as of March 2007 was as under:

Particulars	Number of vehicles				
	Heavy vehicles	Medium vehicles	Light vehicles	Motor cycles	Total
Available as on 1 April 2000	242	497	1,344	719	2,802
Shortage assessed	865	465	934	3,407	5,671
Net requirement	1,107	962	2,278	4,126	8,473
Purchases during 2000-07	4	87	1,089	1,998	3,178
Net vehicles available as on March 2007	236	460	1,617	2,456	4,769
Shortfall as on March 2007	871	502	661	1,670	3,704

The following were observed:

New vehicles were used mainly to replace the unserviceable ones.

- In April 2000, shortage of vehicles assessed was 5,671. Despite purchase of 3,178 vehicles during 2000-07, the net addition of vehicles<sup>46</sup> was 1967 (62 *per cent*) while 1211 vehicles (38 *per cent*) were declared unserviceable. The DGP stated (April 2007) that newly procured vehicles under MPF were used to replace the old unserviceable vehicles. The reply was not tenable as the perspective plans submitted were based on the requirement for additional vehicle and the plan did not envisage such replacement.
- Out of 861 vehicles (heavy vehicles: 3, medium vehicles: 27, light vehicles: 311 and Motor cycles: 520) supplied by the DGP to four test checked districts, 418 vehicles (49 *per cent*) were deployed by the SP offices for *bandobast*, highway security, etc. Fifty six vehicles (6 *per cent*) were retained for SP/Additional SP offices and only 387 vehicles (45 *per cent*) were supplied by the District SPs to the Police Stations.
- The PSs at Pratapgarh and Narayanpur in Alwar (Rural) District were functioning without light vehicles (Jeep/Gypsy), which were necessary for regular patrolling and for attending crime sites etc., since February 2005 and February 2007 respectively.

46. Available as on 1 April 2000: 2,802 + Purchases: 3,178 = 5,980 less available vehicles as on March 2007: 4,769 = 1,211. Net addition = 3,178 – 1,211 = 1,967.



Department has not fixed any standards for response time to be taken for reaching the crime site.

### **3.2.9.2 Response time**

In order to maintain law and order situation in the State, it is necessary to prescribe maximum response time for police to reach the crime site. It was noticed that the Department did not prescribe any such maximum limit. Out of 24 PSs test checked, only one PS (Sardarpura in Jodhpur District) fixed the response time for the police team to reach (15 minutes time for one kilometer; 20 minutes for two kilometers; 30 minutes for three kilometers and 10 minutes for each extra kilometer). The PSs were also required to record the response time in the crime registers. However, in 465 cases in 20 PSs police response time could not be worked out as the necessary information was not recorded in crime register by PS incharges. In 24 test checked PSs<sup>47</sup>, more response time was taken (30 minutes to 218 hours<sup>48</sup>) in 153 cases (out of 469 cases) of December 2006 compared to the norms fixed by Sardarpura PS. The situation was worse than that of December 2000 when the response time was 30 minutes to 197 hours<sup>49</sup> in 189 cases (out of 480 cases). The PS incharges admitted the facts and attributed the excessive time taken to non-availability of additional vehicles, heavy load of work, shortage of manpower etc. Thus, there was no reduction in police response time consequent upon addition of vehicles.

### **3.2.10 Weaponry**

Out of Rs 4.90 crore sanctioned by GOI during 2004-07, weapons worth Rs 3.12 crore were procured as of May 2007. The following irregularities were noticed:

#### **3.2.10.1 Delay in adoption of scale of weapons**

The BPR&D, New Delhi, finalised (January 2001) the scale of weapons for the State Police force. The BPR&D asked the DGP to compute the requirement of weapons phased out over next five to seven years. However, it took more than five years for the DGP to prescribe (September 2006) the scale of weapons. DGP stated (July 2007) that the scales were prescribed after indepth study was not tenable in view of actual time taken in adoption of scales by the State Government.

#### **3.2.10.2 Non- procurement/supply/utilisation of weapons**

There was net shortage of 9,540 weapons in the State including 810 AK-47 rifles, 2926 self-loaded rifles (SLRs) and 3841 revolvers (point 38) as of March 2007. Shortage of weapons would have adverse impact on the effectiveness of police. DGP stated (July 2007) that shortage of weapons

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47. Alwar: PSs, Kotwali, Shivaji Park, Arawali Vihar, Mahila Thana, Khairthal, Malakhera, Kathumar, Thanagazi; Udaipur: PSs, Surajpole, Hathipole, Pratap Nagar, Goverdhan Vilas, Pahara, Bhupalpura, Mavli, Rishabhdev, Dabok; Jodhpur: PSs, Mahamandir, Sardarpura, Sadar Bazar, Khandafalsa, Mandore, Mathania and Jaipur: PS, Shipra Path.

48. 218 hours for covering 2 kilometers: PS, Pahara (Udaipur).

49. 197 hours for 28 kilometers: PS, Goverdhan vilas (Udaipur).

would be recouped in subsequent years as per availability of funds. The reply was not tenable because the scheme was in operation for last seven years and only 150 AK-47 rifles and 500 SLRs were procured. Other interesting points noticed are as under:

- DG supplied 328 modern weapons worth Rs 22.69 lakh to SPs<sup>50</sup> of three test checked districts that were stocked in the Police Lines and not issued to the PSs. DGP stated (July 2007) that issue of weapons by the District SPs to the PSs was on the basis of law and order situation. The reply was not consistent with the scale of weapons prescribed for each PS.

- Women PSs in Alwar and Jaipur city (East) were not provided any weapon since their establishment in January 2001 and January 2006 respectively.

**Weapons worth Rs 1.78 crore were not received from Ordinance Factory.**

- The GOI placed (March 2005, March 2006 and August 2006) three orders on Ordinance Factory Board (OFB), Kolkata for supply of various weapons at a cost of Rs 4.78 crore. The weapons valued Rs 1.78 crore of the supply order dated 30 August 2006 had not been supplied by OFB as of May 2007.

### **3.2.11 Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL)**

The FSL provides valuable aid to investigation through analysis of the forensic evidence. The MHA also suggested (April 2001) to the State Governments to strengthen the FSL.

#### **3.2.11.1 Purchase and utilisation of equipment**

During 2002-07, Rs 9.48 crore out of Rs 9.64 crore released by the GOI were spent on procurement of equipment and other material for State Forensic Science Laboratories (SFSL), Jaipur, Regional Forensic Science Laboratories (RFSL), Jodhpur and Udaipur. The following points were observed:

- Rupees 2.08 crore<sup>51</sup> released (2000-02) by GOI for purchase of equipment for modernisation of the FSLs could not be utilised (as of April 2007) even after lapse of 62 to 73 months. Additional Director, RFSL, Udaipur stated that purchase of Gas Chromatograph Head Space was unnecessary.

**Forensic equipment valued Rs 8.52 crore remained unutilised for five to 49 months.**

- Forty three forensic equipment worth Rs 8.52 crore procured during 2002-07 remained unutilised in SFSL Jaipur, RFSLs, Jodhpur and Udaipur for period ranging from five to 49 months (**Appendix-3.2**). Director, SFSL stated (June 2007) that the equipment could not be installed due to space constraint.

50. SP, Jaipur (City): 6 AK-47 rifles, 25 SLRs and 200 BS; SP, Jodhpur City: 10 SLRs and 10 BS; SP, Jodhpur Rural: 15 SLRs and 19 BS and SP, Udaipur: 15 AK-47 rifles, 8 SLRs and 20 BS.

51. (i) Gas Chromatograph- Head Space (RFSL, Udaipur- Rs 0.19 crore-73 months), (ii) X-Ray Fluorescence Spectrometer (SFSL, Jaipur-Rs 0.59 crore-62 months) and Electron Micro Scope (SFSL, Jaipur - Rs 1.30 crore - 62 months).

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The reply was not tenable as this constraint could be foreseen before the procurement.

Two diesel analysers costing Rs 24.18 lakh were lying idle at RFSLS, Jodhpur and Udaipur.

- The Director, SFSL submitted (August 2004) the proposal for purchasing three diesel analysers against requirement of one diesel analyser for SFSL, Jaipur. The proposal was approved and three analysers worth Rs 36.28 lakh were received (July 2005) by the SFSL, Jaipur from GOI. The Director, SFSL, Jaipur issued two diesel analysers to RFSLS Jodhpur and Udaipur without any requirement from them and hence these were lying idle (March 2007). Thus, Rs 24.18 lakh spent on procurement of two diesel analysers remained blocked.

### **3.2.11.2 Pending cases**

8,430 cases were pending for analysis as on March 2007.

There were 8,430 cases pending for examination as on 31 March 2007 in the three FSLs. Of these, 6,154 cases<sup>52</sup> pertained to 2001-06. Additional Director, RFSL Jodhpur stated (May 2007) that 4,232 cases received in 2005 were being examined and reported in 2007 due to shortage of staff. The contention (May 2007) of the Additional Director, RFSL, Udaipur that no time limit was prescribed for disposal of a sample in FSL Rules was not correct as the pendency adversely affects the credibility of reports, delays prosecution of cases and quite often discharge/acquittal of accused in courts.

### **3.2.11.3 Transfer of technology for De-Oxy-Ribonucleic Acid (DNA) sample testing**

DNA sample testing could not be started in the State.

Director, SFSL, Jaipur remitted (March 2005) Rs 6 lakh to the Director, Centre for De-Oxy-Ribonucleic Acid Finger Printing and Diagnostics (CDFD), Hyderabad to meet expenditure for fine chemicals, kits, manpower, transfer of technology and training to the staff of FSLs in the State. According to the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the CDFD and SFSL, blood samples were to be collected from 300 individuals at random in the State and scientists of both the organisations were to prepare the DNA Finger Print reports. Only 26 such Reports were prepared during 29 November 2006 to 20 April 2007 against the target of 300 samples. Thus, in the absence of transfer of technology and training to staff, DNA sample testing could not be started at Jaipur.

### **3.2.11.4 Non/under-utilisation of buildings resulting in blocking of funds**

Buildings for RFSL, Kota and DNA laboratory at Jaipur could not be used resulting in blocking of Rs 4.11 crore.

The construction of buildings for RFSL, Kota and DNA Laboratory (Lab) at SFSL, Jaipur was completed (March 2007) at a cost of Rs 2.20 crore and Rs 1.35 crore respectively. SFSL also procured equipment worth Rs 0.56 crore<sup>53</sup>. The labs were not operational due to non-sanctioning of manpower. Thus, expenditure of Rs 4.11 crore was blocked. The Director, SFSL, Jaipur stated (June 2007) that manpower for both the labs has been sanctioned now.

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52. 2001 (1), 2002 (99), 2003 (279), 2004 (303), 2005 (843) and 2006 (4,629).

53. (i) Two UV-Vis-Spectrophotometer (Rs 0.28 crore) for RFSL, Kota and (ii) one UV-Vis-Spectrophotometer (Rs 0.14 crore), one Power Generator (Rs 0.09 crore) and one Gel documentation System (Rs 0.05 crore) for DNA laboratory, SFSL, Jaipur.

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The lab building constructed at a cost of Rs 2.20 crore at RFSL, Udaipur in July 2006 was under-utilised as all the five divisions occupied only 29 rooms/halls leaving 25 rooms/halls unoccupied costing Rs 1.01 crore.

### **3.2.12 Finger Print Bureau (FPB)**

**Due to non-functioning of AFIS expenditure of Rs 1.82 crore incurred on modernisation of FPB was unfruitful.**

Government sanctioned (September 2006) Rs 2.25 crore for modernisation of FPB in the State. Of this, Rs 1.82 crore was incurred as of March 2007. The investigation of fingerprints was being done manually in the Department. The State Government conveyed (September 2006) administrative and financial sanction to the DGP for purchase of Automated Finger Print Identification System (AFIS). The proposed AFIS was to capture, store and match fingerprints automatically with precision and in short time and to provide timely and effective help in solving the cases. Cost of the AFIS (Rs 1.44 crore) included charges of installation, commissioning, clearance of backlog of one lakh old prints in 120 days (upto 22 May 2007) and annual maintenance charges. The AFIS supplied by the firm 'A' was installed at FPB and in 32 districts including seven range offices (March 2007). It was observed that AFIS was not installed and commissioned in three test checked District SP offices<sup>54</sup>. The certificate given (March 2007) by the Stores Inspection Committee about installation and commissioning of AFIS in these Districts was thus not correct. The SPs, Alwar and Jodhpur also confirmed (May and July 2007) that the AFIS was still lying packed. Possibilities of non-functioning of AFIS in other districts can not be ruled out.

Eight live scanner (cost: Rs 32.86 lakh) and seven laptops (cost: Rs 5.11 lakh) purchased (March 2007) and supplied to the Director, FPB, Jaipur were lying idle for want of trained manpower as of June 2007.

### **3.2.13 Communication**

#### **3.2.13.1 Police Communication Network Project**

MHA sanctioned Rs 4.41 crore during 2002-06 to the Director, Co-ordination (Police Wireless), New Delhi (DCPW) for integrated Police Communication Network (POLNET) to be completed through a New Delhi based firm by December 2004 (later extended up to March 2006). The aim was to provide connectivity between all the 680 PSs (as on 6 May 1997) in the State and District police Headquarters and any PS in India for voice communication through Multi Access Radio Terminal (MART). Scrutiny of records in four test checked District SP offices showed that the system was not being optimally used for the intended purpose as discussed below:

**Only 30 per cent of MART systems were being put to intended use.**

- Out of 680 MARTs, only 469 were established (June 2007) and 211 MARTs (cost: Rs 22.49 lakh) were lying idle in stores. Out of 469 MARTs established so far, only 329 were established in PSs while 140 MARTs (cost Rs 14.92 lakh) were provided to district police officers (102), police

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54. Alwar, Jodhpur and Udaipur.

outposts/check posts/control rooms (28), zonal offices (10). 137 MARTs worth Rs 14.60 lakh were out of order, hence not providing intended service. Thus, out of total 680 MARTs, only 204 (30 *per cent*) costing Rs 21.75 lakh were used in PSs while 211 were lying idle in stores, 137 were out of order and 128 were irregularly used at places other than PSs. The Director, Police communication intimated (July 2007) that action was being taken to repair the out of order MARTs and that the DCPW had been asked to install MARTs lying in stores.

- The firm did not provide the required training for the POLNET to the operating staff at sites. This resulted in the instruments not being operated/maintained properly (July 2007).

Thus, the Police Department was deprived of the benefit of voice communication among PSs in India through POLNET system.

### 3.2.14 Training

Professionalism in the force largely depends upon the quality of training inputs, which, in turn have direct relationship with training infrastructure. The scheme provided for enhancement of equipment, furniture etc. for which Rs 3.85 crore were approved by the MHA during 2002-07. Expenditure of Rs 3.25 crore was incurred upto March 2007. Seven training institutes namely RPA, Jaipur, RPTC, Jodhpur and PTSs, Jodhpur, Kherwara, Kishangarh, Jhalawar and Police Motor Driving School, Bikaner were engaged in providing initial training, organising promotion cadre courses and other special courses, etc. Scrutiny of records in four institutes<sup>55</sup> disclosed idling of training equipment etc. as discussed below:

**IT equipment costing Rs 72.15 lakh remained idle for 16 to 21 months in three Training Institutes.**

- The DGP purchased Information & Technology (IT) equipment i.e. 70 computers, printers, UPS units, Multi Media projectors etc. from firm 'A' at a cost of Rs 72.15 lakh with warranty period of one to three years and supplied these to RPA, Jaipur (23), RPTC, Jodhpur (22) and PTS, Jodhpur (25) between March 2002 and May 2003 for imparting computer training. No training was imparted to the trainees in these institutes for 16 to 21<sup>56</sup> months in the absence of approved training programmes by the DGP.

**Three simulators costing Rs 41.70 lakh were idling/out of order for 16 to 36 months.**

- The DGP purchased (January 2003) four training simulators for Rs 55.60 lakh and issued (February 2003) these to four Institutes<sup>57</sup>. Three simulators (cost: Rs 41.70 lakh) remained idle/out of order in three Institutes<sup>58</sup> for 16 to 36 months due to transfer of master trainer and for want of annual maintenance contract. Thus, 3,136 trainees in these Institutes<sup>59</sup> were deprived of training through simulators, besides blocking of Rs 41.70 lakh.

55. RPA, Jaipur; RPTC, Jodhpur; PTS, Jodhpur and PTS, Kherwara.

56. RPA, Jaipur: 16 months, RPTC: Jodhpur-16 months and PTS: Jodhpur-21 months.

57. RPA, Jaipur, RPTC, Jodhpur, PTS, Jodhpur and PTS, Kherwara (Udaipur).

58. RPA, Jaipur: 16 months, RPTC, Jodhpur: 19 months and PTS, Kherwara: 36 months.

59. RPA, Jaipur (300), Jodhpur (761) and PTS, Kherwara (2,075).



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- Three power generator sets purchased (March 2006) for Rs 12.30 lakh and issued by DGP (May and June 2006) to the Director, RPA, (2) and Commandant, STS, Jaipur (1) were not commissioned (May 2007) for want of electricity connection, construction of cemented platform etc. Thus, idling of generator sets resulted in blocking of Rs 12.30 lakh.

- The DGP issued (December 2002) orders for organising 45 days refresher course for all commando platoons every year at RPTC, Jodhpur. No such refresher training courses were conducted in the RPTC (May 2007).

In the absence of utilisation, procurement of valuable equipment for these institutes was not justified.

### **3.2.15 Computerisation**

#### **3.2.15.1 Computer Aided Dispatch system**

**The Computer Aided Dispatch systems were not functioning.**

According to AAPs for 2000-01 and 2001-02 approved by the GOI, three Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems were to be purchased (cost: Rs 2.10 crore) and established in Jaipur, Jodhpur and Kota cities to monitor the movement of police and instruct them to reach a particular point of crime in the city. The State Government accorded (September 2006) administrative and financial sanction of Rs 1.50 crore for procurement of the systems. The DGP placed (January 2006) order to a private firm for the supply of three CAD systems. One system (cost: Rs 34.91 lakh) supplied (July 2006) to SP, Jodhpur was installed in March 2007. The system was not operational as of June 2007. The systems supplied to SPs (City), Jaipur and Kota were not installed and commissioned as of June 2007. Thus, the benefit of the CAD system could not be availed of by the Department.

#### **3.2.16 Monitoring and evaluation**

As per instructions (February 2001) of GOI, the SLEC constituted (July 2001) under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary was to hold monthly meetings for proper monitoring and reviewing the physical and financial progress of the scheme and its periodical evaluation. During September 2001 to May 2006, SLEC met six times<sup>60</sup> only to finalise and submit AAP to the GOI. Thereafter no monthly monitoring was conducted by the SLEC. Government stated (July 2007) that it was not possible to hold monthly meeting of the SLEC for the Chief Secretary as he held the highest administrative post in the Government. Though the MPF scheme was in operation for the last seven years, no evaluation of the scheme was undertaken to assess the impact of the scheme.

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60. 24 September 2001, 26 August 2002, 15 September 2003, 26 June 2004, 22 June 2005 and 11 May 2006



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### **3.2.17 Conclusion**

The implementation of the scheme of MPF in the State was not satisfactory. The State Government did not contribute its matching share for the scheme. Important items e.g. construction works were not included in the Annual Action Plans. Sizable number of residential and administrative building construction works were either incomplete or were not started. There was no increase in mobility as vehicles purchased were mainly used to replace the old unserviceable vehicles. Undue delay in prescribing the scale of weapons required resulted in delay in procurement and deployment of modern weapons. The FSL procured costly equipments without planning for adequate manpower and infrastructure. Critical equipments like AFIS, POLNET and CAD were not installed/functioning and the police force was thus deprived of the benefits provided by the equipment. The valuable equipment procured for training institutes was not utilised. The implementation of the scheme was not monitored effectively.

### **3.2.18 Recommendations**

- Proper planning should be done taking into account the actual requirement under all the components.
- Immediate action should be initiated to take over the possession of the completed buildings and to start the construction works where these were not yet started. Monitoring of progress work should be done closely.
- State Government should provide funds for replacement of old vehicles instead of using the scheme funds. Maximum workable response time should be prescribed for the police team to reach the crime site.
- Norms regarding time to be taken in disposal of cases at FSL should be fixed.
- A review of installation, commissioning and utilisation of the equipment purchased should be done and action taken to overcome the deficiencies.
- Monitoring and evaluation mechanism should be made continuous and effective.

The matter was reported to Government in July 2007; their reply had not been received (September 2007).

## APPENDIX-3.2

(Refer Paragraph 3.2.11.1; page 71)

**Details of delay in utilisation of Forensic Science Laboratories equipments due to non-installation, delay in installation, needed accessories etc. during 2002-03 to 2006-07**

S.No.	Name of equipment	Unit	Purpose of equipment	Cost (Rs in lakh)	Date of		Delay in Utilisation (Months)	Reasons for delay in utilisation
					Receipt	Utilisation		
Forensic Science Laboratory, Jaipur								
1.	High Performance Liquid Chromatograph	1	Analyse thermolabile toxicants/chemicals, metabolites	22.87	24.2.03	8.1.04	10	Not intimated
2.	Solvent Extraction System	1	Speedy extraction of poisonous compounds from visceral organs	16.81	24.2.03	26.8.03	6	Not intimated
3.	High Performance Thin layer Chromatography	1	To detect thermo labile chemicals/Psychotropic	14.62	24.2.03	23.11.04	21	Not intimated
4.	Comparison Microscope	1	Comparison of pin marks of bullet serrations	43.94	10.03.03	23.01.04 to +10.02.06 to 15.06.07 (as per division)	10 +16 26	Pre installation requisite like sockets, portable stabilizer etc., Training on software, non availability of colour cartridge Photo system (DMLD) defective
5.	Dust Mark Lifting Kit	1	For lifting dust mark and latent prints	11.81	10.03.03	20.12.03	10	Not intimated
6.	Camera with Accessories	4	For photography	6.83	06.04.03	28.07.04	16	Not intimated
7.	Glass Refractive Index Measurement Equipment (GRIM-2)	1	For examination of accident cases	35.88	10.03.03	20.12.03	10	Not intimated

S.No.	Name of equipment	Unit	Purpose of equipment	Cost (Rs in lakh)	Date of		Delay in Utilisation (Months)	Reasons for delay in utilisation
					Receipt	Utilisation		
8.	Upgradation of Polarograph	1	For metallic Poison detection	1.98	03.10.03	22.07.04	10	Not intimated
9.	Video Record CC TV Camera	1	For surveillance of analytical lapse and case unit and administration section	5.72	06.04.04	30.12.06	33	Not intimated
10.	Mass Spectrometer for Gas Chromatograph	1	Analytical equipment for Toxicological analysis	37.07	07.05.04	06.06.04 + 25.10.06 to 16.06.07 (as per reply)	1+8=9	Turbo power supply board and vacuum control board defective
11.	Petroleum Equipment Automated Distillation Apparatus	1	For distillation of Petroleum products	42.35	17.10.03	15.07.05 (as per division)	21	Not intimated
12.	X-ray Fluorescence Spectrometer (XRF)	1	For analysis of metal pieces and inorganic material	59.05	25.08.05	-	20 (as per division dated 15.05.07)	Chiller awaited and shortage of space
13.	FT Raman spectrometer	1	For analysis of Plastics Polymers, ink, Paints and organic material	52.59	07.05.04	19.6.06 (as per log book)	25	Training was completed as on 10.2.06
14.	Electron Microscope/EDX	1	Examination of Layer of Smoke, Explosive material etc.	129.46	14.11.05 (as per division)	-	18 (as per division dated 15.05.07)	UPS, BSD detector, shortage of space, training due
15.	Computer Forensic Work Station	1	To detect Computer, Internet crime	12.07	16.11.04	02.04.05 (as per division)	5	Not intimated
16.	Inverted Microscope	1	For micro biological analysis	3.00	04.07.06	24.04.07	10	Not intimated
17.	Gel Documentation	1	For check the DNA quality	5.00	14.11.06	12.06.07	7	Not intimated
18.	Hot Stage Microscope	1	For Micro biological analysis	16.00	14.11.06	17.03.07	5	Not intimated
19.	Diesel Analyser	1	Analysis of Petroleum product	12.09	27.07.05	08.02.06	6	Not intimated

S.No.	Name of equipment	Unit	Purpose of equipment	Cost (Rs in lakh)	Date of		Delay in Utilisation (Months)	Reasons for delay in utilisation
					Receipt	Utilisation		
20.	Fourier Transform Infra Red Spectrometer	1	Examination of Poison Sample	15.18	27.07.05	01.02.06	6	Not intimated
21.	Audio Video Tape Authenticity	1	Verification of Audio Video recording, bribe, video CDs etc.	7.12	27.07.05	04.10.06	14	Not intimated
22.	Audio Video Tape Authenticity	1	Verification of Audio Video recording, bribe, video CDs etc.	32.66	27.07.05	04.10.06	14	Not intimated
23.	Upgradation Gas Chromatograph	1	For upgradation of Gas Chromatograph	3.58	07.09.06	-	9 (as per division)	Defective Turbo Pump Cards.
24.	Projectina Docucenter (Spectral comparator)	1	Examination of documents	37.97	04.12.06	13.04.07	5	Spectroscopy showing some problems
25.	UV-VIS- Spectrophotometer	1	To analyse of DNA Quantity	13.99	07.02.06	-	10 (as per letter dt. 16.06.07)	Non availability of DNA Test equipments
26.	UV-VIS- Spectrophotometer (Kota)	1	For Toxicology	13.98	07.09.06	-	10	Staff not available and lab not started
27.	UV-VIS- Spectrophotometer (Kota)	1	For Chemistry	13.98	07.09.06	-	10	Staff not available and lab not started
28.	Upgradation of High Performance Liquid Chromatograph	1	Upgradation of High Performance Liquid Chromatograph	6.81	27.07.05	-	22	Not installed
<b>Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Jodhpur</b>								
29.	High Performance Liquid Chromatograph	1	Analyse thermo labile Toxicants/chemicals/Metabolites	22.98	24.02.03	18.03.03	13	Checking calibration and updating of instrument
30.	Gas Chromatograph - Head Space	1	Examination of Volatile Poisons, Drugs and others	19.02	06.04.03	7.10.05	31	Pending of Demonstration Work

**9. Rajasthan, Audit Report (Civil) for the year ended 31 March 2007**

S.No.	Name of equipment	Unit	Purpose of equipment	Cost (Rs in lakh)	Date of		Delay in Utilisation (Months)	Reasons for delay in utilisation
					Receipt	Utilisation		
31.	Solvent Extraction System	1	Speedy extraction of Poisonous compounds from visceral organs	16.81	24.02.03	28.08.03	6	Not intimated
32.	High performance Thin Layer Chromatograph	1	To detect thermo labile chemicals/Psychotropic	14.62	24.02.03	04.01.04	10	Checking calibration and updating of instrument
33.	Mass Spectrometer Gas Chromatograph	1	Analytical equipment for Toxicology analysis	37.07	07.05.04	07.10.05	17	For installation of electric earthing, dust free environment pending of demonstration
34.	Fourier Transform Infra Red Spectrometer	1	Examination of Poison Samples	15.00	29.05.06	21.12.06	7	KBr disc of liquid sample cell was broken.
35.	Diesel Analyser	1	Analysis of Petroleum products	12.09	27.07.05	-	21	Requirement of other equipments
<b>Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Udaipur</b>								
36.	Gas Chromatograph - Head Space	1	Examination of Volatile Poisons, Drugs and others	19.02	06.04.03	-	49 (19.05.07)	Poor power point/wiring at building, Training not provided
37.	Diesel Analyser	1	Analysis of Petroleum products	12.10	27.07.05	-	22 (24.05.07)	Result was not found perfectly
38.	Camera with Accessories	2	For Photography	3.41	06.04.03	28.07.04	16	Not intimated
39.	Inverted Microscope	1	For micro biological analysis	4.75	04.01.06	15.06.06	5	Not intimated
<b>Total</b>		<b>43</b>		<b>851.58</b>				

## HOME DEPARTMENT (POLICE)

### 3.3 Modernisation of Police Force

#### Highlights

*Government of India introduced (1969) the scheme 'Modernization of Police Force' for augmenting housing facility for police personnel, increasing mobility, equipping with better arms, strengthening control rooms and highway patrolling to meet the internal security threat effectively. An amount of Rs.810 crore was spent on the Scheme during the period 2000-05. Review of the Scheme for the period 2000-05 revealed that the stated objectives of the scheme were not achieved due to slackness in implementation of the various components of the programme and underutilization of funds.*

- **Out of the total expenditure of Rs 810 crore during 2000-05, Rs 314.95 crore (39 per cent) were lying unutilized; Rs 51.98 crore in Personal Ledger Account and Rs 262.97 crore with the construction agencies. In addition, Rs 35.30 crore were diverted to other components/purposes without the approval of the MHA.**

**(Paragraphs: 3.3.8 & 3.3.9)**

- **Against the target of 12267 residential units during 2000-05, 3105 units (25 per cent) only were constructed (two per cent increase in overall availability of residential units). Non-availability of land, delay in according technical sanction and slow progress in construction were the main reasons for low achievement.**

**(Paragraph: 3.3.10)**

- **Against the deficiency of 9780 vehicles at the beginning of 2000-01 in the Department, 2383 vehicles only were purchased during 2000-05. There was, however, no increase in fleet strength, as these purchases were in replacement of condemned vehicles.**

**(Paragraph: 3.3.11)**

- **City control rooms remained ill equipped as maruti chetak, troop carriers, motor cycles, dragon lights were not available in several districts, as a result there was no improvement in the response time of police.**

**(Paragraph: 3.3.12)**

- **Outdated weapons like .303 rifles/.410 muskets to the extent of eighty per cent were still in use by police force as acquisition of modern weapons, i.e., 7.62 SLR/5.56 INSAS rifle/AK 47 was slow.**

**(Paragraph: 3.3.14)**

- **No new training infrastructure capacity was created and full utilisation of existing capacity of training centres was also not achieved.**

**(Paragraphs: 3.3.15 & 3.3.18)**

- **Ninety six per cent police stations were not computerised and office automation remained neglected.**

**(Paragraph: 3.3.20)**



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➤ **State Level Empowered Committee did not watch the progress of implementation of the Scheme. The State Government/Department also did not provide for any mechanism for monitoring implementation of the Scheme.**

**(Paragraph: 3.3.22)**

### **3.3.1 Introduction**

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India (GOI) introduced (1969) the scheme of Modernisation of Police Force (Scheme) to provide additional infrastructure to the State police to improve its efficiency. GOI reviewed the Scheme from time to time and enhanced the quantum of the Central assistance from 2000-01 to remove the deficiencies in infrastructure viz., buildings, mobility, communication, weapons, training, Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Finger Print Bureau (FPB), security equipment, computerisation and office automation to enable the State police to deal with the growing crime, terrorist and naxal activities and meet the internal security threat effectively.

Total expenditure of the Police Department during 2000-05 was Rs 10849.40 crore. Under the Scheme, MHA approved plans for Rs 1167.25 crore during 2000-05 in order to supplement the existing expenditure of the Government towards police force.

### **3.3.2 Organisational set up**

At Government level, Principal Secretary, Home Department assisted by the Secretary (Home) was responsible for implementation and monitoring of the Scheme. The State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) constituted under the chairmanship of Chief Secretary with Principal Secretary, Finance, Principal Secretary, Home and Director General of Police as members among others, was responsible at apex level to finalise the Annual Action Plans (AAPs) and monitor the implementation of the Scheme. At the Department level, Additional Director General of Police (ADG) (Headquarters), Director General of Police (DG) (Training Directorate), ADG (communication) and ADG (Technical Services) were responsible for implementation different components of the Scheme.

### **3.3.3 Scope of audit**

Records for the period 2000-05 were examined at Police Headquarters (PHQ), Training Directorate and Radio Headquarters and in the office of ADG (Technical Services), one FSL out of two, FPB, two out of nine police training centres, viz., Arms Training Centre (ATC), Sitapur and Police Training Centre (PTC), Moradabad. Besides, 14<sup>1</sup> out of 70 District Police Offices (DPOs) (20 per cent) and 56 Police Stations (PSs)<sup>2</sup> were test checked during July to November 2005.

### **3.3.4 Audit objectives**

The review of implementation of the Scheme during 2000-05 was to assess whether:

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<sup>1</sup> Aligarh, Ambedkar nagar, Bareilly, Faizabad, Ghazipur, Gorakhpur, Jaunpur, Lucknow, Meerut, Moradabad, Pratapgarh, Saharanpur, Sultanpur and Varanasi.

<sup>2</sup> @ four PSs in each DPO.

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- Funds provided for the scheme were utilized optimally.
  - Required infrastructure for housing police personnel, increasing mobility and firepower, providing faster and reliable communications was created to improve the operational efficiency of the police.
  - Computerisation and office automation plans were implemented as envisaged.
  - Programme implementation was monitored efficiently.

### **3.3.5 Audit criteria**

The audit criteria were:

- GOI norms for incurring expenditure on different components of the programme.
- Norms prescribed by the Bureau of Police Research and Development, New Delhi.
- Targets fixed by the MHA for various components like police housing, weapon modernization, office automation, training etc. of the programme.

### **3.3.6 Audit methodology**

Audit objective/criteria were finalized after discussions (July 2005) with the Secretary (Home), State Government during the entry conference. To achieve audit objective, records relating to preparation of PP/Annual Action Plans (AAPs) and assistance received from GOI were test-checked. Proposals sent to State Government for purchase of arms, equipment and vehicles and progress reports of construction works were also reviewed. Besides, records relating to computerization in the DPOs and the PSs were also reviewed. Findings and recommendations of the review were discussed with the Secretary (Home) during exit conference held (December 2005) with the Government. Their views have been taken in to account while finalising the review.

### **Audit findings**

#### **3.3.7 Financial arrangements and fund management**

The scheme was to be financed by GOI initially on 50:50 cost sharing basis with the State Government. The share of Central assistance was increased to 60 *per cent* from 2003-04. Due to delay in release of funds by the State Government and consequent delay in purchase of equipment etc., MHA decided (December 2003) to place the orders for supply of vehicles, weapons, security and surveillance equipment and equipment needed at FSL directly on the firms supplying these items. The GOI also decided to release the funds directly to the construction agencies.

Year-wise approved plan by MHA, Central assistance released, the amounts sanctioned by State Government and expenditure incurred there against are given in the table on the next page:

(Rs. in crore)					
Plan Year	Approved plan	Central releases	State's releases	Total (Column 3 + 4)	Total Expenditure
1	2	3	4	5	6
2000-01	247.93	123.97	114.40	238.37	234.97
2001-02	233.83	116.92	105.37	222.29	211.92
2002-03	220.41	59.52	49.65	109.17	106.75
2003-04	228.31	70.88	39.17	110.05	110.05
2004-05	236.77	108.56	37.75	146.31	146.31
<b>Total</b>	<b>1167.25</b>	<b>479.85</b>	<b>346.34</b>	<b>826.19</b>	<b>810.00</b>

The component-wise breakup of the funds approved by MHA and expenditure there against is as under:

(Rs. in crore)			
Sl.No.	Component	Approved plan	Expenditure (per cent to total approved plan)
1.	Buildings	609.55	446.92 (55.2)
2.	Mobility	133.83	87.15 (10.8)
3.	Communication	88.10	55.48 (6.8)
4.	Weapons	85.09	51.62 (6.4)
5.	Security and other equipments	196.10	141.18 (17.4)
6.	Others (Computerisation, Training, FSL/FPB)	54.58	27.65 (3.4)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1167.25</b>	<b>810.00 (100)</b>

### 3.3.8 Short-utilisation of funds

Out of the total assistance of Rs 826.19 crore released during 2000-05, Department did not utilize Rs 16.19 crore as of March 2005. Further out of total expenditure of Rs 810 crore, Rs 314.95 crore (39 *per cent*) were lying unutilized in Personal Ledger Account (PLA) (Rs 51.98 crore<sup>1</sup>) and with construction agencies (Rs 262.97 crore<sup>2</sup>) as of March 2005. The amount in PLA was lying unspent due to non-completion/delay in completion of purchase formalities. The amounts lying unspent with construction agencies were due to non-availability of land, delay in according technical sanction to construction works and slow progress in construction.

### 3.3.9 Diversion of funds

According to instructions (December 2001) of MHA, funds approved by it for one component/purpose were not to be used for another component/purpose without prior approval. The Department diverted Rs 16.53 crore sanctioned for communication/FSL equipment to ammunition/security items, Rs 5.78 crore for river police/training buildings and troop carriers for district police to lighting, sound system equipment for multi gym and astroturf field for Provincial Armed Constabulary, Rs 11.72 crore for additional vehicles for district police/PAC in dacoit affected districts to replacement of condemned vehicles/Ambassador cars and Rs 1.27 crore for Man-pack RT sets scrambler to mobile phones during 2000-05.

### Augmentation of infrastructure

#### 3.3.10 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings

The Scheme laid special emphasis on construction of residential and non-residential buildings with a view to providing a better working environment to

<sup>1</sup> 2000-01 (Rs 12.52 crore), 2001-02 (Rs 13.31 crore), 2002-03 (Rs 13.05 crore), 2003-04 (Rs 7.03 crore) and 2004-05 (Rs 6.07 crore)

<sup>2</sup> 2000-01 (Rs 33.86 crore), 2001-02 (Rs 58.99 crore), 2002-03 (Rs 49.88 crore), 2003-04 (Rs 40.06 crore) and 2004-05 (Rs 80.18 crore)

There was only two per cent increase in overall availability of housing units

the police personnel. Rupees 609.55 crore (52 per cent) of the total approved plan outlay (1167.25 crore) were allocated to it and Rs 446.92 crore (GOI: Rs 267.59 crore; State Government: 179.33 crore) were spent during 2000-05.

### **Residential buildings**

At the beginning of 2000-01, against the requirement of 1,37,563 housing units for the entire police force, the deficiency was assessed at 87,876 units (64 per cent). MHA approved construction of 12,267 housing units during 2000-05 to bring down the deficiency to 55 per cent. Of this, only 5,751 units (47 per cent) were taken up for construction and 3,105 units (54 per cent) were completed as of March 2005. Thus, the deficiency was brought down to only 62 per cent against the target of 55 per cent. Year-wise details are given in *Appendix-3.8*.

Scrutiny of records of 12<sup>1</sup> out of 14 test checked districts revealed that between 3 and 33 per cent of the assessed shortage of residential units in these districts at the beginning of 2000-01, were approved in the perspective plan. The number of residential units approved in the perspective plan was obviously, not related to the shortages in these districts. Moreover, out of 888 housing units approved for construction in these districts during 2000-05, only 447 units (50 per cent) were completed leaving shortage of 6202 units as of March 2005 (*Appendix-3.9*).

### **Barracks**

At the beginning of 2000-01, against a requirement of barracks for 74,650 police personnel for the entire police force, the deficiency for 24,601 police personnel (33 per cent) was assessed at. MHA approved construction of 100 barracks for 6585 police personnel during 2000-05 to bring down the deficiency to 24 per cent. However, 11 barracks for 1,050 police personnel (16 per cent) only were taken up for construction during 2000-05, of which none was completed as of March 2005.

### **Non-residential buildings**

The PP did not reflect the deficiency in non-residential buildings at the beginning of 2000-01. The MHA, however, approved construction of 1,366 buildings during 2000-05 of which, construction of 519 buildings (38 per cent) was taken up during 2000-05. Three hundred six buildings (59 per cent) only were completed as of March 2005. Year-wise details are given in *Appendix-3.10*.

Thus, the construction of 6,516 housing units (53 per cent), 89 barracks and 847 non-residential buildings (62 per cent) was not taken up even after lapse of one to four years of their approval. Compared to approved plan, there was a shortfall of 9,162 housing units (75 per cent) and 1,060 non-residential buildings (78 per cent).

Reasons for delay in completion of all the three categories of buildings as noticed in test check were, non-availability of land, delay in according technical sanction and slow progress by construction agencies. The Department in its reply (January 2006) stated that non-sanction of the technical staff was the reason for delay in according technical sanctions. MHA

<sup>1</sup> Information in respect of two DPOs was not available.

had desired (April 2001) that the State Government should strengthen PAN and increase its construction capacity. However, State Government neither increased the construction capacity of PAN nor selected any other construction agency for taking up increased construction works till February 2003. Besides PAN, six construction agencies<sup>1</sup> were engaged for construction of police residential and non-residential buildings only in March 2003. Delay in selection of construction agencies also contributed to slow progress of construction of buildings during 2000-05.

### **Mobility and communication**

#### **3.3.11 Procurement of vehicles**

At the beginning of 2000-01, there was a deficiency of 9,780 vehicles (61 *per cent*) *vis-a-vis* the requirement of 16,147 vehicles as per norm of Bureau of Police Research and Development, New Delhi (BPR&D). The number of vehicles sanctioned by MHA during 2000-05 and purchases there against are given below:

Serial number	Type of vehicles	Approved during 2000-05	Purchased during 2000-05
1	Heavy vehicles	139	Nil
2	Medium Vehicles	187	Nil
3	Light Vehicles	996	Nil
4	Motor cycles	844	Nil
5	Replacement against condemned vehicles including 55 Ambassador cars	2494	2383
<b>Total</b>		<b>4660</b>	<b>2383</b>

No vehicles were purchased for addition to the existing fleet strength despite availability of Rs 26.42 crore out of allotment of 2000-03.

Department purchased 203 Ambassador cars for replacement during 2000-05 against 55 approved by MHA. While Ambassador cars were replaced to the extent of 53 *per cent* (203 out 384), other types of vehicles were replaced to the extent of 36 *per cent* (2180 out of 5,983 vehicles) only during the period. Further, 67 Ambassador cars were attached to various offices, which were not related to police mobility, such as Home Department, PHQ, etc.

Non-addition of vehicles to increase existing fleet strength as per MHA's approval affected the availability of vehicles in critical areas of police activity such as highway patrolling as noticed in seven<sup>2</sup> out of 14 test checked districts where only six vehicles against a requirement of 35 were available for highway patrolling.

There was, thus, no addition to the existing fleet of vehicles of police force.

#### **3.3.12 Infrastructure at City Control Rooms**

MHA approved installation of dial 100 and voice logging system in CCRs in

**There was no addition to the existing fleet of vehicles**

<sup>1</sup> U.P.Jal Nigam, UP Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation Limited, U.P. Samaj Kalyan Nigam, U.P. project Corporation Limited, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam, National Project construction corporation Limited

<sup>2</sup> Ghazipur, Ambedkar nagar, Jaunpur, Bareilly, Aligarh, Pratapgarh and Sultanpur

City control  
rooms  
remained  
short of  
infrastructure

26 districts during 2000-02 at a cost Rs 12.53 crore to reduce response time of police. This was done to facilitate recording of the message received and transfer of the message by telephone operators to radio operators in seconds to enable the radio operators to pass on the message to police so that the police could reach at crime/accident site speedily. State Government, however, sanctioned installation of dial 100 and voice logging system in 10 districts only and that too in February 2004. This was revoked by SLEC that decided (March 2004) to purchase security and ammunition items out of the above amount on the plea that it was not possible to complete the purchase process in the financial year. Thus, these districts were without the facility of dial 100 and voice logging (March 2005). The Department in its reply stated (January, 2006) that as no funds were available for purchase of ammunition, the amount was diverted. Diversion of funds meant for communication items to ammunition did not have the approval of MHA.

Further, CCRs especially those which were set up in crime/communally sensitive districts were required to be equipped with maruti chetak, motor cycles, troop carrier, dragon light and communication equipment for their effective functioning. These items specifically were approved for CCRs in 2000-01 and 2001-02. Audit scrutiny of records of ten CCRs of test checked districts revealed that seven CCRs<sup>1</sup> did not have maruti chetak, five CCRs<sup>2</sup> did not have a motor cycle, eight CCRs<sup>3</sup> did not have troop carrier, six CCRs<sup>4</sup> did not have dragon light and only one CCR of Saharanpur district had a video camera.

Thus, due to non-availability of adequate infrastructure in CCRs, the objective of reduction in response time of police was not achieved to the extent envisaged.

### 3.3.13 Reporting of crimes

A random check of records relating to reporting time of 1,294 cases of crimes/accidents in 34 PSs in nine<sup>5</sup> of the 14 test checked districts revealed that information in 553 cases (2000: 281 cases and 2004:272 cases) which related to heinous crimes such as murder, loot, dacoity, threat to life and property and accidents was received in PSs very late. In 49 cases of the year 2000, information was received in PSs between one day and 47 days after the occurrence of the crime/accident and in the year 2004, it was received between one day and three months.

This indicated that police patrolling and surveillance remained weak both at the beginning and end of the review period and no improvement in performance was witnessed as a result of the Scheme.

### 3.3.14 Procurement of weapons

The PP 2000-05 envisaged that existing outdated weapons .303 bore rifles/.410 muskets would be replaced by modern weapons 7.62 SLR/5.56 INSAS rifles. Besides, AK 47 rifle was to be provided to police force in more

<sup>1</sup> Faizabad, Gorakhpur, Jaunpur, Lucknow, Meerut, Saharanpur and Varanasi.

<sup>2</sup> Gorakhpur, Lucknow, Meerut, Saharanpur and Varanasi.

<sup>3</sup> Aligarh, Faizabad, Gorakhpur, Jaunpur, Lucknow, Meerut, Moradabad and Saharanpur

<sup>4</sup> Bareilly, Faizabad, Jaunpur, Moradabad, Saharanpur and Varanasi

<sup>5</sup> Information was not furnished in respect of remaining 5 districts.



outdated weapons to the extent of eighty per cent were in use of police force

security risk areas such as Very Important Persons' security, special task force and naxal prone areas.

MHA accorded approval for replacement of 14666 outdated weapons during 2000-05 against which the Department acquired only 9768 (67 per cent) 7.62 SLR/5.56 INSA. Similarly MHA accorded approval for addition of 9046 AK 47 rifles during 2000-05 against which only 1500 (17 per cent) rifles were acquired by the Department.

As a result 80 per cent outdated weapons were still in use (July 2005). Acquisition of weapons was also very slow as only 67 per cent 7.62 SLR/ 5.56 INSAS rifles and 17 per cent AK 47 rifles were provided against the number approved by MHA during 2000-05 despite availability of funds of Rs 7.48 crore since 2000-03.

### Training

#### 3.3.15 Non-creation of infrastructure

Out of 257 housing units and 152 non-residential buildings approved in 2000-01, construction work of 2 housing units and 71 non-residential buildings was taken up in 2002-04 but none of these buildings had been completed as of March 2005.

#### 3.3.16 Establishment of commando training centre

MHA approved (December 2001) construction of a barrack, administrative block and field obstacles for commando training at a cost of Rs 1.08 crore and purchase of training equipment (Rs 0.50 crore) in 2002-03 at ATC, Sitapur. State Government sanctioned the work in March 2003 and made land available to the construction agency in June 2003 for completion of the work by October 2004. However, only 75 per cent work was completed by June 2005. Principal, ATC, Sitapur stated (July 2005) that he was not aware of the reasons for the delay in completion, which indicated poor monitoring. Meanwhile, training equipment purchased at a cost of Rs.0.34 crore for commando training during January to March 2005 was lying idle as of December 2005.

#### 3.3.17 Construction of indoor firing range

PTC, Moradabad was using 23<sup>rd</sup> battalion PAC's firing range, which was 15 kilometers away from the PTC. This firing range was ordinary and open and could be used for .303 rifles only. PTC, Moradabad, needed an indoor firing range for training for .303 rifles as well as other types of rifles and pistols. Though indoor firing range for PTC, Moradabad was approved by MHA in 2000-01 and detailed estimates of Rs 0.38 crore were submitted by PTC to PHQ in May 2001, the PHQ forwarded the estimates to State Government only in July 2003, sanction to which was awaited as of July 2005.

#### 3.3.18 Utilisation of training centres

DG, Training Directorate (Directorate), Lucknow was responsible, *inter alia*, to monitor the implementation of training calendar and to assess the impact of various trainings in the field. There was nothing on record to show that Directorate was monitoring the implementation or assessing the impact of training imparted by PTCs.

Test check of records of ATC, Sitapur and PTC, Moradabad revealed that out of 255 courses targeted in these centres for 18435 police personnel during 2000-05, only 237 courses with 13593 participants (74 *per cent*) were conducted leaving a shortfall of 18 courses. This was largely due to non-arrival of enough number of trainees in the training centres, elections to panchayats/Vidhan Shabha and non-availability of trainers and type writers/computers. Though 20 computers were sanctioned (2001-02) for PTC, Moradabad these were not purchased despite the fact that GOI had released its share in that year itself. Department in its reply stated (January 2006) that no computer was sanctioned for PTC Moradabad in 2001-02. Department's reply was not correct.

Thus, Department not only failed to augment the training infrastructure but also did not utilise the existing capacity of its training centres.

### **3.3.19 Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL)/Finger Print Bureau (FPB)**

The PP 2000-05 envisaged upgradation of existing FSL at Lucknow and Agra, FPB at Lucknow and existing ten mobile FSL units of ten districts. The plan also envisaged setting up of two regional FSL (RFSL) -one at Allahabad and the other at Moradabad in 2001-02 and one DNA unit at FSL Lucknow in 2002-03. MHA approved (2000-05) Rs 10.19 crore for the equipment and Rs one crore for buildings of two RFSLs and DNA unit. The Department purchased equipment for Rs 5.70 crore for existing FSL and FPB (Rs.5.57 crore) and for DNA unit (Rs 0.13 crore) during March 2004 to March 2005.

While the work at FPB, Lucknow was still in progress, none of the two RFSLs was set up nor any district FSL mobile unit was upgraded as of July 2005. Further, FSL Lucknow purchased (March 2004) equipment worth Rs 0.13 crore and could not use it as construction of building for DNA unit was in progress as of July 2005.

Department in its reply stated (January, 2006) that establishment of RFSL at Allahabad had been postponed for the present due to commencement of FSL at Varanasi. There was no reply regarding non-establishment of RFSL at Moradabad. This indicated defective planning of the Department.

### **Computerisation and office automation**

#### **3.3.20 Computerisation**

MHA approved (2000-05) plans for providing computers, *inter alia*, to all DPOs, Circle Officers (COs) and PSs in the State for keeping data about criminals and crime report information system for the purpose of timely reporting and monitoring of criminals. According to the records of PHQ, computers were supplied to all DPOs, COs and all 53 PSs of Lucknow and Gautam Buddha Nagar. The remaining 1314 PSs (96 *per cent*) were not provided computers as of July 2005.

Uttar Pradesh Police Computer Centre Lucknow developed 14 programmes for DPOs during 2000-03 and supplied to all DPOs. Scrutiny of records of 13<sup>1</sup> test checked districts, however, revealed that only four to 12 programmes (29

**Police stations  
were not  
computerised**

<sup>1</sup> One DPO did not furnish the information

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to 86 *per cent*) were received by these DPOs. Six<sup>1</sup> DPOs were not using two to nine programmes (August 2005) received by them. Department did not furnish reason for their non-use.

The above points indicated that computerisation plan was not implemented as envisaged.

### 3.3.21 Office automation

MHA approved (2000-05) Rs 16.31 crore for purchase of photocopier, FAX machines, binding machine, etc. for DPOs and other units of the Department. However, none of the items were purchased as of March 2005.

Office  
automation  
remained  
neglected

Department stated (October 2005) that State Government had sanctioned (March 2004) purchase of 133 photocopiers and 133 FAX machines and accordingly, purchase formalities had been started but no purchase was made as of September 2005.

Thus, office automation for reducing the time taken to present cases in courts, which was one of the main parameters for judging the efficiency of the police, remained neglected.

### 3.3.22 Monitoring

Monitoring  
was weak

SLEC was required to meet every month to monitor the preparation of AAPs for submission to MHA and implementation of the approved AAPs. It was, however, noticed that SLEC met nine times<sup>2</sup> only during June 2001 to March 2005 against 46 meetings it should have held after its constitution in June 2001. This affected adversely the submission of AAPs to MHA for approval as these were sent between August and November in different years and were cleared by MHA in December/January of respective financial year. Further, perusal of minutes of these nine meetings indicated that SLEC never reviewed the implementation of the Scheme; instead it met to approve purchase of ammunition, equipment and construction of buildings, which were not included/approved in AAPs. Hence, monitoring at the level of SLEC was not only infrequent but it also lacked the required perspective.

State Government/Department also did not formulate any system to monitor the implementation of the programme at their level periodically.

### 3.3.23 Conclusion

Implementation of Modernisation of Police Force scheme in Uttar Pradesh was deficient. Despite availability of sufficient funds, there was shortfall of 75 *per cent* in construction of houses and 77 *per cent* in non-residential buildings against their respective targets. There was no fresh addition to the existing fleet to enhance the mobility of the police as envisaged.

City control rooms remained ill equipped; as a result improvement in response time of police was not achieved. Outdated weapons to the extent of eighty *per cent* were still in use by the police force. There was no augmentation in capacity of training and FSLs. There was also no progress in office automation and little progress in computerisation of PSs.

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<sup>1</sup> Ambedkar Nagar, Aligarh, Meerut, Saharanpur, Sultanpur and Pratapgarh.

<sup>2</sup> 2002-03 (4 times), 2003-04 (2 times) and 2004-05 (3 times)

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An efficient monitoring mechanism was absent both at the level of the Government and the Department

**Recommendations**

- The State Government should ensure full and efficient utilisation of the programme funds.
- The pace of construction should be speeded up to ensure completion of the buildings in a time bound manner
- Replacement/procurement of vehicles should be done with the aim of improving the mobility of the police. Infrastructure for strengthening police control rooms should be provided urgently.
- Replacement of outdated weapons by modern weapons should be effected immediately.
- Upgradation of the FSL/FPB should be completed expeditiously.
- The Government should upgrade the training infrastructure and also ensure its optimum utilisation.
- Computerisation and office automation should be completed expeditiously.
- There is an urgent need to put in place a stringent monitoring and evaluation mechanism both at the level of Department and Government as well as SLEC.

Though, the Government did not furnish a written reply it confirmed the fact and figures incorporated in the review in the exit conference held in December 2005 and assured to take corrective measures based on the recommendations of Audit.

### Appendix - 3.8

(Reference: Paragraph 3.3.10; page 56)

#### Details of target, taken up and completed residential buildings during 2000-05

Plan year	Total units approved/targeted in AAPs	2000-05 Year-wise details of works taken up and completed										Total units taken up (per cent to column 2)	Total units constructed as of March 2005	Shortfall with reference to column 2 (per cent)
		2000-01		2001-02		2002-03		2003-04		2004-05				
		No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
2000-01	2145	40	40	1256	1234	588	549	51	35	1	-	1936 (91)	1858	287 (13)
2001-02	2853	-	-	-	-	1649	829	734	Nil	230	130	2613 (92)	959	1894 (66)
2002-03	2289	-	-	-	-	608	288	576	Nil	18	Nil	1202 (53)	288	2001 (87)
2003-04	1413	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Nil		Nil	1413 (100)
2004-05	3567	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Nil	Nil	3567 (100)
Total	12267	40	40	1256	1234	2845	1666	1361	35	240	130	5751 (47)	3105	9162 (75)

### Appendix - 3.9

(Reference: Paragraph 3.3.10; page 56)

#### District-wise shortages of houses and proposal there against during 2000-05

Serial number	Name of district	Shortage as on 1 April 2000	Units approved in Perspective plan (percent to shortage as on 1st April 2000)	Units constructed during 2000-05	Shortage as on 31 March 2005
1	Aligarh	369	26 (7)	20	349
2	Ambedkar Nagar	364	100 (27)	20	344
3	Bareilly	400	118 (30)	108	292
4	Ghazipur	239	80 (33)	Nil	239
5	Gorakhpur	549	88 (16)	Nil	549
6	Jaunpur	323	80 (25)	Nil	323
7	Lucknow	1605	52 (3)	52	1553
8	Meerut	859	98 (11)	98	761
9	Moradabad	240	70 (29)	Nil	240
10	Pratapgarh	325	20 (6)	13	312
11	Saharanpur	895	136 (15)	136	759
12	Varanasi	481	20 (4)	Nil	481
	<b>Total</b>	<b>6649</b>	<b>888 (49)</b>	<b>447 (50)</b>	<b>6202</b>

Appendix - 3.10

(Reference: Paragraph 3.3.10; page 56)

Details of target, taken-up and completed non-residential buildings during 2000-05

Plan year	Total units approved/ targeted in AAPs	Year-wise details of works taken up and completed										Total units taken up (per cent)	Total units constructed as of March 2005	Shortfall with reference to column 2 (per cent)
		2000-01		2001-02		2002-03		2003-04		2004-05				
		No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed	No. of units taken up	No. of units constructed			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
2000-01	249	2	2	48	44	121	54	19	11	-	-	190 (76)	111	138 (55)
2001-02	407	-	-	1	-	275	180	2	1	1	Nil	279 (69)	181	226 (56)
2002-03	259	-	-	-	-	21	13	27	1	2	Nil	50 (19)	14	245 (95)
2003-04	223	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Nil	223 (100)
2004-05	228	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Nil	228 (100)
Total	1366	2	2	49	44	417	247	48	13	3	Nil	519 (38)	306	1060 (78)



## HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

### 3.5 MODERNISATION OF POLICE FORCE

#### *Introduction*

**3.5.1** In terms of recommendations of successive Finance Commissions, Government of India (GOI) had been releasing grants to the State Government for upgradation of the standards of Police administration. Besides, the Central Government allocated funds for implementation of the non-plan scheme of Modernisation of Police Forces to enable the State police force to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. The modernisation scheme included major components like acquisition of arms, procurement of vehicles, communication, intelligence and investigation equipment, upgradation of Forensic Science Laboratories, etc. The scheme was under implementation in the State since 1969-1970 and was extended upto 2010-2011.

Records of Home (Police) Department, Directorate of Forensic Science Laboratory and 13 other unit offices including Director General and Inspector General of Police and Commissioner of Police, Kolkata were test-checked during April to June 2005 covering the period 2000-2005.

#### *Financial Management*

Financial assistance was to be equally shared between GOI and State Government

**3.5.2** As per the scheme guidelines the fund was to be equally shared between GOI and State Government. GOI was to provide its own share by way of 60 per cent (50 per cent prior to 2003-2004) grants-in-aid and 40 per cent (50 per cent prior to 2003-2004) loan re-payable in 25 years. The State Government was to release the matching share from its own budget.

A perspective plan for the period 2000-2005 was drawn up by the Home (Police) Department for Rs 651.72 crore for the modernisation scheme. The basis of preparation of the perspective plan was not available on record. The GOI, however, approved plans for Rs 392.20 crore only for 2000-2005.

Reasons for non-approval for remaining funds (Rs 259.52 crore) were attributable to inclusion of items not covered under the scheme; non-furnishing of required details for the proposed items and non-restriction to the ceiling limit for construction.

During 2000-2005, the State Government did not release any fund towards this scheme though it received central assistance of Rs 118.18 crore (grant: Rs 59.70 crore, loan: Rs 58.48 crore). The year-wise position of release of funds by GOI was as under:

State Government did not release its matching share at all during 2000-2005 jeopardising implementation of the scheme

Year	Plan approved by	Fund received from GOI		State share released	Total	Fund utilised
	GOI	Grant	Loan			
	(Rupees in crore)					
2000-2001	35.95	30.24	30.23	Nil	60.47	25.63
2001-2002	174.53	28.25	28.25	Nil	56.50	27.70
2002-2003	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	49.78
2003-2004	107.32	1.21	Nil	Nil	1.21	6.03
2004-2005	74.40	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>392.20</b>	<b>59.70</b>	<b>58.48</b>	<b>Nil</b>	<b>118.18</b>	<b>110.16</b>

It is seen from the above table that GOI had released Rs 116.97 crore during 2000-2002. Non-release of further grants by GOI was due to non-release of matching contribution by the State Government during 2000-2005 owing to resource constraint. Even the funds released were not fully utilised.

### Procurement under modernisation scheme

3.5.3 The targeted expenditure according to the approved plan of GOI and the actual expenditure incurred on procurement of vehicles and other equipment to equip the force fell short by 33 to 91 per cent as shown below:

Component	Targeted expenditure as per plan approved by GOI	Actual expenditure	Percentage of shortfall
	(Rupees in crore)		
Procurement of vehicle	120.70	80.87	33
Communication	11.83	4.29	64
Intelligence and investigation equipment	36.20	3.36	91
Buildings	102.46	11.68	89

### Vehicles

3.5.4 The expenditure of Rs 80.87 crore was incurred for the procurement of 943 vehicles and 1227 motorcycles against requirement of 2986 vehicles and 1802 motorcycles. Thus, the mobility of the police force intended under the modernisation scheme remained largely unachieved.

### Fighting equipment for insurgency-prone areas

In the terrorism prone areas supply of fighting equipment fell short by a huge margin

3.5.5 Test-check of records of two terrorism/extremist prone districts (Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling), Superintendent of Railway Police, Siliguri and two thanas (Kalimpong and Kurseong) disclosed short supply of different fighting components as compared to requirement as would be evident from the following table :

Component	Jalpaiguri		Darjeeling		SRP Siliguri	
	Requirement	Supply	Requirement	Supply	Requirement	Supply
	(In numbers)					
<b>Weaponry</b>						
a) AK 47	655	39	200	23	26	20
b) 7.62 SLR	1113	247	500	132	NA	1
c) 9 mm Pistol	362	173	310	50	24	15
d) 9 mm Carbine	217	45	350	50	22	3
<b>Protective Equipment</b>						
a) Night Vision Device	3	2	4	Nil	NA	Nil
b) Metal Detector	NA	NA	4	10	4	Nil
c) Bomb Disposal Equipment	NA	NA	4	Nil	3	Nil
<b>Mobility</b>						
Procurement of vehicle	74	20	98	46	18	11

Similarly, it was ascertained from the Commissioner of Police, Kolkata, Lalbazar that the area under Beniapukur, Topsia, Garden Reach and Jorasanko PSs were terrorist prone. It was also ascertained that these elements were likely to target/hit vital administrative headquarters located at various places under the jurisdiction of Kolkata Police. Scrutiny revealed that two (2) such police stations (Beniapukur and Jorasanko) were not at all equipped in conformity with Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) guidelines. The weapon-wise shortfall is shown in the following table :

Nature of Weapon	Weapon required as per BPRD guidelines		Weapon available		Shortfall	
	Beniapukur	Jorasanko	Beniapukur	Jorasanko	Beniapukur	Jorasanko
	( I n n u m b e r s )					
9mm Pistol/ 0.38 Revolver	34	32	17	18	17	14
9mm Carbine	08	07	-	-	8	7
7.62 SLR	71	50	-	-	71	50
12 Bore Pump Action Gun	28	20	-	-	28	20
AK Series Rifle	01	01	-	-	01	01
5.56 IN & AS	01	01	-	-	01	01
0.303" Rifle	28	20	20	15	08	05
37/38 Tear Gas Gun	01	01	-	-	01	01

Both the PS authorities admitted (August 2005) that the existing weaponry was not sufficient to combat terrorist activities.

Thus, adequate fighting equipment were not supplied even to the terrorist/extremists prone districts/police stations which may lead to failure of the police force in facing the challenge successfully at the time of exigencies.

### ***Bomb detection squads***

**Bomb detection squad could not be equipped rendering expenditure of Rs 0.71 crore unfruitful**

3.5.6 To equip three bomb detection squads of Nadia, Bardhaman and Paschim Medinipur districts supply order for procurement of 15 security<sup>1</sup> items was placed (April 2004) with Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corporation, a Government of India undertaking (Corporation). The total value of supply (Rs 0.71 crore) was also paid in advance. Out of 15 items, one ISP kit with X-ray generator and two image storage panels (three sets) valuing Rs 19 lakh were not delivered as of June 2005 since the corporation had gone into liquidation. As a result, the bomb detection squads of the three districts remained inactive as of June 2005 rendering an expenditure of Rs 0.71 crore unfruitful.

### ***Accommodation for police personnel***

**Only 11 per cent of GOI approved estimated cost was utilised for construction of accommodation of police personnel**

3.5.7 On the basis of the proposal of the State Government for construction of residential and non-residential buildings GOI approved for Rs 102.46 crore for construction of 324 residential buildings (Rs 26.93 crore) and for 800 non-residential buildings (Rs 75.53 crore).

Scrutiny revealed that against the target of construction of 324 residential and 800 non-residential buildings at an estimated cost of Rs 102.46 crore as

<sup>1</sup> Explosive vapour detector, ISP kit with X-ray connection and two numbers of image storage panel, Bomb suppression blanket, Deep search metal and mine detector, Hand held metal detector, Explosive container, Bomb sled, Deep search metal detector, Door frame metal detector, Poodder, Extension search mirror, Under vehicle search mirror, RSP Tool kit, Dragon light with battery and charge and Portable generator.

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approved by GOI, 96 residential and 52 non-residential buildings were constructed incurring expenditure of Rs 11.68 crore (11 *per cent*) indicating huge shortfall in providing accommodation to police personnel which was mainly due to paucity of funds.

***Incomplete works***

**3.5.8** Due to non-release of fund of Rs 1.38 crore, the construction works remained incomplete after incurring expenditure of Rs 3.91 crore as detailed below:

**Construction work remained incomplete after spending Rs 3.91 crore for shortage of funds**

- Construction of a pucca class room at Barrackpore for trainee constables at an estimated cost of Rs 93 lakh (taken up in September 2002) could not be completed due to non-release of Rs 27 lakh.
- Construction of hostel buildings for 200 cadet SI/Sergeants at Barrackpore undertaken in 2003-2004 at an estimated cost of Rs 2 crore remained incomplete as of June 2005 after incurring an expenditure of Rs 1.75 crore due to non-release of the final instalment of Rs 25 lakh.
- Construction of four storied Barrack buildings at Alipur Body Guard Lines camp<sup>the</sup> Kolkata started during 2002-2003 at an estimated cost of Rs 2.36 crore remained incomplete (June 2005) after spending Rs 1.50 crore due to non-availability of the remaining amount.

Besides, construction of a Subsidiary Training Centre in Raiganj at an estimated cost of Rs 2.86 crore was not taken up as of June 2005 even after incurring Rs 25 lakh on procurement of materials and soil test in 2001-2002 for want of modified foundation drawing.

Thus, construction work undertaken at an estimated cost of Rs 8.15 crore remained incomplete due to non-release of funds in the subsequent years, resulting in blocking of funds and failure in creation of infrastructural facilities.

***Computer network in Kolkata Police***

**3.5.9** With a view to speedy transportation of data with the system of data entry in off-line mode and on-line transportation to the main server at headquarters under Crime Criminal Information System (CCIS) and for expanding the existing computer network (in detective department and Lalbazar control room) with connectivity to all police stations, Armed Police Battalion, Divisional Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners of Kolkata Police, the Commissioner of Police, Kolkata placed (September 2002) an work order for Rs 1.87 crore to M/s WEBEL

ult, data was being transported from five DC offices through diskettes manually, though Rs 1.83 crore were spent. Reasons thereof were neither on record, nor stated as of September 2005. Thus, the target of speedy transportation of data utilising on-line connectivity was not achieved.

### ***Training and practice***

**3.5.10** During 2000-2005 the department spent a meagre amount of Rs 51 lakh against the GOI approved expenditure of Rs 23.48 crore for imparting training, practice and creation of required infrastructural facilities.

Scrutiny revealed that in the Police Training College, Barrackpore (PTC) the existing training system/infrastructure was far short of the Bureau of Police Research and Development norms as shown in following table :

**Poor performance in imparting live training for handling weapons**

Nature of weapon	Scale of practice per person as per guidelines	Actually done in Police Training college (Average)
0.303 Rifle	40 Rds	15 Rds
7.62 SLR	40 Rds	No training
9M.M. Carbine	50 Rds	10 Rds
9M.M. Pistol	40 Rds	No training
LMG	50 Rds	No training
A.K. Rifle/5.56 INSAS	50 Rds	No training
0.38 Revolver	36 Rds	18 Rds
12 Bore Pump Action Shot Gun	5 Rds	Not in stock
303 Anti Riot Gun	10 Rds	Not in stock
Grenade	5 Gr.	No training
GF Rifle With Launcher Tube	5 Rd	Not in stock
1" Light Pistol	2 Rd	No training
37/38 mm Tear Gas Gun	4 Rd	No training
51 mm Mortar	6 Rd/mint	No training

Live training was not imparted for handling useful weapons viz. 9mm pistol, SLR, LMG, AK Rifles, 5.56 INSAS, Grenade, Teargas, Mortar, etc. and practice in respect of 0.303 rifle, 9mm Carbine, 0.38 revolver, etc. was far below (62 to 80 *per cent*) the prescribed norm. In some cases the weapons were not even in their custody.

The PTC authority while accepting the facts stated in August 2005 that the existing situation had been prevailing for years together.

**Poor performance of training of PTC**

Scrutiny further revealed that during 2003-2005, 30 to 59 *per cent* of unarmed Sub-Inspectors could not pass out, while 17 to 33 *per cent* of Sub-Inspectors of Armed Branch could not pass during 2001-2004 except in 2003 when all the candidates passed out.

Thus, negligence of the department in imparting the field training and practice with modern weaponry might result in crippling of the performance of the police force.

### ***Performance of Forensic Science Laboratory***

**3.5.11** During 2000-2005, the Director of Forensic Science Laboratory procured various sophisticated instrument/machines<sup>2</sup>/apparatus for upgrading its infrastructure at Rs 1.88 crore. Though upgradation was intended for early receipt of chemical examination report in respect of Viscera and other exhibits sent to FSL by investigating officers for finding out the truth, the number of such examination report pending at the end of each year gradually increased from 5102 in 1999 to 8130 in 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Microscope, Spectrophotometer, Automated Solvent, Extraction Unit, etc.

Scrutiny further revealed that report of FSL was also delayed by two to 45 months resulting in delay in the process of investigation and prosecution, delaying justice.

Shortfall in achievement was attributed by the FSL authority to increased court summons, crime scene visits and constant communication with Judicial Authorities. They also added that the state of such affair could only be changed if manpower on need base was provided. The reply is not acceptable as the increase in receipt of cases was marginal (11 *per cent*) while the pendency increased by 59 *per cent* during 1999-2004.

#### ***Monitoring and supervision***

**3.5.12** A State level empowered committee headed by Chief Secretary (Chairman) and other five members was formed in September 2001 to monitor the implementation of the scheme.

The department could not produce any record or information relating to meeting held, if any, by the Empowered Committee during 2000-2005.

#### ***Conclusion***

**3.5.13** Though the scheme of modernisation of police force had been continuing since 1969-1970, a large gap between requirement and availability of equipment/weaponry, infrastructure and training facilities still persists. Failure of the Government in providing its matching contribution to avail of the full financial assistance of GOI during 2000-2005 crippled the implementation of the scheme. Supply of fighting equipment fell short of requirement even in the terrorist prone districts/police stations. Negligence of the department in arranging for sufficient number of modern weaponry for training and practice in police training college might result in inefficient performance at the time of exigencies. Non-completion of construction works and inadequacy in providing accommodation of police personnel also contributed in the basic objective of modernisation of police force remaining largely unachieved.

#### ***Recommendations***

- *The State Government should ensure release of its own share to avail of GOI assistances in full so that implementation of modernisation schemes is not jeopardized.*
- *The gap between requirement and supply of modern fighting equipments needs to be bridged.*
- *The Police Training College is required to be substantially equipped to provide necessary exposure and practice in modern weaponry to the police personnel.*
- *Completion of the works already started for providing infrastructure and accommodation should be emphasised.*
- *Immediate action needs to be taken to activate the Empowered Committee for monitoring and supervision of the progress of the scheme.*



## Special Category States

12. Arunachal Pradesh, Audit Report ( Civil) for the year ended 31 March 2007

### HOME DEPARTMENT

#### 3.1 Modernisation of State Police Force

##### *Highlights*

*The scheme “Modernization of Police Forces” (MPF) was launched in 1969-70 by the Government of India (GOI) for modernizing the police force in the country to enable them to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. The priority areas of the scheme were to provide residential accommodation for upper and lower subordinates of police force, construction of Police Stations (PS) and Out Posts (OPs), improving the mobility of Police Force for reducing response time, skill upgradation and capacity enhancement through training. But even after 20 years of implementation of the scheme, the Department failed to attain these objectives primarily due to deficiencies in planning and improper fund management. Lack of proper monitoring also contributed significantly to poor implementation of the scheme.*

Between 2002-03 and 2006-07 Central funds ranging from Rs.1.62 crore to Rs.5.50 crore remained unspent at the end of each year mainly due to late release of funds by the GOI as well as the State Government.

*(Paragraph 3.1.9.2)*

During each of the years 2002-03 to 2006-07 implementation of annual plans were only 9 to 92 per cent and funds for the year were mostly utilised in implementation of unimplemented portion of earlier year's plans. Further, plans approved during 2002-03 to 2006-07 remained incomplete to the extent of Rs.6.16 crore even at the end of 2006-07.

*(Paragraph 3.1.11.1)*

Establishment of Police Housing and Welfare Corporation for execution of Departmental works also did not yield fruitful results. Out of 35 works costing Rs.4.61 crore, only six works were completed during 2005-06 to 2006-07.

*(Paragraph 3.1.12.2)*

Supply of weapons and equipments to the districts, police stations and battalions were irrational and not in accordance with Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) norms. Shortfall in availability of weapons in the police stations under test checked districts was eight to 100 per cent and in the battalions 13 to 100 per cent as compared to BPR&D norms.

*(Paragraph 3.1.13.2)*

**The Department could utilise only 55 per cent of the funds approved for procurement of training equipments during 2002-03 to 2005-06. Practice of modern weapons in the training centre fell short by 20 to 100 per cent.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.14.1)*

**Police Communication Network (POLNET) could not be made fully functional even after incurring an expenditure of Rs.4.62 crore.**

*(Paragraph 3.1.15.1)*


### **3.1.1 Introduction**

The scheme MPF was launched in 1969-70 by the GOI for modernising the police force in the country to enable them to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. A revised scheme involving substantial outlay of Central assistance was launched by the GOI in February 2001 for a ten year period starting from 2000-01. The basic objective of the scheme is to overcome the deficiencies in the State police force including enhancement in its infrastructure and achieve its planned development and modernisation. The main components of the scheme were housing, buildings, mobility, training, equipment, communication and computerisation. The scheme is being implemented in Arunachal Pradesh since 1987-88.

### **3.1.2 Organisational Set Up**

The Arunachal Pradesh police force is under the administrative charge of the Commissioner, Home (Police) Department who is responsible for overseeing the implementation of MPF. A State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) was set up (August 2001) under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to monitor the implementation of the modernisation plan. Organisational structure for implementation of the scheme in the State is detailed in the Chart given below:

**Chart-3.1**



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### **3.1.3      *Audit Coverage***

The implementation of the scheme relating to the period 2002-03 to 2006-07 was reviewed by a test-check (March-April 2007) of records of the Director General of Police, Police Training Centre (PTC), Banderdewa and State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Banderdewa. Five out of 16 districts<sup>1</sup> (21 PS) and one Battalion<sup>2</sup> out of four were selected on the basis of simple random sampling and an expenditure of Rs.23.56 crore (42 *per cent*) out of the total expenditure of Rs.55.51 crore was covered in audit.

### **3.1.4      *Audit Objectives***

The main audit objectives were to examine and evaluate the

- efficiency of planning for implementation of various components and major thrust areas of the scheme;
- proper utilization of funds for implementation of the programme;
- implementation of major objectives of the scheme as per norms and targets fixed by the Department;
- efforts of the Government to upgrade the skills of the police force, and increase their striking capabilities and
- effectiveness of monitoring mechanism.

### **3.1.5      *Audit Criteria***

The criteria used in the performance review were as follows:

- annual plans prepared by the Department and targets fixed therein;
- scheme guidelines and norms prescribed by the BPR&D;
- prescribed output and bench marks of performance and
- prescribed monitoring mechanism.

### **3.1.6      *Audit Methodology***

The performance review commenced with an entry conference with the Deputy Inspector General of Police (HQ) in March 2007 wherein the audit objectives, audit criteria and scope of audit were explained and suggestions as well as perceptions relating to the strengths and weaknesses of the Department in implementing the scheme were discussed. Data relating to various prioritized items was analyzed apart from a test check of relevant records to arrive at audit conclusions. The audit findings were discussed with the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police (HQ) in an exit conference on

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<sup>1</sup> *Papumpare (Yupia); Lower Subansiri (Ziro); West Kameng (Bomdila); Lower Dihang Valley (Roing) and East Siang (Pasighat)*

<sup>2</sup> *1<sup>st</sup> AP Battalion, Papumpare*

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6 November 2007 and the replies of the Department have been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

### **3.1.7      *Audit findings***

The review on implementation of the MPF in five test checked districts revealed poor planning, delayed implementation of approved plans, low satisfaction level of housing, shortfall in availability of weapons in the districts, deficiency in practice of modern weaponry, *etc.* Audit findings in detail are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

### **3.1.8      *Planning***

Proper planning is imperative for achieving the objectives of a programme in a systematic and efficient manner. GOI, while approving further continuance of the scheme from 2000-01, felt the need for submission of a Five-year plan by the State Government to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) indicating specific projects required to be implemented each year for modernisation of its police force. It was envisaged that the plan would be a coherent, well-thought-out programme of action for upgradation of capabilities in specific areas and should not be a list of items for procurement. Annual plans to be submitted by the States should flow from the Five year plan already submitted.

GOI pursued with the Government of Arunachal Pradesh (September and November 2000) for submission of the five year plan addressing the present status and future requirements keeping in mind the tasks to be performed.

Audit scrutiny revealed that between January 2001 and July 2001, a five year perspective plan was submitted to GOI three times. This was, however, not accepted by GOI on the ground that the proposals were submitted without proper justification and that it was not prepared in accordance with specified guidelines. Besides, there was insufficient information on availability of land for carrying out various construction activities. The State Government submitted (September 2001), a revised perspective plan for 2001-05 rectifying the deficiencies, but approval of the revised plan has not been conveyed by GOI till date (July 2007).

It was observed that although the perspective plan was to have been prepared by obtaining requirements of each component from the field formations, the justification for proposals was called for from the field units only after submission of the revised perspective plan. During exit conference, the DIG of Police (HQ) while accepting the fact stated that the perspective plan was prepared hurriedly without any feed back from the field units. Thus, it is evident that the perspective plan was not formulated keeping in view the actual requirements. The GOI, however, continued to accord approval to the annual plans received from the State Government from time to time.

Detailed scrutiny of records revealed further deficiencies in planning as detailed below:

- Security items worth Rs.68.16 lakh were procured during 2002-03 to 2005-06 beyond approved annual plan without obtaining approval from GOI.
- Proposal for construction of Medium Improved Basa Type (MIBT) Type II quarters at Bomdila (26 Nos.) and Tawang (12 Nos.) as approved by MHA for Rs.1.14 crore was revised to RCC building as the MIBT quarters were not found suitable.
- Completion of construction of security fencing at 2<sup>nd</sup> AP Battalion, Along approved by MHA against the annual plan for 2005-06 was delayed by 24 months due to land dispute.
- Construction of a repeater station at Sagalee as per approved plan 2006-07 was changed to Rumgong since availability of land at Sagalee was not confirmed. Approval for the change, either from MHA or SLEC was neither on record nor stated.

Thus, it is evident that proposals were sent to MHA without proper assessment of requirement and feasibility of execution indicating casual approach and poor planning.

### 3.1.9 Financial Management

#### 3.1.9.1 Funding Pattern

The scheme was funded by the GOI and the State Government on 50:50 basis upto 2002-03. During 2003-04 to 2005-06, 75 *per cent* share was borne by the GOI and 25 *per cent* by the State Government. The scheme is being fully funded by the GOI from 2006-07.

#### 3.1.9.2 Receipt of funds and expenditure

Year-wise funds released by GOI, State's share and expenditure incurred thereagainst in implementation of the scheme during the period from 2002-03 to 2006-07 is shown below. In addition, the Department also received other assistance in kind (*viz.*, weapons, vehicles, other equipment, *etc*) from the GOI during this period.

**Table - 3.1.1**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Opening Balance (Central Share)	Central Assistance during the year		State's share		Total funds available	Expenditure			Closing Balance
				Provided in the budget	Amount released		Central share	State share	Total (Percentage)	Central share
		Cash	kind							
2002-03	0.34	5.03	0.17	4.07	1.57	6.94	1.22	1.57	2.79 (30)	4.15
2003-04	4.15	5.50	1.75	2.20	3.88	13.53	4.15	3.88	8.03 (68)	5.50
2004-05	5.50	2.98	6.15	2.20	4.82	13.30	5.51	4.82	10.33 (97)	2.97
2005-06	2.97	5.32	1.35	2.32	2.31	10.60	5.51	2.31	7.82 (74)	2.78
2006-07	2.78	10.76	0.10	5.10	4.93	18.47	11.92	4.93	16.85 (90)	1.62
Total		29.59	9.52	15.89	17.51	62.84	28.31	17.51	45.82 (75)	

Source: Department of Home (Police) and Finance, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh

Note: Figures in brackets indicate the percentage of expenditure to the total fund available.

It will be noticed from the above, that during 2002-03 the Department was unable to spend the Central assistance fully. Despite carrying forward the unspent balances to the next year, the Department was unable to spend the full Central assistance. Unspent balances carried forward ranged between Rs.1.62 crore to Rs.5.50 crore.

While funds were released late by GOI i.e., in the last quarter of the financial year, the funds did not lapse and were available early in the first quarter of the next financial year. The Department was however, unable to utilize the available funds with the result that the objective of modernization of police force was stifled. Further, the State Government did not also seriously address the task of modernization of police force, as it provided funds to the implementing agencies only at the revised estimates stage during January to February each year. All this deprived the police force of much needed modernization.

### **3.1.10 Submission of inflated utilisation certificates**

Year wise amounts paid to the executing agencies as per approved plans for execution of civil works were certified by the Department to have been utilised. Against expenditure of Rs.9.17 crore including assistance in kind (Rs.1.35 crore) and expenditure from State's share (Rs.2.31 crore) during 2005-06, the Department gave a utilisation certificate (UC) for Rs.12.07 crore. The Department had thus furnished a wrong utilisation certificate to the extent of Rs.2.90 crore.

### **3.1.11 Implementation**

#### **3.1.11.1 Delayed implementation of approved plans**

During finalisation of annual plans each year, MHA time and again reiterated the need for accelerated utilisation of funds in implementation of the approved plans and prompt submission of UC's to facilitate smooth release of Central assistance. Scrutiny revealed that the State Government could utilise only nine to 92 per cent of GOI funds during the year of approval and most of the funds were utilised for implementation of incomplete items of earlier years. Plans approved during 2002-03 to 2006-07 (except 2003-04) remained incomplete even at the end of 2006-07. Position is shown below:

**Table -3.1.2**

(Rupees in crore)

year	Plan approved by GOI	Expenditure incurred during year of approval (Percentage)	Expenditure incurred in subsequent years against plan					
			2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	Total	Excess (+) /Shortfall (-)
2002-03	10.40	1.05 (10)	6.77	1.66	-		10.24	(-) 0.16
2003-04	9.10	0.86 (9)	-	7.54	0.75		9.20	(+) 0.10
2004-05	12.18	2.39 (20)	-	-	3.04		8.78	(-) 3.40
2005-06	9.02	5.38 (60)	-	-	-		7.31	(-) 1.71
2006-07	11.85	10.86* (92)	-	-	-		10.86	(-) 0.99
<b>Total</b>	<b>52.55</b>	<b>20.54 (39)</b>	<b>6.77</b>	<b>9.20</b>	<b>3.79</b>		<b>46.39</b>	<b>(-) 6.16</b>

\* UC is yet to be sent to MHA.

Source: Information furnished by the Department



The above position indicates the State Government's failure to implement the plans from 2002-03 to 2006-07 during respective years of approval. Failure of the State to fully implement the plans during the years of approval was also pointed out by the GOI (August 2004).

### **3.1.11.2 Shortfall in implementation**

Implementation under certain components of the approved annual plans from 2002-03 to 2006-07 fell short of the target by 10 to 100 *per cent* as shown below:

**Table -3.1.3**

(Rupees in crore)

Components	Targeted expenditure as per approved plans from 2002-03 to 2006-07	Actual expenditure	Shortfall (Percentage of shortfall)
Buildings (residential & non-residential)	28.54	25.93	2.61 (9)
Security equipment	4.35	4.16	0.19 (4)
Traffic equipment	1.38	0.85	0.53 (38)
Training equipment	1.28	0.70	0.58 (45)
Computerisation	3.46	1.45	2.01 (58)
Forensic science Laboratory	1.16	-	1.16(100)

Source: Approved annual plan and utilisation certificate submitted to GOI

There was no shortfall in procurement of vehicles, arms and ammunition and communication equipment because supply of these items was mostly made by GOI during 2002-07. There was shortfall only in those components where responsibility for implementation rested with the State Government (e.g. construction of residential and non-residential building, FSL, *etc.*). This is indicative of lack of commitment in implementation of the scheme by the State Government.

### **3.1.12 Buildings**

#### **3.1.12.1 Low satisfaction level of housing**

The National Police Commission (NPC) recommended housing accommodation for all police persons in the State with special emphasis for lower and higher subordinates. In Arunachal Pradesh, construction of only Type I and Type II quarters were included in the modernization plans. Against the requirement of 5252 and 1924 Type I and Type II quarters respectively as on 31 March 2007, only 280 Type I and 130 Type II quarters were targeted for completion by 2006-07 which was just six *per cent* of the requirement. Even these low targets could not be achieved and there continued to be large shortage of housing as would be evident from the following table:

Table -3.1.4

Year	Targets for completion		Achievement	
	Type I	Type II	Type I (Percentage)	Type II (Percentage)
2002-03	66	52	26 (39)	34 (65)
2003-04	40	20	32 (80)	16 (80)
2004-05	54	20	NIL	NIL
2005-06	84	NIL	NIL	NIL
2006-07	36	38	NIL	NIL
<b>Total</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>58 (21)</b>	<b>50 (38)</b>

Source: Compiled from Departmental reports/returns

Note: Figures in bracket indicate percentage of targets achieved.

The above table shows that targets fixed were much below requirement and even the reduced targets could not be achieved. Achievement for Type I quarters against targets during 2002-07 ranged between 0 to 80 *per cent*. There was no achievement during 2004-07. Similarly for Type II quarters achievement was 0 to 80 *per cent*. There was no achievement during 2004-07. Since these are ongoing projects GOI funds were not a constraint. Overall satisfaction of housing needs for lower and higher subordinates was only 31 *per cent*.

Based on the proposals of State Government, GOI sanctioned Rs.25.53 crore for construction of 416 residential buildings (Rs.15.69 crore) and 143 non-residential buildings (Rs.9.84 crore) during 2002-03 to 2006-07. Year wise allotment of funds and expenditure there against as well as status of completion as of March 2007 is shown in Table 3.1.5 - (A) & (B).

Table -3.1.5 (A)

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Funds approved against works during the year			Expenditure incurred as per UC during the year against approved works		
	Residential buildings	Non residential buildings	Total	Residential buildings	Non residential buildings	Total
2002-03	5.39	4.07	9.46	-	-	-
2003-04	3.10	2.39	5.49	3.58	2.67	6.25
2004-05	3.66	0.63	4.29	3.60	3.56	7.16
2005-06	1.68	2.03	3.71	0.30	2.43	2.73
2006-07	1.86	0.72	2.58	5.92	0.86	6.78
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.69</b>	<b>9.84</b>	<b>25.53</b>	<b>13.40</b>	<b>9.52</b>	<b>22.92</b>

Source: Compiled from Departmental reports/returns

Table -3.1.5 (B)

	Sanctioned by GOI		Works awarded		Works completed		Works remaining incomplete	
	Numbers	Value (Rupees in crore)	Numbers	Value (Rupees in crore)	Numbers	Value (Rupees in crore)	Numbers	Value (Rupees in crore)
<b>Residential</b>	416*	15.69	369	13.40	108	4.54	261	8.86
<b>Non Residential</b>	143	9.84	136	9.52	105	7.19	31	2.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>559</b>	<b>25.53</b>	<b>505</b>	<b>22.92</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>11.73</b>	<b>292</b>	<b>11.19</b>

Source: Compiled from Departmental reports/returns

\* Type -I quarter: 280; Type-II quarter: 130 and Transit camp:6.

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Table 3.1.5 (B) shows that the Department had awarded only 369 residential buildings (Rs.13.40 crore) against the sanction of 416 by GOI, and 136 works under non-residential buildings (Rs.9.52 crore) against 143 sanctioned by GOI to various executing agencies<sup>3</sup> during 2002-07 for a total amount of Rs.22.92 crore. Out of this, only 108 residential buildings (29 *per cent*) and 105 works under non-residential buildings (77 *per cent*) were completed by the executing agencies as of March 2007 at a total cost of Rs.11.73 crore. No work was completed during 2004-07 (Table-3.1.4). Thus, the overall utilisation of funds was only 46 *per cent* of the allocated amount. Against this, the percentage achievement of physical progress against the approved works was 26 *per cent* in respect of residential buildings and 73 *per cent* in respect of non-residential buildings.

There was delay in awarding the works and placement of funds by the Department with the executing agencies. The Department had also not pursued with the executing agencies for timely completion of works. All these factors frustrated the Department's commitment to raise the satisfaction level of housing among the lower subordinates from 35 *per cent* in 2000-01 to 50 *per cent* in 2004-05 as contemplated in the perspective plan and the annual plan.

### ***3.1.12.2 Arunachal Pradesh Police Housing and Welfare Corporation Ltd.***

The State Government established (September 2005) the Arunachal Pradesh Police Housing and Welfare Corporation Limited (APPH&WCL) to formulate and execute residential and non-residential housing schemes of police Department and works of other Departments in Arunachal Pradesh as well as outside the state.

Accordingly, GOI released Rs.4.61 crore to APPH&WCL during 2005-06 (Rs.2.03 crore) and 2006-07 (Rs.2.58 crore) for execution of 35 works. Of this, seven works were targeted for completion in 2005-06 and 28 in 2006-07. As of March 2007, six out of 35 works were completed and 20 works were in progress. Out of the remaining nine works, four works were under process of allotment and five were yet to be taken up due to land dispute and selection of site.

Thus, targets set for completion during 2005-06 and 2006-07 remained mostly unachieved with completion of only two works in 2005-06 (29 *per cent* of target) and four works in 2006-07 (14 *per cent* of the target).

### ***3.1.12.3 Cost overrun due to delay in completion of works***

The State Government accorded (March 2004) administrative approval for construction of security fencing around 2<sup>nd</sup> AP Battalion, Along at an estimated cost of Rs.24.41 lakh. Work was to be completed by March 2005.

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<sup>3</sup> *Public Works Division, Rural Works Division, District Rural Development Agency and Arunachal Pradesh Police Housing and Welfare Corporation Limited*

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The entire funds were placed (April 2004) in advance with the executing agency (Project Director, DRDA, West Siang). The work had to be suspended following stay order given by the High Court in May 2005 following a writ petition submitted by local inhabitants. The stay order was, however, vacated by the High Court in January 2007, but the work had not resumed till April 2007. The estimate was revised to Rs.35.92 lakh in March 2006 due to increase in cost of material and labour which was administratively approved with expenditure sanction for Rs.12 lakh accorded (March 2006) and fund placed with the executing agency. Thus, awarding the work without ascertaining availability of freehold land led to delay in execution of the work and increase in cost by Rs.12 lakh so far, which is likely to go up further with the delay in completion of the work.

### **3.1.13 Equipment**

#### **3.1.13.1 Procurement of security and training equipment**

- MHA, while approving the annual plan for 2003-04 directed (December 2003) the State Government to send its requirement for specified training and security equipment for bulk procurement by MHA. Scrutiny, however, revealed that the State Government, instead of sending the requirement of training and security equipments to MHA, procured these equipment<sup>4</sup> valued at Rs.1.16 crore on its own during 2005-06 against approved plans of 2003-04 and 2004-05.
- Scrutiny further revealed that the Department procured security and training equipment valued at Rs.68.16 lakh during 2002-03 to 2005-06 which were not included in the respective approved plans. On this being pointed out by audit, the Department stated (February 2007) that the matter had been referred (March 2006) to MHA for ex-post facto approval. Reply from MHA was awaited (April 2007).
- Scrutiny also revealed that security equipment<sup>5</sup> valued at Rs.23.11 lakh supplied by three firms was rejected (August 2006) by the Board constituted (January 2006) for inspecting the items on the grounds of inferior quality and low sensitivity. However, on the request of the supplier (October 2006), the Police Department reconstituted a Technical Board (November 2006) to examine the quality and sensitivity of the items supplied. The re-constituted Board on examination (November), found the sensitivity of the items satisfactory and recommended their acceptance.

Reasons for reconstitution of a Technical Board even after rejection of these items by the Director General of Police and acceptance of these items subsequently were neither on record nor stated.

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<sup>4</sup> *Fire Arm Stimulator; Explosive Detector; RSP Tool Kit; Bullet Proof Jacket; LHP with accessories and Jammer*

<sup>5</sup> *Extension mirror telescope; Deep Search Metal Detector; Hand Held Metal Detector and Portable Door Frame Metal Detector.*

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- A portable frequency Jammer worth Rs.36.33 lakh installed in December 2005 was found defective in January 2006. The Department did not obtain any guarantee for this equipment and had not taken up the matter with the supplier till August 2006 for repair/replacement of the equipment. No reply from the firm has been received as of April 2007 and the Jammer is lying unused till date.

### ***3.1.13.2 Supply of fighting equipment to district police force, police stations and Battalion***

BPR&D, MHA, prescribed scales of weapons required for Indian Police at the districts, urban and rural police stations in both terrorist prone and non-terrorist areas. Accordingly, the State Police authorities were required to provide weapons to the police personnel in the districts, battalions and police stations according to the prescribed norms.

Test check of records of the selected districts revealed that supply and distribution of weapons to the districts was irrational and not according to the norms prescribed by BPR&D. While the non-extremist prone districts were supplied with modern weapons beyond norms, there were also deficiencies in supply of modern weapons in the extremist prone districts as compared to requirement norms. The district-wise position of distribution of weapons is given in **Appendix -3.1.1**.

Similarly, information on availability of weapons in the police stations under the test checked districts as obtained (March 2007) from the Superintendents of Police of the selected districts revealed that the police stations were also not equipped as per BPR&D norms and the shortfall ranged between eight and 100 *per cent*. Shortfall in availability of weapons in the test checked battalions also ranged between 13 and 100 *per cent*. This state of affairs persisted despite the requirement of arms and ammunition for the State was projected in the annual plans for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06.

Shortage of weapons has a severe impact on the striking ability of the State police force.

### ***3.1.13.3 Cases of Non-procurement/non-receipt of material***

GOI's contribution in implementation of the scheme included supply of items under various components. Accordingly, GOI released (March 2005) Rs.1.97 crore to the Director General Ordnance Factories, Kolkata being the cost of arms/ammunition to be procured by the State. Of this, arms/ammunition worth Rs.1.80 crore had not been collected by the State as on date. Reasons for non-procurement of the material or for not requesting the GOI for cancelling the order even after two years of release of payment by GOI were neither on record nor stated.

Out of Rs.3.17 crore released by GOI (July 2005) to various firms for supply of DGS&D items (vehicles & communication equipment) to the State, communication equipment valued at Rs.1.66 crore had not been received by

the Department till the date of audit. The Department except sending a message (August 2005) requesting for details of items for which supply order was placed to the Director (PMR), MHA, had not taken any further action in this regard.

Facts stated above are indicative of lackadaisical approach of the Department in implementation of the scheme.

### 3.1.14 Training

#### 3.1.14.1 Training and Practice

During 2002-03 to 2006-07, GOI approved plans of Rs.1.28 crore for procurement of equipment required for imparting training. Against this, the Department could procure equipment worth Rs.0.70 crore only (55 per cent of the approved Plans).

The number of police personnel trained in Police Training Centre (PTC) was very low. The year-wise number of police personnel who had undergone training in courses like orientation, counter-insurgency, armour, pre-commando VIP security, Bomb disposal *etc.* is given below:

**Table -3.1.6**

Year	Men in position	No of training programmes conducted	No of personnel trained	Personnel trained as per centage of total police force
2002-03	6896	21	340	5
2003-04	7095	24	493	7
2004-05	7131	6	121	2
2005-06	7258	12	606	8
2006-07	7589	19	703	9

Source: Information furnished by the Department

The percentage of personnel trained ranged between two to nine per cent. Besides no targets were fixed by the Department for conducting training programme in PTC.

Further, average practice of various weapons conducted per police personnel in PTC, Banderdewa during 2002-07 was far short of the scales prescribed by BPR&D as would be evident from the table below:

**Table -3.1.7**

Name of Weapons	No. of personnel trained	Total rounds to be fired as per norms	Total rounds actually fired	Average rounds fired by each person	Shortfall (per centage of shortfall)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
AK Rifles/5.56 INSAS	673	50	2884	4	46 (92)
7.62 SLR	928	40	10743	12	28 (70)
9 mm carbine	727	50	13754	19	31 (62)
9 mm pistol/.38 revolver	98	40	536	5	35 (88)
12 Bore pump action Gun	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	5 (100)
.303 truncated Antiriot Gun	15	10	33	2.2	7.8 (78)
LMG	10	50	403	40	10 (20)
Grenade	Nil	5 grenades	Nil	Nil	5 (100)

Source: Information furnished by the Department



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It is thus evident that shortfall in practice of various weapons in PTC Banderdewa ranged between 20 and 100 *per cent*. No renewal practice was conducted in PTC Banderdewa during the period from 2002-03 to 2006-07.

Annual classification firing practice in the test checked districts was also deficient and the shortfall ranged between 10 and 100 *per cent*. Details are given in **Appendix – 3.1.2**.

Under provisioning of training facilities as well as deficiencies in practice of modern weaponry will certainly impact the efficiency and striking ability of the police during exigencies.

### **3.1.15 Communication**

#### **3.1.15.1 Police Telecommunication Network (POLNET)**

The POLNET is a satellite based integrated network which envisages installation of Very Small Aperture Terminals (V-SAT), Remote Sensing Units (RSUs) and Multi-Access Radio Terminals (MART) to link the national capital with all State capitals.

While intimating (May 2003) the initiation of the process of installation of POLNET, (MHA) informed the State Government that installation of V-SAT in all district headquarters and MART and RSUs in all the police stations and check gates etc. (82) should be completed by September 2004 so that the scheme is made operational in 2005-06.

For providing connectivity to the PS through MART, it was the responsibility of the State to see that district headquarters and the PS have clear Line of Sight (LOS) and was within a range of about 35 kms. The State was also to select sites for tower with suitable height to have LOS with V-SAT site.

Scrutiny of records and information furnished by the Department revealed that as of March 2007 against the required 16 V-SAT, 82 MART and 82 RSUs, only 11 V-SAT, 72 MART and 72 RSUs were installed in 11 out of 16 districts. Out of 82 locations (71 PSs, 5 outposts and 6 check gates) to be covered under POLNET, connectivity could be established in 19 locations (17 PSs and two check gates) as of date (October 2007). In other 63 locations, connectivity could not be provided due to LOS problem (23 locations) and other problems (40 locations).

It was, therefore, evident that the sites for installation of MART were selected without proper survey to ensure clear line of sight leading to non-functioning of the system in most of the PS, check gates and out posts. Expenditure of Rs.27.29 lakh (Rs.43,315 x 63) incurred on procurement of MART (RSUs, etc. supplied by GOI) therefore, remained infructuous.

Thus, even after incurring an expenditure of Rs.4.62 crore (Rs.1.03 crore paid by GOI to the Director of Co-ordination of Police Wireless and Rs.3.59 crore utilised by State Government in procurement of various equipments under

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POLNET) as of March 2007, POLNET was not fully implemented and the objective of extending link to all PS was not achieved.

### ***3.1.15.2 Extra expenditure of Rs.16.56 lakh on procurement of material under POLNET***

Superintendent of Police (Telecom) invited (November 2004) tender for supply of WT and V-SAT equipment including 120 feet self supported tower and 60 feet Lattice antenna mast.

For supply of 60 feet antenna mast, three tenderers quoted their rates, of which the rate quoted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest tenderer (Rs.43,315 per unit) was recommended by the Purchase Board on 7 January 2005 rejecting the lowest rate (Rs.23,124.00 per unit) of a Delhi based firm, on the ground that the delivery time of two to five months offered by the lowest tenderer was not acceptable to the State Government.

Scrutiny, however, revealed that for supply of 120 feet self supported tower (in case of another supply order) the lowest rate quoted by the same Delhi based firm was accepted by the Board after negotiating with the firm to execute the works within the required time frame. Reason for not negotiating with the firm to complete the work of supply and installation of 60 feet antenna within the required time frame was neither on record nor stated.

Scrutiny further revealed that between March 2005 and March 2006, the Department placed orders with the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest bidder for supply of 82 numbers of 60 feet antenna mast at Rs.43,315 each allowing the firm installation time of 30 to 45 days. The firm, however, completed installation of 23 masts after one year of issue of supply order. Against supply order for 59 masts issued in March 2006, report on completion of only 41 masts was furnished by the firm after six months (September 2006) and reports on completion of the balance number were neither on record nor stated. The supply and installation period thus took at least six months to one year flouting the conditions of supply and installation as laid down in the supply order and tender document. However, payment of Rs.35.52 lakh (82 x Rs.43,315) was released to the firm between July 2006 and February 2007.

Thus, selection of the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest bidder instead of the 1<sup>st</sup> lowest without valid reasons and procurement of 60 feet antenna mast at the higher rate led to extra expenditure of Rs.16.56 lakh<sup>6</sup>.

### ***3.1.16 Forensic Science Laboratory***

#### ***3.1.16.1 Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and Mobile Forensic Science units (MFSU's)***

The Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) recommended release of Rs.7 crore for upgradation of the standard of police administration in Arunachal Pradesh,

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<sup>6</sup> (Rs.43315 x 82) - (Rs.23124 x 82) = Rs.16.56 lakh

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of which Rs.1.56 crore was earmarked for MFSUs and Rs.0.53 crore for upgradation of FSL. The DGP, after inviting tenders (January 2004) issued supply orders for eight sets of equipment<sup>7</sup> of MFSUs (November 2004) and one High Performance Thin Layer Chromatography (HPTLC) for FSL (March 2004) with a local dealer. Payment of Rs.195.78 lakh was made for procurement of equipment for MFSUs (Rs.113.60 lakh), HPTLC (Rs.48 lakh) and eight vehicles (Rs.34.18 lakh) against sanctions accorded (March 2004, January 2005 and March 2005) by the Government.

The equipments for MFSUs were received in May 2005 and were allotted to eight districts only eight months later in January 2006.

Test check of records of six districts (West Kameng, East Siang, Dibang, Lohit, Lower Dibang Valley and Anjaw) revealed that the vehicles along with MFSU equipments deployed in four districts (Dibang, Lohit, Lower Dibang and Anjaw) had not collected any samples till date (April 2007). In West Kameng district, only seven samples were collected and in East Siang district, the equipment was not even installed in the vehicle. Thus, the vehicles as well as the MFSU equipments remained mostly underutilized in the districts.

Further, as regards FSL, five major equipments<sup>8</sup> including HPTLC, are essential for making the FSL fully functional. But apart from the HPTLC no other equipment has been procured despite the GOI providing (March 2006) Rs.116.04 lakh for the purpose. The amount has not yet been released by the State Government as of March 2007.

The HPTLC installed (June 2005) in FSL, PTC Banderdewa in June 2005 is not functional till date (April 2007), since it cannot be operated without a computer which has not been provided to the unit till date (April 2007). Thus the HPTLC, procured at a cost of Rs.48 lakh remained idle for more than three years.

The FSL unit also lacked proper infrastructure and trained manpower. An Assistant Director (FSL) has joined only in January 2007. Besides, against the sanctioned strength of one Scientific Officer, five Scientific Assistants and one Laboratory Assistant, only one Scientific Assistant and one Laboratory Assistant have been appointed as of date (October 2007). Hence, almost all samples collected in districts are sent to FSL Guwahati, Kolkata, New Delhi and Hyderabad for analysis.

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<sup>7</sup> *Poliroy Forensic Light Source; Dust Print Lifting Kit; Narcotic Drug Detection Kit; Cyanowand Kit; Portable Fuming Chamber; Halogen portable Search Light; Tool Mark Investigation Kit; Crime Scene Investigation Kit; Dynamite residue and Explosive Detection Kit; Blood Grouping Test Kit; Semen Test Kit; Crime Scene Evidence Collection Kit; Latent Print Kit; Tyre/Foot Print Casting and Lifting Kit; Encyclopedia for Forensic Science and Polaroid Camera.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ultra Violet Visible Spectrophotometer; High Performance Thin Layer Chromatography; GC with Head Space; AA Spectrophotometer; Portable Video Spectro Comparator.*

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### **3.1.17 Monitoring of the Scheme**

While approving the continuance of the scheme for modernization of the State police force in February 2001, the GOI directed the State Government to constitute a SLEC under the Chairmanship of Chief Secretary with Home Secretary and DGP as members among others, to monitor implementation of the projects. The SLEC, was to meet every month and ensure proper implementation of the programme.

Scrutiny revealed that, the SLEC in Arunachal Pradesh was formed in August 2001 and only three meetings were held in August 2001, June 2004 and May 2005. No meeting was held after May 2005 as confirmed by the Department. Thus, the SLEC had very little contribution in monitoring the implementation of the scheme.

### **3.1.18 Conclusion**

In spite of continuance of the scheme in the State for the last 20 years, deficiencies in each of the components of the scheme still persist. Delay in release of funds and defective planning contributed to delayed implementation of annual plans. Plans approved during 2002-03 to 2006-07 remained partially implemented even at the end of 2006-07. Deficiencies in supply of weapons and security equipments to the districts, police stations and battalions as well as irrational distribution of weapons and poor communication facilities proved that the force in the State remained under equipped in dealing with law and order problems. This is also borne out by a marginal increase in crime rate in the State from 197.3 in 2000 to 198.8 in 2005 as per the records of MHA<sup>9</sup>. Irrational distribution of weapons and security equipments coupled with shortfall in providing modern weapons in the insurgent prone districts and PS, insufficient training facilities and inadequate practice on modern weapons, inadequate communication network have resulted in most of the objectives of the scheme remaining unfulfilled.

### **3.1.19 Recommendations**

- **Planning should be strengthened to identify the modernisation requirements of the police force as per norms and approved plans should be implemented during the year of approval;**
- **State Government should ensure timely release and utilization of funds to avoid slippages in works/procurement of equipment;**
- **Training facilities should be provided as per prescribed norms so as to provide necessary exposure and practice on use of modern weaponry;**

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<sup>9</sup> Rates of Indian Penal Code crimes compiled by National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB), MHA.

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- **Timely completion of works must be ensured by the executing agency for providing infrastructure and accommodation;**
  - **Measures should be taken immediately to activate the empowered committee for effective monitoring of the progress of the scheme;**
  - **There should be a definite time frame for completion of various components of scheme.**

The matter was reported to the Government (September 2007); reply had not been received (November 2007).

**APPENDIX – 3.1.1**

**(Reference: Paragraph - 3.1.13.2; Page-45)**

**Statement showing Supply and Distribution of weapons/equipment in the test checked districts against norms fixed by BPR&D**

Components	Extremist Prone Districts												Non-extremist District		
	Papumpare			East Siang			Lower Dibang Valley			West Kameng			Lower Subansiri		
	R	A	Excess(+) Less(-)	R	A	Excess(+) Less(-)	R	A	Excess(+) Less(-)	R	A	Excess(+) Less(-)	R	A	Excess(+) Less(-)
A. Weapons															
(i) Ak series/ 5.56 INSAS RIFLE	33	62	(+)29	29	25	(-)4	10	10	-	16	15	(-)1	NIL	32	(+)32
(ii) 7.62 SLR	287	120	(-) 167	154	105	(-)49	100	80	(-)20	150	105	(-) 45	10	50	(+)40
(iii) 9 mm carbine	94	43	(-)51	54	39	(-) 15	16	12	(-) 4	18	23	(+)5	NIL	18	(+)18
(iv) 9 mm pistol/.38 revolver	35	57	(+)22	31	25	(-) 6	18	29	(+)11	22	31	(+)9	12	18	(+)6
(v) 12 bore pump action gun	29	NIL	(-) 29	15	NIL	(-) 15	10	ML	(-) 10	15	NIL	(-) 15	10	Nil	(-)10
(vi) Truncated 303 Rifle for rubber bullet	57	4	(-) 53	31	NIL	(-) 31	20	1	(-) 19	30	1	(-) 29	20	1	(-)19
(vii) LMG	2	NIL	(-) 2	2	NIL	(-) 2	2	NIL	(-) 2	2	NIL	(-) 2	-	NA	NA
(viii) Hand grenade	287	NIL	(-) 287	154	89	(-) 65	100	NIL	(-) 100	150	64	(-) 86	-	NA	NA

**R: Requirement as per norm**

**A: Available**

**APPENDIX – 3.1.2**

**(Reference: Paragraph - 3.1.14.1; Page-47)**

**Statement showing year-wise position of Annual Classification Firing conducted in test checked Districts**

Sl. No.	Name of Weapon	Annual classification firing as per BPRD norm	2002-03 Districts					2003-04 Districts					2004-05 Districts					2005-06 Districts					2006-07 Districts				
			WK	ES	LS	DV	PP	WK	ES	LS	DV	PP	WK	ES	LS	DV	PP	WK	ES	LS	DV	PP	WK	ES	LS	DV	PP
1	7.62 SLR	20 rds every two years	-	-	-	-	15	6 (40)	5 (50)	-	-	15	-	17	-	-	9 (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	9mm carbine	20 rds every two years	-	-	-	-	15	9 (10)	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	.38 revolver/ 9mm pistol	20 rds every two years	-	-	-	-	12	-	1 9	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	5.56 INSAS	30 rds every three years	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9 (40)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	AK-47	30 rds every three years	-	-	-	-	10 (33)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 (33)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

WK=West Kameng, ES=East Siang, LS=Lower Subansiri, DV=Dibang Valley, PP=Papumpare

Figures in brackets indicate percentage in shortfall



## HOME DEPARTMENT

### 3.1 Modernisation of State Police Force

The scheme of Modernisation of Police Force is an important initiative of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and is under implementation in Manipur since 1969. The scheme, revived in 2000-01 for a period of 10 years, aimed at capacity building of the State Police Force, especially for meeting the emerging challenges to internal security. Manipur has been classified as 'A' category State under the scheme and accordingly receives 100 *per cent* Central assistance for modernisation of its Police Force. A performance review on modernisation of the Force in the State revealed the following lapses:

Although the Manipur Police Housing Corporation had spent only Rs.7.02 crore up to March 2007 out of Rs.18.97 crore placed (2002-07) at its disposal for construction of police stations, buildings and barracks, the Department had shown the entire amount (Rs.18.97 crore) as expenditure.

(Paragraph 3.1.9)

There was 30 to 51 *per cent* shortage of vehicles impacting the mobility of the force adversely.

(Paragraph 3.1.11)

Despite acute shortage of residential buildings, the satisfaction level achieved as of March 2007 was only 11 *per cent* which is very poor in insurgency prone State of Manipur.

(Paragraph 3.1.12)

The objective of sharing/disseminating information with other police organisation/CPMF through POLNET system could not be achieved despite spending Rs.2.63 crore.

(Paragraph 3.1.14)

Forensic laboratory was not functioning properly due to 82 *per cent* vacancies in respect of technical posts resulting in 73 to 82 *per cent* cases pending during 2002-07 for want of analysis.

(Paragraphs 3.1.19 and 3.1.20)

Shortfall of arms and ammunitions ranged from 17 to 100 *per cent* and from 37 to 95 *per cent* respectively, which hindered the capacity of the force to combat insurgency.

(Paragraph 3.1.22)

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### 3.1.1 Introduction

The GOI's scheme of Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) was introduced in Manipur in 1969. The scheme was revived<sup>1</sup> from 2000-01 for a period of ten years up to March 2010. It is an important initiative of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) that aimed at capacity building of the State Police Force, especially for meeting the emerging challenges to internal security in the form of terrorism, naxalism *etc.*

The objectives of the scheme included, *inter alia*, the following:

- Meeting the identified deficiencies in basic police infrastructure;
- Improving operational efficiency of the police force by providing them with better arms and ammunition, and other equipment;
- Improving mobility of the forces by providing better and more secure transportation;
- Improving communication between different field formations with adequate number of new and sophisticated communication gadgets;
- Improving investigative skills through better training and modern equipment; and
- Reducing the dependence of the State Government on the Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) and Army to control internal security and law and order situation.

### 3.1.2 Organisational set-up

The State Police Department is headed by the Director General of Police (DGP) who is assisted by two<sup>2</sup> Additional Directors General of Police (ADsGP), five<sup>3</sup> Inspectors General of Police (IsGP), two<sup>4</sup> Directors, seven Deputy Inspectors General of Police (DIG) and other officers. The implementation of the scheme is overseen by a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) headed by the Chief Secretary. In Police Headquarters (PHQ), the ADGP (AP&LO) is overall in charge of implementation of the MPF programme. The organisational set up is given below:

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
<sup>1</sup> The scheme was not in operation during 1999-2000 in Manipur as the Reserve Bank of India had imposed ban on all transactions involving payments to the State Government.

<sup>2</sup> 1. ADGP (AP& LO); 2. ADGP (TRG/HR/WELFARE/ADMIN)

<sup>3</sup> 1. IGP (AP); 2. IGP (L&O-I); 3. IGP (L&O-II); 4. IGP (INT & CRIME); 5. IGP (ADMN)

<sup>4</sup> 1. Director (MPTS); 2. Director (MPR)

**Chart No.1**



### **3.1.3 Scope of audit**

Performance review of the programme was carried out during April to June 2007 and covered the functioning of the Department during the period 2002-07. Four out of nine districts (Imphal East, Thoubal, Chandel and Churachandpur) were selected for test check.

### **3.1.4 Audit objectives**

The objectives of the performance review were to assess whether:

- The objectives of modernisation of police force were achieved.
- Planning for implementation of the programme was sound and adequate.
- The financial management of the implementation of the programme was efficient.
- The striking capability of the State Police improved with induction of better arms and other equipment.
- There was effective monitoring and evaluation system in place.

### **3.1.5. Audit criteria**

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Perspective Plan of the State Government (2000-05)
- Annual Action Plans of the Department (2000-07)
- Guidelines issued by the MHA

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- Guidelines of Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D) and Directorate of Co-ordination & Police Wireless (DCPW).

### **3.1.6. Audit methodology**

Audit methodology included holding an entry conference (April 2007) with the Department, selection of field units for test check based on simple random sampling without replacement method, checking relevant records, documents, holding discussions with the Departmental officers, analysis of data and documentary evidence on the basis of set audit criteria to arrive at audit findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Audit findings were discussed with the Department in the exit conference (October 2007) and the replies of the Department have been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

### **Audit findings**

The important points noticed in the course of review are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs:

### **3.1.7 Planning**

The MHA approved (February 2001) continuation of the MPF scheme in the State for a period of 10 years from 2000-01. Accordingly, the State Government prepared and submitted a five year Perspective Plan for 2001-05 for approval of GOI (July 2001). The formal approval of the Perspective Plan had not yet (May 2007) been received. The Department did not make any efforts for obtaining the approval of GOI. It was also observed that the Department was yet to prepare and forward the Perspective Plan for next five years (2005-10) even though the first five year plan had ended in March 2005.

- Funds for modernisation were released by the MHA on the basis of requirement projected by the State Police in their Annual Plans. However, the flow of funds lagged behind schedule as is evident from the fact that although the Annual Plans for the years 2000-01 to 2002-03 were approved by the SLEC in the respective years, the Central assistance pertaining to these years was released only between December 2003 and April 2005, i.e. after a lapse of one to three years.
- It was observed that the Annual Plans did not flow out of the Perspective Plan for the first five years. Requirements, which were not projected in the five year plan, were sent separately to MHA by the State Police. The Perspective Plan contained a proposal to provide Thief and Snatch proof Rifle Racks and Central Armoury Store Rooms (Secure – 8 Type) for the Quarter Guards of three MR battalions in a phased manner to be purchased at a total cost of Rs.3.47 crore. However, subsequently the Department changed (2004-05) the item of expenditure because of a change in priority and the equipment was not procured.
- The Perspective Plan also included a provision for raising a Dog Squad at a cost of Rs.4.99 lakh. Due to non-availability of willing Dog Trainers and non-procurement of puppies, the fund could not be utilised. Besides, Rs.51.94 lakh were projected in the Perspective Plan

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for procurement of vehicles and communication equipment, of which the State Government utilised (2003-06) Rs.46.38 lakh on the projected items resulting in savings of Rs.5.56 lakh. The savings were because of projection of higher cost of items in the Perspective Plan. With the approval of MHA, Rs.4.05 lakh out of Rs.5.56 lakh were utilised on procurement of weaponry and balance Rs.1.51 lakh (Rs.5.56 lakh – Rs.4.05 lakh) could not be utilised. The un-utilised balance of Rs.6.50 lakh (Rs.4.99 lakh + Rs.1.51 lakh) was deposited into Government Account in February 2006.

Thus, the *ad hoc* planning and casual and unfocused approach as well as non-prioritisation negated the need for modernisation of the State Police Force which also adversely affected the security preparedness of the State Police in trying times.

The Department stated (June 2007) that the flow of expenditure differed from the Perspective Plan to some extent depending upon immediate necessity.

### ***Financial management***

#### ***3.1.8 Poor financial management***

The financing of the programme was shared by the GOI and the State Government on 50:50 basis up to 2002-03. In 2003-04, Manipur was classified as an 'A' category State and it started receiving 100 *per cent* funding from the Centre for modernisation of police force. The expenditure for maintenance of the capital equipment provided by the Centre is to be met by the State Government through its budget. Miscellaneous security items (other than major security items like arms and weapons), which are not readily available on DGS&D rate contract, can be procured by the State Government after adopting the prescribed financial procedure and with prior approval of the MHA. All such proposals for procurement along with the anticipated expenditure are to be sent to MHA, which examines the proposals and accords approval. The State Government then procures the items as per the prescribed financial norms.

The year-wise approved outlay, funds released by GOI and the State Government and expenditure incurred during 2002-07 are depicted in the following table:

Table No.1

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Approved outlay	Releasable share		Actual release			Expenditure incurred	Savings (-) (w.r.t funds released)
		Centre	State	Centre	State	Total		
2002-03	21.00	10.50	10.50	0.59	0.02	0.61	0.58	(-) 0.03
2003-04	21.00	21.00	Nil	5.69 0.95*	Nil	6.64	6.64	Nil
2004-05	21.00	21.00	Nil	2.00 1.00*	Nil	3.00	3.00	Nil
2005-06	21.15	21.15	Nil	4.67 10.18*	Nil	14.85	14.85	Nil
2006-07	20.00	20.00	Nil	8.65	Nil	8.65	8.65	Nil
<b>Total:</b>	<b>104.15</b>	<b>93.65</b>	<b>10.50</b>	<b>33.73</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>33.75</b>	<b>33.72</b>	<b>(-) 0.03</b>

\* Paid directly by MHA to Manipur Police Housing Corporation for construction works.  
(Source: Departmental records)

During 2002-07, GOI had released Rs.33.73 crore against the total releasable amount of Rs.93.65 crore resulting in short release of Rs.59.92 crore (64 *per cent*). The State Government released only Rs.2 lakh against its releasable share of Rs.10.50 crore during the year 2002-03. Thus, total release of only Rs.33.75 crore against the approved outlay of Rs.104.15 crore during 2002-07 had adversely affected the modernisation programme.

### 3.1.9 Inflated expenditure on housing

During 2002-07, an amount of Rs.18.97 crore (Rs.12.13 crore from MHA, Rs.6.84 crore from the Department) were placed at the disposal of the Manipur Police Housing Corporation (MPHC) for construction of Police Stations, barracks for police personnel and Home Guards, office buildings, boundary fencing *etc.* Out of the above, only Rs.7.02 crore (37 *per cent*) were actually utilized as of March 2007 as per records of MPHC. However, the State Government showed the entire amount of Rs.18.97 crore as expenditure, resulting in inflated expenditure of Rs.11.95 crore, which was irregular.

### 3.1.10 Mobility

One of the major thrust areas of the MPF Scheme was to increase the mobility of the State Police Force to enable them to face the challenges to internal security duties effectively. Holding of adequate number of vehicles is essential for improving the mobility of police personnel and enhance their effectiveness. The State Police bought (2006-07) 25 motor cycles at a total cost of Rs.12.57 lakh and in addition, received 166 vehicles during 2002-07 from MHA in kind.

### 3.1.11 Short holding of vehicles by the districts and MR Battalions

Test-check of records of four selected districts<sup>5</sup> and two MR BNs (1<sup>st</sup> MR and 8<sup>th</sup> MR) revealed that holding of vehicles as of March 2007 was as follows:

<sup>5</sup> Imphal East, Thoubal, Churachandpur and Chandel.



**Table No.2****Position of short holding of vehicles by district formations as of March 2007**

Type of Vehicles	Imphal East			Thoubal			Churachandpur			Chandel		
	Require- ment	Holding	Off road	Require- ment	Holding	Off road	Require- ment	Holding	Off road	Require- ment	Holding	Off road
Non BP Jeep/Gypsy	42	26	11	39	34	11	12	12	5	14	17	8
BP Gypsy	14	18	1	13	10	1	9	4	1	11	2	1
Non BP Tata 407	11	6	-	10	8	5	7	3	-	9	8	3
BP Tata 407	12	2	-	11	4	1	7	2	1	9	2	1
Ambulance	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1
Bus	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Recovery Van	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
Prisoners' Van	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-
Water Cannon	1	1	-	1	-	-	NIL	-	-	NIL	-	-
Water Tanker	2	1	-	2	2	-	1	1	-	1	-	-
Tata Truck	3	3	-	3	2	1	3	3	1	3	2	-
Motorcycles	11	3	-	10	4	1	7	2	-	7	2	1
TOTAL	101	61	12	94	66	20	51	27	8	59	34	15
<b>Shortfall percentage</b>		<b>40</b>			<b>30</b>			<b>45</b>			<b>42</b>	
<b>Off road percentage</b>			<b>20</b>			<b>30</b>			<b>30</b>			<b>44</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

**Table No.3****Position of short holding of vehicles by the MR Battalions as of March 2007**

Type of Vehicle	1 <sup>st</sup> MR			8 <sup>th</sup> M.R		
	Requirement ( as per scale)	Holding	Off road	Requirement (as per scale)	Holding	Off road
Non BP Jeep/Gypsy	16	15	2	16	8	2
BP Gypsy	9	1	-	9	-	--
Non BP Tata 407	10	7	-	10	7	2
BP Tata 407	6	-	-	6	2	1
Tata Truck	5	2	1	5	5	2
Water Tanker	2	1	-	2	1	-
Bus	2	1	1	2	1	-
Mini Bus	1	-	-	1	-	-
Ambulance	1	1	-	1	1	-
Motor Cycles	3	3	-	3	2	-
Total	55	31	4	55	27	7
<b>Shortage percentage</b>		<b>44</b>			<b>51</b>	
<b>Off road percentage</b>			<b>13</b>			<b>26</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

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**Table No. 4****Position of short holding of vehicles by the State as a whole**

Type of vehicle	Scale as per requirement	Present holding	Shortage	Percentage of shortage
Tata truck	100	93	7	7
Water Tanker	41	24	17	41
Bus	42	38	4	10
Water Cannon	4	2	2	50
Prisoners' Van	22	2	20	91
Recovery Van	13	3	10	77
Ambulance	20	18	2	10
Non-BP Tata 407 Medium	239	118	121	51
BP Tata 407	182	50	132	73
Non-BP Gypsy/Jeep	617	593	24	4
BP Gypsy	255	85	170	67
NBP Ambassadors Car	25	24	1	4
BP Ambassador Car	12	10	2	17
Motor Cycle	174	128	46	26
Vajra Anti Riot Vehicle	4	2	2	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>1750</b>	<b>1190</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>32</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

It can be seen that there was severe shortage of vehicles ranging from 30 to 51 *per cent* impacting adversely the mobility of the force. It was also observed that 66 (27 *per cent*) out of total existing holding of 246 vehicles by six units<sup>6</sup> test-checked were off-road due to aging and were awaiting condemnation. Thus, 13 to 44 *per cent* of the total holding vehicles of these units were off-road and the effective availability of vehicles with police formations in relation to their actual requirement ranged from 32 to 49 *per cent*. Although 191 vehicles were procured during 2002-07 and issued to various units/district offices in the State, the gap between the requirement and holding of vehicles did not improve. Thus, the mobility of the units did not improve under the scheme which had a direct relation to their response time.

It will also be seen from the above table that overall shortage of different categories of vehicles by the State as a whole ranged from 4 to 91 *per cent* and the average shortage was 32 *per cent*. This had an adverse impact on the mobility of the State Police force. The Department admitted (June 2007) that vehicles received from MHA during 2002-07 are yet to fulfil the requirement of the State Police. It was further, stated (July 2007) that the shortfall would be augmented by funds provided under the modernisation scheme. The reply is indicative of the fact that the Department had failed to project its actual requirement of vehicles to the MHA during the years.

**3.1.12 Lack of secure residential buildings**

Secure housing is essential in a State like Manipur where law and order is adverse and effective policing requires provision of adequate secure housing

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<sup>6</sup> SP, Imphal East; SP, Chandel; SP, Churachandpur; SP, Thoubal; Commanding Officer (CO), 1<sup>st</sup> MR and CO, 8<sup>th</sup> MR.

infrastructure. Though there was a huge shortage of residential buildings ranging between 9 to 30 *per cent* for police personnel in the State, the State Government had not projected the requirements for new residential buildings in the Perspective Plan (2000-05). The satisfaction level in respect of residential buildings in the State as of March 2007 is depicted below:

**Table No.5**

Group	Strength	No. of persons provided with quarters	Housing satisfaction level ( <i>per cent</i> )
Lower Subordinates	13,605	1,258	9
Upper Subordinates	1,659	325	20
Officers	230	69	30
<b>Total:</b>	<b>15,494</b>	<b>1,652</b>	<b>11</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

Thus, overall satisfaction level was only 11 *per cent* which is very poor given the adverse law and order situation in the State due to presence of numerous underground groups in the State.

The Department also admitted (June 2007) that the housing satisfaction level is one the lowest in the country and that was due to low allocation of funds.

### **3.1.13 Non-completion of administrative buildings**

During 2002-07 the Manipur Police Housing Corporation (MPHC) had taken up 85 works of construction of Police Stations (52 works), barracks (12 works), compound fencing (1 work), office buildings (10 works), toilet/sentry post *etc.* (10 works), under the modernisation programme at a cost of Rs.18.97 crore. Of these, 57 taken up during 2002-06 were to be completed between October 2004 and August 2007 and the remaining 28 works were to be taken up during 2006-07 with stipulated date of completion between March 2007 and July 2008. Details of works taken up and their present status are as below:

**Table No.6**

Year	No. of works taken up	Stipulated date of completion	Present status			
			No. of works completed and handed over	No. of works completed but not handed over	No. of works in progress	No. of works not started
2002-03	3	October 2004	3	Nil	Nil	Nil
2003-04	10	June 2005 to August 2007	2	6	2	Nil
2004-05	8	August 2006 to October 2006	Nil	4	4	Nil
2005-06	36	July 2005 to October 2006	11	6	15	4
2006-07	28	March 2007 to July 2008	Nil	Nil	5	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>85</b>		<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

Out of 57 works taken up during 2002-06, only 16 works (28 *per cent*) were completed and handed over to the Department. Another 16 works, although completed between July 2005 and April 2006, were not handed over to the Department even after lapse of 12 to 21 months from the date of their completion. Besides, 22 works were in progress (June 2007) and site selection in respect of 4 works was yet to be finalised (June 2007) although works orders were issued (November 2005 to March 2007) to the contractors. It was observed that site was selected and work order issued without testing the soil

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in case of the work of construction of 'Water Storage Tank and Supplies System to the Laboratories' in the Forensic Science Laboratory, taken up in June 2005 at an estimated cost of Rs.19.95 lakh. The work had to be stopped due to poor soil condition after incurring an expenditure of Rs.5.10 lakh. This had an adverse impact upon the functioning of Forensic Laboratory.

### ***3.1.14 Procurement of POLNET, communication gadgets and other equipment***

One of the mainstays of operational strategy of the force is improved, effective and efficient communication system. It consists of providing the force with modern and sophisticated gadgets including Police Communication Network (POLNET). POLNET is a satellite based integrated network, which envisages installation of Very Small Aperture Terminals (V-SAT) and Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART) to link the national capital with all the State capitals. As per MHA's instructions, the project is to be implemented by 2005-06 by all the States. The main objective of implementation of POLNET is to obtain criminal data translation through sharing/disseminating information with other Police organisations/Central Para Military Forces (CPMF) inside and outside the State.

Audit scrutiny revealed that 13 Base Station Units (BSUs) including four BSU towers to be used as repeaters of POLNET System and 38 Remote Station Units (RSUs) were to be installed by 30 June 2005 by Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) in Manipur under the Programme at a cost of Rs.2.66 crore. The BEL however installed only nine BSUs and all 38 RSUs. The repeater towers were not installed due to non-receipt of equipments. Out of 38 RSUs installed, 26 RSUs were found to be defective/non-functional (May 2007) due to non-availability of Line of Sights (LOS) and lack of support from the BEL. Although a sum of Rs.33.11 lakh had been paid (February 2005 to March 2006) to the BEL by the MHA for maintenance of POLNET, the firm did not send any engineer to rectify the defective/non-functional RSUs. The equipment costing Rs.2.30 crore was lying idle.

The Department stated (June 2007) that commissioning of POLNET was delayed as technical experts from BEL had not reported despite reminders. Further, it was stated (September 2007) that there was no adverse effect of not commissioning the POLNET as the existing communication system was functioning effectively. The reply is not tenable as the desired objective of sharing/disseminating information with other police organisations/CPMF could not be achieved despite spending Rs.2.63 crore (Rs.2.30 crore on equipment and Rs.0.33 crore on maintenance charges).

### ***3.1.15 Procurement of wrong gadgets***

As per the Action Plan, the Intelligence Branch of the Manipur Police required 100 VHF hand held Transreceiver MS – F3 sets in order to revamp the branch and for effective intelligence gathering. The Department procured 100 ICOM F-3 wireless hand sets with other supporting accessories at a cost of Rs.16.28 lakh in March 2002 from M/s Magnostar, New Delhi and issued the gadgets to the Intelligence Branch in October 2004. However, the Intelligence Branch

returned the equipment back to the Director, Manipur Police Wireless (MPR) as the supplied items were different from what was proposed and were found un-suitable for use by Special Branch (SB) Personnel. Thus, the State Government had procured communication equipment of different specifications resulting in infructuous expenditure of Rs.16.28 lakh. The equipment procured (March 2002) remained unutilised (September 2007). As a result, the much needed revamping of the Intelligence Branch and effective intelligence gathering could not be accomplished.

The Department stated (June 2007) that the equipment were handed over to the Director, MPR for safe custody as Criminal Investigation Department does not have facilities for proper maintenance. The reply is not tenable as the items were of different make from what was proposed as the IGP (Intelligence) had also indicated (April 2007) to this effect.

### **3.1.16 Non- procurement of secrecy devices**

Audit scrutiny also revealed that 540 units of communication equipment like SIMCO PRM 8020 (lower version), SIMCO PRM 8020 (higher version), GP 338 Hand Held set, ICOM MS F – 310/F 3 required for communication system purchased during the period 2003-07 from Magnostar, New Delhi at a total cost of Rs.44.37 lakh, could not be commissioned due to non-procurement of secrecy devices and were lying idle (September 2007).

The Department stated (June 2007) that the procurement of secrecy devices was under consideration.

### **3.1.17 Non-availability of general policing equipment**

The Department projected (2006-07) its requirements for equipment/aids required for investigations, intelligence gathering and traffic control, *etc.* in its Annual Action Plan for 2006-07 and the proposal was approved by the MHA for procurement of 17 to 50 *per cent* of projected requirement of equipment at a cost of Rs.19.15 lakh. However, as funds were not released by the MHA, the required equipment could not be procured (March 2007). The requirement projected and approved is depicted in the following table:

**Table No.7**

Sl. No.	Type of equipment	Requirement as per scale	Holding	Shortfall	Qty approved by MHA as per projected requirements	Percentage approved by MHA
<b>A</b>	<b>Equipment for General Policing</b>					
	Breath Analyser (ALCOMETER)	53	NIL	53	9	17
<b>B</b>	<b>Equipment for Traffic Police</b>					
	Vehicle Immobiliser	4	NIL	4	1	25
	Night Reflective Jackets	151	NIL	151	30	20
	Nose Masks	151	NIL	151	30	20
	Hand Gloves and Night Red Gloves	151	NIL	151	30	20
	Cats' Eye Reflective Road Stand	100	NIL	100	50	50
	LED Baton	40	NIL	40	20	50

(Source: Departmental records)

The non-availability of general policing equipment had adversely affected the performance of the general policing and traffic control system. Thus, modernisation of the police forces in the State with these equipment/aids required for investigation/intelligence gathering and traffic control had remained unfulfilled.

### **3.1.18 Forensic Science Laboratory**

The modernisation programme aimed at equipping Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) in Manipur with state of the art equipment and trained staff. Provision of sophisticated equipment for chemical examination of various exhibits sent to the FSL and their investigation and early detection were the area of focus under the programme.

#### **3.1.19 Inadequate manpower**

Due to lack of equipment and non-filling up of one vacant post of viscera cutter, the Toxicology Division of the FSL remained non-functional (September 2007). Further, 36 (82 *per cent*) technical posts against minimum requirement of 44 posts, remained vacant in various Divisions of the FSL. Division-wise minimum requirement of staff and staff available therein are depicted in the following table:

**Table No.8**

Name of Division	Number of posts in a full fledged Division	Available manpower	Number of vacant posts (percentage)
Toxicology Division	8	2	6 (75)
Photography Division	7	1	6 (86)
Ballistics Division	8	1	7 (88)
Documents Division	7	1	6 (86)
Chemistry Division	7	2	5 (71)
Biology Division.	7	1	6 (86)
<b>Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>36 (82)</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

The MHA stressed (July 2006) upon filling up of the vacant posts i.e. 82 *per cent* on priority basis over procurement of further equipment for FSL. However, the vacant posts were not filled up (May 2007) because of imposition of ban on direct recruitment by the State Government. As a result, the Toxicology Division remained in-operational. Consequently, equipment procured (2004-05) at a cost of Rs.39.85 lakh for use in this Division could not be put to use. Other Divisions of the FSL were also not functioning properly. The posts of Assistant Directors and Scientific Officers were vacant in all the six Divisions. While admitting the fact, the Additional Director, FSL stated (June 2007) that no Division of the laboratory was functioning at the desired level because of lack of adequate manpower.

#### **3.1.20 Poor functioning of Forensic Laboratory**

Analysis report in a forensic case is required to be prepared immediately after the exhibit of the case is received. It was however observed in Audit that the



pendency of cases ranged between 73 to 82 *per cent* during 2002-07 as depicted in the following table:

**Table No.9**

Year	No. of cases received	Back log of previous years	Total cases received	No. of cases examined	No. of pending cases	Percentage of pendency
2002-03	295	820	1115	296	819	73
2003-04	307	819	1126	229	897	80
2004-05	214	897	1111	202	909	82
2005-06	254	909	1163	274	889	76
2006-07	169	889	1058	194	864	82

(Source: Departmental records)

The huge pendency of cases was attributed to shortage of technical manpower in the Divisions of the FSL. Year-wise pending cases is shown in the following table:

**Table No.10**

<i>Year</i>	<i>No. of cases</i>
1999-2002	245
2002-03	115
2003-04	132
2004-05	75
2005-06	154
2006-07	143
<b>Total:</b>	<b>864</b>

(Source: information furnished by FSL)

It would be seen that cases were pending for as long as eight years. In fact, it would be difficult to properly and accurately analyse the old cases due to the decomposition of ageing exhibits. Thus, the utility of the FSL in the State was largely frustrated.

### **3.1.21 *Weaponry and ammunition***

The State Government projected its requirement of various weapons in the Perspective Plan, the approval of which is awaited from MHA. Audit scrutiny revealed that the units at field level did not possess adequate number of weapons and ammunition prescribed to be held by them as per the scale. Further, some units like Chandel had not lifted new weapons from the PHQ as they were less in number and the units did not have adequate place for storing these weapons or firepower to prevent them from being snatched by militants.

### **3.1.22 *Short holding of weapons by units***

It was seen from the revised Annual Action Plan for 2006-07 that there was short-holding of weapons, both arms and ammunition, by the Department as of March 2007 as detailed below:

Table No.11

Type of arms and ammunition	Requirement (as per scale)	Present holding	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
<b>Arms</b>				
7.62 mm SLR	5,315	4,411	904	17
7.62 mm SLR magazine	31,890	16,456	15,434	48
AK-47 Rifle	6,794	2,114	4,680	69
AK-47 Rifle magazine	27,176	2,456	24,720	91
5.56 mm LMG	524	50	474	90
5.56 mm LMG magazine with accessories	13,100	1,250	11,850	90
MP 5 Carbine with magazine	18	Nil	18	100
Cartridge for MP 5 Carbine	5,000	Nil	5,000	100
51 mm Mortar	136	20	116	85
Glock Pistol for CID Personnel	150	Nil	150	100
<b>Ammunition</b>				
5.56 mm CTN	4,98,748	23,478	4,75,270	95
7.62 x 39 mm cartridge	12,22,920	5,50,904	6,72,016	55
7.62 mm CTN	5,60,272	2,11,570	3,48,702	62
7.62 mm BDR	10,55,175	6,60,316	3,94,859	37
.38 special cartridge	3,000	1,911	1,089	36
51 mm Mortar HE Bomb	9,928	1,600	8,328	84

(Source: Departmental records)

The shortfall with regard to arms was between 17 and 100 *per cent* while the shortfall in ammunition was between 36 and 95 *per cent*. Thus, one of the major objectives of the modernisation programme was only partially met, depriving the State Police of necessary means of combating insurgency.

### 3.1.23 Holding of unserviceable weapons

Test-check of records of offices of SPs of four<sup>7</sup> selected districts and two MR Battalions, revealed that the units were holding 703 unserviceable weapons of various kinds (details at *Appendix 3.1*). However, no action was taken for the disposal/replacement of these weapons by issuing serviceable weapons to the units and most of the weapons held by the units were of vintage. Modern sophisticated weapons have not been provided in adequate numbers to meet the operational needs of the State Police. It is particularly serious as Manipur is an insurgency prone State and was graded 'A' category by the GOI.

### 3.1.24 Human resource management

Acquisition of superior weapons, communication and other equipment would become meaningful only if the vacancies in various ranks/technical posts are filled up and adequate training on use of modern gadgets is imparted. But non-filling up of vacancies and inadequate training on weapons acquired by the State Police under MPF contributed to a great extent towards non-achievement of its objectives.

<sup>7</sup> Imphal East, Chandel, Churachandpur and Thoubal

### 3.1.25 Vacancies in State Police

The High Powered Committee of the MHA stressed (July 2006) the need for filling up vacancies in the ranks on priority basis so that the assistance made available under the MPF scheme could be optimally utilized. It was also suggested that 10 *per cent* representation of women in the Police should be achieved in a time bound manner. But the position in the State (March 2007) is as follows:

**Table No.12**

#### **Sanctioned strength and men-in-position**

Ranks	Sanctioned Strength			Men-in-position			Shortfall			Percentage of shortfall	
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Subedar Major	6	Nil	6	6	Nil	6	Nil	Nil	Nil	-	-
Subedar	93	Nil	93	92	Nil	92	1	Nil	1	1	-
Inspector	96	2	98	90	Nil	90	6	2	8	2	100
Sub-Inspector	353	5	358	281	3	284	72	2	74	20	40
Jamandar	291	Nil	291	198	Nil	198	93	Nil	93	32	-
Havildar	2189	Nil	2189	1380	Nil	1380	809	Nil	809	37	-
Head Constable	465	43	508	421	40	461	44	3	47	9	7
Constable	3302	430	3732	3280	191	3471	22	239	261	1	56
Constable Driver	49	Nil	49	26	Nil	26	23	Nil	23	47	-
Rifleman	7837	Nil	7837	6411	Nil	6411	1426	Nil	Nil	18	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>14,681</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>15,161</b>	<b>12,185</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>12,419</b>	<b>2,496</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>2,742</b>	<b>18</b>	

(Source: Departmental records)

It may be seen from the above table that as of March 2007, there were 2,742 vacancies in various ranks which constituted 18 *per cent* of the sanctioned strength. Further, representation of women in the force was only three *per cent*. Against sanctioned posts of 480, it was noticed that 246 posts (51 *per cent*) were lying vacant. Thus, the State Government had failed to take steps to fill up the vacancies and to reduce the gender gap as suggested by the MHA.

The PHQ stated (September 2007) that 206 posts of women constables had since been filled up and the process of filling up another 19 posts was underway.

### 3.1.26 Poor training facilities

2,250 police personnel attended 124 training courses during 2002 to 2006 in and outside the State. Of these, 23 training courses were organised by the Manipur Police Training School (MPTS) which were attended by 2,042 trainees. However, the courses were essentially basic training and refresher courses and no training was imparted on modern weapon systems in MPTS. The IGP stated (April 2007) that practice on certain weapons could not be imparted by the MPTS as the said weapons were not in the custody of the training institute. Besides, the training institute also required more SLRs to give extensive practice to the trainees as this category of weapon is most commonly used by most of the MR Battalions/District Police. It was further stated that the training institute also needed 'passive night vision' and 'telescopic sight' of INSAS Rifles. Thus, although it possessed the expertise to impart training in the use of these sophisticated weapons, the training institute lacked the basic training aids. This impeded capacity building and dissemination of technical know-how to the police personnel.

### **3.1.27 Impact of modernisation programme on striking power of the State Police**

Manipur is an insurgency prone state with several militant organisations active in different parts of the State. One of the major objectives of the Modernisation of State Police was to improve its strike rate to combat the activities of the militant organisations in the State. Audit scrutiny, however, revealed that during 2002-07, there was no reduction in crime rate and the law and order had not improved despite implementation of the modernisation programme in the State.

### **3.1.28 No reduction in crime rate**

The position regarding number of crimes committed and number of cases registered during 2002-07 is depicted in the table below:

**Table No.13**

Year	Number of crimes committed	Number of cases registered	Percentage of cases registered
2002-03	2458	699	28
2003-04	2484	614	25
2004-05	2531	450	18
2005-06	2911	539	19
2006-07	2886	483	17

(Source: Annual Administrative Reports)

It would be evident from the above table that though number of crimes committed during the period increased by 17 *per cent*, the number of cases registered had declined gradually from 28 *per cent* in 2002-03 to 17 *per cent* in 2006-07. This seems to suggest that people seek justice elsewhere rather than from police because of disturbed law and order situation prevailing in the State. It is also possible that people do not have confidence in the ability of the police to solve their cases, considering the meagre number of cases settled by the police over the years, as brought out in paragraph 3.1.20 (Table No.9).

### **3.1.29 Number of persons killed, injured and arrested**

The position of civilians, police personnel and extremists killed/injured during 2002-07 is as below:

**Table No. 14**

Year	No. of persons killed			No. of persons injured		
	Civilians	Policemen	Extremists	Civilians	Policemen	Extremists
2002-03	9	12	140	14	30	NIL
2003-04	69	20	9	20	42	NIL
2004-05	89	35	132	124	112	NIL
2005-06	55	21	55	50	28	NIL
2006-07	128	29	120	8	49	NIL
<b>Total</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>NIL</b>

(Source: Annual Administrative Reports)

It can be seen that the number of civilian casualties have gone up steeply from nine in 2002-03 to 128 in 2006-07 but the casualties in respect of

extremists declined from 140 in 2002-03 to 55 in 2005-06 and to 120 in 2006-07. The casualties in respect of police have shot up from 12 in 2002-03 to 29 in 2006-07. It will also be seen that 477 persons (Civilian: 216, Policemen: 261) were injured during the years 2002-07 as a result of counter insurgency operations. However, there was no instance of any extremist being injured during this period.

Thus, there was no desirable improvement in the striking capability of Manipur Police due to the modernisation programme.

### **3.1.30 Arms and ammunition recovered**

Audit scrutiny also revealed that the number of extremists arrested/surrendered and arms and ammunition recovered did not show any encouraging sign during the past five years. Details are depicted below:

**Table No. 15**

Year	Number of extremists arrested	Number of extremists surrendered	Number of arms recovered	No. of ammunition recovered	Type of weapons recovered
2002-03	529	16	90	967	Rocket launcher, Hand Grenade, Lethod Bombs, Bombs, Detonator, Explosives, W.T Set, IED etc.
2003-04	1149	03	290	2022	
2004-05	687	07	141	2013	
2005-06	894	23	305	2728	
2006-07	780	21	165	1841	

(Source: Annual Administrative Reports)

It was observed in Audit that despite considerable investment in weaponry under the programme, there was no significant improvement in arrest and surrender of the extremists. The arms and ammunition recovered from militants also included rocket launchers, which shows that rather than getting dissipated, extremists were acquiring more sophisticated weapons. The Department admitted (June 2007) that underground elements operating in the State were well-equipped with sophisticated weapons including rocket launchers. This indicates that the capability of the State Police Force is a mismatch with that of the underground insurgent groups.

### **3.1.31 Snatching of arms and ammunition by the terrorists**

Test-check of records of four selected districts and two M.R. Battalions revealed that a large number of arms and ammunition were snatched by the extremists on various occasions (2002-07) from the personnel of 1<sup>st</sup> MR, 8<sup>th</sup> MR, SP, Churachandpur and SP, Thoubal. The snatched weapons include 127 arms and 7,939 rounds of various ammunition/magazine (Details are given in the *Appendix 3.2*).

The above fact highlights the intensity of terrorism in the State and ineffectiveness of State Police force, which does not seem to suggest any improvement in the striking capacity of the Police force.

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### **3.1.32 Monitoring and evaluation**

The SLEC has been entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the physical and financial progress of the programme. Although, it was stated that SLEC met every year before finalisation of the Annual Action Plan, the Department could produce records relating to only two meetings of the committee held during May 2001 and March 2002. No other monitoring mechanism was adopted by the State Government to watch proper implementation of the programme and no evaluation of the scheme was undertaken to assess its impact.

### **3.1.33 Conclusion**

The modernisation programme of State Police in Manipur suffered on account of poor planning and inadequate funds. Both the GOI and the State Government failed to release the approved outlay for various components of the programme, which affected the implementation of the programme adversely. There was shortfall in the number of vehicles required by the force. The programme also suffered on account of inadequacy in modern weapons as well as lack of training of police personnel. Secure residential housing for the police personnel was meagre, being only 11 *per cent*. Forensic Science Laboratory is almost non-functional due to lack of trained staff and equipment procured were not put to use. Communication system suffered on account of mismatch between equipment required and equipment procured. POLNET is non-functional due to lack of maintenance support by the BEL. The programme was being implemented on an *ad hoc* basis and did not have the desired impact on the prevailing adverse law and order situation in the State.

### **3.1.34 Recommendations**

- Five year Perspective Plan should be formulated in a timely manner and Annual Action Plans should flow out of the Perspective Plan.
- Modern vehicles and sophisticated weapons should be procured as per need and norms, to equip the Police force with state of art vehicles and equipment to deal with the challenges of terrorism.
- POLNET and other communication systems should be commissioned at the earliest.
- Residential housing infrastructure should be created to provide secure housing to police personnel.
- FSL should be fully staffed and provided with all the essential equipment for quick analysis of cases to meet the ends of justice
- Training infrastructure available in the State should be strengthened in order to accelerate capacity building by quicker assimilation of new technologies and policing methods.



## Appendix 3.1

(Reference : Paragraph 3.1.23)

### Statement of unserviceable weapons as of March 2007

Nature of Weapon	SP, Imphal East	SP, Thoubal	SP, Chandel	SP, Churachandpur	Ist MR	8th MR	Total
.303 Rifle No.1 MK 11	16	-	-	18	-	16	50
.303 Rifle No.IV MK 1	-	-	-	-	1	42	43
GF Rifle	-	-	-	-	-	14	14
GFD Cup	-	-	-	-	-	14	14
.303 LMG	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
LMG Magazine	-	-	-	-	-	13	13
.303 LMG S/Barrel	-	-	-	-	5	4	9
4-sec Detonator	-	-	-	-	-	187	187
7-sec Detonator	-	-	-	-	-	57	57
.38 Pistol	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
.38 Revolver No.2 MK-1	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
.38 Revolver	3	7	-	-	-	-	10
.45 Revolver	-	8	-	-	-	-	8
9 mm Pistol	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Carbine	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
7.62 mm SLR	12	12	1	6	-	-	31
Sten MK-11	3	-	5	3	1	-	12
.303 Rifle No.1 MK-III	-	18	21	-	7	-	46
Sten MK-IV/V/II	-	5	-	-	2	-	7
MMG-Vicker, .303 Barrel	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
SMC Carbine Magazine	-	-	-	-	13	-	13
SMC Carbine	-	1	-	-	3	-	4
VL Pistol	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
.303 LMG	-	-	-	-	11	-	11
2" Mortar	-	-	-	-	10	-	10
.303 Rifle No.1 MK-III	-	-	-	-	55	-	55
.303 Rifle No.IV MK-1	-	-	-	-	33	-	33
.303 Rifle MK-IV	-	17	17	-	-	-	34
SMC Carbine Magazine	-	-	-	-	30	-	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>349</b>	<b>703</b>

(Source: Departmental records)

## Appendix 3.2

(Reference : Paragraph 3.1.31)

## Statement of arms and ammunition snatched by the extremists

Sl. No.	Weapon	Number of weapons snatched	Number of ammunition snatched
<b>Snatched from CO, 1<sup>st</sup> MR Battalion</b>			
1	.303 LMG	01	168 rounds of GIN 4
2	.303 Rifle MK-III	02	100 rounds of BDR
3	7.62 MM SLR	05	11 Magazines (220 rounds)
4	SMC Carbine	03	07 Magazines (180 rounds)
5	.303 Rifle MK-I	03	60 rounds
6	7.62 x 39 mm A.K 47	-	01 Magazine (20 rounds)
<b>Snatched from SP, Churachandpur.</b>			
1	.303 Rifle	06	-
2	Stengun MK - II	02	-
<b>Snatched from CO, 8<sup>th</sup> MR Battalion</b>			
1	No. 1 MK – III Rifle.	03	3684 BDR round
2	No. 4 MK –IV Rifle	038	2255 CTR round
3	No. MK I Bayonet	02	-
4	GF Rifle , Discharger Cap	02	-
5	Sten gun MK-II	10	16 Magazines
6	SMC – IAI	05	9 Magazines
7	7.62 mm SLR	09	26 magazines (500 rounds)
8	9 mm Pistol	03	i). 08 magazines (630 rounds)
9	.303 LMG	11	74 magazines
10	2” Mortar	02	-
11	.303s/Cartridges	-	20 rounds
12	No. 36 Hand grenade	-	08 numbers
13	4 second Igniters set	-	06 numbers
14	Rifle grenade	-	08 numbers
15	7 second ignite	-	17 numbers
16	2” mortal signal bomb Rcd	-	2 numbers
<b>Snatched from SP, Thoubal</b>			
1	MK-III Rifle	16	-
2	MK-IV Rifle	9	-
3	.38 Revolver	5	-
4	SM carbine	3	-
5	7.62 mm SLR	5	-
6	9 mm Pistol	3	-
7	Sten MK-II	1	-

(Source: Departmental records)

## HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

### 3.3 Modernisation of Police Force

#### *Highlights*

*The scheme of Modernisation of Police Force was launched by the GOI for modernising the police force in the country to enable them to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. The planning for implementation of the scheme in the State was not effective. Important components under the scheme, like police infrastructure, mobility, etc. did not get priority during actual implementation. The financial management of the scheme was poor and allocated funds could not be utilised. Consequently, the objectives of the scheme could not be realised even after 37 years of its implementation.*

- The Central and State Governments had not released Rs.23.94 crore to the implementing Department thereby adversely affecting the implementation of the scheme. Delay in release of Central assistance also led to ineffective implementation of the scheme and non-utilisation of funds by the Department.

(Paragraphs 3.3.9.2, 3.3.9.3 & 3.3.9.4)

- The Department failed to provide basic infrastructure to its police force, like buildings for Police Stations/Out Posts, rest rooms and toilets for the women police.

(Paragraphs 3.3.11.2 & 3.3.11.3)

- The intention of increasing the mobility of police force was defeated because of failure of the Department in providing the required number of vehicles to its force as per norms.

(Paragraph 3.3.12)

- There was short supply of weapons to the police force despite incurring an expenditure of Rs.1.69 crore during 2002-07.

(Paragraph 3.3.13.1)

- The functioning of the Police Training School in the State was not effective because of shortfall in imparting professional training as well as in conducting weaponry practice to the police personnel.

(Paragraph 3.3.14.1)

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
### 3.3.1 Introduction

The scheme 'Modernisation of Police Force' (MPF) was launched in 1969-70 by the GOI for modernising the police forces in the country to enable them to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security. The basic objective of the scheme was to meet the deficiencies in the State Police Force and to achieve its planned development and modernisation. A revised scheme involving substantial Central assistance was launched by the GOI in February 2001 for a ten year period starting from 2000-01. The main components of the scheme are Housing, Buildings, Mobility, Training, Equipment, Communication and Computerisation. The scheme is being implemented in Meghalaya since 1973-74.

### 3.3.2 Organisational Set Up

At the Government level, the Commissioner and Secretary of the Home (Police) Department is responsible for overseeing the implementation of MPF. There is a State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) set up (May 2001) under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to monitor the implementation of the modernisation plan. Organisational structure for implementation of the scheme in the State is detailed below:

**Chart 3.3**



### 3.3.3 Scope of Audit

A review of the implementation of the scheme during 2002-03 to 2006-07 was conducted through a test-check (April-May 2007) of the records of the Home (Police) Department, Director General of Police (DGP) and Inspector General of Police (IGP) covering 41 *per cent* (Rs.12.54 crore) of the total expenditure

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of Rs.30.24 crore. Out of seven districts in the State, three<sup>1</sup> were selected for audit. In the selected districts, records of the Superintendent of Police (SP), two Police Battalions<sup>2</sup> (out of four), five unit offices<sup>3</sup>, six (out of 27) Police Stations<sup>4</sup> and two outposts<sup>5</sup> (out of 55) were test-checked. Besides, records of the Police Training School and Directorate of Forensic Science Laboratory were also test-checked. Results of the review are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### **3.3.4 Audit Objectives**

The performance review was conducted with the objective of assessing whether:

- the objectives envisaged in Police Modernisation plan were achieved;
- planning for implementation of the scheme was carried out in a sound manner;
- adequate funds were provided by the Central/State Governments and funds were utilised for the intended purpose;
- various components of the scheme were implemented economically, efficiently and effectively and as per approved plan/prescribed norms; and,
- implementation of the scheme was effectively monitored.

#### **3.3.5 Audit Criteria**

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Perspective Plan of the Department;
- Norms prescribed by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D);
- Prescribed output and benchmarks of performance;
- Norms regarding satisfaction level of housing, training of the police personnel, creation of infrastructure and procurement of weaponry; and,
- Monitoring mechanism prescribed.

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<sup>1</sup> East Khasi Hills, West Garo Hills and Jaintia Hills Districts.

<sup>2</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Meghalaya Police Battalion.

<sup>3</sup> Police Training School, Meghalaya Police Radio Organisation, Forensic Science Laboratory, Special Branch and State Crime Record Bureau/Criminal Investigation Department.

<sup>4</sup> Shillong Sadar, Laitumkhrah, Tura Sadar, Phulbari, Jowai and Khliehriat Police Stations.

<sup>5</sup> Selsela and Rajabala Outposts.

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### 3.3.6 Audit Methodology

An entry conference was held in April 2007 with the IGP (HQ) wherein the audit objectives, scope and criteria were explained and suggestions as well as perceptions relating to the strengths and weaknesses of the Department in implementing the scheme were discussed.

For the performance review, districts and battalions were selected on the basis of stratified random sampling. Perspective plan, annual plans, utilisation of funds allotted by the Union and State Governments, execution of various activities, *etc.* were analysed using the available data. Audit findings were discussed with the Commissioner and Secretary of the Department in an exit conference on 25 October 2007 and the replies of the Department have been incorporated at appropriate places in the review.

### Audit Findings

#### 3.3.7 Plan Formulation

Proper planning is imperative for achieving the objectives of a programme in a systematic and efficient manner. A Perspective Plan for the period 2000-05 was drawn up (recast afresh in September 2001) by the Department involving an outlay of Rs.50.74 crore. The Annual Plans (APs) were to flow from the five year plan. For the years 2002-07, APs involving an outlay of Rs.54.17 crore were approved by the GOI.

##### 3.3.7.1 Delay in Submission/Approval of Annual Plan

The details regarding submission/approval of AP by the State Government were as follows:

**Table 3.13**

Year	Due date of submission of the annual action plan to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)	Date of submission	Date of approval by MHA
2002-03	31 May 2002	4 September 2002	13 November 2002
2003-04	15 May 2003 (extended up to 7 November 2003)	28 October 2003	18 November 2003
2004-05	20 April 2004	17 June 2004	27 July 2004
2005-06	15 May 2005	25 May 2005	13 July 2005
2006-07	5 May 2006	13 July 2006	12 September 2006

*Source: Correspondence of the MHA and the Department.*

From the above, it is seen that the State Government had delayed the submission of the AP to the MHA for all the years except 2003-04. The delays ranged up to three months. Consequently, the approval of the AP by the MHA was also delayed and in two out of five years, the MHA approved the plan in the third quarter of the relevant financial year leaving insufficient time to spend the scheme funds in the same year.



### 3.3.8 Funding Pattern

The expenditure under MPF was financed during 2002-03 on 50:50 basis by the Union and the State Governments. The ratio was changed to 75:25 during 2003-06. Thereafter, the scheme was fully funded by the GOI.

The Central share during 2002-03 was in the form of 50 *per cent* grant and 50 *per cent* loan. In addition to release of funds to the State Government, the GOI released funds out of its share to different agencies as cost of vehicles, arms and ammunitions, *etc.* to be supplied to the State (termed as assistance in kind).

### 3.3.9 Financial Management

#### 3.3.9.1 Financial Position

Funds released by the Central and the State Governments during 2002-07 for implementation of the MPF (including Central assistance in kind<sup>6</sup>), expenditure incurred thereagainst and unutilised funds were as under:

**Table 3.14**

(Rupees in crore)

Year	Appro-ved outlay	Central share (Per cent)	State share (Per cent)	Ope-ning bala-nce	Funds received from Centre	Funds received from State	Total funds avai-lable	Expen-diture	Unspent balance (Per cent)
					Cash (assis-tance in kind)				
2002-03	10.37	5.19 <sup>(7)</sup> (50)	5.18 <sup>(7)</sup> (50)	0.25	0.42 (0.12)	5.17	5.84	5.60	0.24 (4)
2003-04	9.88	7.41 (75)	2.47 (25)	0.24	1.56 (3.83)	1.45	3.25	1.45	1.80 (55)
2004-05	10.90	8.18 (75)	2.72 (25)	1.80	2.00 (5.59)	0.55	4.35	0.58	3.77 (87)
2005-06	15.02	11.27 (75)	3.75 (25)	3.77	1.78 (2.29)	...	5.55	2.89	2.66 (48)
2006-07	8.00	8.00 (100)	Nil	2.66	4.53 (3.36)	...	7.19	4.53	2.66 (37)
<b>Total</b>	<b>54.17</b>	<b>40.05</b>	<b>14.12</b>		<b>10.29 (15.19)</b>	<b>7.17</b>		<b>15.05</b>	

Source: Approved Annual Plans, GOI's sanction letters and information furnished by the Under Secretary of the Department.

From the above it will be observed that in none of the years did the Centre and the State contribute their full complement of funds. The funds short received ranged between 1 *per cent* and 73 *per cent* and totalled Rs.21.52 crore. Further, even out of the funds received, the Department was unable to utilise them fully. The percentage of unspent funds ranged between 4 and 87.

In addition, assistance of Rs.8.97 crore was released in kind by the GOI during 2002-05 under the Special Central Assistance/ Reimbursement of Security Related Expenditure (SRE) schemes. The year-wise position was as under:

<sup>6</sup> Weaponry, vehicles, other equipment, *etc.*

<sup>(7)</sup> Difference of Rs.0.01 crore is due to rounding.

**Table 3.15****(Rupees in crore)**

Items	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05
Vehicles	2.00	1.98	...
Bullet Proofing of Vehicles	1.20	...	0.14
Communication Equipment	1.09	1.10	...
Arms and Ammunition	1.46	...	...
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.75</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>0.14</b>

Source: Information provided by Assistant Inspector General of Police (Administration).

### 3.3.9.2 Short release of Central Funds

The Department could not utilise 4 to 87 *per cent* of funds available during 2002-07, mainly due to late release of funds by the GOI during the last month of the financial years 2003-04 (Rs.1.56 crore), 2004-05 (Rs.2 crore), 2005-06 (Rs.1.78 crore) and 2006-07 (Rs.4.53 crore).

The State Government also released the funds to the implementing Department after a delay of 4 to 11 months, as detailed below:

**Table 3.16****(Rupees in crore)**

Year	Amount released by the GOI	Month and year of release by the GOI	Amount released by the State Government	Month and year of release by the State Government	Delay (in months)	Short release of Central funds
2003-04	1.56	March 2004	0.03	August 2004	4	1.53
2004-05	2.00	March 2005	1.03	January 2006	9	...
			0.25	March 2006	11	0.72
2005-06	1.78	March 2006	1.61	December 2006	8	0.17
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.34</b>		<b>2.92</b>			<b>2.42</b>

Source: Copies of release orders of funds and Cash Books.

Release of funds by the GOI at the fag end of the years 2003-07, however, left the Department little time to utilise the amount within the financial year.

Besides delay in release of funds, Central funds of Rs.2.42 crore were not released by the State Government to the implementing Department thereby adversely affecting the implementation of the scheme.

### 3.3.9.3 Shortfall in Release of Funds by the GOI


Though the GOI was committed for providing assistance of Rs.40.05 crore during 2002-03 to 2006-07, the assistance released to the State Government was only Rs.25.48 crore (cash: Rs.10.29 crore; kind: Rs.15.19 crore), resulting in shortfall in Central assistance by Rs.14.57 crore.

### 3.3.9.4 Short Release of Funds by the State Government

Against Rs.14.12 crore due to be released by the State Government (as per the funding pattern) during 2002-07 for implementation of the MPF, the actual release was Rs.7.17 crore only. Thus, there was short release of Rs.6.95 crore

violating the condition for sharing of funds. Year-wise position is given below:

**Chart 3.4**



Source: Approved Annual Plans and information furnished by the Under Secretary of the Department.

### 3.3.10 Implementation and Progress of Police Modernisation

The annual plans for the years 2002-07 approved by the MHA provided for implementation of various components under the MPF scheme during the period. The various components, approved outlay for each component for 2002-07 and expenditure incurred thereagainst are given below:

**Table 3.17**

Components	Approved outlay	(Rupees in crore)		
		Expenditure incurred		
		Cash	Kind	Total (Percentage to approved outlay)
Buildings	21.31	...	9.65	9.65 (45)
Mobility	11.47	3.72	2.76	6.48 (56)
Weaponry	2.28	0.31	1.38	1.69 (74)
Training	0.62	0.31	...	0.31 (50)
Security equipment	3.40	2.72	...	2.72 (80)
Communication system	7.17	3.48	0.67	4.15 (58)
Forensic Science Laboratory equipment	1.56	0.60	0.64	1.24 (79)
Common Integrated Police Application Project	0.15	...	0.09	0.09 (60)
Others	6.21	3.91	...	3.91 (63) <sup>(8)</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>54.17</b>	<b>15.05</b>	<b>15.19</b>	<b>30.24</b>

Source: Approved Annual Plans, Release Order of funds and Utilisation Certificates.

<sup>(8)</sup> Office automation (Rs.2.95 crore); Aids to investigation (Rs.0.41 crore); Items for traffic (Rs.0.30 crore); Home Guards (Rs.0.25 crore).

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Position of implementation of some of the major components of the scheme is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

### **3.3.11 Buildings**

#### **3.3.11.1 Low Level of Satisfaction in Housing**

The BPR&D in its Five Year Projection on Modernisation and Upgradation of Police Infrastructure opined (March 2000) that the performance of the police was better in States where accommodation was available in large numbers. The National Police Commission (NPC) also recommended 100 *per cent* accommodation for all police personnel. As per the BPR&D data, for 100 *per cent* satisfaction, the State required 7,338 quarters for lower subordinates<sup>9</sup> and 365 quarters for upper subordinates<sup>9</sup> of police force.

During 2002-07, construction of 46 quarters were taken up under the MPF scheme against the approved outlay of Rs.1.21 crore (upper subordinates: Rs.69 lakh; lower subordinates: Rs.52 lakh). Though the entire amount was advanced (2002-07) to the executing agency (Meghalaya Government Construction Corporation Limited) for construction of the targeted number of quarters, 10 quarters remained incomplete (March 2007). Failure to complete targeted number of quarters under the MPF scheme showed the apathy of the Department in achieving the satisfaction level in respect of housing which has a significant bearing on the performance of the Police force in the State.

#### **3.3.11.2 Failure to provide basic Infrastructure to the Police Force**

Police Station (PS) is one of the most important field operative units. Hence it is important that it is located and accommodated in a proper building for smooth functioning. As per the BPR&D, each PS and Out Post (OP) must have a building, boundary wall, cost of which was also worked out by the BPR&D as Rs.21.87 lakh and Rs.9.37 lakh per PS and OP respectively. But 35 out of 82 PSs and OPs in the State were functioning in semi-permanent buildings, as detailed below:

**Table 3.18**

Category	Existing number	Accommodation in semi-permanent buildings
Police Stations	27	12
Outposts	51	19
Border Outposts	4	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>35</b>

*Source: Information furnished by the Assistant Engineer (Civil), Engineering Cell*

Though construction of seven buildings for two PSs and five OPs at the approved cost of Rs.1.51 crore was taken up during 2003-07, two of these buildings (taken up in 2005-06) for the Rongara and Borsora Police OPs were not completed. The physical progress of these works was 20 *per cent* (March 2007). Financial progress is not available.

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<sup>9</sup> Lower Subordinates: Constables and Head Constables.  
Upper Subordinates: Assistant Sub-Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors.

Similarly, construction of eight buildings (2003-07) approved by the MHA at a cost of Rs.3.99 crore for the Meghalaya Police Radio Organisation, Police Reserve, *etc.* were either not completed or in progress. The details are as under:

**Table 3.19**

Particulars of the buildings	Year	Works taken up		Works in progress		Works not started	
		Number of works	Cost approved by the MHA	Number of works	Progressive expenditure	Number of works	Approved cost
			(Rupees in lakh)		(Rupees in lakh)		(Rupees in lakh)
Repeater Station buildings	2004-05 & 2006-07	4	102.00	2	18.50	2	52.00
Meghalaya Police Radio Organisation Building	2005-06 & 2006-07	2	179.00	1	76.50	1	29.00
Border management Headquarters	2004-05	1	100.00	1	14.00	...	...
Police Reserve Building, Baghmara	2003-04	1	18.00	...	...	1	18.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>399.00</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>109.00</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>99.00</b>

*Source: Information furnished by the Assistant Engineer (Civil), Engineering Cell.*

Despite shortfall in proper buildings for the police force, construction works of four buildings (approved cost: Rs.99 lakh) taken up during 2003-2007 were not started by the Department (March 2007), indicating lack of initiative in providing basic infrastructure to the police force.

### **3.3.11.3 Absence of Basic Amenities for the Women Police Personnel**

According to the BPR&D, in all zonal offices, range offices, reserve lines, SP's office, sub-divisions and police stations, a rest room and a toilet were to be provided for women police. For Meghalaya, the cost of the rest room and the toilet for 38 of these offices was worked out (March 2000) by the BPR&D as Rs.34.20 lakh. In the test-checked PS and OP, four PSs were provided with such basic amenities for women police. In one of the test-checked PSs (Tura), rest room was not provided although toilet was available. The position of these amenities in respect of the Laitumkhrah Police Station was not furnished.

The Deputy Secretary of the Department (DS) stated (October 2007) that the rest rooms and toilets could not be provided because the cost of these amenities as worked out by the BPR&D was quite less. The reply did not indicate whether the GOI was approached to increase the cost.

### **3.3.12 Mobility**

Police mobility is inextricably linked to their performance. The BPR&D has prescribed scales for various types of operational vehicles required for Police Stations, District Armed Reserve and Armed Police Battalion. Against the approved outlay of Rs.11.47 crore for providing mobility during 2002-07, expenditure during the period was Rs.6.48 crore.

The requirement of vehicles for the police force as per BPR&D's norms (January 1998) and actual position in the test-checked districts as of March 2007 are shown below:

**Table 3.20**

Category of vehicles	Unit	Total vehicles		Excess (+)
		Required	Available	Shortage (-)
		(In numbers)		
Heavy Vehicles	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> MLP Battalions	58	22	(-) 36
	SPs of three Districts <sup>10</sup>	21	25	(+) 4
		79	47	(-) 32
Medium Vehicles	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> MLP Battalions	16	12	(-) 4
	SPs of three Districts	51	33	(-) 18
	Six Police Stations	-	1	(+) 1
		67	46	(-) 21
Light Vehicles	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> MLP Battalions	26	30	(+) 4
	SPs of three Districts	42	128	(+) 86
	Six Police Stations	12	9	(-) 3
		80	167	(+) 87
Motor Cycles	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> MLP Battalions	10	5	(-) 5
	SPs of three Districts	21	30	(+) 9
	Six Police Stations	18	2	(-) 16
	Two Police Outposts	4	Nil	(-) 4
		53	37	(-) 16
Total		279	297	

*Source: Information furnished by the Commandants of Battalions, SPs of Districts and in-charge of Police Stations/Out Posts.*

The above table shows that the two battalions are functioning with a shortage of 40 heavy and medium vehicles and five motor cycles. Similarly, there was shortage of 18 medium vehicles with the SPs of three districts. Six PSs and two OPs were also operating with a shortage of three light vehicles and 20 motor cycles. In contrast, 90 light vehicles were provided in excess of requirement to the SPs of three districts (86 vehicles) and two battalions (four vehicles). Since there was shortage of heavy and medium vehicles and motor cycles with the PSs/OPs and the battalions, retention of excess vehicles with the SPs was not justified.

Further, against 260 available vehicles (heavy, medium and light), the sanctioned strength of drivers was 217 and the men-in-position was 208. Thus, there was short deployment of 52 drivers against the available vehicles.

Shortage of required vehicles with the battalions and PSs/OPs and shortfall in availability of drivers indicated mobility deficiency and inability to mobilise the force at short notice for emergency operations. Failure to meet the mobility deficiency in the police force despite availability of funds and expending Rs.6.48 crore during 2002-07 showed the lackadaisical attitude of the Department towards improvement of the effectiveness of police force.

The DS stated (October 2007) that as the light vehicles are more suitable and compatible to the difficult road conditions and hostile hilly terrain of the State, these were provided in excess of requirement. The reply is not tenable

<sup>10</sup> East Khasi Hills, Jaintia Hills and West Garo Hills Districts.



because the action of the Department is contrary to the BPR&D norms and also because excess light vehicles were provided to the SPs rather than the PS, where the operational need is more.

### 3.3.13 Weaponry

#### 3.3.13.1 Shortfall in Supply of Weaponry and Equipment

One of the important aspects of modernisation and upgradation of police force is the scale of weapons with which the police force has to be equipped. Scrutiny of records revealed that despite expenditure of Rs.1.69 crore during 2002-07, 10 to 98 *per cent* of the required weaponry were not supplied in the three test-checked districts. Similarly, there was huge shortfall (17 to 100 *per cent*) in supply of protective equipment (body protector, steel helmet, *etc.*). In contrast, 1,829 bullet proof jackets were supplied to two test-checked districts and one battalion without requirement and in another battalion in excess of requirement<sup>11</sup>. Details of shortfall in supply of weaponry and equipment in the test-checked districts are given below:

**Table 3.21**

(In numbers)

Weapon	Requirement/Supply	East Khasi Hills	West Garo Hills	Jaintia Hills	1 <sup>st</sup> MLP Battalion	2 <sup>nd</sup> MLP Battalion
AK 47	Requirement	80	30	20	...	961
	Supply	30	20	13	42	20
	Shortfall	50	10	7	...	941
	Percentage of shortfall	63	33	35	...	98
7.62 SLR	Requirement	877	100	175	829	961
	Supply	200	90	50	435	325
	Shortfall	677	10	125	394	636
	Percentage of shortfall	77	10	71	48	66
5.56 INSAS	Requirement	130	25	136	...	961
	Supply	30	25	10	30	75
	Shortfall	100	...	126	...	886
	Percentage of shortfall	77	...	93	...	92
9mm Carbine	Requirement	171	50	30	175	175
	Supply	71	50	16	138	120
	Shortfall	100	...	14	37	55
	Percentage of shortfall	58	...	47	21	31
Glock Pistol	Requirement	...	...	4	2	...
	Supply	10	1	1	...	...
	Shortfall	100	...	3	...	...
	Percentage of shortfall	...	...	75	...	...
9 mm Pistol	Requirement	311	50	15	...	111
	Supply	111	31	11	...	50
	Shortfall	200	19	4	...	61
	Percentage of shortfall	64	38	27	...	55

Source: Information furnished by the SPs of East Khasi Hills, West Garo Hills and Jaintia Hills and the Commandant of 1<sup>st</sup> MLP Battalion.

<sup>11</sup> West Garo Hills: 400; Jaintia Hills: 100; 1<sup>st</sup> MLP Battalion: 430; 2<sup>nd</sup> MLP Battalion: 899.

**Table 3.22****Protective Equipment****(In numbers)**

Equipment	Requirement/ Supply	East Khasi Hills	West Garo Hills	Jaintia Hills	1 <sup>st</sup> MLP Battalion
Poly Carbonate Shield	Requirement	900	200	60	...
	Supply	100	125	25	...
	Shortfall	800	75	35	...
	Percentage of shortfall	89	38	58	...
Poly Carbonate Lathi	Requirement	919	300	60	200
	Supply	81	125	25	300
	Shortfall	838	175	35	...
	Percentage of shortfall	91	58	58	...
New Body Protector	Requirement	950	300	60	941
	Supply	50	124	25	0
	Shortfall	900	176	35	941
	Percentage of shortfall	95	59	58	100
Steel Helmet	Requirement	927	200	...	941
	Supply	73	166	52	0
	Shortfall	854	34	...	941
	Percentage of shortfall	92	17	...	100

Source: Information furnished by the SPs of East Khasi Hills, West Garo Hills and Jaintia Hills and the Commandant of 1<sup>st</sup> MLP Battalion.

Thus, the objective of the MPF scheme to equip the police force with sufficient weaponry remained unfulfilled.

### 3.3.14 Training and Manpower

Training is pre-requisite for effective functioning of police force. The MPF scheme provided for infrastructure facilities and equipment for police training institutes in the State. During 2002-07, the Department incurred an expenditure of Rs.31 lakh on training equipment.

Audit scrutiny revealed the following irregularities in imparting training:

#### 3.3.14.1 Shortfall in imparting Training by the Police Training School

The only Police Training School (PTS) of the State, established in 1977, is responsible for imparting in-service training of Inspectors/Sub-Inspectors/Assistant Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables. Further, as per the BPR&D, any police personnel, at the time of recruitment or later, who is likely to use various weapons, must have minimum practice as per prescribed scale. Details showing the number of persons who had undergone professional training and practice to use weapons in the PTS during 2002-07 are given below:

**Table 3.23 : Position of Professional Training**

Particulars	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07
Number of lower and upper subordinates police personnel	5,845	5,224	5,721	5,575	9,376
Number of police personnel trained	1,075	1,222	721	390	1,374
Percentage of persons trained	18	23	13	7	15

Source: Data available in "Crime in India" published by the National Crime Record Bureau and information furnished by the Principal, PTS.

**Table 3.24 : Position of Practice in use of weapons**

Name of weapon	Prescribed scale of practice per person (in rounds)	Practice actually given per trainee (in rounds)	Shortfall (in rounds)	Percentage of shortfall
.303 Rifle	40	20	20	50
9 mm Carbine	50	20	30	60
AK 47 Rifle	50	10	40	80
5.56 INSAS with bay scale	50	10	40	80
7.62 SLR	40	20	20	50
9 mm Browning Pistol	40	24	16	40
.38 Revolver	36	12	24	67

*Source: BPR&D norms and information furnished by the Principal of the PTS.*

The above tables show that during 2002-07, professional training was imparted to only 7 to 23 *per cent* of upper and lower subordinate police personnel. Besides, though there was increase of 3,801 police personnel in 2006-07 over the previous year, training was imparted to only 1,374 personnel during the year. Similarly, shortfall in the practice of weaponry was as high as 80 *per cent*. Deficiencies in the training and practice not only indicated ineffective functioning of the PTS but would also affect the efficiency and striking ability of the police during exigencies.

The DS stated (October 2007) that the PTS was responsible for imparting training to the unarmed police personnel. As regards shortfall in the practice in weaponry, the DS stated (October 2007) that more emphasis was given on imparting classes on law and allied subjects for the unarmed police personnel. The reply is not tenable because as per activities provided in the five year perspective plan for MPF, the PTS was responsible for imparting basic training to the unarmed police personnel as well as in-service training to Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, Assistant Sub-Inspectors and Head Constables.

#### **3.3.14.2 Special Training Centre**

The Special Training Centres (STC) at the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalions of the Meghalaya Police are responsible for imparting basic training to the newly recruited Armed Branch Armed Police Constables. Besides, the cadre courses and specialised courses were also to be conducted in these centres.

According to the information furnished (May 2007) by the Commandant of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, the practice of weapons was done one to 10 times annually during 2002-07. But no such information was furnished by the Commandant of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion. As such, the performance of the STC at 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion could not be assessed in audit.

#### **3.3.14.3 Deployment of Untrained Police Personnel for the Security of Very Important Persons (VIPs)**

The Special Branch (SB) of the Department is responsible for the security of VIPs of the State as well as for other security related matter. During 2002-07, an expenditure of Rs.2.72 crore was incurred on the security equipment.

While communicating (November 2002) the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee on Weapons Standardisation for VIP Security<sup>12</sup>, the MHA observed (November 2002) that the standardisation of weapons should be accompanied by an appropriate training schedule and minimum firing requirement of these specialised weapons by the personnel of the VIP Squadrons in line with the norm of National Security Guard/Special Protection Group. According to the MHA (November 2002), it was also essential for the personnel attached for security duty of VIPs to attend Commandos/VIP security advance course from time to time.

Although 24 Personal Security Officers and 13 Close Protection Teams of the SB were deployed for the security of VIPs, only two out of 22 Inspectors and 11 out of 82 Sub-Inspectors attended VIP security training (theoretical) during 2002-07.

For weapons standardisation for VIP securities, 10 AK-47 Rifles were provided to the SB in May 2006. However, only one annual range practice was undertaken during 2006 for minimum firing requirement of AK 47 Rifles and no personnel attached for VIP security duties were detailed for any Commandos/VIP security advance course.

Absence of requisite training may result in ineffective performance of the police deployed for the security of VIPs.

### 3.3.15 *Manpower*

Adequate manpower is imperative for effective functioning of the Police Department. In order to keep pace with the population growth, BPR&D recommended an annual growth of 2 *per cent* in police manpower. Contrary to this recommendation, the manpower in the Department decreased by 3 *per cent* in 2004-05 over the previous year. Though there was an increasing trend during 2005-07, the total increase during these two years (3 *per cent*) was less than the prescribed norm. The details are given below:

**Table 3.25**

Particulars	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07
Sanctioned strength	10,338	10,338	10,226	10,227	10,371
Men-in-position	8,683	9,166	8,929	8,930	9,202
Total number of vacancies	1,655	1,172	1,297	1,297	1,169
Percentage of vacancies to sanctioned strength	16	11	13	13	11
Total number of women police	134	134	125	126	271
Percentage of women police to the total number of police	2	1	1	1	3

*Source: Data available in the "Crime in India" published by the National Crime Records Bureau and Information furnished by the Assistant Inspector General (Inspection).*

The above table shows that the total number of women police force constituted only one *per cent* of the total police force of the State during 2003-06. There was, however, marginal improvement (by 2 *per cent*) during 2006-07.

<sup>12</sup> Constituted by the MHA to ascertain the nature of police weaponry being utilised on VIP security duties in India.

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### **3.3.16 Installation of Police Communication Network**

The Police Communication Network (POLNET) is a satellite based integrated network which envisages installation of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) and Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART) to link the National Capital with all the State Capitals. According to MHA (May 2005), the project must be implemented in 2005-06.

During 2002-03 and 2004-05, GOI released Rs.37.88 lakh to the Director, Coordination, Police Wireless (DCPW), New Delhi for implementation of POLNET. Accordingly, eight POLNET terminals were installed during 2003-04 and 2004-05. In addition, 34 Remote Station Units (RSU) and eight Base Station Units (BSU) were also installed during 2005-06 and 2006-07. However, one BSU was not working since 2006-07. Consequently, POLNET services were not fully operational in the State.

The DS stated (October 2007) that the BSU was not working due to damage of outdoor unit in cyclonic storm and the matter had been taken up with the DCPW and the Deputy Director, POLNET for rectification of the damaged equipment.

### **3.3.17 Forensic Science Laboratory**

#### **3.3.17.1 Ineffective Functioning of the Forensic Science Laboratory**

The only Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) of the State was established in 1987. During 2002-07, the Department procured various equipment<sup>13</sup> at a cost of Rs.2.10 crore to upgrade the infrastructure of the FSL for scientific and effective investigation of criminal cases. But, the FSL was running with five out of 10 sanctioned posts of specialised staff. Even the post of Director was lying vacant since January 2005. Though the PAC in its Twenty-seventh Report recommended filling up the vacant posts at the earliest, no effective step had been taken by the Department even after 10 years of placing the Report of the PAC before the State Legislature (April 1997). This made the functioning of the FSL with optimum capacity utilisation of facilities and infrastructure impracticable.

The DS stated (October 2007) that effort was being made to fill up the vacant posts and the post of Director could not be filled up because of litigation in the Court.

#### **3.3.17.2 Delay in Reporting of Chemical Examination by the FSL**

Though the FSL was responsible for chemical examination of viscera and other exhibits, no time frame was fixed for reporting the results of examination. In some cases, reporting of chemical examination was delayed

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<sup>13</sup> High performance thin layer chromatography machine, ultra-violet visible spectrophotometer, gas-chromatography headspace, atomic absorption spectro-meter and portable video-spectral comparator.

up to 894 days thereby delaying the process of investigation and prosecution as detailed below:

**Table 3.26**

(Cases in number)

Year	Documentation, Physical, Biology and Chemical Divisions				
	Cases received	Cases examined	Cases pending	Minimum days taken	Maximum days taken
2002	270	214	56	2	894
2003	233	168	65	2	505
2004	284	232	52	1	567
2005	233	164	69	3	349
2006	294	220	74	2	240

*Source: Information furnished by the Director, in charge of FSL.*

### 3.3.17.3 Mobile Forensic Science Units

To strengthen the infrastructure of FSL including the Mobile Forensic Science Units (MFSUs), the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) made provision of Rs.84 lakh which was utilised for setting up of MFSUs in all the districts of Meghalaya. The following irregularities were noticed in this regard:

- Out of seven Mobile Forensic Science Laboratory (MFSL) vehicles procured by the Director in March 2001 (two vehicles) and January 2004 (five vehicles) at a cost of Rs.29.20 lakh for the seven districts, five were allotted to the Superintendents of Police of five districts<sup>14</sup>. Of the remaining two vehicles meant for two districts, one was retained at the FSL and the other was placed at the disposal of the Police Headquarters in September 2001 thereby depriving two districts, viz., West Khasi Hills and South Garo Hills, of the facilities of MFSUs.
- BPR&D guidelines specified the equipment to be provided in the MFSUs. But some<sup>15</sup> of the equipment provided in the seven MFSUs procured by the Department were not in conformity with the guidelines. Reasons for the deviation were not on record.

The DS stated (October 2007) that the MFSL was retained at the FSL due to shortage of departmental vehicles and was utilised solely for the purpose of visiting crime scenes and that the equipment were purchased after assessment of actual field requirement. The reason for retention of MFSL with the Police Headquarters as well as authority for deviation from the BPR&D guidelines had not been stated.

<sup>14</sup> East Garo Hills, West Garo Hills, Jaintia Hills, Ri-Bhoi and East Khasi Hills.

<sup>15</sup> Large Tool Mark Investigation kit, All Purpose Crime Scene Investigation kit, Evidence collection & identification kit, Master Silicon Rubber and foot print casting kit, Halogen flood Light, Face mask with filter arrangement, Instant semen test kit, Multi Colour Light Source Crime Lite with rechargeable Battery and Narcotic Analysis kit.



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### **3.3.18 Implementation of Common Integrated Police Application Project**

The Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA) project was introduced by the GOI in May 2004 to computerise all the PSs in the State. The CIPA was to be implemented by the National Informatic Centre (NIC) as a total package (supply of hardware, software, imparting of training, *etc.*) for which GOI released Rs.9 lakh in 2004-05.

Under the project, the target for 2004-05 was to cover 10 *per cent* police stations of the State in the first phase, for which NIC was to install the hardware. Software was to be installed and tested in these police stations by August 2005. However, the target was revised (January 2006) to six police stations of East Khasi Hills District and the criminal investigation wing of Police Headquarters. In the second phase, 30 *per cent* police stations were to be covered under the project by 2005-06.

It was noticed that six police stations of East Khasi Hills District along with criminal investigation wing were covered under the project after a delay of one to two years between October 2006 and February 2007. But testing was not done till March 2007. The second phase of the project was not taken as of March 2007. Thus, the purpose for which the project was implemented by the GOI had not been achieved even after two years.

#### **3.3.19.2 Increasing Crime Rate**

There was an upward trend in the number of reported crimes as well as number of pending criminal cases during 2002-06 as would be evidenced from the table below:

**Table 3.27**

(In number)

Year	Cases reported during the year	Cases solved during the year including old cases	Cases pending at the end of the year
2002	1,664	1,273	3,210
2003	1,669	1,161	3,718
2004	1,882	1,502	4,098
2005	2,016	1,563	4,551
2006	2,020	2,135	4,436

*Source: Information furnished by the SP, State Crime Records Bureau.*

Persistent increase in the number of crimes is indicative of deteriorating law and order situation and inefficiency of the police force.

#### **3.3.20 Monitoring and Evaluation**

The existence of an effective monitoring system is a pre-requisite for smooth functioning of a scheme. In accordance with the GOI's instructions of February 2001, the State Government constituted (May 2001) an Empowered Committee under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary of the State to monitor the implementation of the scheme. But, no record regarding monitoring the implementation of the scheme by the committee during 2002-07 was produced to Audit.

### **3.3.21 Conclusion**

The objectives of the scheme to modernise the State police force to meet the emerging challenges remained largely unachieved. Even after 37 years of implementation of the scheme, the State failed to provide basic infrastructure like housing and buildings to its force. Fund management was poor and the Department could not utilise the available funds provided by the Central and State Governments. There was no appreciable increase in mobility inasmuch as the State police force was running with a shortage of substantial number of vehicles. Shortfall in imparting professional training to the police personnel and conducting requisite practice to use weaponry by the police force indicated ineffective functioning of the PTS. Such shortfall casts a doubt on the efficiency and striking ability of the police during exigencies. There has been an increase in the crime rate and the FSL is ill equipped to speed up investigations.

### **3.3.22 Recommendations**

On the basis of the shortcomings and deficiencies pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs, the following recommendations are made for streamlining the implementation of the MPF scheme:

- **Timely release and proper utilisation of funds with reference to objectives should be made mandatory.**
- **Infrastructure like buildings for PSs/OPs with basic amenities and 100 per cent accommodation for Police should be created to achieve optimum performance of the police force.**
- **Effective steps should be taken to avoid mobility deficiency by providing required number of vehicles to the police force.**
- **Regular training should be imparted to the police personnel as per norms to upgrade their knowledge and skills.**
- **Monitoring mechanism both at the level of Department and Government should be made effective.**

HOME DEPARTMENT

MODERNISATION OF POLICE FORCE

*Highlights*

*This scheme was introduced by the GOI in 1969. The main focus areas of the scheme were provision of residential accommodation for upper and lower subordinates of police force, construction of permanent buildings for Police Stations (PSs) and Out Posts (OPs) conforming to specified norms, improving the mobility of police force thereby reducing the response time, and skill upgradation and capacity enhancement through training.*

*But even after more than 35 years of implementation of the scheme, the Department failed to attain all these objectives mainly due to improper fund management, failure to focus on the priority areas of the scheme, irrational deployment of vehicles, and inadequate training to police personnel. Absence of internal control, internal audit and lack of proper monitoring also contributed significantly to poor implementation of the scheme.*

**Retention of huge unspent balances ranging from Rs.0.66 crore to Rs.6.10 crore at the end of each year indicated the failure of the Department to optimally utilise funds available with it.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.7.2)**

**State's share of Rs.10.85 crore was not released to the Department.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.7.4)**

**Fifty six percent of the total budget of the modernisation scheme was spent by the Department on non-priority items. Consequently, the main focus areas of the scheme remained grossly neglected.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9.1)**

**The Department failed to provide housing facilities to the upper and lower subordinates of the police force and the satisfaction level, instead of increasing, declined significantly over the period.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9.2)**

**Sixty nine per cent of the total police stations and outposts were accommodated in semi-permanent buildings in contravention of the norms prescribed by the Bureau of Police Research and Development.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9.3)**

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**Fifty per cent of the total arms by the State police force were reported to be not reliable, not useful, very old and outdated.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9.4)**

**All the district units, PS and OPs have massive shortage of vehicles. On the other hand there is surfeit of vehicles (67 nos) in the Police Headquarters at Aizawl.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9.5)**

**Number of vacant posts increased from 356 in 2002-03 to 1712 in 2006-07 although one of the main focus areas of modernization plan was expeditious filling up of all vacancies.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9. 6)**

**The Police Communication Network (POLNET) could not be made functional even after incurring an expenditure of Rs.54.05 lakh.**

**(Paragraph 3.1.9.9)**

### **3.1.1. Introduction**

The scheme 'Modernization of the State Police Force' was introduced by the GOI in 1969 for an initial period of 10 years. It has been extended periodically on several occasions, the latest being in February 2001, when GOI approved the continuance of the scheme for another period of 10 years upto 2010. The scheme aims at improving the efficiency of the police force and enhancing their striking abilities for meeting the emerging challenges.

The main focus of the scheme was to improve the basic police infrastructure particularly Police Stations (PSs) and Out Posts (OPs). The department was to first concentrate on fulfilling the requirements of the PSs and OPs and the men who man them. The major portion of the fund was, therefore, required to be invested in the construction of PSs, OPs, and residential accommodation for the upper<sup>1</sup> and lower<sup>2</sup> subordinates of the police force. The other priority areas would be weaponry, mobility, communication, security, forensic science equipment and training.

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
<sup>1</sup> Upper Subordinates – Assistant Sub Inspector to Inspector.

<sup>2</sup> Lower Subordinates – Constable to Havildar including Grade IV.

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### 3.1.2. Organisational set-up

A chart showing the organizational structure of the Mizoram Police is given below:



AIG: Assistant Inspector General SP: Superintendent of Police; DSP: Deputy Superintendent of Police.

### 3.1.3. Audit coverage

The review was conducted during March-April 2007 by test check of records (2002-07) of the Director General of Police, Aizawl, Principal, Police Training Centre (PTC), Lungverh, Deputy Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Mualpui. Out of 8 districts in the State three districts having international borders and border with troubled neighbouring States were selected viz., Lunglei (having border with Bangladesh and Tripura), Mamit (bordering Bangladesh) and Champhai (bordering Myanmar). 17 out of 35 Police Stations, and 10 out of 48 Outposts and Border Outposts and 2 out of 3 battalions were covered in audit. The important points noticed during audit are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

### 3.1.4. Audit objectives

The main objectives of audit were to assess whether:

- the objectives of the scheme were achieved;
- adequate funds were provided by the Central/State Governments and funds were utilised for the intended purpose;
- various components of the scheme were implemented economically and effectively and as per prescribed norms;

- 
- the scheme was implemented as per priorities identified by the Department;
  - Implementation of scheme was effectively monitored and adequate internal control mechanism existed in the Department.

### **3.1.5            *Audit criteria***

The broad audit criteria used in the performance review were:

- Perspective Plan drawn up by the Department;
- Norms prescribed by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D);
- Output prescribed by BPR&D and bench marks of performance of the Department;
- Prescribed monitoring mechanism.

### **3.1.6            *Audit methodology***

The performance review commenced with an entry conference with the Assistant Inspector General of Police-II in March 2007 where the audit objectives, audit criteria and scope of audit were explained and suggestions as well as perceptions relating to the strengths and weaknesses of the department in implementing the scheme were discussed. Data relating to various prioritised items was analysed apart from test check of relevant records to arrive at audit conclusions. An exit conference was held with the Director General of Police in November 2007 wherein audit findings were discussed and the replies of the Department have been incorporated suitably in the relevant paragraphs.

### **3.1.7            *Financial Management***

#### **3.1.7.1        *Funding pattern***

The scheme was funded by the Centre and State in the ratio of 50:50 till 2002-03, which was revised to 75:25 during the years 2003-04 and 2004-05. Thereafter, the scheme was fully funded by the GOI. The Central assistance and its own share were released by the State Government through the State budget.

#### **3.1.7.2        *Receipt of funds and expenditure***

The approved outlay vis-à-vis funds received and expenditure incurred in implementation of the scheme in the State during the years 2002-03 to 2006-07 is shown below. Besides, the Department also received assistance in kind (viz., weaponry, vehicles, other equipment, etc) from the GOI during this period.



**Table-No.1**

*(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Approved outlay	Unspent balance of previous year	Funds received from			Total funds available	Expenditure (including purchases by GOI)	Unspent balance (percent age)
			Centre		State			
			Cash	Kind				
2002-03	11.00	4.24	5.42	0.08	0.05	9.79	6.43 (66)	3.36 (34)
2003-04	11.00	3.36	6.26	2.21	0.05	11.88	10.34 (87)	1.54 (13)
2004-05	11.00	1.54	5.96	1.49	0.05	9.04	2.94 (33)	6.10 (67)
2005-06	11.00	6.10	3.73	1.95	0.05	11.83	7.54 (64)	4.29 (36)
2006-07	10.00	4.29	7.89	2.46	0.05	14.69	14.03 (95)	0.66 (5)
Total	54.00		29.26	8.19	0.25	57.23	41.28 (72)	

Source: O/o Director General of Police, Govt of Mizoram

Note: Figures in brackets indicates the percentage of expenditure to the total fund available.

It would be seen from the above table that the percentage of saving ranged between 5 per cent to 67 per cent. Earlier the GOI had expressed (January 2002) concern over the non-utilisation of funds in 2001-02 and stated that if the funds were not fully and properly utilized, it might have to deduct the unutilized amount from other Central releases to the State. Nevertheless, the utilization continued to remain low.

### **3.1.7.3 Delay in release of funds by the GOI**

The unspent balance was partly due to late release of funds by the Central Government at the fag end of each financial year and consequent delay by the State Government in releasing the Central assistance to the Department.

Out of the total amount of Rs.29.26 crore released by the GOI in cash during the years 2002-07, Rs. 12.31 crore (42 per cent) was released during the last quarter of the years. Further, out of the fund released in the last quarter, Rs.8.35 crore (68 per cent) was released in the month of March. As a result, the State Government was left with hardly any time to utilise the amount within the financial year necessitating revalidation of the unspent funds in subsequent years. This has contributed to the retention of huge unspent balances every year.

Despite there being persistent unspent balances, there was no reduction in the amounts released by GOI (except 2005-06) indicating the poor planning and monitoring of the modernisation programme. The fact is that funds were provided each year without proper assessment of the Department's requirement or ability to utilize the available funds within the year.

### **3.1.7.4 Short release of funds by the State Government**

The amount due to be released by the State Government (as per the funding pattern) vis-à-vis the amount actually released by the State Government to the Department is shown below:

**Table No. 2 .***(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Funding pattern between Centre & State(Ratio)	Approved outlay	State's share		
			Due to be released	Actually released	Not released
2002-03	50:50	11.00	5.50	0.05	5.45
2003-04	75:25	11.00	2.00	0.05	1.95
2004-05	75:25	11.00	2.75	0.05	2.70
<b>Total</b>		<b>33.00</b>	<b>10.25</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>10.10</b>

*Note: As per the funding pattern the scheme was funded fully by the GOI during the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. However, the State Government released Rs.0.10 crore during the years 2005-06 and 2006-07*

It would be seen from the above table that against the due amount of Rs 10.25 crore, the State Government had released only Rs 0.15 crore (1 per cent) resulting in short release of Rs 10.10 crore. The Department stated (November 2007) that due to shortage of funds in the State, the State Government could not provide its due share.

### **3.1.7.5 Submissions of incorrect and inflated expenditure statements**

The extant Treasury Rules do not permit drawal of funds in advance and in excess of actual requirement. Contrary to this, huge amount of Central assistance was drawn and retained in Civil Deposit each year and shown as expenditure although the funds remained unutilised in Civil Deposit and were utilised in subsequent years. Similarly, the amount transferred by the Department to the PWD for execution of civil works was also booked by the Department as expenditure without even ascertaining the amount actually spent by the PWD. Thus expenditure booked was inflated during 2002-07.

A statement showing the funds deposited in Civil Deposit and transferred to the PWD during 2002-07 is shown below:

**Table No. 3***(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Expenditure reported by the Department	Retained in Civil Deposit	Transferred to PWD
2002-03	6.43	0.99	-
2003-04	10.34	0.34	-
2004-05	2.94	-	0.85
2005-06	7.54	2.16	0.17
2006-07	14.03	2.21	5.85

*Source: DGP Office records*

Admitting the facts, the Department stated (November 2007) that unless the released funds for each year was drawn during the current financial year itself and kept in 8443 – Civil Deposit, it would compulsorily be required to surrender and in that case, the released funds could not be utilized immediately from the beginning of the next financial year. The Department also assured that in future yearly expenditure would be booked after collecting

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confirmation of actual expenditure incurred by the PWD. The fact, however remains that inflated expenditure was booked during 2002-07.

**3.1.7.6      *Discrepancy between expenditure figures reported to MHA, GOI and Finance Accounts***

Expenditure on the scheme as reported by the Department to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs did not tally with the figures reflected in the State Finance Accounts.

**Table No 4**

*(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Expenditure reported by the Department to MHA, GOI	Expenditure as per Finance Accounts
2002-03	6.43	13.25
2003-04	10.34	7.32
2004-05	2.94	2.14
2005-06	7.54	6.55
2006-07	14.03	6.77

*Source: Finance Accounts of the Government of Mizoram and expenditure statements furnished by the department to MHA, GOI*

Reasons for such wide variation between the figures reported as expenditure by the Department and those shown in the Finance Accounts could not be explained by the Department. This indicates poor financial management and monitoring in the Department.

**3.1.8.      *Planning***

Proper planning and efficient execution is imperative for achieving the objectives of a programme in a systematic and effective manner. This scheme is being implemented in the State since May 1972 and has been extended periodically since inception without a definite time frame for completion of various components of the scheme. There has never been any review of the effectiveness of the scheme by the State Government and there was no strategic approach for tackling the deficiencies in the implementation of the scheme in a systematic manner.

The GOI directed (April 2001) that the Department's Perspective Plan should indicate the deficiencies that were made good from the funds released earlier and must highlight deficiencies that persist even thereafter. It further instructed that the plan should not contain merely list of items to be procured but should be a coherent, well thought out programme of action for upgradation of capabilities in specific spheres.

The Perspective Plan framed by the Department in December 2001 failed to adhere to these requirements. For instance, although upgradation of PTC was identified as a priority area, there was no systematic assessment of training

needs of police personnel at various levels. Specific battalions/sectors/ sub-sectors were also not selected for upgradation and modernization of equipments.

As a result, the scheme failed to achieve its desired objectives viz., increasing satisfaction level of housing for lower and upper subordinates, creation of basic infrastructure for PSs and OPs, holding of latest weaponry, rational procurement and deployment of vehicles, imparting adequate training for skill upgradation etc. as discussed in succeeding paragraphs. The Department assured in the exit conference (November, 2007) that the Perspective Plan as well as Annual Action Plan would be prepared carefully in the light of audit observation.

### **3.1.9. Implementation of the modernisation plan**

#### **3.1.9.1 Priorities identified under the modernisation plan and expenditure there against**

The Empowered Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, Mizoram identified (December 2001) the following areas as priorities for execution under modernisation plan by the year 2010.

- decreasing housing shortage for upper and lower subordinates of police force by at least 20 per cent,
- construction of buildings for PS and OPs and equip them with adequate number of vehicles,
- upgradation of the existing PTC and shifting the same from Lungverh to Thenzawl, and
- setting up a State Forensic Science Laboratory.

Expenditure incurred on the priority areas is shown below:

**Table No.5**

*(Rupees in crore)*

<b>Components prioritised in the Perspective Plan</b>	<b>Expenditure during 2002-07</b>	<b>Percentage to total expenditure</b>
Construction of staff quarters	4.66	11
Construction of buildings for police stations and police outpost etc.	8.00	19
Establishment of Forensic Science laboratory (FSL) including purchase of equipment and materials for FSL	0.82	2
Vehicles for PS,OPs	2.30	6
Upgradation of PTC Lungverh	2.31	6
Shifting of the existing PTC from Lungverh to Thenzawl	Nil	
<b>Total</b>	<b>18.09</b>	<b>44</b>

It would be seen from the above that only 44 per cent of the total expenditure was spent on the priority areas identified by the Department. The remaining 56

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per cent (Rs.23.19 crore) was spent on other non- priority items like purchase of riot control equipment (Rs.1.80 crore), bomb disposal equipment (Rs 1.35 crore), office automation (Rs 1.55 crore), traffic control equipment (Rs 0.19 crore), etc. Such low expenditure on the prioritised items despite having sufficient funds each year indicates poor planning and casual approach of the Department towards achieving the main objectives of the modernisation plan. The Department admitted (November 2007) during exit conference that since the Perspective Plan of December 2001 could not be complied with in the subsequent years, expenditure was incurred on non-priority areas. It however, could not explain why the Perspective Plan was not complied with.

Out Rs. 18.33 crore spent on construction, Rs.5.67 crore (31 *per cent*) was spent on construction of buildings other than staff quarters, PS and OPs (details not given) which were not priority areas under the modernization plan. As mentioned in paragraph 3.1.7.5 and 3.1.7.6 the expenditure shown as spent on construction of quarters/buildings is also likely to be inflated since the Department immediately after transferring the funds to the PWD booked the amount of advances as final expenditure without ascertaining the actual amount spent by the PWD. The Department stated (November 2007) that the funds released for civil works had been utilized for construction of administrative buildings etc.

The main focus areas of the modernization plan thus remained grossly ignored and purchase of materials, equipment etc got priority over these areas. The DGP stated (November 2007) that it was not possible to upgrade and modernize the State Police Force rapidly, as the State Government was unable to provide its matching share.

### **3.1.9.2            *Low satisfaction level of housing***

The BPR&D in its five year projection on modernization and upgradation of Police infrastructure observed that the performance of the Police was better in the State where adequate accommodation for Police force was available.

The National Police Commission (NPC) also recommended housing accommodation for all police persons in the State. The objective of increasing the availability of quarters for upper and lower subordinates of police force from 20 per cent to 40 per cent by the year 2010 was identified by the Department as one of the priority areas of the modernization plan. But even after expiry of six years of the plan period (2001-2010), the satisfaction<sup>3</sup> level of housing remained much below the targets fixed.

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<sup>3</sup> Note:- Satisfaction level means extent to which Police persons had been provided with residential accommodation by the Department

**Table No. 6***(in per cent)*

Targeted group	Satisfaction level		Shortfall (percentage)
	Targeted	Achieved	
Supervisory level (Dy SP and above)	100	43	57
Upper subordinate	70	16	54
Lower subordinate	60	18	42

*Source: Office of the DGP, Aizawl**Note:- Achievement level pertains to the year 2006-07.*

Instead of attaining higher level of satisfaction, the level of satisfaction of housing in fact declined between 1999-2000 and 2006-07 as shown below:

**Table No.7***(in percentage)*

After	Satisfaction for	
	Upper subordinates	Lower subordinates
1999-2000	30	20
2006-07	16	18

*Source : BRPD's publications and departmental records*

The above table shows that targets fixed were much below the recommended level and even the reduced targets could not be achieved. More importance was attached to construction of quarters for supervisory level officers as indicated by the higher targets fixed, which is in contravention of one of the objectives of the Perspective Plan. This was also stated as inadmissible by GOI (August 2006) till such time the basic deficiencies as identified by BPRD are not fully satisfied. On these being pointed out by Audit, the Department stated (November 2007) that more priority would be given for housing of lower subordinates in the coming years.

The Department had not maintained Registers of buildings showing dates of commencement and completion of works, expenditure incurred on each work, dates of occupation, etc., in the absence of which, the genuineness and veracity of expenditure, achievements etc., could not be vouchsafed in audit.

### **3.1.9.3 Failure to provide basic infrastructure to Police Stations (PSs) and Out Posts (OPs)**

Construction of buildings for PSs and OPs etc, was also identified (December 2001) by the Department as a priority area under modernization plan. During 2002-07 the Department proposed to construct 32 buildings (10 PSs, 10 OPs and 12 BOPs) at a total expenditure of Rs 3.49 crore against which, it actually constructed 26 buildings ( 8 PSs, 7 OPs and 11 BOPs) for Rs 8 crore. Thus only 81 percent of the target was achieved with cost overrun of Rs 4.51 crore .As per BPRD's norms of March 2000, each PS, OP must have a boundary



wall and basic amenities like Reception room, Interrogation room, Computer room, Wireless room, etc. A table showing availability of buildings in the PSs, OPs is given below:

**Table No.8**

Categories	Total number in the State	Accommodation in	
		Semi-permanent buildings	Permanent buildings
Police stations(PSs)	35	27	8
Out Posts (OPs)	14	7	7*
Border Out Posts (BOPs)	34	23	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>26</b>

\* 2 OPs are functioning in rented accommodation

Source: Annual Action Plan of the department for 2006-07

Thus, 57 out of 83 PSs, OPs and BOPs in the State (69 per cent) were accommodated in semi-permanent buildings which were reportedly constructed 15-20 years back. None of the 83 PSs and OPs had proper boundary wall and many of them did not have the basic amenities. The Department could not explain as to why construction of buildings, conforming to BPRD's norms for PSs, OPs etc was not taken up earlier despite having sufficient funds.

The total number of (PSs), (OPs) and Border Out Posts (BOPs) targeted to be constructed during 2001 – 2004 vis-à-vis the number actually constructed is given below:

Category	Targeted to Be constructed	Actually Constructed	Shortfall
Police Stations	18	8	10
Out Posts	15	7	8
Border Out Posts	20	11	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>

Thus, against the target of 53 buildings for PSs, Ops and BOPs, only 26 buildings were constructed despite an expenditure of Rs. 8 Crore (19 percent of funds received). The Department Stated (November 2007) that it had undertaken construction of some buildings based on the urgent requirement, which were not included in the Perspective Plan of December 2001.

#### **3.1.9.4 Arms and Ammunitions**

As per GOI instructions (January 2001), the Department was required to procure non-lethal/less lethal weapons (12 bore pump action shot gun, tear gas gun, truncated .303 etc.) on priority basis and lethal weapons were to be procured thereafter. But contrary to these instructions, the Department procured lethal weapons like AK 47 rifles (400 nos.) and SLRs (3089 nos. ) during 2002-07. On the other hand, only 2 out of the 12 bore pump action guns were held by the Department.

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On this being pointed out by Audit, the Department Stated (November 2007) that as these weapons were rarely used by the Department, more quantity was not procured during 2002-2007 and lethal weapons were procured considering the insurgency atmosphere prevailing in the State as well as in the neighboring States.

Further, following anomalies were noticed:

- 2289 numbers of arms of 21<sup>4</sup> categories were held by the Department without authorization;
- 706 numbers of 9 MM carbine guns were retained against the authorization of 503 guns (40 per cent excess holding);
- the Department held 2.14 lakh rounds of ammunition of five<sup>5</sup> categories against the authorization of 1.22 lakh rounds which resulted in overstocking of 0.92 lakh rounds (78 per cent);
- in case of six<sup>6</sup> categories of arms, 5103 numbers of arms were held against the authorization of 7139 numbers, resulting in shortage of 2034 weapons.

The SP (Security) reported (March 2007) that 7.62 MM SLRs held by the Department require immediate replacement as these are too long and do not match the short stature of the Mizos. As of March 2007, 3089 numbers of SLRs were held by the Department. The SP also opined that bullet proof (BP) jackets, BP helmets held by the Department were too heavy (10.2 kg and 1.65 kg respectively) to carry and were unsuited to the average physical stature of the local Police personnel. This opinion was also endorsed by the Principal, PTC Lungverh. However, there was nothing on record to indicate that the Department initiated any proposal for acquiring suitable replacements. There was also nothing on record to show whether any consultations were held with neighboring States to see how this issue was being tackled by them as the situation would be similar.

The SP (Security) also opined (April 2007) that out of 20 categories of arms held by the Mizoram Police, 10 categories (50 per cent) of arms were not reliable, not useful, very old and outdated, and many of these arms could be used only for training and drill purposes. On these being pointed out by Audit, the Department Stated (November 2007) that the opinion of SP (security) and Principal, PTC Lungverh were not conclusive as the Department did not

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<sup>4</sup> 9mm CM sten, 9mm Baretta, 7.65 Machine Pistol, 7.62 x 39mm SKS Rifle, 7.62mm RPK Rifles (AK 86), 7.62mm G-III Rifles, 7.62mm Sniper Rifles, 7.62mm BA Rifles (all types), 6.35mm Machine Pistol, 5.56mm Rifle, .45" Pistol Revolver, .410 Musket Rifles, .38" Pistol Revolver, .38 Special Revolver, .303" GF BA Rifles All types, .303 LMG Bren, .22" Rifle.

<sup>5</sup> 7.62mm Ammunitions, 7.62mm CTN Ammunitions, 45" Ammunitions, 0.38" Ball Ammunition and 0.38mm Special Ammunition.

<sup>6</sup> 9mm Pistol Auto IA, 9mm Carbine Machine, 7.62x39mm AK-47 Rifles, 7.62mm Self loading Rifles, 7.62mm GMIB, 2"/51mm Mortar OML.

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procure weapons of its own choice since offer and allocation had been made by the GOI.

The Department reported (March 2007) that 500 AK rifles received from the GOI in 2001-02 were issued to PTC, Lungverh but as per the Principal, PTC's report (March 2007) to audit, only 20 AK rifles were received by him during 2002-03 to 2006-07.

Moreover, although all these AK rifles were stated to have been issued to the PTC, one lakh rounds of ammunitions received for these AK rifles were retained in Police Headquarters (PHQ), Aizawl.

On these being pointed out, the Department Stated (November 2007) that it actually received (April 2004 and May 2005) 400 AK-47 rifles from the GOI and these rifles were distributed to various Units. As regards ammunition received from the Ordinance Factories, it was stated that these were initially kept in PHQ and subsequently issued to the concerned units as per their requirements.

In PTC, Lungverh, out of the total stock of 804 of weapons, 305 weapons (38 *per cent*) were unserviceable. The Department had not taken (April 2007) any action to replace the outdated/unserviceable weapons with modern weapons and return the arms and ammunition which were held by it in excess of authorized quantity.

### **3.1.9.5      *Mobility***

Police mobility is inextricably linked to its readiness in its duties and ensuring effective performance. In a well-equipped police force, mobility deficiency should be nil. The NPC recommended one vehicle for every 25 personnel of the District Reserve and Armed Battalions. The BPRD also laid down (March 2000) requirement of vehicles for battalions, district units, PS and OPs. The requirement of vehicles as per BPRD's norms and actual availability of the vehicles in the State are shown below:

**Table No.9**

Category of vehicles	Total number of vehicles		Excess (+) Shortage (-) (in numbers)
	Required	Available	
Heavy vehicles	143	47	(-) 96
Medium vehicles	160	100	(-)60
Light vehicles	221	282	(+)61
Motor cycles	276	142	(-)134
Total	800	571	(-)229

*Source: Information furnished to audit by the department*

It would be seen from the above that against a total requirement of 800 vehicles of different categories, the department had 571 vehicles resulting in a shortage of 229 vehicles (29 per cent).

The GOI directed (August 2006) the State Government to deploy vehicles procured under modernization scheme only at PS level. Despite the district offices, PS and OPs functioning with shortage of vehicles, 67 vehicles were held by the PHQ, Aizawl. The Department while admitting the fact stated (November 2007) that these 67 vehicles stationed in PHQ were meant for all officers posted in PHQ. The reply is not acceptable as it could not explain as to why these vehicles had been retained in PHQ by seriously compromising the mobility of the field units in performing their duties.

GOI further clarified (August 2006) that deployment of hard-top vehicles for officers would be treated as inadmissible. Despite this, hard top vehicles (Tata Qualis, Bolero, Maruti Esteem, Tata Indica, Gypsy King etc) were procured under modernization plan. The Department had no bullet-proof (BP) vehicles although as per the BPRD's recommendations, 10 per cent of the total vehicles of the State should be bullet-proof. The department assured (November 2007) that it would look into the matter and take necessary action as per the instructions of GOI.

### **3.1.9.6 Manpower**

One of the principal areas of focus under modernization plan is expeditious filling up of vacancies and substantial improvement in strength of women police force. BPRD recommended an average 2 *per cent* annual growth in police manpower in order to keep pace with the population growth. However, the number of police personnel has consistently declined over the years.

The sanctioned strength of Mizoram police and the men-in-position during the years 2002-03 to 2006-07 are shown below:

**Table No. 10**

<b>Particulars</b>	<b>2002-03</b>	<b>2003-04</b>	<b>2004-05</b>	<b>2005-06</b>	<b>2006-07</b>
Sanctioned strength (in number)	8917	8917	8917	8917	9977
Men-in-position (in number)	8561	8501	8441	8371	8265
Total number of vacancies	356	416	476	546	1712
Percentage of vacancies to sanctioned strength	4	5	5	6	17
Total number of women police	160	160	160	160	160
Percentage of women police to the total number of police	2	2	2	2	2

*Source O/o DGP, Aizawl*

As can be seen from the above table, the number of vacancies has been increasing consistently over the last five years while the sanctioned strength remained constant. In 2006-07, there was an increase in the sanctioned strength by 1060 over the previous year and the vacancy position also increased correspondingly. The vacancies were not filled essentially because of ban on recruitment imposed by the State Government. Against the

prescribed norm of 10 *per cent*, the total number of women police constituted only 2 *per cent* of the total police force of the State during all these years.

### 3.1.9.7 Training

Training is essential for any police force for all round development and regular upgradation of their professional and physical skill and ensuring their preparedness in executing their duties. The only PTC of the State was established in 1973 with an intake capacity of 300 persons.

A table showing number of persons trained in the PTC during 2002-07 is given below:-

**Table No. 11**

Particulars	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07
Total number of police personnel in the State	8561	8501	8441	8371	8265
Total number of police personnel trained ( <i>per cent</i> )	857 (10)	254 (3)	274 (3)	252 (3)	307 (4)
Trainer to trainee ratio	1 : 12	1 : 3	1 : 4	1 : 3	1:4

Source: PTC, Lungverh

The above table shows that very few police personnel were given training by PTC during these years. The percentage of personnel to men in position ranged between three *per cent* to ten *per cent*. The reason for this was stated (November 2007) to be manpower shortage and inability to spare police personnel from field assignments. The Principal, PTC Lungverh stated (February 2007) that no training was imparted in handling modern weaponry, surveillance equipment, improved electronic gadgets, computers etc. procurement of vehicles primarily for

The PTC had 74 faculty against the requirement of 43. The Department paid Rs.1.33 crore as salary to the 31 faculty who were retained in excess of requirement during the years 2002-07. The trainer to trainee ratio ranged between 1:3 to 1:12 which shows that there was no justification of having 74 officials on faculty and even the sanctioned 43 officials were not justified. Further, the average expenditure on training per trainee increased from Rs. 6,583 in 2002-03 to Rs. 24,436 in 2006-07.

The PTC had no Perspective Plan/schedule of training and training was imparted on an adhoc basis. Although the Department spent Rs. 2.31 crore under modernization plan during the aforesaid years for purchase of different training aids/materials, (like computers, generators, dummy rifle, SLRs smoke bomb, pistol, carbine, grenade etc.), no police personnel was given any training to use these materials which indicates apathy and lack of planning.

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### **3.1.9.8            *Establishment of a Forensic Science Laboratory***

The only Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) of the State was established in July 2000. MHA directed (August 2006) that filling up of vacancies in the State FSL should get priority over procurement of equipment. However, as of March 2007, the FSL had only 4 officers and 2 staff against the requirement of 14 officers and 13 staff (78 per cent shortage). Although most of the posts were vacant, Rs.2.44 crore was spent on purchase of equipments (like Digital Colour Video Coupler, Microscope, colour printers, chemicals etc) in clear contravention of MHA's direction.

The Department purchased 3 Mobile Forensic Vans (MFV) during the years 2002-03 to 2004-05 at a total cost of Rs.16.40 lakh although no post of driver was sanctioned by the Government for running these mobile units. The Department further spent Rs.20.23 lakh on installation of various equipments and instruments in these 3 vans. As per the BPRD's norms, each MFV should have a long chasis and 10<sup>7</sup> other equipments, against which only 4 equipments were installed in these vehicles. 10<sup>8</sup> other equipments which did not conform to BPRD's norms were also installed.

Scrutiny of logbooks of these vehicles showed that none of these 3 mobile vans were used for crime detection. They were used for transportation of staff and officers, thus making the whole expenditure of Rs.36.63 lakh unfruitful.

The State FSL was also required to submit daily crime reports to National Crime Research Bureau. However this was not done.

### **3.1.9.9            *Installation of Police Communication Network***

The Police Communication Network (POLNET) is a satellite based integrated network which envisages installation of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) and Multi Access Radio Telephone (MART) for providing connectivity amongst the National capital, State/UT capitals/district headquarters and all PS of the country.

Rupees.58.75 lakh was allotted (August 2006) by the GOI for the installation of POLNET in the State. As of March 2007, out of the 8 districts in the State, V-SATs were installed in 4 districts (Aizawl, Kolasib, Lunglei and Saiha) out of which, 3 are defective and have not been functioning since installation. Out of 31 Remote Subscribers Units (RSUs) to be installed for functioning of POLNET, only 9 RSUs were installed in Aizawl and Kolasib districts. Reasons for non-installation of the remaining 22 RSUs were attributed to the

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<sup>7</sup> **Required to be installed** – Automatic Photography Camera, Sex Crime Investigation Kit, Search light, Tunable Light Source, Portable Generator, Finger print lifting and detection unit, Engineering drawing equipment, Firearm discharge residue collection kits, Blood grouping kit, Latent Finger print development kit.

<sup>8</sup> **Actually installed** – Video camera, Latent Finger print taking kit, Gunshot residue kit and Blood evidence taking kit.



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non-availability of Line of Sight (LOS) and defective V –SATs etc.

Meanwhile, the Department spent Rs.54.05 lakh in construction of towers (Rs.39.49 lakh) for erecting the RSUs and for purchase of generators and other materials (Rs.14.56 lakh). Consequently, not only did Rs.54.05 lakh become unfruitful but the main objective of POLNET to provide connectivity amongst the capital, districts and PS was also not achieved

The Department Stated (November 2007) that unless the MHA solves the problems, implementation of POLNET cannot be done as the funds earmarked for this project were placed with the DCPW(Directorate, Co-ordination Police Wireless), MHA and the Department has no record of expenditure on this project.

#### **3.1.9.10      *Implementation of Common Integrated Police Application (CIPA) project***

The CIPA project was introduced by the GOI in May 2004 to computerize 10 percent of the PS in the State. The CIPA was to be implemented by the National Informatic Centre (NIC) as a total package (supply of hardware, software, imparting of training etc) for which GOI released Rs.23 lakh to the NIC in 2004-05.

The State Government submitted (February 2005) names of 8 PS to the GOI where CIPA was to be implemented. Although the Department spent Rupees six lakh for site preparation (2006-07), the project could not be made functional (April 2007) because the NIC had not imparted the required training to the police personnel.

#### **3.1.9.11      *Other Points of interest:***

- As per GOI instructions (July 2000), expenditure on replacement of old vehicles and equipment, furniture, duplicating machines, steel almirahs, steel furniture, stationery, photocopy machines etc were not to be met from the Central assistance given for modernisation plan.

Contrary to the above instructions, the Department expended Rs.3.39 crore during 2002-07 on various items/materials which were not permissible as per the GOI's instructions.

The Department while admitting this, stated (November 2007) that from 2004-05, it purchased only those items which were approved by the GOI.

The fact however, remains that the Department had incurred expenditure on items which were not permitted under GOI's instructions.

- The Department purchased 1000 pairs of Anti embolism stockings during the year 2002-03 @ Rs.1600 per pair and issued them to 8 SPs,

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5 Commandants of Armed Battalions and 2 Reserve Battalions. In June-July 2006, all the Commandants and 5 SPs informed the Department that around 650 pairs of stockings valuing Rs.10.40 lakh were lying unused since 2003-04. This was due to purchase of stockings without assessing the actual utility and requirement.

The Department stated (November 2007) that it had taken more care towards purchase of materials as per the instructions of the Government.

### **3.1.10. Increasing crime rate**

Increase in incidence of crime indicates the performance of police force. As per the publication of the National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB), crime rate of the State during the years 2002 to 2005 was significantly higher than the all India average (excepting 2004) as shown below:

**Table No. 12**

Year	Incidents of crime	State rate	All India average
2002	2820	309.90	169.50
2003	3456	374.90	160.70
2004	1515	161.90	168.80
2005	2156	227.70	165.30
2006	Not yet published by the NCRB		

Source : "Crime in India" published by NCRB

It can reasonably be said that this was on account of slow progress of police modernisation process in the State, lack of police mobility in the field units, as well as inadequate training of police officials.

The Department while admitting the increasing crime rate in the State stated (November 2007) that the increase was due to liquor cases booked under 188 IPC and drugs abuse cases.

### **3.1.11 Inspection and Monitoring**

In chapter XXI of the Mizoram Police Manual, the Department prescribed schedule of inspection requiring its officers to conduct periodic inspections of all PS, OPs and district offices and to maintain 3 inspection registers for formal, informal and cursory inspections. But no such register was made available to audit. It could not be ascertained therefore whether the prescribed inspections were carried out.

In March 2001, the Government constituted an Empowered Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to monitor and review implementation of the modernization plan. Although as per GOI's instructions (April 2001), the Committee should meet every month and ensure proper implementation of the programme, it could not be ascertained whether such meetings were held since no minutes of the meetings were furnished to audit. The Department assured (November 2007) that necessary action would be taken in future to conduct periodical inspections and monitoring.

**3.1.12. Internal control mechanism and internal audit**

The Department had not prescribed any format for submission of periodic reports by its officers showing physical and financial progress regarding implementation of modernization plan. There was also no mechanism for internal audit in the department. Had there been an effective internal control mechanism and internal audit, the deficiencies pointed out by audit above could have been addressed by the Department.

**3.1.13. Conclusion**

Despite the scheme being in operation in the State for over three and a half decades, it failed to achieve its objectives. The scheme was plagued by delay in releasing/non-availability of sufficient funds due to non-release of matching share by the State Government and where funds were available, the Department failed to utilise them efficiently and effectively. Basic infrastructure was not provided to the police force and the State remained under-equipped to deal with law and order problems. This is also borne out by a higher crime rate in the State compared to the national average. There were shortages in vehicles, equipment and training courses and poor communication net work.

**3.1.14 Recommendations**

- The Department should have a definite time frame for the modernization scheme and ensure that deadlines/targets for implementation of various components of the plan are enforced scrupulously.
- The Department should focus its attention on implementation of priority areas/items identified in the Perspective Plan. Materials, equipment etc. should be purchased based on proper assessment.
- Funds provided by GOI should be utilized optimally and the State should release its matching share promptly so as to ensure that the modernization objectives are achieved in a timely manner.
- The discrepancies between the expenditure actually incurred and the reported expenditure should be reconciled and the correct position be reported to the GOI with regard to the expenditure actually incurred;
- Training needs should be properly assessed and regular training must be imparted for upgradation of professional skills of the police force.
- Implementation of the Perspective Plan should be monitored closely and timely corrective action should be taken.

The findings were reported to the Government (September 2007); reply had not been received (November 2007).

## HOME (POLICE) DEPARTMENT

### 3.4 Manpower Management in Police Department

*Police Department is the biggest Government Department in the State giving employment to more than twenty thousand people. The performance review of “Manpower Management in Police Department” revealed gross irregularities in recruitment, promotion, training, deployment of police personnel and their performance appraisal.*

#### *Highlights*

Expenditure on manpower was 64 to 76 per cent of the total expenditure of the Department during the period 2002-03 to 2006-07.

(Paragraph 3.4.7)

Training courses were not conducted as per planned schedule in training institutes. As a result large number of recruited staff remained untrained as of March, 2007.

(Paragraph 3.4.13.1)

Due to lack of basic training as per norms, 777 Recruit Constables remained without any stipulated work and the Department incurred an idle and unfruitful expenditure of Rs.4.97 crore towards pay and allowances of these personnel from April 2006 to March 2007.

(Paragraph 3.4.13.2)

Deployment of police personnel for security guards to VVIPs/VIPs was in excess of entitlement and for longer periods of time.

(Paragraph 3.4.15)

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**Promotion to various posts was not done as per prescribed norm/policy.**

**(Paragraph 3.4.17)**

**There was no system of submission of monthly/quarterly returns/reports regarding manpower management to Government.**


**(Paragraph 3.4.18)**

### ***3.4.1 Introduction***

Police Department is the biggest Government Department in the State with a staff strength of 20784 as of March 2007. It is responsible for maintaining law and order, security in the State including VIP security, control of crime, protection of life and property of the citizens and security on all the highways to ensure safe passage and movement of essential commodities and passengers. The State police is also engaged in checking and controlling drug trafficking, drug abuse and smuggling of other contraband items, illegal and unauthorised entry of outsiders to the State and checking Inner Line Permit defaulters.

### ***3.4.2 Organisational set-up***

The Department is headed by the Director General of Police (DGP) assisted by two Additional Directors General of Police (ADGP), Inspectors General of Police (IG) and Deputy Inspectors General of Police (DIG). There are 11 District Executive Force (DEF), 12 Armed Battalions and two Training Centres. An organogram of the Department is given below:



NAP: Nagaland Armed Police, NPTO: Nagaland Police Telecommunication Organisation, INT: Intelligence

The DEF is located in all the 11 districts of the State and is responsible for maintaining law and order in the respective districts. The 12 NAP Battalions are armed police field units located at various places in the districts and help the DEF in maintaining law and order of the districts as and when called for.

### 3.4.3 Scope of audit

Performance review of manpower management in the Department was carried out during April-July 2007 by a test check of the records relating to the period 2002-07. Out of 11 districts (three districts were formed in 2004-05), two districts i.e., Dimapur and Mokokchung in addition to capital district Kohima, were selected for field audit. Records of Police Headquarters, training centres and office of IGP (Intelligence) and DIG (Wireless) were also test checked.

### 3.4.4 Audit objectives

The objectives of the performance review were as follows:

- Examine whether norms/guidelines prescribed for assessment of requirement and recruitment of manpower were followed;
- Assess whether training programmes were planned and conducted based on the training requirements of police force;
- See that the manpower was deployed judiciously, keeping in view the prevalent law and order situation;



- See whether the system of performance appraisal for promotions, transfer etc., was effective and complied with the existing rules and regulations; and
- Evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring mechanism.

### 3.4.5 Audit criteria

Audit findings were benchmarked against the following criteria:

- Nagaland Armed Police (NAP) Act.
- Norms/policy framed by the State Government for recruitment and training of police personnel.

### 3.4.6 Audit methodology

An entry conference was held on 14 June 2007 with the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Administration) Headquarters, wherein the audit objectives, criteria and scope of audit were explained and the procedures followed for recruitment, promotions, deployment of manpower and performance appraisal system were discussed. The audit findings were discussed with the Department in an exit conference on 7 November 2007 and the replies of the Department have been incorporated in the review at appropriate places.

### 3.4.7 Financial arrangements

Budget allocation and expenditure incurred by the Department on manpower during the period 2002-07 are detailed below:

**Table-3.4.1**

*(Rupees in crore)*

Year	Budget allocation	Total expenditure	Expenditure on manpower	Percentage of expenditure on manpower	Percentage of other expenditure
2002-03	228.17	228.37	162.74	71	29
2003-04	267.00	259.33	165.67	64	36
2004-05	254.14	247.78	187.64	76	24
2005-06	297.81	286.61	218.48	76	24
2006-07	317.94	315.54	237.64	75	25

*Source: Appropriation Accounts*

From the above, it may be seen that the major expenditure of the Department was on salary and accounted for 64 to 76 *per cent* of the total expenditure during the period under review. The expenditure on other police related activities ranged between 24 to 36 *per cent*.

### Audit findings

The major findings of audit are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

### 3.4.8 Assessment of requirement

The Department did not furnish the guidelines/norms prescribed for assessment of requirement of manpower despite several requisitions from the audit team (April, May and June 2007) and there was no evidence on record of any comprehensive exercise having been conducted by the Department to assess its manpower requirement based on population, for carrying out its assigned functions. Table below shows the sanctioned strength and men in position of the uniformed personnel of various groups of the Department.

**Table-3.4.2**

Group <sup>34</sup>	2002-03		2003-04		2004-05		2005-06		2006-07	
	Sanctioned strength	Men in position	Sanctioned strength	Men in position	Sanctioned strength	Men in position	Sanctioned strength	Men in position	Sanctioned strength	Men in position
A	215	189	216	186	234	176	242	199	245	220
B	184	144	184	124	191	128	191	140	198	148
C	4200	4097	4200	4078	4200	3996	4392	4185	4556	4332
D	14069	14561 *(4%)	14069	14558 *(3%)	14069	14549 *(3%)	14877	15324 *(3%)	15649	16084 *(3%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>18668</b>	<b>18991</b>	<b>18669</b>	<b>18946</b>	<b>18694</b>	<b>18849</b>	<b>19702</b>	<b>19848</b>	<b>20648</b>	<b>20784</b>

Source: Departmental figure \* overstuffed

The above table reveals huge inter-year variations between the sanctioned strength and men-in-position in all the cadres. While the number of men-in-position in Group A, B and C cadres declined during 2002-05 (except Group B in 2004-05) and improved thereafter, the shortage of staff in these three cadres ranged from 3.67 *per cent* to 7.03 *per cent* during the period under review. The Group D cadre on the other hand was overstuffed by three to four *per cent* during the corresponding period.

The Department could not furnish any reasons for the fluctuation in the number of sanctioned staff and men-in-position over the years. Despite repeated requests, it could also not furnish any documentary evidence relating to creation of posts year after year in various cadres. Apart from being indicative of adhocism in the functioning of the Department, recruitment of staff in excess of approved strength is irregular.

### 3.4.9 Recruitment

Recruitment policy as laid down in 1999 for the Department is detailed below:

- Fifty *per cent* of vacancies in the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police/ Assistant Commandants are to be filled up through Departmental promotions and the remaining fifty *per cent* by direct recruitment through Nagaland Public Service Commission.

<sup>34</sup> Group A: DGP, ADGP, IGP, DIGP, AIG/SP, Addl. SP, Dy .SP, Commandant, Dy. Commandant ant Asst. Commandant.

Group B: Un-armed Branch Inspector and Armed Branch Inspector.

Group C: Armed Branch Sub-Inspector/Un-armed Branch Sub-Inspector, Havildar, Thana Havildar Constable and Naik.

Group D: Lance Naik, Constable and Non-Combatant Employees.

- Out of total vacancies in the rank of Unarmed Branch Sub Inspectors (UBSI) and Armed Branch Sub Inspectors (ABSI), fifty *per cent* of the vacancies are to be filled by direct recruitment through selection tests and fifty *per cent* by promotion through Central Promotion Test (CPT) from the rank of Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) and Havildar (HAV)/Thana Havildar (THC)s/Head Constable (HC) subject to vacancies.
- Similarly, in the rank of ASI, 50 *per cent* of the vacancies are to be filled by direct recruitment from matriculate passed candidates through selection tests and the remaining fifty *per cent* from the rank of constable to Havildar/Head Constables subject to vacancy.
- All constables are to be recruited directly based on educational qualifications laid down i.e. class-VIII pass for advanced tribes and class-VI pass for backward tribes, through written and physical tests. All the posts are reserved for Nagas only.

The Department had not complied with the recruitment procedures laid down by the Government in a number of cases as brought out in the following paragraphs.

**Table-3.4.3**

Year	Rank					
	UBSI/ABSI		ASI		Excess recruitment	
	Vacancies	Recruitment	Vacancies	Recruitment	UBSI/ABSI	ASI
2002-03	+12	2	32	19	14	--
2003-04	+5	6	33	42	11	9
2004-05	2	28	105	1	26	--
2005-06	12	44	68	--	32	--
2006-07	16	13	18	--	--	--

Sources: Departmental figure

From the above table it may be seen that during 2002-03 and 2003-04, there were 17 excess ABSI/UBSI, however, the Department recruited 8 more ABSI/UBSI during the above periods. Again, during 2004-05 and 2005-06, against the vacancy of 2 and 12 posts in this cadre, the Department recruited 28 and 44 personnel respectively. On the other hand, excess recruitment of nine personnel was done for the post of ASI during 2003-04. The Department incurred extra expenditure towards pay and allowances of these staff during the above period.

#### **3.4.9.1 Irregular recruitment of ABSI**

The DGP constituted (January 2005 and April 2006) a Recruitment Board to fill up the vacant posts of ABSIs. Audit scrutiny revealed that the Board, after due process of recruitment, recommended appointment of 22 candidates in 2004-05 and 13 candidates in 2006-07. The Department, however, appointed 6 in 2004-05 and 44 in 2005-06 resulting in excess as against that recommended by the Board.

#### **3.4.9.2 Excess recruitment**

As per rule 7 of Recruitment Rules, 2005 the Appointing Authority should ensure wide publicity for fresh recruitment through local newspapers and radio.

During the period September 1998 to April 2006 some unit Commanders of Battalions and SPs of DEF recruited constables for their units randomly without assessing the requirement or notifying the vacancy position through local newspapers/radio as prescribed under rules. The unit wise excess appointments, as per the DGP's records are shown below:

**Table-3.4.4**

Name of the unit	No of excess appointments	Period of appointment
IGP (INT)	48	12/03 to 9/05
7 NAP Bn Comdt	33	11/02 to 2/05
SP Kiphire	169	from 4/05 onwards
SP Zunhebboto	23	from 8/04 to 11/05
	14	from 4/05 onwards
SP Phek	31	from 5/03 to 9/ 05
Commandant 1 <sup>st</sup> NAP Bn	21	from 9/98 to 4/03
S P Peren	55	from 04/03 to 04/06

*Source: Departmental figure*

This resulted in irregular expenditure of Rs.4.36 crore (average emoluments) towards pay and allowances of these staff during the period. The DGP proposed (May 2006) initiation of disciplinary action against the officers involved in excess recruitment. The case was, however, yet to be finalised (November 2007).

The DGP deputed (February 2006) senior Departmental officers to visit all the battalions and SP offices to report on the excess appointments made by the respective unit Commanders. During the process, excess appointment of 105 constables was detected in various battalions. The Department did not furnish the dates of their recruitment or the details of excess pay and allowances on account of these constables despite repeated requests from Audit.

### **3.4.9.3 Unauthorised appointment**

With a view to regularising the excess irregular appointments made earlier in the Department and to prevent further erosion of credibility, the DGP withdrew (April 2006) the appointment authority of all SPs and Commandants with immediate effect.

Test check of records of units in the selected districts revealed that the Commandants and SPs continued to recruit constables and Non-combatant employees (NCE) despite the ban, as shown in the table below:

**Table No. 3.4.5**

Name of the Unit	No. of personnel recruited	Period of recruitment
S P Dimapur	Constables -2 & NCE- 2	04/06 to 03/07
1 <sup>st</sup> NAP Bn.	Constables -15	02/07 to 03/07
Police Training School	Constables -7	04/06 to 03/07
Police Central Workshop	Constable -1 & NCE-1	12/06 to 03/07 02/07 to 03/07

*Source: Departmental figure*

Despite clear violation of the instructions, no action was initiated against the concerned Commandants and SPs nor was the irregular appointment annulled (March 2007).

### 3.4.9.4 Irregular recruitment of constables

It was observed that during 2006, 885 persons were recruited as constables in different units of the Department and sent (May 2007) for basic training to Nagaland Police Training Centre (NAPTC).

A central screening test carried out by a Board to scrutinise whether the constables were recruited as per norms, revealed that, out of 885 recruits, while 31 were absent, 70 were under height, 11 did not have the requisite educational qualification and 27 were medically unfit. All these 139 RCs including the 31 absent RCs were sent back to their respective units with a direction to discharge them from service. But the service of only 32 RCs have been terminated during March and August 2007.

Had the unit Commanders recruited RCs as per norms of recruitment prescribed by the Department, the recruitment of 108 RCs could have been avoided. The lapses at the initial stage resulted in excess expenditure of Rs.69 lakh <sup>35</sup> towards the pay and allowances of these personnel from April 2006 to March 2007.

### 3.4.10 Inspector vs Constable Ratio

Based on the information furnished (June 2007) by the Department, the Inspector vs Constable ratio of the Department was worked out in audit as follows:

Table-3.4.6

Year	Inspectors		Constables		Ratio	
	Sanctioned strength	Men-in position (NAP & DEF)	Sanctioned strength	Men-in position (NAP & DEF)	Sanctioned strength	Men-in position
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2002-03	184	144	12,319	12,736	1:67	1:88
2003-04	184	124	12,319	12,733	1:67	1:103
2004-05	191	128	12,319	12,724	1:64	1:99
2005-06	191	140	13,057	13,430	1:68	1:96
2006-07	198	148	13,759	14,120	1:69	1:95

As per “Data on Police Organisation in India” published (June 2006) by the Bureau of Police Research and Development, Union Ministry of Home Affairs, the National average ratio of Inspectors to Constables is 1:47.

Against the ratio of sanctioned strength of Inspectors to Constables ranging from 1:64 to 1:69 during 2002-07, the Department maintained men-in-position ratio between 1:88 and 1:103 during the above period. This indicated that there was no review of cadre strength or improving the promotional prospects of constables for effective control and utilisation of the Police force at the line level. Reasons for this high ratio of Inspectors to Constables were not available on record.

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(Rupees in lakh)			
Period	No. of RCs	Average emolument per month	Total emolument
4/06 to 3/07	108	5335x12 (m)	69

### 3.4.10.1 Officers vs men ratio

The Committee on Police Reforms, 2000 (Padmanabhaiah Committee) had recommended reduction in recruitment of constabulary and enhancement of Officers in Police Department. The Committee suggested that the ratio of Officers to men should be improved to 1:4. The Department did not take any action to comply with this recommendation. The position in this regard for the last five years is shown below:

**Table-3.4.7**

Year	Officers**		Men#		Ratio	
	Sanctioned strength	Men-in-position (NAP & DEF)	Sanctioned strength	Men-in-position (NAP & DEF)	Sanctioned strength	Men-in-position
2002-03	1450	1363	16196	16530	1:11	1:12
2003-04	1451	1333	16196	16516	1:11	1:12
2004-05	1476	1248	16196	16504	1:11	1:13
2005-06	1508	1334	17102	17348	1:11	1:13
2006-07	1540	1431	17946	18117	1:12	1:13

Source: Departmental figure

Note: \*\*Officers comprise ASI and above rank. Men comprise Constables and Head Constables

# Total number of Officers and Men in position as shown in Table: 3.4.7 differs with that in Table: 3.4.2 due to non-inclusion of Non-combatant employees.

Against the ratio of sanctioned strength of Officers to men ranging from 1:11 to 1:12 during 2002-07, the Department maintained men-in-position ratio varied between 1:12 and 1:13 during the above period which indicated that the Department failed to rationalise the ratio in regard to sanctioned strength and men-in-position as recommended by the Padmanabhaiah Committee. In spite of having constabulary in excess of the norms, the Department recruited 435 more Constables during the period 2002-07.

### 3.4.11 Appointment of Women Police

Due to increase in incidents of crime against women and children and greater involvement of females in criminal activities, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) stressed the need to review the strength of Women Police (WP). The National Police Commission (NPC) recommended (November 1980) opening of Women Cell in every police station and increasing the strength of WP in the Police stations. The NPC further recommended that ten *per cent* of the force should be women.

The percentage of WP in Nagaland Police (March 2007) is negligible as may be seen from the details given below:



**Table-3.4.8**

Rank	No of personnel in DEF	Women Police		Percentage of Women Police to overall Police force
		Sanctioned strength	In position	
Inspector	82	4	4	5
UBSI	304	13	14	5
ABSI	94	-	-	-
ASI	423	27	28	7
Havildar/THC	1373	-	1	0.07
Naik	340	-	-	-
L/Naik/Constable	5633	47	194	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>8249</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>241</b>	

Source: Departmental figure

The above table reveals that the sanctioned strength of WP is just about one *per cent* of the total number of personnel in the Department. However, as with the recruitment of staff in various cadres, the actual WP in position is over twice their sanctioned strength. The Department had not given any reasons for either the insignificant number of WP or the excess of WP on rolls over the sanctioned strength.

It was learnt that the DGP had requested (July 2006) the Government to accord sanction for 545 posts of WP under various categories in view of the recommendation of the NPC to deal with the increased multifarious criminal activities and crimes against women in the State, but there was no further development in this regard (November 2007).

### **3.4.12 Adhoc/Contract appointments**

The State Department of Personnel & Administrative reforms imposed (April 1993) ban on appointment of ad-hoc/casual/temporary and work charged employees. It was reiterated in February 2001 that no appointment on ad-hoc/temporary/work charged basis shall be made under any circumstances in any Department at any level.

However, the Department appointed 244 Grade IV staff (Constables and non combatant employees) on ad-hoc/contract/temporary basis, out of which, 196 were employed after April 1993 and all the employees rendered service in the Department for periods ranging from 1 to 14 years as of March 2007. The Department was extending their service from year to year in view of their good performance and utility. The unit wise number of these staff is shown in the table below:

**Table-3.4.9**

Unit	No. of staff			Total
	Contract	Ad hoc	Temporary	
DEF Kohima	10	17	2	29
DEF Dimapur	7	-	-	7
DEF Wokha	1	4	-	5
DEF Phek	2	5	-	7
DEF Peren			3	3
DEF Zunheboto	4	-	-	4
DEF Tuensang	2	-	-	2
DEF Mon	-	-	1	1
DEF Kiphire	-	1	-	1
PHQ	9	-	-	9
2 <sup>nd</sup> NAP Bn	1	4	-	5
4 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	5	2	4	11
5 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	4	-	-	4
6 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	-	19	-	19
7 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	13	14	-	27
8 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	-	2	-	2
9 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	-	1	-	1
11 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	36	12	-	48
NAPTC	5	-	-	5
OC PCS	-	-	3	3
PTS	5	-	-	5
IGP INT	-	46	-	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>244</b>

Source: Departmental figure

The Cabinet decided (April 2002) on the following course of action:

- Services of those contract employees who have put in more than 10 years of service be regularised. Overage may be condoned in whichever case it is applicable.
- Services of those contract employees who have put in 5 to 10 years of service be regularised after holding a suitability test subject to scrutiny of Government.
- Service of those contract employees who have put in 2 to 5 years of service be regularised after giving them opportunity to take part in the normal recruitment test subject to scrutiny of the Government.

The Department did not regularise the services of ad hoc/contract employees as of March 2007 despite the Cabinet decision though 198 of them were eligible for regularisation.

### **3.4.13 Training**

#### **3.4.13.1 Training Plan and Implementation of training programme**

The Department has two training institutes viz., (i) Nagaland Armed Police Training Centre (NAPTC) and (ii) Nagaland Police Training School (NPTS) for imparting training to different categories of police personnel.

Scrutiny of annual training plan and training programmes conducted revealed that courses were not conducted as per the annual training plan. The variation in training courses planned and conducted during the period 2002 to 2006 are shown in the table below:

**Table-3.4.10**

Year	No. of training courses planned during the year		No. of training courses conducted as per planned schedule		No. of unplanned courses conducted		Total training courses conducted	
	NAPTC	PTS	NAPTC	PTS	NAPTC	PTS	NAPTC	PTS
2002	NA	1	NA	1	NA	1	NA	2
2003	12	7	1	3	5	1	6	4
2004	17	6	1	2	3	6	4	8
2005	16	6	1	1	6	3	7	4
2006	12	7	11	2	3	2	14	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>22</b>

*Source: Departmental figures*

From the table above it will be seen that during the years 2002-06, as against 57 and 27 training courses planned for by the Commandant, NAPTC and Principal, PTS, only 14 and 9 courses were conducted respectively during the period. Also, as against 23 (NAPTC: 14, PTS: 9) courses conducted as per planned schedule, 30 unscheduled courses were conducted (NAPTC: 17, PTS:13).

Further, it was noticed that during the calendar years 2002-06, the Department recruited and promoted 171 and 245 persons to the post of ABSI/UBSI and ASI respectively, but qualifying training course for ABSI/UBSI and basic training for ASI which was mandatory and planned for every year was imparted only to 80 and 101 ABSI/UBSI and ASI respectively. Thus, 91 ABSI/UBSI and 144 ASI remained untrained till date. The reason for shortfall in training was neither on record nor stated to audit. Thus, the purpose of planning and preparing the training schedule proved futile.

#### **3.4.13.2 Basic training of Recruit Constables (RCs)**

As per the orders of PHQ issued from time to time, the recruitment of constables, both DEF and NAP personnel of the Department was to be done once in a year during the month of October/November so that the new recruits could be deputed to training institutes for training to be started from February of the following year.

Audit scrutiny revealed that during the year 2006, 885 constables were recruited in different units of the Department (unit wise date of recruitment was not made available to audit) and sent (May 2007) for basic training to NAPTC. The Department claimed (May 2007) that recruitment was made in 2006 but test check of records of selected units revealed that actual recruitment of constables was made in earlier years *i.e.*, 2004 and 2005. It may be mentioned that during the calendar year 2005 and 2006, no basic training for RCs was conducted in the training institutes.

As mentioned in paragraph 3.4.9.4, during screening (May 2007), the Board rejected 108 RCs due to irregular recruitment and 746 were finally enrolled for training (31 were absent). Therefore, all 777 (746+31) RCs remained untrained in the respective units without any stipulated work since their recruitment due to lack of basic training as per norms. The Department incurred an idle and unfruitful expenditure of Rs.4.97

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crore<sup>36</sup> towards pay and allowances of these personnel from April 2006 to March 2007.

#### **3.4.14 Deployment of manpower**

Deployment of personnel is handled by the DEF for prevention and detection of crime, maintenance of law and order, VIP security, static guards to various State and Central Government establishments located in the State with the support of NAP personnel deployed as an armed reserve force of the DEFs and also in areas not covered by Police Station staff of the DEFs.

The total manpower of State Police as of March 2007 was 20784. This number does not include various battalions of the Central Police Forces of the Assam Rifles and CRPF which are stationed throughout the State for maintenance of law and order.

The population of the State, area and deployment of police personnel as of March 2007 are indicated below:

**Table-3.4.11**

Area (sq.km)	Population (2001 census)	Total No. of police personnel posted in the State	No. of policemen per sq. km in the State	No. of policemen per 100 population
16,579	19,90,036	20,784	1.25	1.04

*Source: Statistical Hand Book of Nagaland*

Test check of records of units in three selected districts revealed that the deployment of police personnel in urban and rural areas was not based on population. The details of population in urban and rural areas and police personnel deployed are shown in the table below:

**Table-3.4.12**

District	Population		Percentage of population		Policemen posted		Percentage of posting	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Kohima	78,584	2,35,782	25	75	2726	114	96	4
Dimapur	1,23,892	1,84,490	40	60	1,021	911	53	47
Mokokchung	31,204	1,96,026	14	86	1,437	417	77	23

*Source: Statistical Hand Book and Departmental figure*

From the table above, it will be seen that 60 to 86 *per cent* population live in rural areas and 14 to 40 *per cent* in urban areas. On the contrary, the percentage of police personnel deployed in rural areas was only 4 to 47 *per cent* and in urban areas, it was 53 to 96 *per cent*. Thus, deployment of police personnel in rural areas was significantly low in comparison to the urban areas. Due to improper deployment, the people of the rural areas remained out of security coverage.

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<sup>36</sup> @Rs.5335 per month on average x 777 x 12 months = Rs.4,97,43,540.

### 3.4.15 Security coverage to VVIPs

Scrutiny of deployment of police personnel showed that armed police personnel from different NAPs and DEFs have been deployed for providing security cover to VVIPs, politicians and other high ranking Government officials. During the period covered in review, a large number of policemen of various grades were deployed in providing security cover to persons identified with threat perception in the Z+, Z special, Z, Y and X categories. The details of police personnel deployed for security cover to VVIPs are shown in table below:

**Table-3.4.13**

Year	No. of VVIPs					Entitlement					Security deployed					Excess deployment					Total excess deployment
	Z spl	Z+	Z	Y	X	Z spl	Z+	Z	Y	X	Z spl	Z+	Z	Y	X	Z spl	Z+	Z	Y	X	
2002-03	1	1	5	14	25	--	--	8	6	3	--	--	66	91	89	-	-	26	7	14	47
2003-04	--	3	4	50	42	-	-	8	6	3	--	--	50	320	130	-	-	18	20	4	42
2004-05	--	3	7	28	46	-	-	8	6	3	--	--	75	180	140	-	-	19	12	02	33
2005-06	--	3	7	28	46	-	-	8	6	3	--	--	80	180	150	-	-	24	12	12	48
2006-07	--	3	7	28	46	--	--	8	6	3	--	--	75	185	155	-	-	19	17	17	53

Source: Departmental figure

The above table shows that during the last five years, there were 33 to 53 security personnel deployed with VVIPs in excess of the latter's entitlement. The Government's order for class wise entitlement of security guards was neither on record nor produced to audit. The Department has not reviewed the threat perception of various VVIPs/VIPs at periodical intervals to ascertain the need to deploy security guards for VVIP/VIP security for long periods of time.

### 3.4.16 Deployment of Static Guards

Instructions (March 1971) of the State Government as reiterated (March 1995) by the DGP, stipulate that the cost of providing police guards is to be recovered at the rate of fifty *per cent* of the pay and allowances of the guards deployed at banks/offices. The DGP also directed (May 1995) all unit commanders to ensure that all payments due are to be realised on time and credited to Government account.

Test check of records of the units in selected districts revealed that all the units deployed police personnel as static guards in other organisations but the cost of their deployment amounting to Rs.14.04 crore (including opening balance of Rs.2.15 crore) for the period 2002-07 was not realised as of March 2007. Details are shown in the table below:

**Table-3.4.14**

Name of the unit	Place of deployment	Amount outstanding (in lakh)
4 <sup>th</sup> NAP Bn	State Bank of India	19
S P Kohima	Central Bank, Co-operative Bank, Rural Bank and Vijaya Bank	93
S P Dimapur	Co-operative Urban Bank, Rural Bank, LIC and GRP	932
1 <sup>st</sup> NAP Bn	State Bank of India and Co-operative Bank	110
S P Mokokchung	State Bank of India and Co-operative Bank	204
2 <sup>nd</sup> NAP Bn	State Bank of India, Allahabad Bank and Bank of Baroda	46
<b>Total</b>		<b>1404</b>

Source: Departmental figure

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There was no record to show that the Department took any initiative to realise the long outstanding amount.

#### **3.4.17 Performance appraisal**

As per norm prescribed by the Department, 50 *per cent* of the vacant posts of different categories of staff are to be filled up through a Central Promotion Test (CPT) conducted departmentally and also as per recommendation of the Selection Board. As per Police Manual, the following norms/guidelines are required to be followed by the Department for promotion of police personnel to different ranks.

- A constable recruit should not be allowed to sit for the Departmental examination for promotion to ASI until he has put in at least one year as a constable after the completion of training. The SPs will send their recommendation to the DGP for promotion, who will make the final selection.
- A constable should not be promoted to the post of Head Constable unless he possesses a certificate of competency in drill.
- An ASI must ordinarily have served with credit for full 3 years in the Department and sufficiently well educated to make him eligible for promotion.
- Promotion to Sub Inspector will ordinarily be made by selection from amongst the confirmed Havildars and Head Constables subject to their passing of the prescribed cadre course(s). Proficiency in drill, including riot drill, a good knowledge of weapons etc. are required.
- Promotion to the rank of Inspectors will be made by the DGP from the list to be prepared by a State Selection Board constituted by him from time to time for the purpose.

It was seen that the Department maintained seniority list which was not updated regularly. In case of ABSI, UBSI, ASI and Havildar, seniority lists were prepared up to 2002, 1999, 1989 and 1998 respectively, without recording full information regarding training and other performance parameters against the individual. It was also seen that during the period from 2002-07, promotions were made to various categories of staff based on the recommendations of CPT Board but it was not clear whether the relevant norms/guidelines to be followed as per the provisions of Police Manual for promotion were followed, since the relevant records were not produced to audit. Moreover, promotions were made without observing the vacancy position in the promotional posts and the promotional criteria of 50 *per cent*. The details of vacancies and promotions made to certain categories of posts during the last five years are shown in the table below:



Table-3.4.15

Year	Rank							
	UBSI/ABSI		ASI		Excess promotion			
	Vacancies	Promotions	Vacancies	Promotions	UBSI/ABSI		ASI	
					No. of promotions as per 50% vacancies	Promotion in excess of 50% vacancies	No. of promotions as per 50% vacancies	Promotion in excess of 50% vacancies
2002-03	(+) 12	-	32	62	--	--	16	46
2003-04	(+) 5	30	33	32	--	30	17	15
2004-05	2	15	105	33	1	14	53	--
2005-06	12	46	68	56	6	40	34	22
2006-07	16	52	18	76	8	44	9	67
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>150</b>

Source: Departmental figure

From the table above it will be seen that the Department had neither followed the promotion criteria nor assessed the vacancy position of posts resulting in excess promotion to the particular cadre.

Also, during the period 2002-07, the Department stated to have promoted 124 personnel from Naik and constable to the rank of Havildar. But cross check of CPT recommendations and promotion orders issued in respect of Constable and Naik cadre revealed that the Department actually promoted 377 personnel from Naik and Constable to Havildar posts. Thus, there was a discrepancy in promotion of 253 Naik and Constables to the rank of Havildar during these five years which could not be explained to audit.

The DGP constituted (November 2002) a Board consisting of Chairman and seven other members to conduct CPT for promotion of Naik to Havildar at Nagaland Armed Police Training Centre. Accordingly, the Board conducted CPT and selected 151 candidates on merit-cum-seniority basis for promotion to the rank of Havildar. The Board recommended (January 2003) that promotion of Naik from Serial No. 1 to 56 of the seniority-cum-merit lists can be effected against the vacancy of 56 Havildar posts. The Board further recommended that those Naiks who secured 50 *per cent* total marks from Serial No. 57 to 151 may be kept in the waiting list for a period of two years.

It was seen in audit that against the Board's recommendation for promotion of 56 Naiks to the rank of Havildar, the Department within a short spell of one year exhausted the entire list of 151 candidates by giving them promotion to the post of Havildar. Thus, promotion of 95 Naiks to the rank of Havildar was against the recommendation of the Board and without observing the existing vacancies.

### 3.4.18 Monitoring and evaluation

There was no prescribed procedure for monitoring the activities of the Department. Monthly/quarterly reports/returns regarding manpower management by the PHQ were not being submitted to the Government. Unit Commanders are authorised to appoint Constables and NCE staff subject to vacancies but due to lack of monitoring, many Unit Commanders appointed such personnel irregularly without the knowledge of/intimation to higher authorities. The gradation/seniority list of various categories of staff was not updated.

### **3.4.19 Conclusion**

The Department had not carried out any analysis to assess its manpower requirement for carrying out its functions. Recruitment of different categories of staff was made in an adhoc manner without regard to the actual requirement/vacancies and without observing the norms/instructions laid down by the Government/Department for the purpose. The Department also failed to initiate action against erring officials. Training needs were not analysed and planned training schedules were not adhered to. It neither maintained a comprehensive database of its manpower to facilitate its effective management nor monitored the deployment vis-à-vis requirement.

### **3.4.20 Recommendations**

The following recommendations are made:

- Requirement of staff at various levels should be assessed at regular intervals and recruitment should be with reference to the requirement and policy/guidelines of the Government.
- Training to different categories of staff should be imparted as per plan based on norms.
- Deployment of staff should be need based and security coverage and deployment of security guards to VVIP/VIP should be based on identified threat perception and entitlement.
- A comprehensive database of staff should be created and maintained upto date to ensure that staff are not recruited or promoted in violation of policy/norms.
- Stringent action should be initiated against officials who violate Government orders/policy/instructions.

The matter was reported to the Government/Department in August 2007; reply had not been received (November 2007).